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This is a critical time for U.S. efforts in the war in Afghanistan. In his 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama announced that the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan would draw down by an additional 34,000 troops, to about 33,000, by February 2014, and that by the end of 2014 our war in Afghanistan will be over. Further decision-making regarding the U.S. force presence in Afghanistan, including after the end of NATO s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission at the end of 2014, is expected later this year. Yet while troop levels tend to steal the headlines, far more fundamentally at stake is what it would take to ensure the long-term protection of U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Arguably, the United States may have a number of different interests at stake in the region: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremists; preventing nuclear proliferation; preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states; standing up for American values, including basic human rights and the protection of women; and preserving the United States ability to exercise leadership on the world stage. At issue is the relative priority of these interests, what it would take in practice to ensure that they are protected, and their relative importance compared to other compelling security concerns around the globe. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan include an array of activities: prosecuting the fight on the ground, in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to counter the insurgency; supporting Afghanistan s political process, including the presidential elections scheduled to be held in April 2014; providing assistance to help Afghans craft and grow a viable economy; and facilitating Afghan-led efforts to achieve a high-level political settlement with the Taliban., CRS Report for Congress.

In conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya, the United States has taken part in establishing and maintaining no-fly zones. As no-fly zones represent a significant commitment of U.S. forces, and may prove a precursor to other military actions, Congress may wish to consider issues surrounding the strategy, international authorization, congressional authorization, operations, and costs of establishing and maintaining no-fly zones. The military strategy designed to support U.S. grand strategy, it has been suggested, might be based on these considerations: the operational-level military objectives that need to be achieved, to support the overall grand strategy; and the extent to which a no-fly zone as one set of ways and means helps achieve those objectives. Practitioners and observers have debated what constitutes international authorization for the establishment of a no-fly zone. Given the paucity of relevant precedents, and the dissimilarities among them, there may not exist a single, clear, agreed model. The concept of authorization is typically considered to be linked to the ideas of both legality and legitimacy the three concepts overlap but are all distinct. The precise meaning of each of the terms is still debated. Express authorization from the U.N. Security Council provides the clearest legal basis for imposing a no-fly zone. In addition to international authorization, debates have addressed the question of congressional authorization whether and when there is a need for congressional approval based on the War Powers Resolution for a proposed no-fly zone. The question of whether and how congressional authorization is sought for a proposed operation could have an impact on congressional support including policy, funding, and outreach to the American people for the operation., CRS Report for Congress

On January 5, 2012, President Obama announced a new defense strategy entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, and commonly referred to as the defense strategic guidance or DSG .1 The DSG was significant at the time because it was explicitly intended to reshape future Department of Defense (DOD) priorities, activities, and budget requests for the following decade. That reshaping meant, in part, reducing defense spending by about $487 billion over 10 years, to meet the initial budget caps set in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011.2 And it meant in part refining DOD s 10-year strategic outlook in response to changes in the global security environment and the end of the decade of warfare that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The DSG is significant now, in 2013, because it is still intended to serve as the strategic foundation for further DOD policy and resource decision-making, under tighter fiscal constraints. By all accounts, the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), conducted by DOD at the direction of Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel during spring 2013, adopted the DSG as its baseline and tested options for cutting costs against the impact such steps might have on DOD s ability to execute that defense strategy. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is statutorily mandated to be conducted in 2013, with a report based on the review due to Congress in February 2014, is also expected to be based broadly on the premises of the DSG.3 Importantly, the DSG did not account for the possibility of sequestration further significant, across-the-board cuts triggered by the BCA. At the time the DSG was issued, defense officials stated that, were they directed to find an additional $500 billion in cuts, the guidance would not apply, and DOD would have to shed missions and commitments and capabilities that we believe are necessary to protect core U.S. national security interests., CRS Report for Congress

