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In recent decades, the development of trilateral institutions among China, Japan and South Korea has begun to take shape. This study analyzes its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the nexus between trilateralism and bilateralism. A well-functioning trilateral grouping needs to overcome two structural limitations – dilution effects and bilateral constraints – both of which are triggered by embedded bilateral approaches. The critical juncture approach is effective in terms of elevating the payoffs of cooperative trilateralism during times of exigency. However, once common crises have dissipated, trilateralism has revealed starkly different performances with respect to functional and political-diplomatic cooperation. This article adopts a dichotomous approach between the two. Functional trilateralism has been steadily growing, and has proven to be less subject to fluctuations in the nations’ political relationships. Its outcomes are positive and worthy of praise. However, the outcomes of trilateralism have been less convincing in fields of middle and high politics. Trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations when its embedded bilateral relations change, and cooperative outcomes within a trilateral grouping are prone to being diluted by bilateral approaches. China–Japan–Korea trilateralism at diplomatic levels remains more an extension of bilateral relations than a mature form of minilateral arrangement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyzes Por mares y por tierras (1899) by Eduardo Wilde, especially his notes about Japan and China. Written at the end of the nineteenth century, Wilde's travel diaries share some elements with the modernist texts from the period. However, his writing stands out for its cultural and scientific perspective that emphasizes the alternative modernity of Japan against the primitive condition of China, thereby questioning the idea of a homogenous Asia. On the other hand, the comparison between Japan and China highlights counterpoints that symbolize the famous dichotomy between civilization and barbarism. In this way, Wilde's observations about Asia reveal a political objective, from where the future of Argentine republic is envisioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are numerous studies on China's Resistance War against Japan, most of which focus on mainland China. By contrast, there is very limited knowledge on the role of Hong Kong in the Anti-Japanese War in the 1930s. My research uncovers that the contribution of a British colonial English newspaper, the South China Morning Post in the anti-Japanese war has been largely neglected. I argue that while China had been invaded by Japanese military forces, the journalists, readers and lots of advertisers of the South China Morning Post focused on the pro-China reporting and essentially supported China's Resistance. Within the article, I disclosed how the board members and editors debated about the press freedom and the business profit issues, as well as the connections of the South China Morning Post with political parties such as the China Communist Party and the China Nationalist Party. As result of unique social position of the South China Morning Post, it became a fl agship newspaper of the anti-Japanese invasion. As a result, international and local newspapers quoted and reprinted the South China Morning Post's war news and editorials. In brief, the South China Morning Post has a pivotal role in the history of China's Resistance War against Japanese invasion, which had been largely neglected in previous studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars tend to overlook the overseas Chinese press as a communicative tool for Chinese nationalism. This paper takes media history as its focal point to demonstrate the contextual influences that shaped the operations of Chinese print media and gave rise to the manifestation of the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) identity in Japan. In particular, it emphasises that the mobilisation of the modern Chinese nationalism movement of the time was not the sole determinant of Chinese identity. It was also influenced by the way in which Chinese ethnic boundaries came to be shaped and reshaped in different historical periods through the dynamics between overseas Chinese communities and Japanese society. I use two overseas Chinese publications from different periods to illustrate the impacts of modern Chinese nationalism and the changing social and political context of Japan on the Chinese press. Finally, I present a synthetic narrative to account for the history of the overseas Chinese press in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract:The post-Cold War context has accompanied the ascent of East Asian economies and consumer markets, as exemplified by China, while Japan's experience has been marked by the struggle with an economic slump after the collapse of the so-called bubble economy. Japan has been actively promoting ‘cool Japan’ instead of the economy, but even more notable is the rise of the Korean Wave. Joined together with political contestation over historical issues, anti-China/Korea sentiments have been growing, as is the accompanying hate-speech movement against resident Koreans in new-millennium Japan. Growing East Asian rivalry along with the relative decline of Japan, the widely shared sense of socio-economic predicament and the upsurge of digital media communications have been conjoined to generate the hunt for proximate enemies – China, Korea, and resident Koreans in Japan – as the object of expressions of hate. How to develop better uses of digital media towards the cultivation of dialogic cultural citizenship is an imperative issue. