Search

Character strengths research has the potential to imply that youth have character deficits or moral failings that cause their problematic behavior. This ignores the impact of context, especially for youth who are members of historically marginalized groups in under resourced communities. On the other hand, framing youth who are members of underrepresented groups solely as products of oppression undermines their agency and the power of collective action. It may be possible to promote character development in a contextually relevant, culturally grounded way through a transdisciplinary, participatory action approach. We engaged in this work in three phases: goal specification; logic model identification; and intervention development and testing. Lessons learned included the need for intensive trust-building and identifying the limitations in scope and capacity. Overall, a transdisciplinary, participatory action approach is a promising strategy to overcome the existing bias in virtue development research and to leverage positive psychology to address health disparities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: In light of the increasing prevalence of non-human services, organizations can benefit by emphasizing distinctively human qualities in their services. This paper suggests that cultivating virtues among employees can enhance the value of human-provided services. Design/methodology/approach: This conceptual paper incorporates ideas from management and service research examining the notion of virtue as well as human qualities that are associated with virtuousness. The paper builds upon service research, which emphasizes the important role of human elements in service interaction, along with extensive research in positive organizational scholarship, which characterizes virtues as the finest attributes of human nature. Findings: The paper introduces "service virtuousness," the voluntary and authentic expression of human virtues like compassion and creativity in service delivery, treating customers as individuals beyond their formal roles. A review of the literature reveals how virtuousness appears in services. The study also identifies when it is most beneficial, explores the challenges in its implementation, and suggests future research directions. Originality/value: The paper offers a novel concept for service research grounded in core human values. Although service virtuousness does not focus on outcomes, it offers numerous benefits to all parties involved in the service setting. The theoretical framework for studying service virtuousness provides new opportunities to identify the conditions in which virtuousness is most beneficial in a service context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neo-Confucian metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical theories provide support for an architectural ethic. The latter can be justified through an emphasis on the humane person who becomes one with all things, appropriate knowing of reality, and an extended theory of virtue. Built space can express a wide range of virtue or excellence, some human-centered, some not, demonstrating how qi 氣 and li 理 present an enormous range of possibilities. A Neo-Confucian approach to built space also aligns with specific themes prevalent in Western "biophilic" design, emphasizing the causal interrelation between a building and its surrounding environment. Finally, the former discussion can serve as a useful response to the tension between contemporary Western architectural principles and the current call toward sustainable design. An architectural ethic rooted in Neo-Confucian philosophy appears to call for a revision of certain prominent design principles while also being sympathetic to particular concerns of aesthetic creativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the moral evaluation of video games from a virtue ethics perspective. It argues that actions in video games can still be evaluated morally, even if they are not traditionally considered in moral evaluations. The author examines previous attempts to justify the belief that certain video games or playing certain games are morally wrong, pointing out their limitations. The article proposes an identification theory based on Harry G. Frankfurt's theory of volition to explain why abnormal gaming behavior in normal games can be ethically problematic. It concludes by suggesting that virtue ethics can help us understand the ethical aspects of video games, as well as other areas such as simulation, art, and literature. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Humanities & Educational Sciences Journal is the property of Humanities & Educational Sciences Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that $\neg p$ ¬ p and yet is sincere in asserting that $p$ p. I argue that the agent qualifies as sincere in asserting the contrary of what they in the most basic sense believe in virtue of asserting what they are committed to believing. It is only by recognizing such commitments and distinguishing them from the more basic beliefs whose rational regulation is automatic that the tension between the self-deceived agent's actions and assertions can be explained in a core subset of cases of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text explores the concept of σωφροσύνη, or temperance, in classical Greece. It delves into the various meanings and interpretations of σωφροσύνη, going beyond self-control to include self-mastery, self-knowledge, and inner harmony. The author examines ancient texts and debates to understand the complexities of σωφροσύνη and its relationship to other virtues. The text also considers the challenges of interpreting σωφροσύνη and its relevance in contemporary society. It provides valuable insights into this Greek virtue and its significance in ancient Greek philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

