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Copyright of Education Policy Analysis Archives / Archivos Analíticos de Políticas Educativas / Arquivos Analíticos de Políticas Educativas is the property of Educational Policy Analysis Archives & Education Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article addresses the importance of the judiciary fulfilling its obligation to serve the litigants, especially the most vulnerable. Topics such as effective judicial protection, due process, and the importance of respecting the principle of natural judge are discussed. The relevance of electronic evidence in judicial processes is highlighted, as well as the need to adapt to new technologies to strengthen efficiency in obtaining and presenting evidence. [Extracted from the article]

Why does the law recognize families? Sometimes family recognition serves to foster cooperative communities in which sharing norms, more than the market or the government, determine rights and obligations. These communities often take care of dependents and serve as important sources of individual self-determination and pluralism. At other times, family delineation serves a corrective purpose, when it forces family members who are not sharing with each other to do so. At still other times, family delineation serves a distributive purpose, as when the law uses "family" definition to distribute resources to determine an intended beneficiary. This use of "family" for assumptive purposes helps distribute either public or private resources efficiently and appropriately. In the constitutional jurisprudence of the family, the Supreme Court has rarely acknowledged these different purposes for defining family even as it has adopted, without explaining, different definitions of family in different contexts. This Article argues that the different purposes served by family delineation help explain why the Supreme Court has been so willing to embrace different definitions of family. Contrary to what the Supreme Court has said, whether a statute or program "slices into" or "infringes on" the definition of family is not an important question. All legislation that impacts families does that. The important question is whether a particular definition of family is appropriate in light of the governmental purpose served by family in that context. In explaining why one must consider context before deciding on the appropriate definition of family, this Article shows that the Supreme Court's application of constitutional doctrine in the family context has been confused because it has been premature. One cannot determine what either the equal protection or due process rights of family members are unless one knows what a family member is. How the Court has determined what a family member is can--and this Article argues should--turn on the purpose family delineation is serving in different contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to counsel is a cornerstone of due process. This article explores the legal construction of "indigency" in criminal county courts. I examine Texas's Fair Defense Act (2001) , a policy mandate that required all 254 counties to create formal criteria used for determining eligibility for access to counsel, as an empirical case for understanding local policy choices that shape access to justice. Drawing on novel data from court plans, I find significant variation in the stringency of eligibility criteria used to determine indigency. Results show that socioeconomic conditions, racial threat, interest group presence, and elements of judicial discretion are key determinants of restrictive eligibility criteria. These findings suggest racial threat can be tied to the institutional design of policies, rather than the enforcement or dormancy of criminal law. The variable institutionalization of eligibility criteria has implications for understanding the entrenchment of racial and class-based inequalities in access to legal institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Supreme Court opinions involving race and the jury invariably open with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, or landmark cases like Strauder v. West Virginia (1880). Legal scholars and historians unanimously report that free people of color did not serve as jurors, in either the North or South, until 1860. In fact, this Article shows that Black men served as jurors in antebellum America decades earlier than anyone has previously realized. While instances of early Black jury service were rare, campaigns insisting upon Black citizens' admission to the jury-box were not. From the late 1830s onward, Black activists across the country organized to abolish the all-white jury. They faced, and occasionally overcame, staunch resistance. This Article uses jury lists, court records, convention minutes, diaries, bills of sale, tax rolls, and other overlooked primary sources to recover these forgotten efforts, led by activists who understood the jury-box to be both a marker and maker of citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sexual harassment remains pervasive in the workplace. Complementing past research examining the intra-organizational effects of sexual harassment, this paper investigates its extra-organizational consequences by considering reputational damage organizations can suffer from sexual harassment claims. Four experiments (NTotal = 1,534) show that even a single sexual harassment claim can damage public perception of gender equality of an organization, which reduces organizational attractiveness. However, an organizational response characterized by proactive consideration of the claimant (compared to no mention of sexual harassment, mention of sexual harassment with no response, or a minimizing response to a sexual harassment claim) fully restores, and sometimes even increases, public perceptions of the organization's commitment to due process and gender equality. