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This article uses FAS 123R regulation to examine how reduction in CEO compensation incentives affects managerial "playing it safe" behavior. Using proxies reflecting deliberate managerial efforts to change firm risk, difference-in-difference tests show that affected firms drastically reduce both systematic and idiosyncratic risks, leading to an 8% decline in total firm risk. These reductions in risk are achieved by shifting to safer, but low-Q, segments while closing the riskier ones, without significant changes in investment levels. Our findings suggest that decrease in risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation, when not compensated for by alternative incentives or governance mechanisms, exacerbates risk-related agency problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We document that firms that expect their CEOs' compensation to exceed the median CEO compensation of their Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) peers influence ISS to revise these peer sets. Controlling for changes in firm characteristics that ISS uses to select peers, we find that ISS applies an abnormally high turnover rate in the members of these peer sets and increases the representation of focal firms' chosen peers. This turnover results in increases in the medians of the ISS peers' CEO compensation and size. We find that these firms underperform and conclude that they attempt to camouflage high CEO pay to mitigate outrage costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: This study investigates whether the underrepresentation of women in executive-level roles within the supply chain management (SCM) field is justified or the result of gender injustices. The analysis examines if there is a gender compensation gap within executive-level SCM roles and whether performance differences or other observable factors explain disparities. Design/methodology/approach: Publicly reported executive compensation and financial data are merged to empirically test if gender differences exist and investigate whether the underrepresentation of women in executive-level SCM roles is unjust. Findings: Women occupy only 6.29% of the positions in the sample of 447 SCM executives. Unlike prior studies, we find that women executives receive higher compensation. The analysis does not identify observable factors explaining the limited inclusion of women in top-level roles, suggesting that gender injustices are prevalent in SCM. Research limitations/implications: This study only considers observable factors and cannot conclusively determine if discrimination is occurring. The low level of inclusion of women in executive roles suggests that gender injustice is intrinsic within the SCM profession. These findings will hopefully motivate firms to undertake transformative actions that result in outcomes that advance gender equity, ultimately leading to social justice for female SCM executives. Originality/value: The use of social justice and feminist theories, a focus on SCM roles, and an empirical methodology utilizing objective measures represents a novel approach to investigating gender discrimination in SCM organizations, complementing prior survey-based studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the relation between CEO pay components and aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures using CEO pay components as proxies for managers' short- versus long-term focus. Specifically, we explore the extent to which short-term bonus plan payouts and long-term incentive plan payouts are associated with: (1) Managers' propensity to exclude expense items in excess of those excluded by equity analysts; and, (2) The magnitude of those incremental exclusions. We find that long-term incentive plan payouts are negatively associated with the likelihood and magnitude of aggressive non-GAAP exclusions. Our results are consistent with managers reporting non-GAAP information less aggressively when they are more focused on long-term, rather than short-term, value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Survey assessments have found limited evidence of benefits of executive attractiveness. We use an objective measure of facial attractiveness that is correlated with survey assessments but less noisy and identify several benefits from executive facial attractiveness previously found in the general population but heretofore empirically elusive among executives. We examine the effect of both measures on executive compensation, promotion to CEO and the corresponding shareholder reaction, and promotion to board chair. The objective measure identifies significantly positive labor market effects for executive attractiveness in all outcomes in contrast to survey assessments of attractiveness that do not correlate with any outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions across a broad range of areas in the empirical corporate finance literature. We assemble the necessary data and apply a single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd et al. to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems. We assess empirical performance across a wide spectrum of areas in corporate finance and indicate varying research opportunities for empiricists and theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we aim to investigate the relationship between CEO pay ratio and corporate financial performance in Polish public companies. Using a sample of 259 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, we demonstrate that links between the pay gap and accounting measures of performance differ from market ones. Our findings indicate a negative correlation between CEO pay ratio and return on sales. This implies that companies pay executives less during periods of high profitability, possibly to avoid the negative impact of excessive pay on firm performance. We also discover that the pay gap, measured by CEO pay ratio, is positively linked with Tobin’s Q and annual stock returns. A high CEO pay ratio signals strong incentives for top executives to perform, potentially leading to better strategic decisions and, consequently, higher Tobin’s Q ratios and annual stock returns.