This article develops a novel theory of sport that I call 'Confucian mutualism'. Confucian mutualism is underpinned by the Confucian Golden Rule and the Confucian conception of human dignity. It resembles the mutualist theory of sport developed by Robert L. Simon in maintaining that sport participants ethically ought to prioritize promoting sporting excellence both in themselves and in their co-participants. However, while Simon's mutualism maintains that sporting excellence consists in proficiency at sport constitutive skills, Confucian mutualism maintains that sporting excellence consists in success at achieving the Confucian virtues through sport participation. I provide a preliminary case for why Confucian mutualism's virtue-centric conception of sporting excellence makes it better able than Simon's mutualism to explain why sporting excellence is stance-independently ethically significant for all sport participants. I do so by trying to show that we have prima facie justification for believing that Confucian mutualism is not vulnerable to certain kinds of criticisms that have been leveled at Simon's mutualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The urgency of ensuring adequate moral courage in clinical nursing practice is evident. However, currently, there are few formal intervention plans targeted at enhancing the moral courage of nurses. Aim: To develop a training program for improving the moral courage of nurses using the modified Delphi method. Research design: A modified Delphi study. Participants and research context: From November to December 2022, a literature review and expert group discussion were conducted to develop a preliminary training plan framework. From January to March 2023, a two-round Delphi survey was performed, and a consensus was reached regarding the plan through online questionnaires. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the data. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the institutional ethics committee (No. 138, 30 August 2021). All participants provided written informed consent. Results: Consensus was reached on eight themes and 33 items to strengthen the moral courage training program for nurses. Conclusions: Guided by a unified goal of moral education, a multi-level and acceptable intervention plan was designed to enhance the moral courage of nurses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a person-centered understanding of courage, based on the classical, organismic-relational perspective in person-centered psychology. Drawing on literature (Shakespeare) and philosophy (especially Aristotle and Tillich), it discusses both the courage to be (and become) – and to belong. It considers courage as a virtue which in its deficiency is fear but in its excess is over-confidence, and elaborates four ways of understanding and working with this therapeutically: in terms of being (in terms of regard and self-regard), process (from fixity to fluidity), encounter (with self and others), and communities (influence and impact). At a meta-perspective, the article also offers a commentary on the issue of belonging in a world of psychology and/or psychotherapy that tends to discount person-centered psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plato's Republic divided subsequent study of justice in two, as a virtue of people and of institutions. Here, the start of a reunification is attempted. Justice is first understood personally as the virtuous mean between arrogance and servility, where just people properly respect themselves and others. Because justice requires that like cases be treated alike and self-respect is a special instance of respect generally, justice requires a single standard for self and others. In understanding justice in terms of respect, structural analogies become apparent between "recognition" and "appraisal" respect, on the one hand, and Rawls' two principles of justice on the other. The present view is then compared to "social egalitarian" theories of justice and the essay concludes with a discussion of how mercy is related to justice and an explanation of why just people always look for reasons to mitigate blame and punishment but never to aggravate them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While true interdisciplinarity is needed to understand morality and its development, a realistic step in that direction for the current special issue is to enhance and promote a neglected disciplinary contribution to the field, namely sociology. This special issue brings together six articles applying sociological analysis to moral development and education together with one article overviewing sociological contributions to morality in general. The work is intended to invigorate sociological treatments of moral development and education as a step toward a genuinely interdisciplinary domain of research on morality and its education. The contributions to this special issue bring alive the moral background by combining contextual and individual levels of analysis in the exploration of difficult topics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by Aristotle and Goffman this article considers how the study of virtue acquisition may be pursued through an observational theorising about social interactions in institutions. Adapting Goffman's and Harré's notions of moral order