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Immediately after the occurrence of the Nanjing Massacre, it was reported by both official and nonofficial media, and followed by witness accounts and victim recollections. All this formed the basic memory of the atrocity in Chinese society. After Japan's surrender in 1945, the National Government conducted preliminary investigations and organized memorial services. However, the investigation was interrupted by the outbreak of the Civil War (1947-49). After the Communist victory in 1949, relationships between the Communists and Nationalists, China and United States and China and Japan all played a role in suppressing and even forgetting the memory of the Nanjing Massacre. It was not until the 1980s, after the normalization of Sino- Japanese relations, that the memory finally entered a process of reconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Toki Experimental Project, a theatrical collaboration between China and Japan that incorporates the traditional Chinese Kunqu and Japanese nō with contemporary Chinese and Japanese dance and theater. It mentions the work of Japanese theater director Sato Makoto and Chinese theater director Danny Yung in beginning the project and describes several of the transnational projects created by Toki.

Following Japan's invasion of China in 1937, Japanese bureaucratic and intellectual elites constructed a volatile image of the munitions worker as trickster. Within this discursive realm, the worker became an object of hope, fear, and rage for the guardians of an idealized home front struggling to bolster war production while still adhering to wartime goals of national austerity. In the cultural fantasies and nightmares of the Japanese home front, the munitions worker fluctuated between the valorized “industrial warrior” laboring for the nation and a violent delinquent ready to wreak havoc on society. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since 2012, China’s assertion of its sovereignty claim to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has significantly raised the risk of a potentially escalatory political-military crisis with Japan. As circumstances worsen, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed major institutional reforms aimed at centralizing Japanese security policy decision-making and vastly improving crisis management. This article assesses these reforms’ significance for ameliorating Japan’s long-standing internal crisis management weaknesses, and enhancing its ability to communicate with Beijing promptly under challenging conditions. While significant issues remain, recent developments – especially the establishment of Japan’s first-ever National Security Council – demonstrate significant progress. Bilaterally, however, important firebreaks remain conspicuously absent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to explore the Sino-Japanese rival and interdependent relations in East Asia through stressing their competitions for the regional "leadership." The article suggests that the regional leadership requires strong national strength and other regional countries' acceptance. Thus, to gain these competitive capitals, China and Japan have to treat each other as rivals to win relative capitals within East Asia. Therefore, China and Japan are playing zero-sum games. Moreover, making a bigger "regional" pie also could enhance both countries' capitals, especially given the transnational character of non-traditional security; therefore, China and Japan have to be interdependent on one another, which is playing positive-sum games. This article concludes that rival and interdependent are measures for both countries' leadership aspiration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the relational IR literature on identity politics and Sino-Japanese relations. Theoretically, we develop Rumelili's framework for studying modes of differentiation by incorporating the sectoral characteristics of key discourse signs. Empirically, we apply this framework to the construction of Self and Other in the official Japanese security discourse regarding the Senkaku Islands dispute from 2010-2014, a period of dispute climax that is meaningful for studying the (re)production of Japan's understanding of China. The inclusiveness of the discourse signs that Japan uses to construct China possibly opens up for a positive evolution of Sino-Japanese relations, as