Fundamental principles of agency theory and incentive mechanisms suggest that executive compensation should align with a company's developmental goals. This paper aims to explore whether the executive compensation of listed companies in the Chinese capital market aligns with their ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) practices, and the underlying mechanisms of this influence. For the first time, this study integrates ESG practices with executive compensation, creating a novel analytical framework and filling a gap in the existing literature. Employing empirical research methods such as the PSM-DID (Propensity Score Matching – Difference-in-differences) model, fixed effects model, heterogeneity analysis, and tests for mediating effects, the study concludes that ESG practices of Chinese listed companies significantly increase executive compensation, demonstrating consistency between the two. Additionally, the beneficial impact of ESG practices on executive compensation incentives is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises compared to non-state-owned ones. Financial performance, company reputation, and investor relations partially mediate the relationship between a company's ESG practices and executive compensation. Specifically, financial performance acts as a negative mediator, while company reputation and investor relations serve as positive mediators. Initially, participation in ESG practices tends to exacerbate 'income inequality' between executives and other employees. However, as companies continue to enhance their ESG practice levels, this 'income inequality' gradually diminishes. Finally, the paper offers several suggestions: Firstly, Chinese listed companies can attract and retain top executive talents by strengthening ESG practices. Although initial ESG practices may lead to pay imbalances, long-term involvement will help reduce this disparity. Secondly, investors can conduct a more comprehensive assessment of a company's future performance, governance structure, and corporate social responsibility by analyzing how ESG practices are reflected in executive compensation. Lastly, the paper provides valuable insights for policymakers, suggesting that regulators should develop more targeted policies and guidelines based on the relationship between a company's ESG practices and executive compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is already a wealth of literature on how the design of salary for technicians affects corporate innovation, but the influential mechanisms of executive incentives on corporate innovation have not received sufficient attention. As a source of motivation for executives to promote innovation, the design of pay gap plays an important role in improving firm's innovation performance. In this research, we attempt to examine the impact of the executive team's internal pay gap on corporate innovation using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021. The results are as follows. Firstly, pay gap among executives can significantly enhance a firm's innovation performance. Secondly, the executive pay gap promotes innovation through the stability of executive team members. Thirdly, executive compensation stickiness moderates pay gap and firm's innovation positively. This paper reveals the mechanism by which the executive pay gap affects corporate innovation and suggests that companies should formulate effective compensation incentive mechanisms to stimulate executives' enthusiasm for innovative projects, and strengthen executive support and promotion of corporate innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the risk taking properties associated with incentive plans that use relative performance evaluation, with a focus on the form of payout, whether in cash or shares. By analyzing determinants and consequences of payout form choice, I find that share-based plans offer risk-averse managers weaker incentives to pursue projects with idiosyncratic risk compared with cash plans. This occurs because share plans—unlike cash plans—expose managers to systematic performance trends, as payout values are linked to stock prices. Additionally, I document that the variation in risk taking incentives depends on expected relative performance and the strength of the incentives. Overall, this study's findings suggest that commonly used share-based relative performance plans might not always motivate managers to pursue innovative projects with high idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available. Data Availability: All data are available from the sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G30; J33; J41; M12; M41. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO's incentives generated from the grant's duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting. JEL Classifications: J33; M52. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I evaluate the effect of financial statement audits on the governance practices of nonprofit organizations. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits revenue-based exemption thresholds, I find that financial audits cause organizations to implement governance mechanisms, such as conflict of interest policies, whistleblower policies, and formal approval of the CEO's compensation by a committee. Consistent with these governance practices curtailing managers' private benefits, I document reductions in nepotism and CEO-to-employee pay ratio. The results are more pronounced for organizations (1) whose audit is overseen by an audit committee, (2) that already have an independent board, and (3) that face high charity-level demand for oversight. Collectively, these findings shed light on how financial audits shape the governance practices of small, less sophisticated organizations like nonprofits in ways that go beyond financial statements' direct use in decision-making and contracting. JEL Classifications: M42; G34; M48; L31. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Question/Issue: This study investigates the role of board‐level employee representatives (BLERs), a common corporate governance practice in Europe, in determining the pay ratio between CEOs and average employees. Research Findings/Insights: Using 15,340 firm‐year observations from 17 European countries between 2001 and 2019, we find that BLERs provide greater bargaining power to the board for dealing with CEOs and use this power to reduce the pay gap between CEOs and employees. Subsample analyses indicate that bargaining power is more apparent when BLERs are more socially connected, have longer tenure, and hold more seats on the board. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study supports the role of BLERs in providing workers with more bargaining power to create fairer wage distribution in firms. Furthermore, it supports the fair wage–effort theory, indicating a positive effect of lower pay ratios on firm value following the presence of BLERs. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study demonstrates the effects of a unique corporate governance practice, the presence of BLERs, on companies' wage distribution, with significant policy implications. In particular, the results indicate that when presented with opportunities in affecting companies decision‐making BLERs provide fairer environments for the workers who they represent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the influence of boardroom gender diversity (BGD) on the adoption of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics in executive compensation, a concept emerging from the stakeholderism debate. Prior research has focused on the impact of BGD on traditional compensation metrics, but the role of BGD in ESG‐linked compensation remains underexplored. Our research fills this gap by examining whether BGD contributes to the incorporation of ESG considerations in executive pay structures. Additionally, we analyze how board members' external affiliations might moderate this relationship, considering that these affiliations can provide diverse perspectives and insights into ESG issues. Using data from 14 countries, our findings reveal a positive and significant association between BGD and ESG metrics in executive compensation, suggesting that women directors significantly influence the integration of sustainability and ethical considerations in corporate strategic planning. Moreover, the impact of BGD on ESG‐linked compensation is found to be more pronounced with higher levels of board members' affiliations. Our results are robust to alternate estimation techniques such as propensity score matching (PSM) and generalized methods of moments (GMM). Our study contributes to the existing literature on gender diversity, corporate governance, and sustainability, offering insights for policymakers and corporate boards on aligning corporate strategies with ESG goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research shows that luck increases CEOs' pay at their current firm. In this work, we explore how luck affects: (1) CEOs' employment opportunities and (2) the performance of firms that hire lucky CEOs. Our results indicate that luck increases the likelihood to get a CEO job at new companies. Conditional on moving, lucky CEOs obtain a higher pay (both in absolute terms and relative to new industry peers) mostly due to higher incentive pay. Moreover, lucky CEOs tend to be hired by firms operating in less competitive industries. Despite the higher compensation they receive, the appointment of lucky CEOs is associated with a substantial decline in firm performance. (JEL : G34, D86, J33, M12) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between REIT CEO compensation, firm stock performance and risk, after FASB accounting changes and additional SEC compensation disclosure requirements in 2006, are examined. Total compensation becomes more weighted to bonus payments and stock grants and away from options and salary. The majority of REIT CEO compensation comes from bonus payments and stock grants. REIT CEO compensation is found to be positively correlated with lagged firm stock performance, but not lagged firm risk measures. A new metric related to the REIT dividend requirement, dividends paid to CEOs from share ownership, is positively related to CEO total compensation, and the positive relation is driven by a strong association between cash dividends to CEOs and their equity-based compensation. These findings suggest that REIT CEOs trade-off certainty in cash compensation for equity-based wealth and related cash flows. Most important, our results suggest that REIT CEOs are paid for performance and are less likely to earn windfalls that have been associated with the use of options and mis-priced firm risk in non-REIT firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry. Design/methodology/approach: In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity. Findings: We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect. Research limitations/implications: Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation. Practical implications: When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations. Originality/value: This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore how insider trading returns, disparities in executive pay, and CEO turnover are interrelated. Our findings reveal both independent and interactive effects for insider trading returns, the CEO pay gap, and the likelihood of CEO turnover. First, an increase in abnormal returns from insider purchases lowers the probability of a CEO's turnover, while an increase in abnormal returns from insider sales increases the likelihood of a CEO's dismissal. Second, the CEO pay gap negatively affects the probability of CEO turnover for insider purchases, but it does not have a similar effect on insider sales. Third, the interaction between insider abnormal returns and any CEO pay disparity influences the impact of these returns on CEO turnover. Specifically, this interaction diminishes the positive effect of insider selling on the probability of a CEO's dismissal, offsets the negative effect of insider purchasing on CEO