and moral career, it proposes character education to be a dialogic process requiring negotiation between social actors over time. Taking part in educational institutions, learners learn to perform various roles in a manner by which virtues are to be attributed. But this is not all. Goffman's and perhaps Aristotle's accounts are arguably too 'thin' to allow for moral change, unless these processes themselves are mastered by learners and may be transcended by them. It is thus by applying the sociological imagination to the institutions we are in, the criticality necessary for true character is developed. The role of sociology in character education is therefore twofold: to inform educators in the creation of institutions and practices that transmit and manifest virtues; and, as an essential part of a virtue-ethics curriculum—giving moral agents the sensitising concepts necessary to understand, negotiate and mould the social frame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I develop ideas for supporting character education through sociology and virtue ethics philosophy. A combination of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of habitus together with (neo) Aristotelian virtue ethics philosophy is used to promote a critical form of character education—one that accents the individual as well as the social context through human embodiment. In brief, my intention is that this framework may underpin conceptual and practical possibilities for critical (moral) character development for youth. Obviously the two approaches making up the theoretical framework differ by levels of analysis with predictably less concern for individual moral development from Bourdieu whose focus is on social context (e.g., race, class etc.) as it shows up in patterns of individual perceiving, feeling, thinking, and valuing. The proposed critical character education involves incorporating into processes of virtue and character development a reflexive capacity to understand how community practices, habits, and relations may be unjust or unconducive for human flourishing. The aim is to champion and develop shared qualities of being human while also acknowledging and tackling differences and oppressions in ways that are not counter-productive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant is frequently read as saying that all self-love is bad, and the virtuous agent is one who suppresses self-love as much as possible. This paper argues that this is mistaken and that the right kind of self-love – what Kant calls rational self-love – plays an important role in a successful moral life. It shows how Kant provides a detailed taxonomy of different kinds of self-love. He contrasts the (practical) incentive of self-love with the (pathological) feeling of it, self-love of benevolence with self-love of delight, and self-absorbed/selfish with rational/moral varieties of each. The paper then argues that, while the Critique of Practical Reason only identifies a self-absorbed variety of self-love of delight, self-conceit, it gains a rational counterpart in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason: "self-contentment". This is a positive self-love of delight uniquely felt by the morally good person. It is suggested that this shift reflects Kant's increasing appreciation of the affective dimension of the virtuous life: for imperfect human beings the moral law must not only be worth obeying, but worth loving. Thus, while for morally bad agents self-love and morality inevitably conflict, good agents can and should love themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show that the nascent field of ethics of collegiality may considerably benefit from a symbiosis with virtue and vice epistemology. We start by bringing the epistemic virtue and vice perspective to the table by showing that competence, deemed as an essential characteristic of a good colleague (Betzler & Löschke 2021), should be construed broadly to encompass epistemic competence. By endorsing the anti-individualistic stance in epistemology as well as context-specificity of epistemic traits, we show how the individual vice of a colleague can have a positive epistemic outcome for the team while individual virtue can be damaging if all team members share it thereby contributing to the negative epistemic outcome. We argue that the evaluation and analysis of collegial relationships should be done through one's contribution to the team dynamics: without this collectivist perspective, the ethics of collegiality cannot aspire to become encompassing normative theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The virtue development literature often draws on the language of goal-directed automaticity and flow states in discussions of virtue. This article examines the attentional features of various virtues and argues that only some virtuous actions can be adequately described in these terms. It proposes a distinction between three kinds of virtuous actions—flow state actions, deliberative actions, and presence actions—which have varying attentional features, bodily reliance, and conscious reasoning in virtue performance. Then the article motivates these distinctions as important, describing how one might take on-board these classifications in character education, providing a more tailored development of virtues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a person-centered understanding of courage, based on the classical, organismic-relational perspective in person-centered psychology. Drawing on literature (Shakespeare) and philosophy (especially Aristotle and Tillich), it discusses both the courage