Search

[No abstract]

Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory.

Most social science fields find prediction, even in the post-diction sense, to be very difficult. Predictive accuracy is generally low. Thus one would expect great enthusiasm once a field is able to move up to 80-90 percent correct prediction. This level has now been achieved in the legislative roll call analysis area. That would seem to suggest an important theoretical breakthrough has occurred in the area--until it becomes apparent that this same level of predictive success has been achieved by several different and competing theories. How does one go about choosing between theories in such situations? Are statistical criteria irrelevant at this juncture? How is this uniformly high success to be explained?

Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory.

This paper examines how rational voters might choose between candidates under conditions of uncertainty. We shall emphasize two rational voting approaches--"defensive voting" and "credulous voting "--which have previously escaped notice. Additionally, we shall map out some of the implications of electoral uncertainty for empirical tests of the rational model and for the development of spatial theory. We shall not attempt to prove how citizens decide to vote, but we shall expand considerably the conventional interpretation of rational voting.

By what means does one determine a rule to use in determining a rule for the making of social decisions? This rather perplexing problem appropriately has the flavor of an infinite regress. Yet, several scholars have attempted to phrase the question in a manner which circumvents the problem. The essay here is a discussion of the broad settings in which the problem has been posed. An examination of the question calls for the context of the question. Three separate contexts suggest themselves. The first context arises with the "justification" of "social actions" or "decisions." The second arises when one seeks advice on what type of rule he "should" support. The third involves a theory about the type of rules that are "likely" to be "agreed" upon by a group of people.