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This article focuses on the paper on bootstrapped induction published in the earlier issue that was a part of an extended body of work in which the problem of reference from a sociological point of view was considered. The great sociological importance of the problem of reference will be apparent. If the proper use of a term can be unproblematically fixed in advance by its meaning, or by secure reasoning from its previous usage, or indeed, by anything at all, so that what it refers to is completely and immutably specified, then verbal rules have set implications, norms may govern and determine, values may command actions. A number of interesting alternative approaches are to be found in the sociology of knowledge and science, the context of much of my own work. There is no indication of why it should bear upon the question of the correctness of mechanism. Worse, there is no indication of what dehumanization and reduction consist in. And there is certainly no evidence offered of any connection between the use of mechanistic representations and the production of either of these outcomes.

This paper suggests an alternative to the received view of the relationship between power and authority. It regards authorities as the passive agents of powers. Thus to possess authority is to possess less than to possess power in its own right. Contrast this with the received view where to possess authority is to possess more than to possess power: authority may be power plus legitimacy, or power plus consent. The paper goes on to consider some of the implications of this alternative view, and shows how it allows an analogy between possessing authority in relation to actions and being an authority in relation to knowledge and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's comments on empirical problems encountered in the study of verbal culture. Sociologist Hilary Putnam goes to great lengths to show that the normal linguistic inclinations can strongly predispose one against taking descriptions or even definitions as criteria of membership of a kind. And as far as normal linguistic inclinations are concerned there is no doubt that he is right. Whether a definition or identifying description is applicable to an instance, and whether the instance really is an instance of the associated term, are often treated as distinct questions in practice. Conversely, realists stress that instances may deviate from the requirements of an identifying description and yet be accorded the status of the associated term. In a community with division of linguistic labour it is still possible to employ verbal descriptions in the provisional identification of instances of natural kinds. These descriptions or stereotypes are in some ways analogous to identifying descriptions but their use is not to be relied upon.

This article presents the author's comments on the article "Three Models of Scientific Development," by M.J. Mulkay. Mulkay suggests that such development is better understood in terms of a `model of branching' rather than in terms of a `model of closure' such as that to be found in the work of T.S. Kuhn. Kuhn's interest in cognitive and cultural change as such is manifest in his concentration on the process of innovation. Mulkay has used his notion of branching into new areas of ignorance, produced as the consequences of innovation, to account for social change within science. If these interests are confused, it becomes dangerously easy to fall victim to misleading inferences and groundless expectations. Some of the most interesting issues in the study of science and scientists surround the problem of understanding why some areas or activities are thought to be more promising than others, why some doing normal science find their field `played out' whilst others find more problems being generated, hydra-like, than are being solved.

This article suggests an alternative to the received view of the relationship between power and authority. It regards authorities as the passive agents of powers. The received view of authority within the sociological tradition is that it is power plus: power plus consent, or power plus legitimacy, or power plus institutionalization. There is debate and controversy about what precisely must be added to power to transform it into authority, but there is wide agreement that something must be. And there is wide agreement too that the consequent transformation enhances the effectiveness of what initially is power, that it is a transformation much to the advantage of possessors of power, even essential to their continued enjoyment of their dominant position. Power holders, it is said, do well to seek legitimacy and consent as soon as they may, so that they can enjoy the enduring benefits, which flow to occupants of positions of authority. Someone who thinks of authority as power plus and someone who thinks of it as power minus will find themselves referring at times to different phenomena as authority, or manifestations of authority. There will be an insufficient number of agreed external "facts about authority" for use in deciding between them.

Presents an obituary for philosopher Thomas S. Kunh, who died on June 17, 1996.