to be (and become) – and to belong. It considers courage as a virtue which in its deficiency is fear but in its excess is over-confidence, and elaborates four ways of understanding and working with this therapeutically: in terms of being (in terms of regard and self-regard), process (from fixity to fluidity), encounter (with self and others), and communities (influence and impact). At a meta-perspective, the article also offers a commentary on the issue of belonging in a world of psychology and/or psychotherapy that tends to discount person-centered psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an earlier essay, I argued that King Xuan 宣 sacrifices a sheep rather than an ox to save money, and that Mengzi 孟子 offers the king an alternative, benign rationale for the substitution in order to overcome the king's reluctance to improve his own character. In the current essay, I defend my interpretation of the dialogue between King Xuan and Mengzi, and highlight two further points. First, Mengzi does not always mean what he says. Dramatic context is crucial to interpretation, and the context reveals that Mengzi is manipulating the king with flattering falsehoods rather than persuading him with sound arguments. Second, although Mengzi maintains that human nature includes sprouts of virtue, he recognizes that some people's sprouts are dormant or overgrown with weeds (vices). He provides a deceptive strategy for gaining interlocutors' buy-in to the project of virtue cultivation, and other strategies (deliberately misdescribed as "extension") for the eradication of vices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its origin in 15th century European imperialism, the globe has been an object of conquest involving regimes of territorial exclusion and various forms of land abstraction now known as nationalism, colonialism, capitalism, and industrialism. Coming to think like the Earth system and generating politics grounded in it could pose a welcome disruption of these systematically controlling orders only if such planetary thinking is grounded in a nondominating orientation. We propose that this grounding be geological wonder, the open consideration of Earth as a system exceeding human narcissism. Following Dipesh Chakrabarty's distinction between the globe and the planet, we articulate planetarism in an emerging cosmology decentering human life while emphasizing human limits. Globality, by contrast, is a modern, narcissistic formation that geological wonder unsettles. We draw on Martha C. Nussbaum's politics of wonder to articulate a postglobal, disruptive virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ÖZ: Epiküros Helenistik Dönem hazcılık öğretisinin başlıca temsilcisidir. O, hazzın kendi başına bir iyi olduğu noktasında, Aristippos başta olmak üzere, birçok hazcı filozofla aynı görüştedir ancak mesele hazzın mahiyetini konuşmaya geldiğinde söz konusu filozofların çoğundan ayrılır. Nitekim Epiküros tek türden bedensel hazlar tasnifini yeterli görmemiş ve hazlar arasında niceliksel olanın yanında niteliksel bir sınıflamaya da yer vermiştir. Epiküros’a göre insan yaşamının amacı mutluluktur ve mutlu bir yaşam haz dolu bir yaşamdır, bununla birlikte yaşamın amacı olacak türden bir mutluluğa erişmek anlık doyumlar içeren salt bedensel hazlarla değil, daha çok yaşam boyu sürmesi beklenen kalıcı hazlarla mümkündür. İşte, bu çalışmada Epiküros’un hazcılık öğretisinin sınırlarını çizdiği türden mutlu bir yaşama erişmede erdemlerin rolünün ne olduğu araştırılmıştır. Epiküros erdemlerin mutlu bir yaşamın ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğunu iddia etmiştir ve dahası bu iddia bir yönüyle araştırmacılara Epiküros felsefesinde erdemli bir yaşamın kendi başına bir amaç olup olmadığını düşündürmüştür. Ne var ki Epiküros’un yaşamın nihai amacının mutluluk olduğu iddiası kesin bir dille ortadadır ve bu iddia teorisinin diğer unsurlarını mutluluğa göre araçsal bir konuma indirgemektedir. Dolayısıyla Epiküros’un hazcılık öğretisinde erdemler, kendilerine yüklenen anlam ne kadar güçlü olursa olsun, temelde araçsal bir değere sahiptir. ABSTRACT:In Hellenistic Period Epicurus was the main representative of the hedonism doctrine. He agrees with many hedonist philosophers, especially with Aristippos, on the point that pleasure is a good in itself, but he differs from most of the philosophers in question when it comes to the nature of pleasure. Hence, Epicurus did not satisfied with the clasification that based only on corporeal pleasures and included a qualitative classification as well as a quantitative one among the pleasures. According to Epicurus, the purpose of human life is happiness and a happy life is a life full of pleasure. At the same time, achieving the kind of happines that could correspond to purpose of life would possible with permanent pleasures that are expected to last throughout life, not just with corporeal ones. In this study, the role of virtues in reaching to a happy life, framed by the doctrine of hedonsim on the lines of epicureanism, has been investigated. Epicurus has claimed that virtues were an integral part of a happy life, and moreover, this claim, in a way, has made researchers think whether a virtuous life was an end in itself in the philosophy of Epicurus. However, the claim of Epicurus according to which the ultimate purpose of life is happiness is absolutely clear, and this claim reduces the other elements realitive to happiness in his theory to an instrumental position. Therefore, in hedonist theory of Epicurus virtues essentially have an instrumental value and the strenght attributed to them does not matter.