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article traces the modern development and institutional design of detained immigration courts—that is, the courts that tie detention to deportation. Since the early 1980s, judges in detained immigration courts have presided over more than 3.6 million court cases of persons held in immigration custody, almost all men from Latin America, most of whom are charged with only civil violations of the immigration law. Primary sources indicate that detained immigration courts are concentrated outside major urban areas, most commonly in the South, and often housed in structures not traditionally associated with courts, including inside prisons, jails, detention processing centers, makeshift tents, shipping containers, and border patrol stations. Other defining features of these detained courts include case completion goals prioritizing speed, minimal representation by counsel, heavy reliance on video adjudication, constrained public access, and arrest and venue rules that give the government unfettered control over the court that hears the case. Accompanying these developments, judges working inside detained courts have become increasingly separated from the rest of the immigration judge corps and, when compared to their counterparts in the nondetained courts, are more likely to be male, to have served in the military, and to have worked as prosecutors. This Article argues that the largely unregulated design elements of detained immigration courts threaten due process and fundamental fairness by fostering a segregated court system that assigns systematic disadvantage to those who are detained during their case. Recognizing the structure and function of the detained immigration court system has a number of important implications for organizing efforts to reduce reliance on detention, policy proposals for restructuring the immigration courts, and future research on judicial decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the benefits and pitfalls associated with integrating a common blockchain model within a distinct administrative environment, focusing particularly on its effects on decision-making processes. The study is grounded in the doctrine of procedural due process, a holistic concept encompassing intertwined administrative rules and principles, designed to promote fairness and justice in decision-making, which can be succinctly distilled into three core principles: accuracy, integrity, and transparency. On initial examination, these principles seem to correspond with the fundamental characteristics of blockchain technology, which are identified as authenticity, integrity, and transparency. In our analysis, we measure the extent to which the attributes of blockchain technology align with the principles of the due process doctrine. An essential component of this assessment includes a meticulous examination of the practical merging of each characteristic within the decision-making procedure. The approach and practical applications explored in this study highlight the potential of blockchain technology to enhance adherence to due process, especially in areas where traditional trust-based systems have faltered in maintaining basic procedural safeguards. However, given the intricate complexity tied to its implementation, this technology should be regarded as a fallback option, strictly reserved for situations where the benefits of its utilisation unmistakably outweigh the numerous inherent risks. In the ensuing sections of this paper, we will delve deeper into these risks and propose actionable mitigation strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Over the last decade, there has been ample evidence reporting the lack of high-quality and compliant Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) in the United States. This problem has many consequences, including poor student outcomes and failure to follow legal due process. Despite these consequences, research has not thoroughly examined the perspectives and needs of special educators on IEP development or the role of pre-service training on special educators' ability to write high-quality, compliant IEPs. To address this gap, this study surveys 218 Pennsylvania special educators to examine their perspectives on the sufficiency of their pre-service training to write high-quality IEPs. Data on the types of training and support special educators need to successfully write IEPs were also gathered. Results provide information on needed teacher preparation program components, supports for in-service special educators when writing IEPs, and areas for future professional development. Implications and future directions for training on writing IEPs are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reformers currently proposing the abolition of capital punishment by federal legislation have only targeted the federal death penalty. They are aiming too low. Concerns about the roughly 50 prisoners facing execution by the federal government should not cause advocates to ignore the approximately 2,400 on the combined Death Rows of the states. Congress has the authority to abolish the death penalty in the states, and good reason to exercise it. This Article takes as a given the Supreme Court's view that the death penalty is not itself unconstitutional. But under existing law Congress would have no difficulty in compiling a record that would support the use of its enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a statute forbidding the imposition of capital punishment by those states that retain the practice. The statute would be congruent and proportional legislation to remedy and prevent an amply documented history of violations of rights that the Court has long recognized as fundamental concerns. Those violations include the states': (1) denial of effective assistance of counsel to capital defendants, (2) racial discrimination in the selection of capital jurors and in charging and sentencing decisions, (3) failure to structure death penalty systems so as to reliably result in the execution of the most culpable of the potentially eligible defendants, (4) execution of the mentally impaired, (5) execution of prisoners contrary to the