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The article uses a political economy approach to examine critically the conventional arguments for central bank independence and to make the terms of debate more precise. It assesses the advisability and feasibility of greater autonomy in relation to the constellations of political forces in specific societies and concludes by suggesting how, in the context of developing societies, an accommodation of interests might be reached to support a more autonomous but not fully independent central bank., I. INTRODUCTION The question of central bank independence has recently entered the policy agenda of many countries, cutting across both development status and political regime. Countries of the North and [...]

An analysis of economic reforms in China resulting in sustained and stable economic development, shows that the active local state plays an important role in its reform programs and that the economic progress can be fully explained only by identifying the importance of social ownership in China. However, China is still facing problems in the economic and social sectors and it is essential to institutionalize these reforms to reinforce rural institutions and the multi-level state. Chinese economy is undergoing a radical change with a possibility of evolving into a form of corporatism.

There is no single socialist model because the traditional socialist models focus on a single model which focuses on state ownership and a highly- integrated system of central planning. On the other hand, the new socialist models focus on various ownership and central planning patterns, resulting in different economic models. For social democracy to survive, it must prove itself capable of being adaptable and dynamic.

This two-part article analyses the attempts to reform the socialist financial system in China by diversifying financial assets and introducing capital markets. The approach used is that of political economy, in the sense of elucidating the interplay between political and economic interests, actors and issues in the reform process. Part I discusses the issue of bonds by governments and enterprises. Although the reform era has seen gradual progress towards something resembling a bond |market' in terms of a diversification of bond types and growing competition between bond issues, there is no evidence that this has improved allocative efficiency in the economy. Rather, bonds have functioned as one instrument in a complex struggle for resources between political, institutional and economic actors in the context of a continuing shortage economy'. This competitive system falls far short of a true market'; rather it embodies powerful systemic factors reflecting the basic structural and institutional features of a semi-reformed socialist economy. One of these systemic factors is the institution of social ownership of the means of production which has been called into question by the emergence of shares and share markets, a process we discuss in Part II. Share issues have in the event been economically unimportant but politically important since they challenge the ideological and institutional underpinnings of a socialist' economy. The key to the future of this form of financial liberalisation depends not merely on further progress in complementary areas of economic reform policy, but also on a resolution of these fundamental political issues.