there is space for progress if China's behavior-and Japan's interpretation of it-proves to be more peaceful, transparent, and law-abiding. The findings also suggest, however, that the strong sense of superiority in Japan (and China) vis-à-vis a subordinate Other may not bode well for Sino-Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on Akutagawa Ryūnosuke'sShina yūki(Travels in China): an account of a four-month journey through eastern, central, and northern China in the spring and summer of 1921. Due to Akutagawa's reputation as a writer and the account's vantage point on a transitional period in Japan's expansion abroad,Travels in Chinahas traditionally enjoyed a prominent place in the canon of twentieth-century Japanese travel writing. What has received less attention, however, is the relation of the work to the rest of Akutagawa's literary corpus. In this paper, I situateTravels in Chinawithin the larger context of Akutagawa's ongoing interest in Chinese fiction and drama. Rather than readingTravels in Chinaas a work of journalism, as Akutagawa initially invited his readers to do, I argue that the work is an extended exploration not only of the relationship between ‘New China’ and Akutagawa's beloved traditional Chinese culture, but also of the boundaries separating journalism, fiction, and other literary genres. Ultimately, I connectTravels in Chinato Akutagawa's later work: texts that similarly interrogate and deconstruct the distinctions between genres and modes of narrating experience. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reassesses the 2006 and, tentatively, the 2014 reset in Sino-Japanese relations to argue in favour of an increasingly state-centric understanding of Japanese diplomacy. By making use of a narrative account and a variety of primary sources--including personal memoirs, elite interviews, participatory observation, and leaked State Department cables--this article finds that Abe Shinzo's foreign policy confidante, Yachi Shotaro, embodied the unmatched influence of government actors in Japan's political landscape. The article provides a close-up portrait of Yachi, with an emphasis on his preference for geopolitics, strategy, and secret diplomacy. Yachi and the institutional apparatus he represented sought detente with Japan's main strategic adversary, while pushing for geopolitical initiatives that targeted China. The article concludes by arguing that the Abe administration's insistence on, and institutionalized practice of, conducting public affairs in secret will likely further strengthen the role of the nation-state and of government actors in Japan, also in light of growing geopolitical tensions in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of Japan's large-scale aerial bombing of Chongqing and the surrounding mountainous natural environment during the Anti-Japanese War, shelters became important places where the residents of wartime Chongqing evaded attacks by Japanese planes. In addition, the differences between the public and private bomb shelter facilities reflected the high and low, noble and humble people in the shelters, indicating the social class differences in wartime Chongqing. Shelters, especially public shelters, also provided places for socializing, recreation, and they had political and economic functions. Thus, bomb shelters became new public living spaces. Living in bomb shelters also became an important component of the daily lives of the residents in wartime Chongqing. Discussing their daily lives in the shelter allows us to not only understand and know the diversity and complexity of the daily lives of Chongqing's wartime citizens but also reveals the significant impact of the all-encompassing invasion waged by Japan at the micro level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Philippines and Japan have evolved a security partnership in the face of China's maritime expansion in the South and East China Seas. The two countries pursue this security partnership through regular bilateral consultations among Philippine and Japanese heads of states, political leaders, defense ministry officials, and high-ranking military officers; joint naval exercises; and exploratory discussions for arms transfers and negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Japan and the Philippines. Initially, Article 9 of Japan's 1947 Constitution hindered this security partnership. However, a recent reinterpretation of the pacifist constitution now allows Japan a collective self-defense “particularly to export arms to its allies and security partners and to deploy the JSDF overseas when necessary. Now, the challenge for Japan and the Philippines is to ensure the viability of their security partnership in the light of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's efforts to improve his country's relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As most studies on Middle East–East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article operationalizes Japanese leadership in foreign and security policy, specifically the Abe administrations’ consistent China balancing. It