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EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for peste des petits ruminants (PPR). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective, except for the first affected establishments detected, where 33 days is recommended. It was concluded that beyond the protection (3 km) and the surveillance zones (10 km) only 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1–5.5%) of the infections from an affected establishment may occur, respectively. This may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread (95% probability of containing transmission corresponds to 5.3 km). Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad‐hoc requests in relation to PPR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Classical swine fever (CSF). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, details of the model used for answering these questions are presented in this opinion as well as the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Here, several recommendations are given on how to increase the effectiveness of some of the sampling procedures. Based on the average length of the period between virus introduction and the reporting of a CSF suspicion, the monitoring period was assessed as non-effective. In a similar way, it was recommended that the length of the measures in the protection and surveillance zones were increased from 15 to 25 days in the protection zone and from 30 to 40 days in the surveillance zone. Finally, the analysis of existing Kernels for CSF suggested that the radius of the protection and the surveillance zones comprise 99% of the infections from an affected establishment if transmission occurred. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CSF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this opinion the antimicrobial‐resistant bacteria responsible for transmissible diseases that constitute a threat to dog and cat health have been assessed. The assessment has been performed following a methodology based on information collected via an extensive literature review and expert judgement. Details of the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. A global state of play of antimicrobial resistant Staphylococcus pseudintermedius, Staphylococcus aureus, Staphylococcus schleiferi, Escherichia coli, Proteus mirabilis, Klebsiella spp., Enterobacter spp., Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Clostridium perfringens, Clostridioides difficile, Enterococcus faecalis and Enterococcus faecium has been provided. Among those bacteria, EFSA identified S. pseudintermedius, E. coli and P. aeruginosa with > 90% certainty as the most relevant antimicrobial resistant bacteria in the EU based on the available evidence. The animal health impact of these most relevant bacteria, as well as their eligibility for being listed and categorised within the animal health law framework will be assessed in separate scientific opinions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission requested EFSA assess antimicrobial-resistant bacteria responsible for animal transmissible diseases, with a view to listing such pathogens for European Union action. This Scientific Opinion addresses the ad hoc method developed: (i) to give a global state of play as regards resistant animal pathogens that cause transmissible animal diseases, (ii) to identify the most relevant bacteria in the EU and (iii) to summarise their actual or potential animal health impact, and to perform their assessment for being listed and categorised according to the criteria of Articles 7, 5, 9 and 8 within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework. An extensive literature review is carried out to give the global state of play of selected resistant bacteria that constitute a threat to animal health (i). An expert judgement procedure, based on the outcome of the literature review, is applied to identify which among those bacteria subjected to the literature review are the 'most relevant' in the European Union (ii). Their animal health impact in the European Union and their assessment for being listed and categorised according to the AHL framework will follow the 'ad hoc method for the assessment on listing and categorisation of animal diseases within the framework of the Animal Health Law' that EFSA has developed in the past (iii). The assessment of (i) and (ii) is addressed in distinct scientific opinions that are published separately by animal species of interest (dogs and cats, horses, pigs, poultry, cattle, small ruminants, rabbits and aquatic animal species). The assessment of (iii) is addressed in distinct scientific opinions and published separately by the animal pathogen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission requested that EFSA provide study designs for the investigation of four research domains according to major gaps in knowledge identified by EFSA in a report published in 2019: i) the patterns of seasonality of African Swine Fever (ASF) in wild boar and domestic pigs in the EU; ii) the epidemiology of ASF in wild boar; iii) survival of ASF virus (ASFV) in the environment and iv) transmission of ASFV by vectors. In this Scientific Opinion, the third research domain on ASFV survival is addressed. Nine research objectives were proposed by the working group and broader ASF expert networks, such as ASF stop, ENETWILD, VectorNet, AHAW network and the AHAW Panel Experts. Of the nine research objectives, only one was prioritised and elaborated into a general protocol/study design research proposal, pertaining ASFV survival in feed and bedding. To investigate the survival of ASFV in feed, bedding and roughage, laboratory survival studies are proposed. To investigate possible risk mitigation measures, proof‐of‐concept approaches should be investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission requested that EFSA provide study designs for the investigation of four research domains according to major gaps in knowledge identified by EFSA in a report published in 2019: (i) the patterns of seasonality of African Swine Fever (ASF) in wild boar and domestic pigs in the EU; (ii) the epidemiology of ASF in wild boar; (iii) survival of ASF virus (ASFV) in the environment and (iv) transmission of ASFV by vectors. In this Scientific Opinion, the fourth research domain on ASFV transmission by vectors is addressed. Eleven research objectives