Constitution due to the fortuities of litigation timing, (6) execution of the innocent, and (7) use of torturous methods of execution. If death penalty reformers focus their advocacy efforts on a federal statute they may achieve surprising success. Congressional representatives from abolitionist states may support their efforts, and so may some from retentionist states, buttressed by the growing number of political conservatives who support abolition. In any event, the campaign itself may strengthen the abolitionist cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista CES Derecho is the property of Universidad CES and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For over fifty years, indigent defendants have had a due process right to a free transcript of previous court proceedings if they show that (1) such a transcript would help in their current trial or appeal, and (2) no available alternatives exist. Can a court deny a defendant’s request for a transcript with no discussion of either of these factors? In State v. Gaddis, the Supreme Court of North Carolina said yes—at least so long as the State presented “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” such that the erroneous transcript denial was “harmless.” This Recent Development argues that such a maneuver cheapens not only the right to a transcript, but the notion of a fair trial itself. It suggests that courts should instead treat erroneous denial of a transcript as structural error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The standing doctrine undergirds every case litigated in federal court yet, despite its ubiquity, the doctrine is difficult to apply, cannot be derived from the plain meaning of Article III of the Constitution, and does not effectively serve the goals the Supreme Court has explained as its raison d'être. Accordingly, the standing doctrine has frequently been criticized as a policy-driven, judicially-invented, fabrication. This article posits that, appropriately understood, the standing doctrine is required by the Constitution's text--but by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not by Article III. The Due Process Clauses prohibit courts from depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." As Justice Amy Coney BarreP has explained, stare decisis can often function similarly to preclusion, and consequently the application of stare decisis can deprive litigants of their life, liberty, or property rights without due process of law. This article proposes that standing resolves the due process issue identified by Justice BarreP by ensuring that litigants presently before a court are adequately representing potential future litigants and thereby providing those future litigants with due process. In short, the Due Process Clauses require courts to check for standing because otherwise the application of stare decisis--a legal principle tracing back to before the Founding--would deprive future litigants of their rights without due process of law. Viewing standing as a due process requirement both ties the doctrine to the Constitution's text and helps explain much of the Court's discussion of the standing doctrine's purpose. This article then discusses the implications that arise from reframing standing as a due process requirement rather than an Article III requirement. These include implications for courts' jurisdiction, the method of assessing standing, state courts, and the treatment of precedent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Meaningful" access to the courts is a fundamental right under the Constitution's Due Process Clause. But for incarcerated persons, this access is severely limited. The Supreme Court has thus required states to provide prisoners with legal assistance for presenting complaints of civil rights violations and challenges to confinement. Because incarcerated individuals often represent themselves pro se, states often have fulfilled this constitutional duty by providing proper law libraries or legal assistance programs. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Casey severely curtailed prisoners' right of access, disclaiming the notion that states must enable prisoners to "litigate effectively once in court." The decision has created a circuit split about the extent of a state's obligations to incarcerated persons after a complaint has survived the pleading stage. While some circuits have found the right of access to include "affirmative assistance" after the pleading stage, others have required that the state merely not engage in "active interference" with the plaintiff's case without mandating that the state facilitate access. This Note argues that lack of affirmative assistance directly violates prisoners' due process right to access the courts. Successful claims often depend on complying with legal technicalities that an incarcerated individual would not know about without affirmative assistance. Therefore, lack of affirmative assistance after the pleading stage causes meritorious lawsuits to fail. To rectify the disparity, this Note proposes reconciling Lewis' existing framework with the need to provide post-pleading stage assistance by introducing the "legal information vs. legal advice" distinction: states must be required to furnish access to legal information after the pleading stage but are not required to provide legal advice. This dichotomy has already become commonplace in thirty-eight states that assist non-incarcerated pro se parties in civil actions, and should similarly apply to the prisoner litigation context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case Santos-Zacaria v. Garland wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that immigration exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement. Topics discussed include background on the immigration appeal process and jurisdictional versus claims-processing rules, split on the jurisdictional nature of immigration exhaustion and the Supreme Court's resolution, and an explanation of the missing reason in Santos-Zacaria: due process fairness.