Strategy together with decision-making, planning and execution, budgeting, and congressional oversight is a critical component of U.S. government thinking and practice in the arena of national security. In theory, effective national security strategy-making can sharpen priorities and refine approaches; provide a single shared vision for all concerned agencies; clarify the roles and responsibilities of all concerned agencies so that they may more effectively plan and resource; offer a coherent baseline for congressional oversight; and communicate U.S. government intent to key audiences at home and abroad. While there is no single shared view of the boundaries of the concept of national security, many would include homeland security, and an array of economic, energy and/or environmental concerns, as well as traditional military affairs. In practice, the U.S. government at the levels of both the White House and individual agencies conducts a wide array of strategic reviews, and issues many forms of strategic guidance. The pinnacle of the national security strategic architecture is the national security strategy, issued by the President. That effort is supported by an array of subordinate quadrennial reviews the Quadrennial Defense Review by the Department of Defense, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review by the Department of State, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review issued by the Department of Homeland Security, and the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review issued by the Office of the Director for National Intelligence as well as a number of subordinate strategies including national defense strategy, national military strategy, national homeland security strategy, and national intelligence strategy., CRS Report for Congress

On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid out U.S. government approaches for winding down the war in Afghanistan.1 While a number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to wind down a war, the Administration s commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan is clear. As of mid-2012, many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward shared by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international engagement has been extended., CRS Report for Congress

Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations and foreign policy experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power to full advantage. For the 112th Congress, proposals to address these problems may be of interest for their perceived potential not only to enhance performance, but also to save money by streamlining processes, encouraging interagency cooperation, and reducing duplication. These proposals also provide context for current legislation, including the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, the Global Security Contingency Fund contained in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as well as in the House's FY2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act. The FY2012 NDAA requires the President to submit to Congress a whole-of-government implementation plan. This report draws on over three dozen studies with recommendations to improve the current national security system. The studies surveyed include three prepared by the Project on National Security Reform, with comprehensive recommendations, four prepared or co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and two by RAND in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomats, as well as reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, the National Defense University, and others. This report draws from these studies, as well as a few articles, for recommendations to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting; to improve institutional authorities, structures and arrangements; and, to create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms., CRS Report for Congress.

On January 5, 2012, President Obama announced new defense strategic guidance entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. This new guidance is significant because it is explicitly intended to reshape future Department of Defense (DoD) priorities, activities, and budget requests for the next decade. While the guidance is intended to steer DoD decision-making as it reduces defense spending by about $487 billion over the next 10 years to meet the initial budget caps set in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, it does not account for the possibility of sequestration -- further significant, across-the-board cuts that could be required pursuant to implementation of the BCA. Defense officials have stated that, were they directed to find an additional $500 billion in cuts, this guidance would not apply, and DoD would have to shed missions and commitments and capabilities that we believe are necessary to protect core U.S. national security interests. This CRS report highlights and analyzes key strategic-level issues raised by the new guidance. The report will not be updated., CRS Report for Congress.

On June 22, 2011, President Obama delivered a major policy speech in which he laid out the parameters for surge recovery -- the Administration's new term of art that refers to the drawdown of all U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan. Surge recovery has subsequently generated considerable interest across the U.S. political spectrum, including in Congress. Yet troop levels are only one facet of much broader U.S. government engagement in Afghanistan. Basic, broader strategic issues are at stake, all of which have implications for the troop levels debate: (1) What fundamental national security interests does the United States have in Afghanistan and the region?; (2) What minimum conditions -- political, economic, security -- would need to pertain in Afghanistan for those U.S. interests to be protected?; (3) How appropriate are current and projected future U.S. approaches for helping Afghans establish those conditions?; (4) When and to what extent are Afghans likely to be able to sustain those conditions with relatively limited support from the international community?; and (5) Ultimately, how important is this overall effort -- given its likely timeline, risks, and costs -- compared to other U.S. government priorities? This report draws in part on the author's recent three-week visit to Afghanistan, in November 2011, based on an invitation from the Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General John Allen. It provides initial observations about surge recovery in broader operational and strategic context, and links those observations to current debates that may be of interest to Congress as it considers the strength and duration of further U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. This report will not be updated., CRS Report for Congress.