dismissal, and, finally, amplifies the negative impact of CEO pay disparity on the probability of a CEO's dismissal during periods witnessing insider purchases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executive compensation contracts may influence financial reporting quality, and the CFO plays a key role in preparing the financial statements. This study examines whether the structure and components of CFO compensation are associated with audit risk as measured by audit fees for a sample of S&P 1500 companies during the period 2012–2022. We find that the percentage of total compensation composed of either stock or options is significant and positively related to audit fees, while non-equity incentive plan compensation is significant and negatively related to audit fees. We also find that the dollar amount of equity compensation is significant and positively related to audit fees, while the dollar amount of non-equity compensation is not related to audit fees. These results suggest that CFO compensation structure is an important factor in the assessment of audit risk, which is important for compensation committees as well as regulators. This is the first study, to our knowledge, that examines the relationship between the dollar amount and composition of CFO compensation and audit fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to appraise the impact of ESG credentials on the financial performance of agricultural companies with main headquarters in Europe by examining the strategic ESG investment behaviour of firms in twelve specific sectors. The methodology consists of a two-fold approach: first, cross-sectional FGLS regression with generalised least squares; second, overall interlinkages between considered variables through Bayesian network analysis. The research questions focus on the implications of each ESG pillar -- environmental, social, and governance -- on the performance of agricultural companies. Key findings entail that the environmental dimension strongly relates to agricultural companies' outcomes, such as toxic chemicals reduction strategies, waste recycled to the total waste contribution, biodiversity impact reduction, and eco-design products. As regards the social pillar of ESG, salaries and wages positively relate only to shareholders' earnings, while governance factors like CEO compensation, board structure type, and board's gender diversity favourably influence the financial performance of agricultural companies. ESG implications for agricultural companies are beneficial when they implement sustainable strategies. These strategies include establishing targets for water efficiency policies, increasing employee turnover, maintaining a steadfast water efficiency policy, enhancing the use of environmentally-friendly products, and reevaluating board structures from unitary to two-tier or mixed types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test whether industry tournament incentives (ITI) for CEOs influence debt contracting. Measuring ITI as the pay gap between a CEO and the highest-paid industry peer, we find that firm credit ratings decrease and loan spreads and the tightness of non-price loan features increase with the industry pay gap. We find that a history of income increasing discretionary accruals and accounting restatements accentuate the influence of ITI on the cost of loans, while more restrictive loan contracts, greater alignment of managerial and creditor incentives, and higher default risk attenuate the influence of ITI on the cost of loans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of sustainability-oriented governance factors on companies reporting on due diligence requirements of conflict minerals (DDRCM). We use the rating scores that are assigned by the Responsible Sourcing Network (RSN) on a sample of multinational companies between 2015 and 2019. We consider whether the existence and type of an independent external audit, the existence of sustainability reports to communicate a firm's message, the inclusion of sustainability-related targets in executive compensation contracts, and the existence of board-level sustainability committees are associated with DDRCM reporting. We find that the combined effect of sustainability-oriented governance factors is associated with higher DDRCM reporting suggesting that sustainability governance plays an effective role in shaping the corporate response to conflict mineral risks. We also find that effective boards moderate the association between sustainability governance and DDRCM reporting suggesting that effective boards can substitute for the resources that are required for sustainability governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of short-selling mechanisms on management net tone. By utilising data from A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 2007 and 2017, the analysis employs a difference-in-differences model which reveals that short-selling mechanisms significantly reduce management net tone. The conclusions drawn from this study remain robust after a series of stringent tests. Further analysis reveals that in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower information transparency, and those operating within superior market and legal environments, short-selling mechanisms effectively suppress management tone inflation. Additionally, the study identifies analyst coverage and executive compensation as mediating channels through which short-selling mechanisms influence management net tone. This research provides valuable theoretical insights for regulatory bodies concerning the disclosure of non-financial information by listed companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between CEO compensation schemes and ESG greenwashing behavior in Chinese listed firms during the period 2013–2022. We find that a CEO's cash (equity) compensation has a significantly positive (negative) correlation with corporate ESG greenwashing behavior. From mechanism analysis, consistent with the agency problem view, firms engage in more severe ESG greenwashing behavior under a higher proportion of cash in the CEO