were proposed by the EFSA working group and broader ASF expert networks, such as ASF stop, ENETWILD, VectorNet, AHAW network and the AHAW Panel Experts. Of the 11 research objectives, six were prioritised based on the following set of criteria: (1) the impact on ASF management; (2) the feasibility or practicality to carry out the study; (3) the potential implementation of study results in practice; (4) a possible short time‐frame study (< 1 year); (5) the novelty of the study and (6) if it was a priority for risk managers. The prioritised research objectives were: (I) Studies on the potential vector fauna at the pig–wild boar interface and the feeding preference of blood‐feeding potential vectors in ASF‐affected areas; (II) Assessment of the efficacy of insect screens on indoor/outdoor pig holdings to prevent the entry of blood‐sucking vectors (i.e. Stomoxys) in ASF endemic areas; (III) Assess the role of mechanical vectors in the virus transmission in ASF‐affected areas; (IV) Distribution of the potential mechanical transmission vectors in ASF‐affected areas of the EU; (V) ASFV transmission by synanthropic birds; and (VI) Assessment on the presence/absence of the soft tick Ornithodoros erraticus in ASF‐affected areas in Europe. For each of the selected research objectives, a research protocol has been proposed considering the potential impact on ASF management and the period of 1 year for the research activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This opinion describes outdoor farming of pigs in the EU, assesses the risk of African swine fewer (ASF) introduction and spread associated with outdoor pig farms and proposes biosecurity and control measures for outdoor pig farms in ASF-affected areas of the EU. Evidence was collected from Member States (MSs) veterinary authorities, farmers' associations, literature and legislative documents. An Expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) was carried out to group outdoor pig farms according to their risk of introduction and spread of ASF, to rank biosecurity measures regarding their effectiveness with regard to ASF and propose improvements of biosecurity for outdoor pig farming and accompanying control measures. Outdoor pig farming is common and various farm types are present throughout the EU. As there is no legislation at European level for categorising outdoor pig farms in the EU, information is limited, not harmonised and needs to be interpreted with care. The baseline risk of outdoor pig farms for ASFV introduction and its spread is high but with considerable uncertainty. The Panel is 66-90% certain that, if single solid or double fences were fully and properly implemented on all outdoor pig farms in areas of the EU where ASF is present in wild boar and in domestic pigs in indoor farms and outdoor farms (worst case scenario not considering different restriction zones or particular situations), without requiring any other outdoor-specific biosecurity measures or control measures, this would reduce the number of new ASF outbreaks occurring in these farms within a year by more than 50% compared to the baseline risk. The Panel concludes that the regular implementation of independent and objective on-farm biosecurity assessments using comprehensive standard protocols and approving outdoor pig farms on the basis of their biosecurity risk in an official system managed by competent authorities will further reduce the risk of ASF introduction and spread related to outdoor pig farms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/ 429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for foot and mouth disease (FMD). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, ii) monitoring period and iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection zone of 3 km and of the surveillance zone of 10 km are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective, and it was concluded that the protection and the surveillance zones comprise > 99% of the infections from an affected establishment if transmission occurred. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to FMD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This opinion assesses the risk posed by different matrices to introduce African swine fever virus (ASFV) to non‐affected regions of the EU. Matrices assessed are feed materials, enrichment/bedding materials and empty live pigs transport vehicles returning from affected areas. Although the risk from feed is considered to be lower than several other pathways (e.g. contact with infected live animals and swill feeding), it cannot be ruled out that matrices assessed in this opinion pose a risk. Evidence on survival of ASFV in different matrices from literature and a public consultation was used in an Expert Knowledge Elicitation (EKE) on the possible contamination of products and traded or imported product volumes used on pig farms. The EKE results were used in a model that provided a risk‐rank for each product's contamination likelihood (‘q’), its trade or import volume from affected EU or Eurasian areas (N) and the modelled number of potentially infected pig farms (N × q). The products ranking higher regardless of origin or destination were mash and pelleted compound feed, feed additives and cereals. Bedding/enrichment materials, hydrolysed proteins and blood products ranked lowest regardless of origin or destination. Empty vehicles ranked lower than compound feed but higher than non‐compound feed or bedding/enrichment material. It is very likely (95–99% certainty) that compound feed and cereals rank higher than feed materials, which rank higher than bedding/enrichment material and forage. As this is an assessment based on several parameters including the contamination and delivery to a pig farm, all of which have the same impact on the final ranking, risk managers should consider how the relative rank of each product may change with an effective storage period or a virus inactivation step.This publication is linked to the following EFSA Supporting Publications articles: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/supporting/pub/9993e and http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/supporting/pub/9994e [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission requested EFSA to provide study designs for the investigation of four research domains according to major gaps in knowledge identified by EFSA in a report