It is analyzed and concretized from the participatory action on those rulings of the Constitutional Court, focused on highlighting the transversal introduction of due process in labor relations in the private sector, filling the gaps left by the labor law. To that extent, the labor disciplinary process must be structured from the characteristics, principles and purposes of the material and formal labor law, to ensure respect for the human dignity of workers. From the question, does due process have a cross-cutting effect on labor relations in the private sector? Understanding the reflexive analysis of due process as a phenomenon and circumstance of transversalization in labor contracts and private labor relations, from its transdisciplinarity between the disciplinary process and labor law. From the qualitative, transdisciplinary and transversalization approach, deductive, phenomenological and hermeneutic complex method, being explanatory and exploratory. It is corroborated that currently the due process is a dogmatic category within the national legal system that fulfills the ontological function of transversality, the pro homine principle of human dignity in private labor relations. It is a contribution in the labor relations of the private sector, which shows the need to constitutionalize the substantive labor code in relation to the disciplinary due process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Article 20 of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code addresses the concept of real competition of infractions, which occurs when the same person commits several autonomous and independent actions that conform to different criminal types. In this case, the sentences are added without exceeding forty years in total. Although the legal text defines this concept, it does not specify how it should be applied procedurally. This lack of clarity has led to the fact that, in practice, these behaviours, although independent, are judged in a single criminal proceeding. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether this violates due process and whether it is necessary to hold separate trials to guarantee the accused adequate time to exercise his right to defence. This investigation concluded that the actual concurrence of infractions can generate consequences in determining the penalty, since the accumulation of penalties provided for each type of crime is considered. Therefore, in this type of competition, correctly individualising the penalties for each crime the subject commits is essential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document explores the topic of punitive damages in franchise disputes, focusing on the evolution of these damages over the past thirty years. It discusses the Supreme Court's role in establishing guidelines for when punitive damages may be allowed and the limitations on their size. The importance of reprehensibility and proportionality in determining the scope of punitive awards is emphasized. The document also provides examples of Supreme Court cases and state court cases that have influenced the understanding and application of punitive damages in franchise-related lawsuits. Additionally, strategies for franchisors to avoid punitive damages claims are offered, including comprehensive agreements, maintaining a collaborative relationship with franchisees, and ensuring consistency in treatment. [Extracted from the article]

Criminal justice institutions are held to account in a number of ways yet there is limited knowledge as to how these systems of regulation function. One primary method for regulating systems of punishment is through the use of independent inspectorates, yet very little empirical research has explored how inspectorates engage with the organisations they inspect nor how inspection is received by inspected organisations. Procedural justice theory has been used to understand compliance with laws. It can also shed light on compliance with systems of accountability, although there is a dearth of research in this area. Thus, our understanding of how regulation works in situ is limited. This article uses procedural justice theory to analyse data that were collected in England and Wales to explore how His Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation garners legitimacy from those it inspects. The article suggests that the Inspectorate is seen to be trustworthy and impartial, treats people with respect and provides them with a voice although there is variance between groups. The article contributes to (1) our understanding of how regulation works in the field of probation and (2) procedural justice theory by exposing the mechanisms that underpin compliance with regulatory regimes in institutional settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the beginning of Henry VIII's reign, the prosecution of heresy was based on three statutes of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Under this system, the Church tried the crime with the assistance of secular authority. Juries presented suspects, whose cases were then transferred to the church courts for determination. In 1532, the Supplication against the Ordinaries challenged the conduct of heresy trials. It invoked common-law principles about due process and standards of proof. Two years later, a new statute modified the system, although less drastically than had been proposed. The royal supremacy and new religious policies changed the context in which heresy was prosecuted. Up until 1539, however, the church courts still determined accusations. Thereafter, in the case of specified heresies, the Act of Six Articles made lay juries responsible for determining guilt or innocence. Commissions under this act combined elements of canon law and common law. These reforms were, however, not seen to have improved the conduct of heresy trials. It proved easier to criticize the traditional method of prosecution than to devise a better one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natural Law is an essential element of America’s Constitutional-based legal system. Many of the Founding Fathers, most notably James Wilson, vigorously championed the necessity of preserving Natural Law doctrines. In many ways, Natural Law provides a moral foundation to the Constitution and a justification for the basic human rights it was created to respect. Some of the many natural rights inherent within Natural Law are expressed through the basic protections listed in the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment right to freely practice one’s religion without government intrusion, and the Fifth Amendment guarantee to life, liberty, and property with due process under the law. Natural Law has been relied upon in a host of United States Supreme Court case opinions. Decisions in the early Court were more directly forthright when referencing Natural Law to justify the moral basis for certain rulings. Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Fletcher v. Peck (1810) points to how certain portions of the Constitution, such as the “contract clause” in Article I, Section 10, can be interpreted as providing the textual equivalent of Natural Law principles. My Article draws a connection from Justice Marshall’s Natural Law jurisprudence and reliance on the contract clause to the Natural Law respecting decisions rendered during the Lochner Era. My Article seeks to establish a more robust understanding of the Constitutional justifications for the Lochner Court’s application of the “liberty to contract” and “substantive due process” to strike down state laws infringing upon corporate privileges. The Court’s use of Natural Law here may have extended the deregulatory period had the majority coalition relied upon the contract clause and Justice Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of A&C - Administrative & Constitutional Law Review - Revista de Direito Administrativo e Constitucional is the property of A&C - Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional (Instituto Bacellar) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the enforceability of parental waivers and the implications for children's well-being, using the case of Justice v. Marvel, LLC as a focal point. Topics include the historical context of exculpatory contracts, Minnesota's approach to analyzing such contracts, and the intersection of parental due process rights and child well-being in legal decisions regarding parental waivers.