will do so to dispel instances of Premier-centered diplomacy and posit that Abe's diplomatic agenda has rested on a ‘hybrid’ policy-making authority, where the leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's office (the Kantei) rested on little-appreciated politicized personnel appointments and demotions within the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, successful Japanese leadership has functioned especially when operating within the scope of the US strategic framework towards East Asia. While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the USA and bureaucratic coordination, may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent years have seen a deterioration in political relations between China and Japan, in particular over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and history-related problems. Commentators have noted an attendant decline in trust between the two sides and have stressed the need for confidence-building measures in order to address the trust deficit. This article explores the origins of declining trust between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships. It argues that attempts to build a friendly and trusting relationship in the early post-war and post-normalisation periods began to fail in the 1980s, and have been in a gradual state of decline ever since. Using the concepts of trust and friendship, the article suggests that the lack of trust properties such as empathy, bonding, reliability and predictability have contributed to the deterioration of trust at both elite and popular levels. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the Japanese Occupation of China (1931-45), countless Chinese cultural relics were simply destroyed or looted in accordance with Japan's notorious 'Three Alls Campaign,' also known as 'Burn all, loot all, and kill all'. Due to the 1972 Japan-Chian Joint Communiqué, however, the Chinese Government renounced its demand for war reparation from Japan. The question then becomes whether, when the Chinese Government renounced its claims for war reparations in a peace treaty. Chinese individuals still have a means to vindicate their rights to request restitution of Chinese cultural relics from Japan. The primary purpose of this research is to tackle two questions: First, was the taking of Chinese cultural relics during the Japanese Occupation prohibited by law? Second, can the Chinese individuals legally require the restitution of looted cultural relics? This paper handles a case of a 1300-year's old Tang dynasty stele in Japan which has been asked to hand over to China since 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has been overlooked as a ‘cyber power’ but it now becoming a serious player in this new strategic domain. Japanese policy-makers have forged a consensus to move cybersecurity to the very core of national security policy, to create more centralized frameworks for cybersecurity, and for Japan’s military institutions to build dynamic cyberdefense capabilities. Japan’s stance has moved rapidly toward the securitization and now militarization of responses to cyber challenges. Japan’s cybersecurity stance has bolstered US–Japan alliance responses to securing all dimensions of the ‘global commons’ and extended its defense perimeter to further deter but potentially raise tensions with China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan has recently lifted its self-imposed ban on arms imports and exports and reinterpreted its pacifist constitution to allow its armed forces to engage in military operations. This is in line with the Japanese government's readjustments of its foreign policy over previous decades, in response to various geopolitical conflicts and disputes, particularly with China. Japan's shift away from a "pure" form of pacifism is unique in modern history. What remains unclear are the future implications of this shift in shaping strategic and military relations in the region. In this article, I argue that Japan's reinterpretation of texts of its constitution, in tandem with its economic influence, has drawn many countries in the region closer to a mutually beneficial opposition to China's territorial claims. I also argue that Japan's shift has sparked the beginning of an informal military coalition and initiated a "safety in numbers" response to China, though this is being held back by unhealed political disputes. Additionally, I examine some implications for the emerging military relationships in the Asia Pacific, particularly with regards to unrestricted access to the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines China's maritime claims as of January 2017, highlighting an international arbitral tribunal ruling that invalidated China's nine-dash line and other maritime activities in the South China Sea on July 12, 2016. Topics include China's efforts to protect its maritime rights and interests, its goal of expanding maritime power, and development of maritime technology to explore natural resources. Also discussed are the factors that influenced changes in China's maritime policy since 2012.

