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This article aims to show that there is an alternative way to explain human action with respect to the bottlenecks of the psychology of decision making. The empirical study of human behaviour from mid-20th century to date has mainly developed by looking at a normative model of decision making. In particular Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) decision making, which stems from the subjective expected utility theory of Savage (1954) that itself extended the analysis by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). On this view, the cognitive psychology of decision making precisely reflects the conceptual structure of formal decision theory. This article shows that there is an alternative way to understand decision making by recovering Newell and Simon’s account of problem solving, developed in the framework of bounded rationality, and inserting it into the more recent research program of embodied cognition. Herbert Simon emphasized the importance of problem solving and differentiated it from decision making, which he considered a phase downstream of the former. Moreover according to Simon the centre of gravity of the rationality of the action lies in the ability to adapt. And the centre of gravity of adaptation is not so much in the internal environment of the actor as in the pragmatic external environment. The behaviour adapts to external purposes and reveals those characteristics of the system that limit its adaptation. According to Simon (1981), in fact, environmental feedback is the most effective factor in modelling human actions in solving a problem. In addition, his notion of problem space signifies the possible situations to be searched in order to find that situation which corresponds to the solution. Using the language of embodied cognition, the notion of problem space is about the possible solutions that are enacted in relation to environmental affordances. The correspondence between action and the solution of a problem conceptually bypasses the analytic phase of the decision and limits the role of symbolic representation. In solving any problem, the search for the solution corresponds to acting in ways that involve recursive feedback processes leading up to the final action. From this point of view, the new term enactive problem solving summarizes this fusion between bounded and embodied cognition. That problem solving involves bounded cognition means that it is through the problem solver’s enactive interaction with environmental affordances, and especially social affordances that it is possible to construct the processes required for arriving at a solution. Lastly the concept of enactive problem solving is also able to explain the mechanisms underlying the adaptive heuristics of rational ecology. Its adaptive function is effective both in practical and motor tasks as well as in abstract and symbolic ones.

In this article I work on image proliferation in the age of ubiquitous media.

Visual culture studies and photography are the keywords for understanding the contemporary, the age of digital images. The aim of this paper is to verify the role of photography in order to give form and meaning to the experience.

Gli studi sullo sguardo femminile hanno ormai una lunga anche se forse non consolidata tradizione interdisciplinare che risale almeno agli anni ’70 del Novecento. Se è stato di sicuro l’ambito dei Film Studies, e soprattutto quello dei Feminist Film Studies, ad aver dato un imprescindibile impulso a questi studi (è scontato riferirsi all’ormai classico Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema di Laura Mulvey così come agli studi di Mary Ann Doane) alla fine del Novecento e all’inizio del ventunesimo secolo la messa in questione di una “differenza” di genere all’interno delle pratiche, delle tecnologie, delle specificità dello sguardo si è allargata ad ambiti diversi. In questo saggio ci concentreremo su alcuni di questi ambiti come quelli degli studi sociali sulla scienza e degli studi post-coloniali. Ma è sicuramente all’interno del più ampio alveo della (in)disciplina della cultura visuale che si sono sviluppati gli studi sullo sguardo, inteso come una delle componenti di quel complesso interplay che è il regime scopico, insieme alle immagini e ai dispositivi

Siri Hustvedt, una scrittrice che ha saputo sempre coniugare l’analisi del proprio bíos – della pro- pria “fragilità” psichica e fisica – con la teoria della narrativa, con particolare attenzione per le articolazioni della “mente narrativa”: le emozioni, l’immaginazione, la memoria. Siri Hustvedt nelle sue opere alterna profonde analisi psicologiche di carattere narrativo, in particolare autobiografico, e riflessioni saggistiche in cui centrale è il confronto con la più recente e agguerrita letteratura neuroscientifica. Siri Hustvedt, a writer who has always known how to combine the analysis of her own bios - of her psychic and physical "fragility" - with the theory of fiction, with particular attention to the articulations of the "narrative mind": emotions, imagination, memory. Siri Hustvedt in his works alternates deep psychological analyzes of a narrative nature, in particular autobiographical, and essay reflections in which the comparison with the most recent and fierce neuroscientific literature is central.

