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This CFE Opinion Statement, submitted to the EU institutions in January 2022, addresses the ECJ decision in État Luxembourgeois v. L (Case C-437/19), in which the Third Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) delivered its decision on 25 November 2021, [1.] following Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion. [2.] The Court clarified the conditions for the identification of a taxpayer in group information requests under the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (2011/16) (hereinafter DAC) [3.] and confirmed that article 47 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights requires the information holder to be given the necessary information to assess the request’s legality.

In dit advies worden 7 vragen beantwoord die de staatssecretaris heeft gesteld naar aanleiding van het arrest van de Hoge Raad van 24 december 2021, aangaande de box-3 heffing

Income from invested capital and from making assets available for the use by others is covered by Article 10-12 OECD and UN MC: Dividends (Article 10); interest (Article 11) and royalties (Article 12). These provisions cover the allocation of tax jurisdiction of income received by both private individuals and enterprises. With regard to dividends, the standard of both MCs is that the tax jurisdiction is shared. The State of source has been granted a limited tax jurisdiction. Its taxation is credited by the recipient's State of residence, even when it otherwise applies the exemption method (Article 23A(2) OECD and UN MC). Shared taxation in connection with an ordinary tax credit is also the system applied to interest under the OECD and UN MC, and to royalties under the UN MC. However, under the OECD MC, tax jurisdiction in respect of royalties is exclusively allocated to the recipient's State of residence. Tax sharing is a typical compromise to settle a clash between the State of source and the State of residence in cases in which both believe that they have justified claims to tax jurisdiction that they do not want to forgo completely. This is especially true in respect of dividends, interest and/or royalties. On the one hand, the State of residence may put forward as justification that the invested capital or the assets allowed to be used emanate from its national wealth. On the other hand, the State of source may emphasize that the income is produced by means of its infrastructure, labour force, etc. These conflicting interests emerge especially in the relationship between typical capital-exporting States, like most of the OECD member countries, and typical capital-importing States, like developing countries. From a budget perspective, there is a real need for capital-importing States to impose and collect taxes on dividends, interest and royalties received by non-residents (see, e.g., no. 8 UN MC 2011 Comm. on Article 10). The 1971 Andean Model deviates from the OECD and UN MC. It exclusively allocates tax jurisdiction on dividends, interest and royalties to the State of source. The UN MC did not adopt this approach; however, it has some flavour of it because it leaves open the maximum rates at which the State of source may tax dividends, interest and royalties. Developing States pleaded for exclusive taxation by the source State (see, e.g., no. 8 UN MC 2011 Comm. on Article 10; no. 9 UN MC 2011 Comm. on Article 11 no. 9 UN MC 2011 Comm. on Article 12). Consensus could not be reached. No winner of the ‘battle of distribution’ between the State of source and the State of residence can be designated. The battle is only transferred to another level. With regard to other items of income, tax jurisdiction is allocated to one Contracting State exclusively or primarily. They may be taxed at full domestic tax rates of the State concerned. Here, tax sharing is not the applied policy, neither in the MCs nor in tax treaty practice. The major drawback of tax sharing is the transfer of tax benefits granted to investors by the State of source to the State of residence as a result of crediting the State of source's tax. Even the UN MC does not provide for a solution of this disadvantage. As a consequence, capital-importing States do not have the opportunity to stimulate economic policies by means of tax incentives in the context of dividends, interest and royalties. A tax sparing credit or a matching credit can remove this drawback. In their DTCs with developing States and subject to certain conditions, European countries, Canada, and Japan have included such credits. The US does not adopt this approach. Currently, the prevailing view under OECD member countries is that tax incentives are not an efficient and effective way to attract foreign direct investments. They will allow tax sparing credits only with respect to certain identified incentives or activities, and will limit in time the application of the tax sparing provisions). Another solution to this drawback would have been the adoption of the solution suggested by Georg von Schanz. In 1892, he suggested a tax sharing at a tax base level and not at the level of the amount of taxes. His proposal was that, e.g., three quarters – or some other part – of the foreign source income would be allocated to the State of source and taxed on the basis this State's domestic tax law. The other quarter – or another counterbalance as the case may be – would be allocated to the State of residence. Von Schanz's suggestion was only applied once: Article 15 of the 1939 DTC between France and the US. The structure and the wording of some parts of Articles 10-12 are rather similar. These provisions therefore have a number of common interpretation issues. This chapter discusses four of these common issues: The terms ‘paid to’ and ‘beneficial owner’; the ‘permanent establishment proviso’ and the procedures for reducing tax at source. An outlook to the future is the final section of this chapter.