One of the biggest challenges for the East Asian region today is the Sino-Japanese relationship. Starting with the fishing trawler incident in September 2010, followed by Japan's nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this relationship is experiencing an escalation of tensions in most, if not all, areas of the bilateral relationship. In response to the intensifying competition, China and Japan have elevated the importance of South-East Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their foreign policy strategies. Focusing on how elites from five South-East Asian states -- Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam--perceive the engagement of China and Japan with the region, this article poses two questions: (1) How do South-East Asian elites view the Sino-Japanese competition? and (2) How do South-East Asian elites view the role of ASEAN in managing the competition? The analysis here concludes that while some South- East Asian elites see opportunities in the Sino-Japanese competition, they nevertheless do not perceive it as an issue of critical significance. Instead, the concern lies generally with majorpower dynamics, and particularly with Sino-US relations. ASEAN is viewed to lack the ability to manage the negative consequences of the Sino-Japanese competition, although its external balancing function has perceptibly helped to restrain any escalation of major-power tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the midst of rising tension between China and Japan, two powerful countries in Asia, the favorable attitudes of each country's citizens toward the other country have dropped to a historical low. The Taiwan issue, historical legacy, island disputes, and maritime resource competition are major obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations, but the most fundamental issue is a deep-seated mutual distrust and suspicion between the two countries, which result in rising threat perceptions. Beyond the structural and political elite-centered approaches, this study examines the evidence related to the three approaches (face-to-face contact, cross-cultural exposure, and social identity) to reduce mutual distrust and antipathy in the two countries. With a careful analysis of the survey data, this study sheds light on the conditions under which contact (a) results in improved attitudes toward outgroup, (b) has little or no effect on intergroup relations, and (c) yields more prejudice and hostility toward the outgroup. The findings of this study not only identify factors that could facilitate mutual understanding between Chinese and Japanese people and more favorable impressions of one another, but are also relevant to planning interventions to reduce prejudice and distrust among people from different races, religions, and countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper compares patterns of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) for Japan and China over similar periods of their integration into the global economy. From a statistical perspective, China's recent pattern of OFDI flows (2004-2010) differs from Japan's OFDI flows during a similar period of growth and emergence onto the world scene (1976- 1982). While acknowledging that the world economy is a much different place today than it was in 1982, we nevertheless argue that these differences in OFDI flows constitute an important component in any understanding of the nature of development followed by these two important Asian economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this wide-ranging interview and discussion with Kuan-Hsing Chen and Sun Ge, Mizoguchi Yūzō describes the origins of his interest in China studies and the process through which he developed his perspective on China, Japan, and the world. Mizoguchi details his break with both old-style Japanese Sinology and Western-influenced scholarship, which assumes Japanese superiority over China and takes Euro-American society and concepts as its standard. Mizoguchi suggests that historians can and should cultivate a new subjectivity for themselves and understanding of the history of the world as a whole through an approach to China that attempts to understand China’s own internal historical processes rather than assuming the universality of Western processes. He discusses his efforts to help reform the institutional structure of China studies in Japan, and further touches on the part played by Japan in China’s modern history as well as its historical relations with Taiwan and Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Why is the period from the Opium War through the Republican era in recent Chinese history treated by so many scholars of different stripes as a decline of China itself, rather than as a decline simply of the dynastic order? What is the nature of the Republican period? What role has the centralization and decentralization of power played through these years – and is it limited to the Republican period, or is it part of a much longer trend in Chinese history? Why have so many scholars fixated on the Opium War at the beginning of Chinese modernity? Mizoguchi asks these penetrating questions and makes telling comparisons with Japan over roughly the same period of time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper highlights the issue of the recognition of the existence of a dispute between China and Japan regarding sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, identifies such a recognition, and comments on the implications flowing from that recognition for Japan and China, as well as for other States, especially the United States, and argues that in light of the well-known US position of taking no view on sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, Article V of the US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty cannot apply to the island. Some comments are also offered on Japan's "nationalization" and other measures and China's response measures and/or counter-measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do interstate