Socrates’ final argument in the Protagoras is premised on the surprising identification of the pleasant with the good and argues that virtue is the “art of measurement” that can be easily taught to the Many. The view that virtue can be taught is also espoused by Socrates elsewhere, notably in the Phaedrus. However, while the Protagoras identifies virtue with the art of calculating the greatest pleasure, which is identified with the greatest good, in the Phaedrus virtue is shown to consist in the ceaseless search for the good. I argue that the picture of virtue presented in the Protagoras is in agreement with that of the Phaedrus in that the Protagoras depicts the first stage of the process of learning genuine virtue, which is outlined as a whole in the Phaedrus. The argument of the Protagoras then works as a protreptic: it teaches an elementary way of thinking about the ends of one’s actions and opens up the way toward genuine virtue.

This paper addresses the critique regarding the apolitical nature of institutionalist theorizing by developing the concept of virtuous institutions. I start from the observation that current public discourses are often characterized by a destructive pitting of ‘my values’ against ‘your values’. Values, in this usage, represent personal emotion-laden beliefs that are ultimately incompatible. In addition to fueling destructive public discourses, incompatible values (a feature that is central to institutional value theorizing) make system integration (a feature that is also central to institutional theorizing) very difficult. I therefore propose to reconceptualize values as virtues. Drawing on the communitarian ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre and the concept of institutional valuation of Roger Friedland, I suggest a reconceptualization of institutional values that introduces the notion of a common good, understands institutional practices as co-constitutive with such a good, and abolishes the assumption that values are fundamentally irrational and beyond reasoning.

I discuss everyday situations that bring about and contain suffering. We must take it seriously and distinguish between mental and physical pain and full-fledged suffering that entails dysphoria. I focus on morally relevant cases where I am innocent and contrast them with cases where my suffering is my fault. I discuss cases where we harm others and suffer from guilt and remorse. Our moral emotions cause extra suffering; sometimes, a person’s suffering is vicarious. Finally, I tackle the argument that suffering develops the sufferer’s virtues. I believe suffering is an intrinsic evil, and its good consequences are controversial and, at best, incidental. One may also argue that suffering ruins the victim’s character. This question may belong to empirical psychology.

AbstractVirtue is a significant but underexplored factor in comprehending posttraumatic growth and psychosocial adaptation in the aftermath of traumatic loss. While empirical evidence suggests that the dominant virtues and their combinations can vary among individuals, the specific variances and their unique impacts remain uncertain. This research investigated the virtue profiles, based on five virtue subfactors of the Virtue-based Psychosocial Adaptation Model, in association with posttraumatic growth and demographics among 257 South Koreans who experienced either direct or vicarious traumatic loss. Using latent profile analysis, three virtue profiles were discerned: high, mid, and low-virtue groups. Of the participants, 33.9% were categorized into the high-virtue group, displaying pronounced levels across all five virtue sub-factors. The mid-virtue group, comprising 59.9% of participants, exhibited moderate levels for these virtues. The low-virtue group, which encompassed 6.2%, showed the lowest levels across the virtue factors. The high-virtue group demonstrated the most pronounced posttraumatic growth, followed by mid and low-virtue groups. Age, socio-economic status (SES), and chronic illness or disability (CID) were demographic determinants significantly associated with profile memberships. Older age and higher SES were associated with the high-virtue group compared to the mid-group. CID status was a predictor of the mid-virtue group, compared to high-group. The findings suggest the necessity of tailored approaches, which acknowledge the interdependence of virtues and consider the diverse backgrounds and environments of individuals for more nuanced and effective support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foucault's corpus is animated by an ethical or political impulse: to liberate individuals from a kind of oppression, one which does not involve the familiar tyranny of the totalitarian state but exploits instead values that the victim of oppression herself accepts, and which then leads the oppressed agent to be complicit in her own subjugation. Foucault's critique also depends on a skeptical thesis about the epistemological authority of the social sciences that is supposed to be supported by his genealogies of those sciences. It is this conjunction of claims – that individuals oppress themselves in virtue of certain normative claims they accept because of their supposed epistemic