Centraal in deze bijdrage staat een casus die door Van Mourik werd geschetst in een artikel in NJB uit 2007. Het geregistreerd partnerschap tussen tante en nichtje is volgens Van Mourik een ‘estateplanningstool’ die door de estate planner kan worden ingezet. Hij haast zich om daaraan toe te voegen dat het oneigenlijk gebruik in zijn ogen geen diskwalificatie inhoudt maar dat er sprake is van ‘creatief gebruik’ van de rechtsfiguren die door de wetgever worden aangeboden. Uit het artikel blijkt dat ik deze mening niet deel als het gaat om de tante-nichtje-casus. Het is geen creatief gebruik van het instituut huwelijk maar juist een praktijk die de rechtvaardiging van de bijzondere behandeling van partners in de Successiewet ondermijnt. Het is in mijn ogen evenmin een estateplanningstool. De boedelmenging zou naar mijn mening op basis van een zelfstandige fiscaalrechtelijke kwalificatie kunnen worden aangemerkt als een gift. De partnerschapsfaciliteiten zijn gebaseerd op de continuïteits- en verzorgingsgedachte. Als het huwelijk hoofdzakelijk is aangegaan (en tot het overlijden gecontinueerd) vanwege die faciliteiten, kan naar mijn mening met een beroep op fraus legis de toepassing daarvan worden gew

Een onderzoek naar de relatie tussen het huwelijksvermogens- en erfrecht en de bedrijfsopvolgingsfaciliteiten voor de inkomstenbelasting en de schenk- en erfbelasting. De conclusie is dat de gevolgen voor de bedrijfsopvolgingsfaciliteiten op diverse punten in strijd is met de bedoeling van de wetgever. Voor die punten worden aanbevelingen gedaan aan de wetgever zodat de wetgeving wel in overeenstemming komt met de bedoeling.

Sinds jaar en dag gebruikt het CPB het zogeheten houdbaarheidstekort om te beoordelen of het begrotingsbeleid houdbaar is. Deze praktijk wordt ook in het buitenland vaak toegepast. Het begrip houdbaarheidstekort roept echter in toenemende mate discussie op. Het tekort fluctueert sterk in de tijd, het begrip is soms lastig uit te leggen en het kan conflicteren met het begrip brede welvaart. Een discussie over het begrip houdbaarheidstekort is op zijn plaats nu de rente op overheidsobligaties lager is dan de economische groei. Zou deze situatie voor altijd blijven gelden, dan kan het begrip houdbaarheidstekort zijn betekenis verliezen.

In drie artikelen bespreken de auteurs de actualiteiten rondom de bedrijfsopvolgingsfaciliteiten bij schenking en overlijden. In deel 3 gaan zij in op de voortzettingseis van art. 35e SW 1956.

Tax is a moral phenomenon. Enterprises bear responsibility for the fairness and integrity of the international tax system. This responsibility cannot be reduced to strict rule following (applying black letter law). CSR and good tax governance entail voluntarily going beyond the mandatory tax obligations. The substantive element of good tax governance concerns the amount of tax that a company pays and Companies should avoid morally irresponsible tax behavior and strive to comply with the spirit of the law. The procedural element of good tax governance concerns public tax transparency. Both should be an expression of an internal moral commitment, rather than a calculated response to external pressures.

In drie artikelen bespreken de acteurs de actualiteiten rondom de bedrijfsopvolgingsfaciliteiten bij schenking en overlijden. In deel 2 gaan zij in op de bezitseis van art. 35d SW 1956.

Analyse van Artikel 104 Grondwet: Belastingen van het Rijk worden geheven uit kracht van een wet. Andere heffingen van het Rijk worden bij de wet geregeld.