relations deteriorate and become conflictual, even under conditions where one might expect improved ties? The article seeks an answer to this question through a case study of the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the twenty-first century, which took place despite the existence of several factors that might be thought likely to have led to an improvement. Existing theoretical approaches cannot fully explain this puzzle. The article argues that such deteriorations can result from disruptions to states’ reciprocally performed routinised recognition, and identifies three mechanisms through which these can occur. To facilitate this argument, the article draws on scholarship on relational identity, recognition, and ontological security to develop a theory of identity construction that takes account of how self and other routinise the ways in which they recognise each other and how they react to the other’s representational practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exploring how the history of the Fifteen-year War was dealt with in pre-1982 mainland China is an essential step towards understanding the currently explosive Sino-Japanese History Problem; furthermore, this might shed light on various issues in the post-war history of China and Sino-Japanese relations. However, available research on the pre-1982 period is scarce and problematic. Earlier political scientists argue that the history of the war was ruthlessly manipulated by the Chinese Communist Party regime, while some recent studies believe that the war was conveniently ‘forgotten’ as Sino-Japanese friendship was vital for the government of the People's Republic of China. This article aims at providing an accurate and thorough picture of how the history of the Fifteen-year War was positioned in the diplomatic practice of the Chinese Communist Party regime in relation to Japan during the period. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that as opposed to the conventional wisdom of Japan’s hedging policy, Japan has been constantly taking balancing behavior vis-à-vis China since the end of the Cold War; however, the incremental shift to explicit balancing began after the 2010SenkakuBoat Collision Incident. The shift was accelerated by the 2012 Japanese Government Purchase of theSenkakuIslands. Since then, Japan has attempted to engage in both internal and external balancing by taking more security burden-sharing with the United States through the relaxation of Japan’s constitutional and political constraints on its military capabilities and the enhancement of security linkages with other regional states, such as Australia and India. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This thesis examines China’s acceptance ofSandakan No. 8andArrestin order to analyze the historical context and its impact, which enabled the cultural movement during the Cold War in Asia. New China pursued a people’s diplomacy policy that separated the Japanese government and the Japanese people in order to promote relationships between the two countries during the Cold War. Japanese Movie Week, which was held to celebrate the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, was an outcome made possible throughout the People’s Solidarity between the two countries. Despite the colonial and imperialist war and the animosity created by the Cold War, the Chinese audience accepted Japanese movies without any rejection because of the people’s diplomacy policy.Sandakan No. 8andArrestwere fervently consumed as cultural icons that symbolized the Chinese society in the 1980s. However, the controversies over the profanity and sexual descriptions inSandakan No. 8led individuals to assert self-discretion over their own sexuality. The popular mimicry of the main characters ofArrestin the daily lives of the Chinese overthrew the existing socialist gender norms and reconstructed a new femininity and masculinity that created a fight against the state. The fight against the state was indirectly expressed through sexuality and gender and developed into a criticism against the socialist regime, forming another Cold War logic that was different from that of the Cold War. It was also transformed into a fervent nationalism that advanced the issues of historical responsibility, such as the issue of war reparations. The success of the People’s Solidarity transcended nation-states and ultimately led people to negate its own logic. In this regard, the process of acceptingSandakan No. 8andArrestrevealed the issues of the impossibility of the state accurately representing the people and the contradiction between the state and the people under the Cold War logic. It also urged the contemplation of the complex structure of the Cold War and the post-Cold War that was created by those two entangling forces in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on recognition in International Relations has demonstrated that states are not exclusively concerned about their physical security, but also anxious to be recognised by other states. What counts as recognition and non-/mis-recognition, however, is not always clear. Scholars of recognition seem to agree that recognition theory has not yet developed a persuasive way of recognising recognition. Providing a satisfactory answer to the question of how we recognise recognition and its denial is a necessary first step towards being able to convincingly theorise about recognition. This is especially important since recognition is often treated as a dependent variable—how states are recognised by other states is seen as influencing their behaviour, sometimes with military conflict as the outcome. This article further develops the concepts of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ recognition as it addresses the problem of how to recognise recognition. Based on an analysis of empirical material on what, in Japan, has been interpreted as Chinese non- and mis-recognition of Japan, the article shows how concrete expressions of thin and thick recognition between established states can be