merits – that marks Foucault's uniquely disturbing contribution to the literature whose diagnostic aim is, with Weber, to understand the oppressive character of modernity, and whose moral aim is, with the Frankfurt School, human liberation. Foucault is also a kind of 'realist' in his approach: he does not offer moral arguments to persuade people that they ought to behave differently than they do, but instead shows people the actual history of the institutions and norms to which they subjugate themselves. This essay explains Foucault's critical and realist project, and concludes with critical reflections on its plausibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay begins with preliminary observations about the nature of agnosticism. Based on the term's etymology, in this essay an agnostic about some proposition (e.g., God exists) is someone who does not know whether the proposition is true. Being an agnostic about the truth of a proposition is compatible with the proposition appearing to be true or the state of affairs obtains but incompatible with an agnostic knowing its truth or that the state of affairs obtains. (Reference to propositions and states of affairs is intended to be inclusive, rather than a controversial metaphysical distinction.) Based on apparent virtues and vices, reasons are offered about when agnosticism (or the profession of agnosticism) is virtuous or philosophically desirable and when either actual agnosticism or its profession seems to be a vice or undesirable. The essay concludes with challenging Anthony Kenny's case for agnosticism about theism based on the virtue of humility. The central claims about apparent virtues and vices rest on the positive epistemic standing of appearances as defended by many so-called "common sense philosophers" Thomas Reid, Roderick Chisholm, and, more recently, Thomas Nagel's thesis about the justified status of the appearance of values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we introduce a new ‘Thom class’ formulation of topological T-duality for principal torus bundles. This definition is equivalent to the established one of Bunke, Rumpf, and Schick but has the virtue of removing the global assumptions on the H-flux required in the old definition. With the new definition, we provide easier and more transparent proofs of the classification of T-duals and generalize the local formulation of T-duality for circle bundles by Bunke, Schick, and Spitzweck to the torus case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Domain adaption has attracted quite a lot of interest in object detection. It is hoped that domain adaption can mitigate the discrepancy between the source domain with label-rich and the target domain with no label or label-scarce. In this paper, we address the domain transfer issue from three aspects: (1) We design a synthetic image generator with automatically labelled based on 3d scenes. (2) A structured domain adaptation framework was designed and two domain adapters on global-local levels, respectively, were constructed to mitigate the cross-domain gap. (3) By the virtue of synthetic data, different strategies are adopted to deal with sample transferability in the global and local levels, respectively, to eliminate the performance bottleneck. Recently, adversarial-based methods were used to make alignment with distributions for source and target objects that have been proven effective when adapting object classifiers. We reinforce the two domain adapters to learn a domain classifier with synthetic data and a consistency regularisation is applied to boost the performance. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the proposed model achieves large performance margins, which show significant advances over the other state-of-the-art models, performing a promotion of 10% −15% mAP on various domain adaptation scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his work on Wu wei, Edward Slingerland argues that the classical Chinese ideal is an inherently paradoxical concept that is first and foremost spiritual and political only secondarily. Through a close reading of the Dao de Jing, the first major classical text to substantially deploy and develop the concept, I argue that Wu wei isn't inherently paradoxical and that this is seen precisely when it is viewed in terms of its political primacy. On my reading, the emergence of Wu wei in the Daoist canon is an equilibrating moment of political mediation between the highly intentionalized sphere of human pursuits and the purposeless fluidity and boundless flux of the natural world. Wu wei here takes on a different aspect—mystery rather than paradox—when considered within a form of political collectivity in which the intentional and the innate, purposive and natural are constantly juxtaposed and contending with one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the judicial virtues exemplified by Chief Judge William H. Pryor Jr., emphasizing virtues such as incorruptibility, courage, and impartiality. These qualities define Judge Pryor's career, from his integrity in combatting corruption to his courage in controversial cases, illustrating a commitment to judicial excellence grounded in ethical principles and rigorous diligence.