Gezien de financiële, economische en sociale relaties tussen Nederland en Duitsland zijn de fiscale ontwikkelingen in Duitsland voor de fiscale praktijk interessant en inspirerend. In Duitsland is in de afgelopen maanden een aantal fiscale wetten in werking getreden. Daarnaast is recentelijk het Belastingverdrag Nederland-Duitsland aangepast en zijn er in september van dit jaar Bundestagverkiezingen. Voor ons reden genoeg om in deze bijdrage nader in te gaan op een aantal recente fiscale ontwikkelingen in en met Duitsland. In onderdeel 2 bespreken wij het op 24 maart 2021 ondertekende Wijzigingsprotocol van het Belastingverdrag met Duitsland. In onderdeel 3 geven wij een schets van het huidige Duitse fiscale systeem, vergelijken wij de verliesverrekeningstemporisering in Duitsland met die van Nederland en gaan wij in op het arrest van de Hoge Raad van 2 juli 2021 over Duitse “definitief” geleden verliezen. In onderdeel 4, 5, 6, 7 en 8 gaan wij in op enkele Duitse fiscale wetsvoorstellen die inmiddels allemaal zijn aangenomen, namelijk het Abzugsteuerentlastungsmodernisierungsgesetz (AbzStEntModG), ATAD-Umsetzungsgesetz (ATADUmsG), Körperschaftsteuermodernisierungsgesetz (KöMoG), Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetzes (StAbwG), respectievelijk het Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grunderwerbsteuergesetzes (GrEStG). Bij de bespreking van deze wetten ligt onze focus op de relevantie voor (en vergelijking met) de Nederlandse fiscale praktijk. In onderdeel 9 werpen wij een nadere fiscale blik op de verkiezingen in Duitsland (Bundestagswahl) op 26 september 2021. In onderdeel 10 sluiten wij onze bijdrage af.

In drie artikelen bespreken de auteurs de actualiteiten rondom de bedrijfsopvolgingsfaciliteiten bij schenking en overlijden. In deel 1 behandelen zij de materiële ondernemingseis en enkele daarmee samenhangende aspecten.

This chapter examines the legal issues that may arise when implementing and maintaining a Cooperative Compliance programme. While the majority of jurisdictions introduced such programmes by means of administrative actions, a small minority established them through statutory provisions. On the basis of the research that was conducted, the group made a number of recommendations

Tax complexity is a multi-faceted and pervasive phenomenon. Narrow, detailed drafting of the law is a particular manifestation of tax complexity. Tax legislatures often try to control and regulate every conceivable situation by issuing very specific rules covering the full range of circumstances. The result is a tax system is populated by dense thickets of often thorny rules, which lacks transparency and goes at the expense of certainty and equality. Principles-based legislation is sometimes termed as an alternative regulatory instrument to counter both the complexity of detailed tax drafting and tax avoidance. However, it should not be seen as a magic formula but rather as a helpful addition to the legislature’s toolbox. In this article we will elaborate on principles-based legislation, rule-based drafting, and two other drafting styles - legal fictions and standards. We investigate these three ‘friends’ as alternatives, or supplements, to precise rules from the perspective of (legal) principles as advocated by the legal philosopher Dworkin. It will be argued that securing the integrity of tax law requires a balancing act between different legislative drafting styles such as fictions, standards and principles-based legislation.

In deze bijdrage zet ik de verliesverrekeningsregels voor in Nederland gevestigde vennootschappen uiteen. Ik analyseer onder meer in hoeverre Nederland voldoet of kan voldoen aan de aanbeveling van de Europese Commissie van 18 mei 2021 over de fiscale behandeling van verliezen geleden gedurende de coronacrisis. In de aanbeveling wordt een gecoördineerde aanpak uiteengezet van de behandeling van verliezen over de boekjaren 2020 en 2021. Daarnaast bespreek ik de verliesverrekeningsregels in het licht van de huidige ontwikkelingen op het gebied van wetgeving, jurisprudentie en literatuur. In paragraaf 2 worden “binnenjaarse” verliesverrekeningsregels besproken. Daarmee bedoel ik de regels omtrent verliesneming op vermogensbestanddelen die van invloed zijn op het fiscale jaarresultaat. Ik ga expliciet in op de fiscale gevolgen van een afwaarderingsverlies op een vordering, een deelnemingsverlies, een liquidatieverlies en de door de wetgever getroffen mogelijkheid om coronagerelateerde verliezen te verrekenen middels het vormen van een reserve. In paragraaf 3 worden “buitenjaarse” verliesverrekeningsregels uiteengezet. Daarmee bedoel ik de aan het eind van het fiscale jaar bij beschikking vastgestelde nog te verrekenen verliezen (compensabele verliezen). In verschillende sub-paragrafen worden de verliesverrekeningstermijnen, verliesverrekeningstemporisering, houdsterverliezen, handel in verlieslichamen, verliesverrekening bij fusie en splitsing en het fiscale eenheidsregime behandeld. Ik sluit in paragraaf 4 af met een slotbeschouwing.