published in 2019: i) the patterns of seasonality of ASF in wild boar and domestic pigs in the EU; ii) the ASF epidemiology in wild boar; iii) ASF virus (ASFV) survival in the environment and iv) ASF transmission by vectors. In this Scientific Opinion, the first research domain on ASF seasonality is addressed. Therefore, five research objectives were proposed by the working group and broader ASF expert networks, such as ASF stop, ENETWILD, VectorNet, AHAW network and the AHAW Panel Experts. Of the five research objectives, only two were prioritised and elaborated into a general protocol/study design research proposal, namely: 1) to monitor the herd incidence of ASF outbreaks in EU Member States (MS) and 2) to investigate potential (seasonal) risk factors for ASF incursion in domestic pig herds of different herd types and/or size. To monitor the incidence in different pig herd types, it is advised to collect, besides ASF surveillance data, pig population data describing at least the following parameters per farm from the first moment of incursion in an affected MS: the numbers of pigs (e.g. number of breeding pigs sows and boars, weaners and fatteners) and the location and the type of farm (including details on the level of biosecurity implemented on the farm and the outdoor/indoor production). We suggest collecting data from all ASF‐affected MS through the SIGMA data model, which was developed for this purpose. To investigate potential risk factors for ASF incursion in domestic pig herds, we suggest a matched case–control design. Such a study design can be run either retrospectively or prospectively. The collected data on the pig herds and the ASF surveillance data in the SIGMA data model can be used to identify case and control farms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFS Aassessed the role of seropositive wild boarin Africans wine fever (ASF) persistence. Surveillance data from Estonia and Latvia investigated with a generalised equation method demonstrated a significantly slower decline in seroprevalence in adult animals compared with subadults. The seroprevalence in adults, taking more than 24 months to approach zero after the last detection of ASFV circulation, would be a poor indicator to demonstrate the absence of virus circulation. A narrative literature review updated the knowledge on the mortality rate, the duration of protective immunity and maternal antibodies and transmission parameters. In addition, parameters potentially leading to prolonged virus circulation (persistence) in wild boar populations were reviewed. A stochastic explicit model was used to evaluate the dynamics of virus prevalence, seroprevalence and the number of car casses attributed to ASF. Secondly,the impact of four scenarios on the duration of ASF virus (ASFV) persistence was evaluated with the model, namely a: (1) prolonged, lifelong infectious period, (2) reduction in the case-fatality rate and prolonged transient infectiousness; (3) change in duration of protective immunity and (4) change in the duration of protection from maternal antibodies. Only the lifelong infectious period scenario had an important prolonging effect on the persistence of ASF. Finally, the model tested the performance of different proposed surveillance strategies to provide evidence of the absence of virus circulation (Exit Strategy). A two-phase approach (Screening Phase, Confirmation Phase) was suggested for the Exit Strategy. The accuracy of the Exit Strategy increases with increasing numbers of carcasses collected and tested. The inclusion of active surveillance based on hunting has limited impact on the performance of the Exit Strategy compared with lengthening of the monitoring period. This performance improvement should be reasonably balanced against an unnecessary prolonged‘time free’with only a marginal gain in performance. Recommendations are provided for minimum monitoring periods leading to minimal failure rates of the Exit Strategy. The proposed Exit Strategy would fail with the presence of lifelong infectious wild boar. That said, it should be emphasised that the existence of such animals is speculative, based on current knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for African Horse Sickness (AHS). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum duration of measures in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures were assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, sampling procedures described in the diagnostic manual for AHS were considered efficient for all Equidae considering the high case fatality rate expected. The monitoring period (14 days) was assessed as effective in every scenario, except for those relating to the epidemiological enquiry where the risk manager should consider increasing the monitoring period, based on the awareness of keepers, environmental conditions and the vector abundance in the region. The current protection zone (100 km) comprises more than 95% of the infections from an affected establishment. Both the radius and duration of the zones could be reduced, based on local environmental conditions and the time of year of the first index case. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation relating to AHS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for African Swine Fever (ASF). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts reviewed the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the assessment of the laboratory sampling procedures for ASF are presented here. Here, also, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, several sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual for ASF were considered ineffective and a suggestion to exclude, or to substitute with more effective procedures was made. The monitoring period was assessed as non-effective for several scenarios and a longer monitoring period was suggested to ensure detection of potentially infected herds. It was demonstrated that the surveillance zone comprises 95% of the infections from an affected establishment, and therefore is considered effective. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to ASF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the assessment of the laboratory sampling procedures for HPAI are presented here. Here, also, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual for HPAI were considered efficient for gallinaceous poultry, whereas additional sampling is advised for Anseriformes. The monitoring period was assessed as effective, and it was demonstrated that the surveillance zone comprises 95% of the infections from an affected establishment. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to HPAI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cattle of different ages may have to be killed on farm for purposes other than slaughter (the latter being defined as killing for human consumption) either individually or on a large scale, e.g. for economic reasons or for disease control. The purpose of this scientific opinion is to assess the risks associated with the on‐farm killing of cattle. The processes during on‐farm killing that were assessed included handling and moving, stunning and/or killing methods (including restraint). The killing methods were grouped into mechanical and electrical methods as well as lethal injection. In total, 21 hazards compromising animal welfare were identified and characterised, most of these related to stunning and/or killing. Staff was identified as an origin for all hazards, either due to lack of appropriate skills needed to perform tasks or due to fatigue. Possible preventive and corrective measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for 19 hazards, and the staff was shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Three welfare consequences of hazards to which cattle can be exposed during on‐farm killing were identified: impeded movement, pain and fear. The welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures related to these were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal‐based measures, origins of the hazards, preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise the welfare consequences are proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pigs at different stages of the production cycle may have to be killed on‐farm for purposes other than slaughter (where slaughter is defined as killing for human consumption) either individually (e.g. severely injured pigs) or on a large scale (e.g. unproductive animals or for disease control reasons). This opinion assessed the risks associated with the on‐farm killing of pigs and included two phases: 1) handling and moving of pigs and 2) killing methods (including restraint). The killing methods were subdivided into four categories: electrical methods, mechanical methods, gas mixture methods and lethal injection. Four welfare consequences to which pigs can be exposed to during on‐farm killing were identified: pain, fear, impeded movement and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures were described. In total, 28 hazards were associated with the welfare consequences; majority of the hazards (24) are related to Phase 2 (killing). The main hazards are associated with lack of staff skills and training, and poor‐designed and constructed facilities. Staff was identified as an origin of all hazards, either due to lack of skills needed to perform appropriate killing or due to fatigue. Corrective measures were identified for 25 hazards. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal‐based measures, hazard origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed and mitigation measures proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector‐borne disease transmitted by different mosquito species, especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals and humans. In November 2018, RVF re‐emerged in Mayotte (France) after 11 years. Up to the end of October 2019, 126 outbreaks in animals and 143 human cases were reported. RVF mortality was 0.01%, and the number of abortions reported in polymerase chain reaction (PCR)‐positive ruminants was fivefold greater than the previous 7 years. Milk loss production in 2019 compared to 2015–2018 was estimated to be 18%, corresponding to an economic loss of around €191,000 in all of Mayotte. The tropical climate in Mayotte provides conditions for the presence of mosquitoes during the whole year, and illegal introductions of animals represent a continuous risk of (re)introduction of RVF. The probability of RVF virus (RVFV) persisting in Mayotte for 5 or more years was estimated to be < 10% but could be much lower if vertical transmission in vectors does not occur. Persistence of RVF by vertical transmission in Mayotte and Réunion appears to be of minor relevance compared to other pathways of re‐introduction (i.e. animal movement). However, there is a high uncertainty since there is limited information about the vertical transmission of some of the major species of vectors of RVFV in Mayotte and Réunion. The only identified pathways for the risk of spread of RVF from Mayotte to other countries were by infected vectors transported in airplanes or by wind currents. For the former, the risk of introduction of RVF to continental France was estimated to 4 × 10−6 epidemic per year (median value; 95% CI: 2 × 10−8; 0.0007), and 0.001 epidemic per year to Réunion (95% CI: 4 × 10−6; 0.16). For the latter pathway, mosquitoes dispersing on the wind from Mayotte between January and April 2019 could have reached the Comoros Islands, Madagascar, Mozambique and, possibly, Tanzania. However, these countries are already endemic for RVF, and an incursion of RVFV‐infected mosquitoes would have negligible impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rabbits of different ages may have to be killed on‐farm for purposes other than slaughter (where slaughter is defined as killing for human consumption) either individually or on a large scale (e.g. for production reasons or for disease control). The purpose of this opinion was to assess the risks associated to the on‐farm killing of rabbits. The processes during on‐farm killing that were assessed included handling, stunning and/or killing methods (including restraint). The latter were grouped into four categories: electrical methods, mechanical methods, controlled atmosphere method and lethal injection. In total, 14 hazards were identified and characterised, most of these related to stunning and/or killing. The staff was identified as the origin for all hazards, either due to lack of the appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or due to fatigue. Possible corrective and preventive measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for five hazards and the staff was shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Five welfare