The ongoing uprising in Libya against the government of Muammar al Qadhafi has been the subject of ongoing domestic and international debate about potential international military intervention, including the proposed establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. Congress may wish to consider issues surrounding the strategy, international authorization, congressional authorization, operations, and costs of establishing and maintaining no-fly zones. The military strategy designed to support the grand strategy, it has been suggested, might be based on these considerations: the operational-level military objectives that need to be achieved, to support the overall grand strategy; and the extent to which a no-fly zone?as one set of ways and means?helps achieve those objectives. Practitioners and observers have debated what constitutes international ?authorization? for the establishment of a no-fly zone. Given the paucity of relevant precedents, and the dissimilarities among them, there may not exist a single, clear, agreed model. The concept of authorization is typically considered to be linked to the ideas of both ?legality? and ?legitimacy??the three concepts overlap but are all distinct. The precise meaning of each of the terms is still debated. Express authorization from the U.N. Security Council provides the clearest legal basis for imposing a no-fly zone., CRS Report for Congress

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched and led military operations in Afghanistan in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. Many observers argue that in succeeding years, as U.S. and world attention shifted sharply to the war in Iraq, the Afghan war became the "other war" and suffered from neglect. The Obama Administration, however, has made the war in Afghanistan a higher priority, by giving it early attention, regularly conducting strategy reviews, and making significant additional commitments of civilian and military resources. By early 2011, senior leaders, including the Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General David Petraeus, were pointing to discrete progress on the ground, though noting that such progress was still "fragile and reversible." In late 2010, NATO and the Afghan government agreed to pursue a key medium-term goal: the transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans throughout the country by the end of 2014. The U.S. government has stated its intention to begin drawing down some U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, and also to maintain a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014., CRS Report for Congress

With a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort--often called "America's other war" --required greater national attention. For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan's neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO's relevance in the 21st century., CRS Report for Congress

With a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort?often called "America's other war" required greater national attention. For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan's neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO?s relevance in the 21st century., CRS Report for Congress.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein's regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development., CRS Report for Congress

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20,2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein's regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. Gradually, an insurgency gained strength in Iraq and violence escalated. In January 2007, the Bush Administration announced a new strategy, the "new way forward," which included both a troop surge and new counter-insurgency approaches that emphasized population security and reconciliation. The last surge brigade redeployed from Iraq without replacement in July 2008. Most observers agree that security conditions in Iraq have improved markedly since mid-2007. On September 9, President Bush, calling the decision a "return on success," announced that about 8,000 additional U.S. troops would redeploy from Iraq without replacement by February 2009. The next major development in the campaign is likely to be implementation of two new U.S.-Iraqi strategic agreements, finalized in late 2008. The documents include a strategic framework agreement, which outlines principles for bilateral cooperation in multiple areas, and a Status of Forces-like document that defines the legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and imposes a number of constraints on U.S. military operations there. Together, the documents suggest a shift toward greater exercise of Iraqi sovereignty., CRS Report for Congress

A growing community of interest, including Members of Congress, senior officials in the executive branch, and think-tank analysts, is calling for a reexamination of how well the U. S. government, including both the executive branch and Congress, is organized to apply all instruments of national power to national security activities. The organizations and procedures used today to formulate strategy, support presidential decision-making, plan and execute missions, and budget for those activities are based on a framework established just after World War II. That framework was designed to address a very different global strategic context: a bipolar world with a single peer competitor state, the Soviet Union, which was driven by an expansionist ideology and backed by a massive military force.