compensation structure. Such distortion behavior is mitigated by higher internal control quality in firms having an equity incentive for their CEO under the convergence of interest viewpoint. Additional analysis reveals that corporates audited by large accounting firms and those with more media coverage exacerbate the positive correlation between CEO cash compensation and ESG greenwashing behavior, while government environmental regulations reinforce the inhibitory effect of CEO equity compensation on ESG greenwashing. Our results imply that different CEO compensation schemes can have opposite effects on limiting firms' ESG greenwashing behavior in the Chinese context. Furthermore, we highlight that the question of form over substance principle to certain external governance mechanisms, leading CEO to exacerbate impression management of ESG disclosure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reasonable compensation contract arrangements have long been an essential means of promoting the hard work of executives and enhancing corporate performance. While internal pay disparity and its incentive effects have garnered widespread attention, few studies have examined the impact of executive external pay disparity on enterprise innovation. Using panel data from Chinese mixed-ownership listed companies spanning from 2013 to 2020, this study explores how executive external pay disparity affects enterprise innovation. Our findings demonstrate that enterprise innovation is positively influenced by the disparity in executive external pay. This facilitating role is further strengthened in enterprises with a high level of board governance. Additionally, the benefits of executive external pay disparity for innovation are particularly evident in general commercial mixed-ownership enterprises. Mechanism tests reveal that executive external pay disparity plays a pivotal role in enhancing enterprise innovation by increasing corporate risk-taking, ultimately leading to improved enterprise value. This study not only enriches our understanding of the influencing factors behind enterprise innovation from a new perspective but also holds significant implications for deepening the reform of mixed ownership and promoting enterprise innovation through the optimization of compensation contract arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study shows that executive stock options are an effective compensation policy that takes corporate investment to the optimal level in the presence of unpredictable risk from economic policy uncertainty (EPU). We aim to explore whether stock options provide incentives for executives to choose a project that the optimal investment needs to be implemented. We use delta and vega as a proxy for price sensitivity and compensation sensitivity, respectively, to examine the interaction between executive stock options portfolio and EPU. We use delta for price sensitivity and vega for compensation sensitivity, respectively, to examine the interaction between executive stock options portfolio and EPU. Our analysis shows that a well-designed compensation structure motivates executives to maintain the optimal investment level when faced with unpredictable risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to examine the connection between chief executive officer (CEO) traits and earnings management practices estimated by discretionary accruals (DAs). To accomplish this, we analyzed data from 134 businesses listed on the Tadawul Exchange from 2019 to 2022. We also employed an appropriate analytical method and conducted robustness tests to ensure the reliability of our findings. Our findings indicate that tenure as CEO, CEO compensation, CEO board membership, and CEO ownership are positively influenced by DAs. On the other hand, our results show that CEO financial expertise has a negative influence on DAs. Interestingly, our study did not reveal any evidence of a link between CEO-Founder status or nationality and DAs. The findings suggest that CEOs of firms are primarily motivated by personal gains, including financial benefits, rather than founding status and nationality. Furthermore, the findings indicate that CEO financial expertise plays a role in mitigating earnings management, which improves financial report quality. The outcomes contribute significantly to offering investors a comprehensive understanding of the extent of DAs practices in Saudi businesses and identifying the specific CEO traits that encourage such activities. The current study suggests several practical implications for Tadawul investors, Saudi Arabian official organizations, and researchers with an interest in the Saudi landscape. This would provide a spur for the companies to develop a high standard of financial reporting that would attract investment and boost investor confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm's generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family's aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research analyzes the effects of information technology (IT) and e-commerce (EC) investments and trends of the speeds of adjusting the observed toward the desired CEO pay in US firms, based on the adjustment model and its associated adjustment valuation (AV) approach, where the adjustment speeds are assumed dynamic and variable. The findings include: the speeds of adjusting the observed toward the unobserved compensation are fast; either IT or EC appearing alone or jointly impacts CEO compensation; the trends of adjustment speeds are nonlinear and nonstationary; and overall, the US CEOs tend to underpay during the period under study; among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contaduría y Administración is the property of Facultad de Contaduria y Administracion-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the effect of executive compensation incentives, specifically CEO inside debt holdings, on the choice of industry specialist auditor. Design/methodology/approach: High inside debt holdings are expected to constrain excessive managerial risk-taking and align the interests of managers and outside