consequences of the welfare hazards to which rabbits can be exposed to during on‐farm killing were identified: not being dead, consciousness, pain, fear and distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal‐based measures, origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The AGRI committee of the European Parliament requested EFSA to assess the welfare of rabbits farmed in different production systems, including organic production, and to update its 2005 scientific opinion about the health and welfare of rabbits kept for meat production. Considering reproducing does, kits and growing rabbits, this scientific opinion focusses on six different housing systems, namely conventional cages, structurally enriched cages, elevated pens, floor pens, outdoor/partially outdoor systems and organic systems. To compare the level of welfare in the different housing systems and rabbit categories, welfare impact scores for 20 welfare consequences identified from the literature were calculated, taking their occurrence, duration and severity into account. Based on the overall welfare impact score (sum of scores for the single welfare consequences), obtained via a 2‐step expert knowledge elicitation process, the welfare of reproducing does is likely (certainty 66–90%) to be lower in conventional cages compared to the five other housing systems. In addition, it is likely to extremely likely (certainty 66–99%) that the welfare of kits is lower in outdoor systems compared to the other systems and that the welfare is higher in elevated pens than in the other systems. Finally, it is likely to extremely likely (certainty 66–99%) that the welfare of growing rabbits is lower in conventional cages compared to the other systems and that the welfare is higher in elevated pens than in the other systems. Ranking of the welfare consequences allowed an analysis of the main welfare consequences within each system and rabbit category. It was concluded that for reproducing does, as well as growing rabbits, welfare consequences related to behavioural restrictions were more prominent in conventional cages, elevated pens and enriched cages, whereas those related to health problems were more important in floor pens, outdoor and organic systems. Housing in organic rabbit farming is diverse, which can result in different welfare consequences, but the overall welfare impact scores suggest that welfare in organic systems is generally good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This opinion on the killing of rabbits for human consumption (‘slaughtering’) responds to two mandates: one from the European Parliament (EP) and the other from the European Commission. The opinion describes stunning methods for rabbits known to the experts in the EFSA working group, which can be used in commercial practice, and which are sufficiently described in scientific and technical literature for the development of an opinion. These are electrical stunning, mechanical stunning with a penetrative and non‐penetrative captive bolt and gas stunning. The latter method is not allowed in the EU anymore following Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, but may still be practiced elsewhere in the world. Related hazards and welfare consequences are also evaluated. To monitor stunning effectiveness as requested by the EP mandate, the opinion suggests the use of indicators for the state of consciousness, selected on the basis of their sensitivity, specificity and ease of use. Similarly, it suggests indicators to confirm animals are dead before dressing. For the European Commission mandate, slaughter processes were assessed from the arrival of rabbits in containers until their death, and grouped in three main phases: pre‐stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of rabbits from containers), stunning (including restraint) and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Ten welfare consequences resulting from the hazards that rabbits can be exposed to during slaughter are identified: consciousness, animal not dead, thermal stress (heat or cold stress), prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures (indicators) are described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, indicators, origins, preventive and corrective measures are developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are also proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poultry of different ages may have to be killed on‐farm for purposes other than slaughter (in which slaughtering is defined as being for human consumption) either individually or on a large scale (e.g. because unproductive, for disease control, etc.). The processes of on‐farm killing that were assessed are handling and stunning and/or killing methods (including restraint). The latter were grouped into four categories: electrical methods, modified atmosphere, mechanical methods and lethal injection. In total, 29 hazards were identified and characterised, most of these regard stunning and/or killing. Staff were identified as origin for 26 hazards and 24 hazards were attributed to lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or due to fatigue. Specific hazards were identified for day‐old chicks killed via maceration. Corrective and preventive measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for 13 hazards, and management showed to have a crucial role in prevention. Eight welfare consequences, the birds can be exposed to during on‐farm killing, were identified: not dead, consciousness, heat stress, cold stress, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal‐based measures, origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences were also proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The killing of poultry for human consumption (slaughtering) can take place in a slaughterhouse or during on‐farm slaughter. The processes of slaughtering that were assessed, from the arrival of birds in containers until their death, were grouped into three main phases: pre‐stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of birds from containers); stunning (including restraint); and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Stunning methods were grouped into three categories: electrical, controlled modified atmosphere and mechanical. In total, 35 hazards were identified and characterised, most of them related to stunning and bleeding. Staff were identified as the origin of 29 hazards, and 28 hazards were attributed to the lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or to fatigue. Corrective and preventive measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for 11 hazards, with management shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Ten welfare consequences, the birds can be exposed to during slaughter, were identified: consciousness, heat stress, cold stress, prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal‐based measures, origins, and preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences were also proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spring Viraemia of Carp (SVC) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to SVC. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by the AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment performed here, it is uncertain whether SVC can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (45-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that SVC does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-33% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 10-66%, 45-90% and 45-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for SVC according to Article 8 criteria are provided., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Infection with salmonid alphavirus (SAV) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid out in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with SAV. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method on data collection and assessment developed by AHAW Panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment, it was uncertain whether infection with salmonid alphavirus can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-80% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that infection with salmonid alphavirus does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-10% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 50-90%, probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for infection with SAV according to Article 8 criteria are provided., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Infection with Gyrodactylus salaris was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid down in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with G. salaris . The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether infection with G. salaris can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-70% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that Infection with G. salaris does not meet the criteria in Section 1 and 3 (Category A and C; 1-5% and 10-33% probability of fulfilling the criteria, respectively) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 4 and 5 (Categories B, D and E; 33-80%, 33-66% and 33-80% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for infection with G. salaris according to Article 8 criteria are provided., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Bacterial kidney disease (BKD) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid out in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to BKD. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method on data collection and assessment developed by AHAW Panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to this assessment, BKD can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (66-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that BKD does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 3 (Categories A, B and C; 1-5%, 33-66% and 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) but meets the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 (Categories D and E; 66-90% and 66-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for BKD according to Article 8 criteria are provided., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Infectious pancreatic necrosis (IPN) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to IPN. The assessment was performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether IPN can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that IPN does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 0-1% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 33-66%, 50-90% and 50-99% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for IPN according to Article 8 criteria are provided., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

This document provides methodological guidance developed by the EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare to produce Scientific Opinions in response to mandates received from the European Commission in the context of the Farm to Fork Strategy. The mandates relate to the welfare of (i) animals during transport, (ii) calves, (iii) laying hens, (iv) broilers, (v) pigs, (vi) ducks, geese and quails, and (vii) dairy cows. This guidance was developed in order to define the methods and strategy to be applied for responding to the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the mandates. The mandates each consist of a set of General ToRs which refer to the husbandry systems used in the production of each animal species or the current transport practices for free moving animals and animals transported in cages, and a set of specific ToRs for which difficulties in ensuring animal welfare have been identified and where specific scenarios are envisaged. Part I of the guidance includes a description of welfare consequences for the animals. Part II includes a new methodology for providing quantitative recommendations regarding animal welfare. The proposed methodology follows the assumption that the effect of an exposure variable (e.g. space allowance) on animal welfare can be quantified by comparing the expression of an animal-based measure (ABM) under 'unexposed conditions' (e.g. unlimited space) and under high exposure (e.g. restrictive conditions). The level of welfare as assessed through this ABM can be quantified for different levels of the exposure variable (e.g. at increasing space allowances) and quantitative recommendations can thus be provided. The final version of the methodological guidance was endorsed for public consultation, which took place between 14 February 2022 and 31 March 2022. The comments received are integrated in this document., (© 2022 Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KgaA on behalf of the European Food Safety Authority.)