Since the “reform and opening‑up” policy in 1978, Chinese tax incentives have experienced fluctuations. China has tailored its tax incentives to create a level playing field in the market, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, China still has a state‑oriented attitude towards the granting of tax incentives. This can be witnessed from conflicts between certain Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules. China tends to treat tax incentives as instruments to achieve policy goals, but they often lack the necessary legal control. The European Union (EU) is a comparable power as to China in the world. The ultimate objective of the EU is the establishment of an internal market, which is based on market economy and free trade. State aid law, as a part of EU competition law, aims to limit the negative effects of state aid measures, thus creating a level playing field for all member states. In recent years, it plays an increasing role in restricting the harmful effects of tax incentives in the internal market. How can China improve the legal control over its tax incentives? Are there any inspirations for China from the experiences of EU State aid law? This article makes suggestions to an improved legal control over Chinese tax incentives against the background of EU State aid., Studi Tributari Europei, Vol 8 (2018)

The launching of the new tobacco products, namely e-cigarettes and heat-not-burn tobacco, poses a challenge to the current EU legal framework of the excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, currently under the revision by EU Commission. This contribution grasps the tobacco example to question the EU legitimacy to harmonize within Article 113 Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

This paper makes a welfare comparison between the issuance of price-indexed and nominal public debt in the presence of fiscal constraints, viz. a debt constraint, a deficit constraint and a combination of both. Distortionary taxes or public consumption are regulated to avoid the violation of the relevant fiscal constraint(s). Under a debt constraint indexed debt is generally preferred, while under a deficit constraint the results are more mixed. Introducing inflation persistence and raising the maturity of the debt tend to increase the magnitude of the welfare differences between the two types of debt. Welfare differences are further affected by the degree to which public consumption and tax revenues are indexed to actual versus structural nominal GDP.

Over the last decades, we have generally seen a gradual shift from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to funding to finance pensions. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework that includes three models of pension design, allowing us to study the role of efficiency, redistribution, and time-consistency in pension policies. We use these models to analyse the impact of several trends (a permanent decline in the rate of return on financial markets, a decline in the average rate of economic growth, decreased output volatility and increased capital market volatility) on the optimal balance between PAYG and funding. Although the models lead to similar qualitative results, general conclusions cannot easily be drawn as the various trends work in opposite directions. A numerical simulation experiment with a calibrated version of the time-consistent model shows that it may be wise to halt the shift towards more funding. There is insufficient evidence however to call for a real revival of PAYG.

De rol van de commissionairsfictie in de btw (jurisprudentie HvJ)

Traditional tax havens and conduit countries have different economic and tax characteristics. This paper shows that conduit countries are larger economies, have higher statutory and effective tax rates, have more bilateral treaties and are more transparent. Because of these characteristics, other countries apply lower withholding taxes on income flows to conduit countries compared to tax havens and do not apply CFC-rules on profit income generated in conduit countries. I assess quantitatively the role of tax havens and conduit countries in international corporate tax avoidance taking account of the literature on corporate tax revenue losses, treaty shopping and phantom investment. I allocate the global tax revenues losses due to profit shifting and treaty shopping to individual countries, using GDP, tax rates, FDI positions and FDI income. Traditional tax havens are only responsible for a small part of corporate tax avoidance. Conduit countries are involved in a much larger share, in particular on treaty shopping. A large share of the profit shifting losses is also due to different tax arrangements between other developed countries.