The United States has entered a new constitutional era where substantive due process, under attack by the Supreme Court itself, can no longer be viewed as a solid foundation for the securing of personal privacy rights. In a post- Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization world, the right to personal privacy, long understood to be protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses, is in need of a new doctrinal home. The evisceration of modern substantive due process in the context of abortion rights implicates and endangers LGBTQ+ rights and other personal privacy rights as well. As such, it is essential to identify alternative potential constitutional sources of protection for personal privacy and relationships. This Article begins by describing various responses to Dobbs in the aftermath of the decision's release. In the first year following the Supreme Court's stripping away of substantive due process protections for abortion rights, scholars have proposed various ways to either preserve substantive due process or to establish alternative doctrinal homes for the protection of personal privacy rights. Such responses to Dobbs have often reflected concerns that even beyond reproductive rights, liberty protections for autonomy and privacy in our most personal relationships and life choices, including those of members of same-sex couples and other less traditionally protected relationships, are also in danger. One such alternative doctrinal home for personal privacy is the freedom of intimate association. This Article describes the potential that the freedom of intimate association offers as a safe haven for the right to personal privacy, particularly for familial, romantic, and sexual intimate relationships of same-sex couples and others. The Article documents the evolution of the freedom of intimate association as a hybrid right largely grounded in the First Amendment, from older privacy cases to the first case explicitly naming the freedom of intimate association, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, and beyond. This Article explains how intimate association rights are distinct from, and provide greater constitutional protections than, the expressive associational rights that have been usurped by businesses seeking to deny public accommodations to LGBTQ+ people and using the First Amendment to do so, including in the 2023 free speech case, 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. That said, the freedom of intimate association's evolution has included splintered interpretations and application over the years, including as to the appropriate role of tradition and history in determining the extent of protections for intimate relationships. This Article proposes a repositioning of tradition along with a reclaiming of intimacy itself to pave the path for future cases in which LGBTQ+ people and others may successfully claim the strong constitutional protections to which they are entitled for their personal relationships, through the long-neglected freedom of intimate association doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, the Supreme Court sharply altered its substantive due process analysis in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, reversing the 49-year-old decision in Roe v. Wade to establish abortion access as a constitutional right. The Court reframed its substantive due process analysis as a two-step test, requiring a right to be narrowly framed and “deeply rooted in history and tradition” before it could be analyzed as “implicit in the concept of liberty,” instead of its previous balancing test that involved a broad description of the right. In the Dobbs majority opinion, the Court cherry-picked elements of common law jurisprudence as its chosen “history and tradition” to strike down Roe v. Wade. In doing so, the Court demonstrated its ability to weaponize substantive due process with originalist theory, threatening to utilize the very doctrine that many civil liberties are based in to strike those down. This Note uses a combination of historical analysis and social science to criticize this approach to substantive due process, using one of the common law authorities the Dobbs majority cited— scholar and witch-hunter Sir Matthew Hale—as an example of the type of history the Court has the potential to recreate. It argues that the Court’s decision to treat Hale as a legal authority enshrines the culture of oppression through witch-hunting that contributed to the Salem Witch Trials, paving the way for a legally enforceable codified morality. It ultimately concludes with a criticism of the overutilization of common law and an assertion of alternate means to argue abortion rights, combined with a prediction of the potential downfall of substantive due process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to assess the factors that may explain the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) convergence, considering Hofstede's cultural dimensions as the theoretical reference for the cultural approach proposed. Additional factors include countries' contextual and macroeconomic characteristics. Design/methodology/approach: Logistic and probit regression models were used to identify the factors that may explain the IPSAS (fully or adapted) use by countries, including 166 countries in this assessment (59 for those whose cultural dimensions are available). Findings: The findings consistently indicate collectivism and indebtedness levels as explanatory factors, providing insights into cultural dimensions along with macroeconomic characteristics as a relevant factor of countries' convergence to IPSAS. Research limitations/implications: There are different levels of IPSAS convergence by countries that were not considered. This aspect may hide different countries' characteristics that may explain those options, which could not be distinguished in this paper. Practical implications: As a result of this paper, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board