The EFSA asked the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare to develop a guidance document on good practice in conducting scientific assessments in animal health using modelling. In previous opinions, the AHAW Panel has responded to two-thirds of animal health-related mandates using some kind of modelling. These models range from simple to complex, employing a combination of scientific, economic, socio-economic or other types of data. Hence, there is strong interest in the development of a guidance document to integrate modelling efforts into the routine process of EFSA working groups. In this document, an 'operating procedure' (OP) for the use of modelling within an AH working group is presented. The OP provides a detailed flowchart enabling modelling to be transparently and consistently integrated in the assessment. The OP is structured into phases. These phases combine the relevant standard operating procedures and working instructions of EFSA with the modelling process. Each phase includes roles and actions to be taken, expected output and the sequence of agreements that need to be made between all partners in the scientific assessment. In conclusion, it is expected that adherence to the OP will improve transparency of models in EFSA outputs, and it is recommended to adopt it as a standard procedure when responding to AHAW mandates., (© 2022 Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KgaA on behalf of the European Food Safety Authority.)

Effectiveness of surveillance and control measures against Rift Valley Fever (RVF) in Mayotte (overseas France) and in continental EU were assessed using mathematical models. Surveillance for early detection of RVF virus circulation implies very low design prevalence values and thus sampling a high number of animals, so feasibility issues may rise. Passive surveillance based on notified abortions in ruminants is key for early warning and at present the only feasible surveillance option. The assessment of vaccination and culling against RVF in Mayotte suggests that vaccination is more effective when quickly implemented throughout the population, e.g. at a rate of 200 or 2,000 animals vaccinated per day. Test and cull is not an option for RVF control in Mayotte given the high number of animals that would need to be tested. If the risk of RVFV introduction into the continental EU increases, ruminant establishments close to possible points of disease incursion should be included in the surveillance. An enhanced surveillance on reproductive disorders should be applied during summer in risk areas. Serosurveillance targets of 0.3% animals should be at least considered. RVF control measures possibly applied in the continental EU have been assessed in the Netherlands, as an example. Culling animals on farms within a 20 km radius of detected farms appears as the most effective measure to control RVF spread, although too many animals should be culled. Alternative measures are vaccination in a 50 km radius around detection, ring vaccination between 20 and 50 km and culling of detected farms. The assessment of zoning showed that, following RVFV introduction and considering an R 0 = 2, a mean vector dispersal of 10 km and 10 farms initially detected, RVFV would spread beyond a radius of up to 100 km or 50 km from the infected area with 10% or 55% probability, respectively., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The killing of cattle for human consumption (slaughtering) can take place in a slaughterhouse or on farm. The processes of slaughtering that were assessed for welfare, from the arrival of cattle until their death (including slaughtering without stunning), were grouped into three main phases: pre-stunning (including arrival, unloading from the truck, lairage, handling and moving of cattle); stunning (including restraint); and bleeding. Stunning methods were grouped into two categories: mechanical and electrical. Twelve welfare consequences that cattle may be exposed to during slaughter were identified: heat stress, cold stress, fatigue, prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, impeded movement, restriction of movements, resting problems (inability to rest or discomfort during resting), social stress, pain, fear and distress. Welfare consequences and their relevant animal-based measures are described. In total, 40 welfare hazards that could occur during slaughter were identified and characterised, most of them related to stunning and bleeding. Staff were identified as the origin of 39 hazards, which were attributed to the lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or to fatigue. Measures to prevent and correct hazards were identified, and structural and managerial measures were identified as those with a crucial role in prevention. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, origin of hazards, and preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The killing of pigs for human consumption (slaughtering) can take place in a slaughterhouse or on farm. The processes of slaughtering that were assessed for welfare, from the arrival of pigs until their death, were grouped into three main phases: pre-stunning (including arrival, unloading from the truck, lairage, handling and moving of pigs); stunning (including restraint); and bleeding. Stunning methods were grouped into three categories: electrical, controlled atmosphere and mechanical. Twelve welfare consequences the pigs can be exposed to during slaughter were identified: heat stress, cold stress, fatigue, prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, impeded movement, restriction of movements, resting problem, negative social behaviour, pain, fear and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures were described. In total, 30 welfare hazards that could occur during slaughter were identified and characterised, most of them related to stunning and bleeding. Staff were identified as the origin