There is an abundance of computational models in cognitive neuroscience. A framework for what is desirable in a model, what justifies the introduction of a new one, or what makes one better than another is lacking, however. In this article, we examine key qualities ("virtues") that are desirable in computational models, and how these are interrelated. To keep the scope of the article manageable, we focus on the field of cognitive control, where we identified six "model virtues": empirical accuracy, empirical scope, functional analysis, causal detail, biological plausibility, and psychological plausibility. We first illustrate their use in published work on Stroop modeling and then discuss what expert modelers in the field of cognitive control said about them in a series of qualitative interviews. We found that virtues are interrelated and that their value depends on the modeler's goals, in ways that are not typically acknowledged in the literature. We recommend that researchers make the reasons for their modeling choices more explicit in published work. Our work is meant as a first step. Although our focus here is on cognitive control, we hope that our findings will spark discussion of virtues in other fields as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Hungarian Parliament passed legislation prohibiting the dissemination of information on diverse sexual and gender identities to minors, the Commission launched infringement proceedings pleading a breach of the common values under Article 2 TEU, amongst others. The dispute constitutes the occasion to explore the meaning of toleration in the EU and its scope, i.e., whether alleged intolerance of national minorities does or should lead to transnational intolerance of the EU vis-à-vis its Member States. Putting the work of the political philosopher Rainer Forst into dialogue with EU constitutional theories, this article identifies three justifications for transnational toleration: (1) functional; (2) liberal multicultural; and (3) liberal constitutional. By reference to the Hungarian case study, the article shows that these justifications are liable to legitimise transnational toleration on ethical rather than moral grounds. The dense structure of EU constitutionalism impairs a moral justification by way of Article 2 TEU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transhumanism is an unsettling prospect for proponents of a natural law ethic. The goal of transhumanism is to fundamentally alter our human nature, while the natural law tradition relies on this nature for producing normative claims. The tension seems clear. But beyond the need to explore this underdeveloped relationship, it may be that natural law provides precisely the sort of ethical framework—a framework centered on human nature—for best evaluating transhumanism and bioenhancement technologies. Building on the work of Jason T. Eberl and Brian Patrick Green, I articulate how a Thomistic theory of natural law can guide us in a brave new world. Along the way, I note ways in which both Eberl and Green are too limiting in their interpretations of natural law, but in offering these critiques, I hope to bring out how natural law proves an invaluable guide for navigating life in creation—even a creation that has been tampered with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of Kongzi 孔子, in the Zhuangzi, has been a compelling story. Can we read the stories about Kongzi as constituting a type of commentary on his teachings and the early development of Confucian philosophy in general? First, let us consider the way Zhuangzi has put his own teachings into the mouth of Kongzi because he was accepted to be a sage who understood how to live well. Then, I turn to the more problematic references to Kongzi as being punished in Chapter 5 and his being a "condemned person" in chapter 6 to illustrate how these stories are taken to be forms of commentary or criticism of Kongzi's project because he did not understand complete virtue. The role of Kongzi in the Zhuangzi can be read as a criticism-like commentary using Kongzi to criticize Kongzi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thought of rule by virtue in ancient China holds a significant role in Chinese ideological history. Because of the similarity in nature and authority, morality in ancient China played a similar role to religion in Western countries. The Confucian rule by virtue thought in the pre-Qin dynasty profoundly influenced subsequent generations. During the pre-Qin period, Confucian rule by virtue thought evolved—from personal cultivation to statecraft, integrating law and ritual. Concepts of rule by rite, rule by man, and rule by virtue intertwined with the legal philosophies of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. Confucian moral governance focuses on human values and life quality, retaining relevance today. Constrained by historical and social contexts, it had unique dilemma and unobservable limitations. In order to eliminate the ideological dilemma, a return to virtue and law while adhering strictly to their boundaries is a feasible path for the Confucian rule by virtue thought from the pre-Qin Dynasty to the modern era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseño y Comunicación is the property of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseno y Comunicacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the recent resurgence of interest in character and virtues within philosophy, psychology, and educational studies. This renewed interest has been inspired by a retrieval of character-and-virtue research in psychology and the advent of positive psychology. The article explores the concept of phronesis, or practical wisdom, and its role in moral decision-making. It also examines the relationship between virtues, wisdom, skills, and expertise. The aim of the article is to bring together scholars from various disciplines to address the methodological and substantive challenges in the study of virtue cultivation, practical wisdom, and expertise. [Extracted from the article]

Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theory. Scholars have predominantly understood educating character as a process that entails the formation of certain distinct character traits or functions through practice and habituation. However, these approaches present some problems. This paper explores the educational implications of various accounts focusing on the relationship between phronesis and other virtues. In particular, our focus will be on those that Miller (2023) has classified as Standard Model and Eliminativist Model of practical wisdom. Starting from these accounts, we will outline three specific problems that the latter models appear to generate at a theoretical level in character education. Finally, we will address the task of demonstrating why the monist account of moral virtue recently proposed by the Aretai group—which conceives being virtuous in possessing phronesis understood as ethical expertise—might offer a refined response to these challenges. In addition, we will illustrate three educational pathways that can emerge from the same model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to be a good thinker? Which virtues work together in someone who possesses good intellectual character? Although recent research on virtues has highlighted the benefits of individual intellectual virtues, being an excellent thinker is likely a function of possessing multiple intellectual virtues. Specifically, a good thinker would both recognize one's intellectual shortcomings and possess an eagerness to learn driven by virtues such as love of knowledge, curiosity, and open-mindedness. Good intellectual character may only successfully manifest when individuals possess not just one or a few intellectual virtues, but a larger set of such virtues to different degrees. However, little is currently known about what combination of virtues are necessary for good thinking. We argue that it is important to identify and clarify the nature of the good thinker and outline a profile methodology for achieving this goal. This approach characterizes the good thinker in terms of a profile of multiple intellectual virtues. Understanding this profile can allow greater insight into the extent to which people possess such a profile, and the potential for societal benefits of educating for these qualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on Anscombe, in this essay I argue that we should not take Aristotle to be a moral philosopher, nor a virtue ethicist. This is because contemporary virtue ethics has little to do with Aristotelian ethics. While contemporary virtue ethics (or aretaic moral theory, as one may call it) operates on the level of moral and thus categorical norms, Aristotelian ethics—an aretaic life ethics—is primarily concerned with pragmatic norms. The main question for Aristotle is what a good general conduct of life is. The major concern of aretaic moral theory, on the other hand, is to provide a criterion of morally right action and hence to define the concepts of the morally right, the impermissible and moral duty in aretaic terms. This shows that contemporary authors assume a primacy of virtue, while Aristotle assumes a primacy of eudaimonia. I illustrate this distinction by addressing the question of how the virtues benefit their possessor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent models of wisdom in philosophy and psychology have converged on conceptualizing this intellectual virtue as involving metacognitive processes that enable us to know how to live well and act morally. However, these models have been critiqued by both philosophers and psychologists on the grounds that their conceptions of wisdom are redundant with other constructs, and so the concept of wisdom should be eliminated. In reply, I defend an account of wisdom that similarly conceptualizes wisdom as involving metacognitive processes, but without being subject to the critique that wisdom is redundant. To isolate what's unique about wisdom, I examine the self-regulatory processes that are relevant for being effective in striving to achieve our goals and draw further insights from the research on skill acquisition and expertise. This framework reveals that the unique contribution that wisdom can make beyond these other processes is in setting and revising our conceptions of living well and the constitutive virtues, and so the concept of wisdom is not redundant. In addition, this account can help to resolve two other areas of contention in wisdom research, which is accounting for the connection between wisdom and moral motivation, as well as the role of emotion in wisdom. A goal-oriented approach provides insight into factors influencing moral motivation due to distinctions in the ways goals are formulated, and for a better understanding of the connection between emotion and wisdom I endorse enactivist accounts that maintain that emotions are embodied appraisals connected to our deeply held cares and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practical wisdom is the sine qua non of good conduct for Aristotelian virtue ethicists. Aristotelians conceive it as the virtue responsible for the intellectual side of good conduct, which involves having the right goal and deliberating well about what fulfils that goal, among other tasks. But is there any such trait as practical wisdom? Given the diversity of jobs practical wisdom is asked to do (seven goals are often enumerated), there may be a cluster of traits corresponding to what Aristotelians are talking about, so there really isn't one trait. In this paper, I defend a traditional Aristotelian position on practical wisdom, arguing that it is one thing despite having different functions. Following Thomas Aquinas, we can see practical wisdom as having parts. Those parts may be psychological components (integral parts) of the trait, or they may be derivative functions (virtual parts), things that someone with practical wisdom is also able to do because they have practical wisdom. Still, practical wisdom is one because it is a trait that functions to enable us to pursue the good as good; it possesses what I will call here 'practical unity' as the master virtue of praxis or acting well full stop. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]