debtholders. The authors hypothesize that reduced debtholders' expropriation concerns will decrease the demand for high audit quality, measured by industry specialization. The authors investigate a sample of US firms from 2006 to 2018 using OLS regression and use CEO relative leverage to proxy for CEO inside debt holdings. The authors conduct an additional two-stage least squares regression analysis to address potential endogeneity issues. Findings: The paper finds that firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend not to appoint an auditor with industry specialization. This result is consistent with the notion that inside debt mitigates agency conflicts between managers and debtholders, reducing the demand for high-quality audits as a monitoring mechanism. The paper also finds that among firms which are excessively leveraged, those with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend to appoint an industry specialist auditor. Originality/value: The findings contribute to the literature on agency cost and auditor choice by demonstrating that CEO inside debt has both substitutive and complementary effects on demand for industry specialist auditors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CEOs in United States firms have experienced significant compensation gains since the late 1970s. A key component of these compensation packages are stock options, which now represent a larger share of total compensation. This reliance on stock options may encourage CEOs to focus on short-term performance, potentially incentivizing excessive risk taking to boost the firm's stock price. We utilize a sample of publicly traded firms in order to comment on the extent to which compensation and risk taking are related, and in particular, if compensation is associated with risky corporate behaviors. We use data from S&P 1500 firms and their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) for the period of 2006–2022, sourced from Compustat and Execucomp databases. In this paper, we proxy firm-level risk-taking behavior through Altman's Z-score and stock volatility. To address the likely endogeneity of compensation, we employ a Two-Stage Least Squares approach; we instrument CEO tenure and firm size and include two sets of policy and asset pricing controls. Ultimately, we find a strong positive relationship between CEOs' stock and options awards and risk taking as represented by Altman's Z-score and stock volatility. By contrast, CEO's total compensation is reversely correlated with Altman's Z-score and stock volatility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously awarded incentive compensation after the discovery of accounting manipulation or misconduct. The author evaluates the impact of clawback enforcement heterogeneity on the horizon of executive compensation. Design/methodology/approach: The author provides empirical tests to evaluate the impact of clawback adoption decisions. The author deals with the endogeneity of clawback adoption decisions through an instrumental variables strategy that exploits the transmission of governance choices within firms' networks. Findings: While the author finds that clawback adoption reduces the frequency of accounting manipulation, this reduction is accompanied by heterogeneous effects on the horizon of executive pay across firms. Clawback adopters with high director independence, high leverage, high managerial termination payments and low executive ownership tilt their compensation toward the short-term. Practical implications: The results, robust to alternative specifications, suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback. The stock market reacts positively to the adoption in firms with weak enforcement, suggesting that clawbacks significantly reduce the managers' rent-extraction capacity. Originality/value: Using a novel empirical and identification approach, the results suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)‐backed entrepreneurship for high‐earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder‐CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC‐backed entrepreneurship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, companies’ disclosure of information regarding their carbon emissions has evolved rapidly. However, an important question remains whether carbon emissions disclosure has any influence on climate change risk reporting. Previous literature has not focused on the more pressing question of how changes in carbon performance may lead to subsequent changes in climate change disclosure. This study examines how sustainable board and the use of sustainability targets in executive compensation can moderate the relationship between climate change disclosure and carbon performance. Following a mixed theoretical framework focusing on upper echelon theory, we revisit the relationship between climate change reporting and carbon performance. The Leadership Index is used to measure the level of climate change disclosure, and carbon performance is based on both the carbon intensity of emissions and the mitigation of carbon emissions. From an international sample of listed companies, we use an ordered logit regression methodology. Our study contributes to the growing literature on sustainable governance and the effect of Chief Sustainability Officer serving on the board of directors on climate change reporting. The most important idea is to know which sustainable board mechanisms should be responsible for improving climate reporting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we examine the impact of social capital surrounding firms' headquarters on their chief executive officers (CEOs)' pay duration, reflected by the vesting periods of the short‐term and long‐term components in their annual compensation. Our analysis reveals that CEO pay duration increases with the level of social capital in the county in which firms are headquartered. We further find that this effect is more pronounced when CEOs are more likely to be short‐term‐oriented, suggesting that under the influence of the local community's social capital, the board of directors uses longer pay duration to better align CEOs' interests with long‐term shareholder value. Our results are robust to a variety of additional tests and a smaller sample of firms that had relocated their headquarters to communities with a different level of social capital. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that social capital incentivizes firms to be long‐term‐oriented and refrain from short‐term opportunistic activities, and this lengthens CEO pay duration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Dodd–Fank Act mandated shareholder votes on executive's change‐in‐control (golden parachute) payments at the time the firm is sold. We study bid premiums surrounding the introduction of the vote and find that they are lower in the post‐period. Moreover, there is a positive association between the relative size of parachute payments and premiums, particularly after the parachute vote was required. In contrast, we observe no association between premiums and parachute features questioned by many shareholders. Additionally, we find lower voting support for parachutes with features that are (i) of concern to shareholders, (ii) amended in the lead‐up to the vote and (iii) identified as problematic in proxy advisor analyst reports. However, we find little evidence that directors overseeing payments with opposition from shareholders or a leading proxy advisor are penalized with lost board seats, fewer key board committee memberships or increased shareholder opposition in subsequent director elections at other firms. Overall, our findings suggest that the parachute vote requirement is too little too late. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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There are ongoing debates globally regarding excessive executive compensation, the perceived weak link between pay and performance, and the widening inequality gap. The South African corporate governance code King IV's Principle 14 addresses the need for fair, responsible, and transparent remuneration. At the same time, the newly enacted Companies Amendment Act No. 16 of 2024 in South Africa emphasizes transparency in compensation, shareholder voting, and responding to shareholder feedback. This study conducts a systematic literature review of 30 articles on the transparency of executive remuneration disclosures and their determinants by analyzing Scopus-indexed articles published between 2010 and 2023, selected through specific keyword searches. The findings suggest an increasing focus on research regarding the disclosure of executive compensation, predominantly conducted in the Global North and primarily framed through agency theory. Studies exploring the factors influencing executive remuneration and the relationship between pay and performance are prevalent, with mixed results generally indicating a positive connection. Firm size emerges as a key factor in transparency, and many studies employ binary scoring to evaluate whether executive compensation disclosure is present. This paper provides valuable insights for investors, analysts, and policymakers and adds to the current understanding of executive remuneration transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate how executive pay disparity affects insider profits around earnings news. Our findings reveal that high pay disparity is linked to higher abnormal returns from insider purchases before positive news, suggesting insiders exploit good news for greater gains. Conversely, it is associated with lower abnormal returns from insider sales before negative news, indicating less benefit from such sales. These insights highlight the influence of pay disparity on insider trading and underscore the importance of understanding this dynamic to improve decision-making and reduce misuse of insider information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the risk incentives of traditional and non-traditional call options in the context of a levered firm where managers under-invest due to risk aversion. Our results contrast with those presented in the literature inasmuch as lookback calls do not always induce higher risk taking than regular calls, and managers always prefer a combination of regular calls and shares of stock in their compensation package as opposed to only company shares. We also show that Asian options outperform both plain-vanilla and other nonstandard options in inducing higher risk taking and, thereby, are a superior remedy for alleviating the agency costs of deviating from the optimal volatility level. Finally, we shed new insights that better clarify the incorrect arguments found in the literature regarding the delta of regular and lookback calls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study seeks to assess whether CEO Compensation, Managerial Ability, and Tenure individually have a positive and significant impact on the Debt-to-Equity Ratio. Additionally, it aims to determine whether CEO Compensation, Managerial Ability, Tenure, and the Debt-to-Equity Ratio significantly and positively influence Return on Assets. The study employs a quantitative path analysis methodology using Eviews version 12 statistical software. Data comprises secondary sources from annual financial reports available on the Indonesia Stock Exchange website, covering a 5-year span (2018-2022) across 25 companies in the Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector listed on the IDX, resulting in 125 observations. The findings reveal that (1) CEO Compensation does not positively affect the Debt-to-Equity Ratio, (2) CEO Managerial Ability negatively impacts the Debt-to-Equity Ratio, (3) CEO Tenure does not negatively affect the Debt-to-Equity Ratio, (4) CEO Compensation does not positively influence Return on Assets, (5) CEO Managerial Ability does not positively impact Return on Assets, (6) CEO Tenure does not have a positive effect on Return on Assets, (7) the Debt-to-Equity Ratio negatively impacts Return on Assets, and (8) the Debt-to-Equity Ratio does not mediate the effect of CEO Tenure on Return on Assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]