There is a growing, still highly inchoate, debate among practitioners and scholars, including participants from across the political spectrum, concerning the need to reform the U.S. government s national security system. Reform proponents argue that much of the current architecture was designed to meet the global security challenges of the post-World War II context, and may not be appropriate for addressing 21st-century challenges. That architecture includes the organizations, structures, and processes that govern decision-making, budgeting, planning and execution, and congressional oversight of national security activities. Strategic guidance documents, including formal strategies and other forms of guidance, are a key element of that system. The current debates are timely because a new administration may begin issuing strategic documents early in its tenure in office. National security strategy can theoretically serve several distinct purposes: ! By offering prioritized objectives and indicating which elements of national power ( ways and means ) are to be used to meet them, it can provide guidance to departments and agencies to use in their internal processes for budgeting, planning and executing, and organizing, training, and equipping personnel. ! By clearly linking goals and the approaches designed to meet them, national security strategy can provide the executive branch a key tool for justifying requested resources to Congress. ! By laying out a detailed strategic vision, it can help inform public audiences both at home and abroad about U.S. government intent. Some critics charge that executive branch processes for developing strategy are flawed because, for example, they fail to establish priorities, consider fiscal constraints, or assign responsibilities to specific agencies., CRS Report for Congress

After planning to bring up a bill on May 8, the House has put off floor consideration of a measure to provide FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental appropriations for overseas military operations, international affairs, and domestic programs. As described by the House Appropriations Committee on May 7, the draft bill provides $183.7 billion in discretionary appropriations in FY2008 and FY2009. The bill also includes an expansion of veterans' education benefits at a cost of $52 billion in mandatory spending over the next 10 years, and extended unemployment compensation at a cost of $11 billion. The bill provides $101.2 billion in FY2008 and $65.9 billion in FY2009 for the Department of Defense, including military construction; $5.9 billion in FY2008 and $5.1 billion in FY2009 for international affairs, including emergency food aid; $5.8 billion in FY2009 for Gulf Coast levee construction; and $644 million for other domestic programs. It also includes a measure to delay new Medicaid regulations that would reduce payments to the states. The Senate Appropriations Committee had planned to mark up its version of a supplemental appropriations bill on May 8, but that has been delayed until May 15. The Chairman's mark of the Senate bill provides $103 billion in FY2008 and $65.9 billion in FY2009 for the Department of Defense, including military construction; $10.4 billion for hurricane protection; $850 million in FY2008 and $395 million in FY2009 for P.L. 480 international food assistance; $1.2 billion for science programs in several agencies; and more than $2 billion for other domestic programs, including secure schools, VA trauma centers, law enforcement grants, highways, and the FDA. It also includes expanded GI bill education benefits and extended unemployment compensation, and it delays new Medicaid rules. This CRS report will be updated regularly to report on congressional action on remaining FY2008 supplemental appropriations and on FY2009 supplemental funding., CRS Report for Congress.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has helped shape the DOD role by providing DOD with its mandate for such activities through a wide variety of authorities. The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three purposes: responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and capabilities, and strengthening foreign governments ability to deal with internal and international threats through state-building measures. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military's capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have long viewed such activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, DOD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan., CRS Report for Congress

There is a growing consensus among many national security practitioners and scholars, across the political spectrum, broadly in favor of reforming the interagency system to encourage a more effective application of all elements of national power. The reform debates have included proposals to establish and foster an interagency cadre of national security specialists from all relevant departments and agencies. According to proponents, cadre members, through a long-term career development program that might include education, training, and exchange tours in other agencies, would gain a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies. They would become better prepared to plan national security missions together in Washington, D.C., and to execute them in the field, and eventually, better able to oversee their own agencies efforts from leadership positions. As a rule, such proposals have not been aimed solely at creating individual specialists. Rather, just as the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in the Department of Defense (DOD) sought to foster greater "jointness" among the Services, "interagency cadre" proposals have also aimed to adjust the organizational cultures of all agencies with national security responsibilities, in order to make interagency collaboration and integration second nature., CRS Report for Congress