of 29 hazards, which were attributed to the lack of appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or to fatigue. Corrective and preventive measures for these hazards were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified, and management was shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, origins and preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Rabbits of different ages may have to be killed on-farm for purposes other than slaughter (where slaughter is defined as killing for human consumption) either individually or on a large scale (e.g. for production reasons or for disease control). The purpose of this opinion was to assess the risks associated to the on-farm killing of rabbits. The processes during on-farm killing that were assessed included handling, stunning and/or killing methods (including restraint). The latter were grouped into four categories: electrical methods, mechanical methods, controlled atmosphere method and lethal injection. In total, 14 hazards were identified and characterised, most of these related to stunning and/or killing. The staff was identified as the origin for all hazards, either due to lack of the appropriate skill sets needed to perform tasks or due to fatigue. Possible corrective and preventive measures were assessed: measures to correct hazards were identified for five hazards and the staff was shown to have a crucial role in prevention. Five welfare consequences of the welfare hazards to which rabbits can be exposed to during on-farm killing were identified: not being dead, consciousness, pain, fear and distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures were described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, animal-based measures, origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

This opinion on the killing of rabbits for human consumption ('slaughtering') responds to two mandates: one from the European Parliament (EP) and the other from the European Commission. The opinion describes stunning methods for rabbits known to the experts in the EFSA working group, which can be used in commercial practice, and which are sufficiently described in scientific and technical literature for the development of an opinion. These are electrical stunning, mechanical stunning with a penetrative and non-penetrative captive bolt and gas stunning. The latter method is not allowed in the EU anymore following Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, but may still be practiced elsewhere in the world. Related hazards and welfare consequences are also evaluated. To monitor stunning effectiveness as requested by the EP mandate, the opinion suggests the use of indicators for the state of consciousness, selected on the basis of their sensitivity, specificity and ease of use. Similarly, it suggests indicators to confirm animals are dead before dressing. For the European Commission mandate, slaughter processes were assessed from the arrival of rabbits in containers until their death, and grouped in three main phases: pre-stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of rabbits from containers), stunning (including restraint) and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Ten welfare consequences resulting from the hazards that rabbits can be exposed to during slaughter are identified: consciousness, animal not dead, thermal stress (heat or cold stress), prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal-based measures (indicators) are described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, indicators, origins, preventive and corrective measures are developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are also proposed., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The AGRI committee of the European Parliament requested EFSA to assess the welfare of rabbits farmed in different production systems, including organic production, and to update its 2005 scientific opinion about the health and welfare of rabbits kept for meat production. Considering reproducing does, kits and growing rabbits, this scientific opinion focusses on six different housing systems, namely conventional cages, structurally enriched cages, elevated pens, floor pens, outdoor/partially outdoor systems and organic systems. To compare the level of welfare in the different housing systems and rabbit categories, welfare impact scores for 20 welfare consequences identified from the literature were calculated, taking their occurrence, duration and severity into account. Based on the overall welfare impact score (sum of scores for the single welfare consequences), obtained via a 2-step expert knowledge elicitation process, the welfare of reproducing does is likely (certainty 66-90%) to be lower in conventional cages compared to the five other housing systems. In addition, it is likely to extremely likely (certainty 66-99%) that the welfare of kits is lower in outdoor systems compared to the other systems and that the welfare is higher in elevated pens than in the other systems. Finally, it is likely to extremely likely (certainty 66-99%) that the welfare of growing rabbits is lower in conventional cages compared to the other systems and that the welfare is higher in elevated pens than in the other systems. Ranking of the welfare consequences allowed an analysis of the main welfare consequences within each system and rabbit category. It was concluded that for reproducing does, as well as growing rabbits, welfare consequences related to behavioural restrictions were more prominent in conventional cages, elevated pens and enriched cages, whereas those related to health problems were more important in floor pens, outdoor and organic systems. Housing in organic rabbit farming is diverse, which can result in different welfare consequences, but the overall welfare impact scores suggest that welfare in organic systems is generally good., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)