recognised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthropology, religious studies, and area studies constitute sociology of religion's disciplinary neighbors through their shared interest in religion as an analytical object. Within these fields, a number of significant critiques of both how religion is defined and described and who ultimately shapes those definitions have emerged. By analyzing clusters of these critiques related to religion as a category and whether religion has essential characteristics, and emic/etic distinctions, this paper incorporates important points in each of these criticisms that have significant implications for the direction of sociological research on religion. Additionally, this paper draws on historical data from China and Japan's period of state formation and their attempts to deal with the question of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The accelerating tensions and military posturing between Japan and China have created a serious crisis with a danger of a catastrophic war. I he purpose of this paper is to summarize the events of the current crisis, and to put it in the context of Japan's long history of hostility to China and repeated attempts at conquest. The historical record shows that Japan has attacked China at least seven times, even though China has never attacked Japan. The irrationality of Japan's behavior is demonstrated by the repetition of this hostile behavior despite the enormous human and economic costs that Japan has suffered because of it. The irrationality of Japan's militarism suggests that psychological explanations may be required to understand this phenomenon. Several hypotheses are proposed, including 1) projected paranoid aggression, 2) collective Zeigarnik compulsion, 3) perceived weakness exciting aggression, 4) national inferiority feelings, 5) cultural narcissism, and 6) Oedipal-like hatred of a parent culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the legal significance of Diaoyu and Senkaku Islands dispute for the international legal community. Topics discussed include rightful ownership of the Diaoyu and Senkaku Islands by analyzing each country's historical and legal arguments, China and Japan's roles as world powers may prevent peaceful resolution and types of international law such as maritime law, international treaties, and customary laws regarding legal territorial acquisition.

While Sino-Japanese relation(s) have been placed on hold since 2013, Japan has become the most desired overseas destination for mainland Chinese tourists. This study aims to understand the unexpected tourist flows of Chinese tourists to Japan seen through the lens of tourist emotions. Using a qualitative approach and netnography data, the study reveals that during their trip, Chinese tourists experience mixed feelings of resistance, admiration, welcome, embarrassment, and attachment to Japan and its people. The trip has challenged Chinese tourists’ stereotypes about Japan and has stimulated their reflections on China’s modernization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the later stages of World War I, the Allied Powers dispatched an expeditionary force to Siberia, with Japan and the United States sending the most troops. The Allied forces were not immediately withdrawn after World War I ended, and in the meantime, Russia sank into a chaotic civil war. On March 5, 1920, several hundred Japanese soldiers and expatriates residing in the town of Nikolayevsk-on-Amur clashed with the Russian Red Army in the “Nikolayevsk Incident.” Four Chinese naval warships happened to be detained in Nikolayevsk during the hostilities between Russia and Japan. In May 1920, after Nikolayevsk was recaptured by Japanese reinforcements, Japan accused the Chinese forces of aiding in the Russian attack, arrested several Chinese sailors, and insisted that both sides send officials to conduct an investigation. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Navy were forced to send officials to negotiate with the Japanese. China was not able to withdraw its warships, troops, and expatriates until, after several rounds of negotiations, it finally agreed to Japan’s demands for an apology, payment of an indemnity, and punishment of the involved personnel. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented which examines the career of Chinese stage actor Mei Lanfang, noted for his work as a "dan" (female roles) player, and discusses how his mustache was a symbol of masculinity and resistance to Japanese aggression. It explores how Mei's depiction of Chinese women on stage were compared to his male persona off stage as well as how his dramatic characters displayed female masculinity.

This article studies the stance of China on free trade-related intellectual property in the context of the China-Japan-Korea (CJK) free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. It analyses the intellectual property provisions in FTAs and discusses the consistent stance of China on intellectual property in FTAs by reviewing the intellectual property provisions under existing FTAs involving China. The article then examines into major factors that influence China’s stance on intellectual property: its stage of economic development, innovation capacity and level of intellectual property enforcement; and explores China’s stance on intellectual property from the perspective of the CJK FTA negotiations and beyond. It finds that though China expressly stands against the TRIPS-plus standards for intellectual property enforcement, its attitude towards intellectual property issues in FTA negotiations is fairly flexible. It further argues that with intellectual property becoming increasingly important for its innovation-driven economy and with higher standards of intellectual property enforcement being incorporated in such influential FTA as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), China’s stance on intellectual property in future FTA negotiations will eventually change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]