may gain insights that can be applied within the IPSAS due process to overcome the main challenges when collaborating with national authorities to achieve a high level of convergence. This analysis may include how to accommodate countries' cultural differences as well as their contextual and macroeconomic characteristics. Social implications: There is a trend of moving toward accrual-based accounting standards by countries. Because the public sector embraces a new culture following the IPSAS path, it is relevant to assess if there are cultural factors, besides contextual and macroeconomic characteristics, that may explain the countries' convergence to those standards. Originality/value: To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first cross-country analysis on the likely influence of cultural dimensions on IPSAS convergence as far as the authors' knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical examination of injured plaintiffs by doctors hired by defendants is a staple of modern tort litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 and its state counterparts authorize such examinations when the plaintiff's physical or mental condition is at issue. Although typically dubbed "independent" medical examinations or IMEs, their use often appears to be anything but independent in that defense-retained medical professionals have a strong financial incentive to dispute or diminish injury claims in order to obtain or retain a steady stream of lucrative work from defendants and their insurers. Although often tainted, defense-driven medical examinations remain necessary as a matter of due process. Defendants are entitled to test plaintiff claims. But they are not entitled to disparage those claims through a black box process in which the defense expert fails to sufficiently disclose or accurately describe the nature of the examination, including administration of tests or environmental factors impacting the examination. Empirical study reveals that defective, inaccurately reported defense examinations take place with disturbing frequency. To prevent tainted examinations from tainting justice, video recording, observation of the process, and production of testing and diagnostic materials should be the norm and not the exception. Unless forensic examination is made fully transparent it can easily promote error and unjust results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Religación: Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades is the property of Religacion: Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recently, advances in artificial intelligence (“AI”) have sparked interest in a topic that sounds like science fiction: robot judges. Researchers have harnessed AI to build programs that can predict the outcome of legal disputes. Some countries have even begun allowing AI systems to resolve small claims. These developments are fueling a fascinating debate over whether AI courts will increase access to justice or undermine the rule of law. However, this Article argues that AI adjudication is more likely to flourish in one of the most controversial areas of the American civil justice system: forced arbitration. For decades, corporations and arbitration providers have capitalized on the U.S. Supreme Court’s muscular interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to create their own alternative procedural universes. These entities may soon take the next step and eliminate human decision makers in some contexts. First, most objections to AI judges do not apply to AI arbitrators. For example, because some AI systems suffer from the “black box problem”—they cannot explain the reasoning behind their conclusions—deploying them in the judicial system might violate procedural due process principles. But opacity is already the norm in arbitration, which is private, confidential, and often features awards that are unwritten. Second, although AI legal prediction tools are still embryonic, they work well in the simple debt collection and employment misclassification disputes that businesses routinely funnel into arbitration. Third, AI programs require little overhead and operate at lightning speed. The ability to streamline the process has become especially important in the last few years, as plaintiffs’ lawyers have begun fling “mass arbitrations”— overloading the system with scores of individual claims in an effort to saddle defendants with millions of dollars in fees. For these reasons, companies and arbitration providers have powerful financial incentives to experiment with automating decision making in certain cases. The Article then offers an insight that will have a profound impact on this futuristic form of dispute resolution. Drawing on the FAA’s text, structure, and legislative history, the Article contends the statute only applies to adjudication conducted by a “person.” Thus, there is no federal mandate that courts enforce agreements to resolve disputes by AI. In turn, because state law flls gaps in the FAA, individual jurisdictions will be able to decide for themselves whether to permit robot arbitration. Finally, the Article explains why this incremental approach is better than either barring AI dispute resolution or fnding that it triggers the gale force of the FAA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various defamation cases and the impact of the actual malice standard in defamation law. It explores high-profile cases involving public figures, such as Sarah Palin and Donald Trump, and their legal battles with media organizations. The article also examines challenges to the actual malice standard and the ongoing debate surrounding its application. It suggests potential improvements to defamation law, including the use of anti-SLAPP laws and stricter pleading and discovery standards. Overall, the article emphasizes the importance of protecting free speech while also holding individuals accountable for spreading false information. [Extracted from the article]