La ricerca di Roger Caillois sul mimetismo animale, avviata in ambito surrealista già negli anni Trenta, si fondava su alcuni interessi per l’entomologia e le società primitive, su solidi studi sul mito e alcune incursioni nella psicopatologia, mentre le spiegazioni fornite riconducevano il fenomeno a una necessità di assimilazione allo spazio e a una inerzia dello slancio di vita, in aperto contrasto con le teorie darwiniane della selezione naturale. Una interpretazione non utilitaristica faceva del mimetismo un “lusso dispendioso” di alcune specie animali che, per ragioni non adattive, mettono in campo alcune tipologie precise di comportamenti: l’invisibilità, il travestimento e l’initimidazione. Così riletto il mimetismo non è basato esclusivamente sulla somiglianza ad un modello, ma è innanzitutto una strategia di sguardi reciproci tra predatore e preda, un utilizzo di particolari dispositivi interni o esterni al corpo animale, che permettono di trasformarsi in altro, e una riformulazione della distinzione tra individuo e spazio circostante, secondo una teoria della visione aptica e multimodale. Sono pratiche che riguardano direttamente questioni fondamentali della visualità e inaugurano regimi scopici inusuali che, riletti in una prospettiva postumanista, consentono una deterritorializzazione delle immagini, una spersonalizzazione degli sguardi e una rifunzionalizzazione dei media, così come le hanno riconsiderate recentemente Elizabeth Grosz, Jurri Parikka e Pooja Rangan. Si tratta solo di alcune delle interpretazioni contemporanee della teoria cailloisiana sul mimetismo animale, quelle che hanno inaugurato nuove prospettive di ricerca e hanno permesso di operare quella svolta bioculturale negli studi di cultura visuale che ritrova nei primi anni del Novecento un humus fertile Roger Caillois's research on animal mimicry, initiated in the Surrealist field as early as the 1930s, was based on some interests in entomology and primitive societies, solid studies on myth and some forays into psychopathology, while the explanations provided traced the phenomenon back to a need for assimilation to space and an inertia of life momentum, in open contrast to Darwinian theories of natural selection. A non-utilitarian interpretation made mimicry a "wasteful luxury" of some animal species that, for non-adaptive reasons, deploy certain precise types of behavior: invisibility, disguise and initimidation. Thus reread, mimicry is not based solely on resemblance to a model, but is first and foremost a strategy of reciprocal gazes between predator and prey, a use of particular devices inside or outside the animal body, which allow it to transform itself into something else, and a reformulation of the distinction between individual and surrounding space, according to a haptic and multimodal theory of vision. These are practices that directly address fundamental questions of visuality and inaugurate unusual scopic regimes that, reread from a posthumanist perspective, allow for a deterritorialization of images, a depersonalization of gazes, and a refunctionalization of media, as reconsidered recently by Elizabeth Grosz, Jurri Parikka, and Pooja Rangan. These are only some of the contemporary interpretations of the Cailloisian theory of animal mimicry, those that have inaugurated new research perspectives and enabled the biocultural turn in visual culture studies that finds fertile humus in the early twentieth century.

Background Individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) feel rejected even when socially included. The pathophysiological mechanisms of this rejection bias are still unknown. Using the Cyberball paradigm, we investigated whether patients with BPD, display altered physiological responses to social inclusion and ostracism, as assessed by changes in Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA). Methods The sample comprised 30 patients with BPD, 30 with remitted Major Depressive Disorder (rMDD) and 30 Healthy Controls (HC). Self-report ratings of threats toward one’s fundamental need to belong and RSA reactivity were measured immediately after each Cyberball condition. Results Participants with BPD showed lower RSA at rest than HC. Only patients with BPD, reported higher threats to fundamental needs and exhibited a further decline in RSA after the Inclusion condition. Conclusions Individuals with BPD experience a biased appraisal of social inclusion both at the subjective and physiological level, showing higher feelings of ostracism and a breakdown of autonomic regulation to including social scenarios.

There is little doubt that one of Simon’s key contributions throughout his scientific career - if not the main one - was rooting the notion of bounded rationality in cognitive psychology (Simon, 1976). He called his notion of bounded rationality in the cognitive psychology realm ‘cognitivism’ (Haugeland, 1978), an approach, also known as the ‘information-processing’ approach, which he contributed to affirming together with his colleague Allen Newell starting in the mid-1950s. According to cognitivism, cognition works through the internal (i.e. mental) manipulation of representations of the external environment accomplished through referential ‘symbols’ (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972). Connecting Simon’s theory of cognition to his theory of rationality is the notion that cognition works in a way that is necessary and sufficient for intelligent behavior (what is known as the ‘physical symbol system hypothesis’, see Newell & Simon, 1976). The idea that results from integrating Simon’s view of cognition with his view of bounded rationality is that rationality is a “process and product of thought” (Simon, 1978) in which the internal bounds of reason (Simon, 1955) adapt to the external bounds of the environment (Simon, 1956) in a disembodied fashion. In this picture, in fact, there is no place for flesh and blood. Patokorpi (2008) has emphasized that there is an inner tension in Simon’s thought, as on the one hand he was a strong advocate for a realistic approach to the bounds of rationality while, on the other hand, he represented them through the ‘unbounded’ power of digital computation and the metaphor of computers. This inner tension, which did not simply concern Simon’s thought but an entire generation of cognitive scientists, would have huge consequences in the history of cognitive psychology. In the early 1990s, Newell and Simon’s physical symbol system hypothesis was questioned when the ‘embodied robots’ designed by Rodney Brooks proved able to simulate simple forms of intelligent behavior by externalizing most of cognition onto the physical properties of environments, thus dispensing with abstract symbolic processing (Brooks, 1991). This is just one instance from the recent history of cognitive science pointing to the fact that while bounded rationality remains a pivotal notion in behavioral economics and economic psychology, new theoretical views and massive experimental evidence in cognitive science have led to supersede cognitivism and its abstract representation of cognition (Wallace et al., 2007). Contemporary cognitive psychology emphasizes that cognition is ‘embodied’, as it constitutively depends on body states, on the morphological traits of the human body, and on the sensory-motor system (see, e.g., Wilson, 2002). As such, it can be said to introduce another ‘bound’ to human cognition, able to integrate the internal bounds represented by cognitive limitations and the external bounds of task environments: the human body. In this paper, we argue that, in so far as the human body represents a new bound for human cognition, it can also have an important role in the re-conceptualization of bounded rationality. Since the new approach of embodied cognition is so recent, it is still rather plural and variegated, and as such far from a stable synthesis (for reviews on the issue of conceptual pluralism in embodied cognition see the classic Wilson, 2002; for more recent reviews, see Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Clark, 2008; Kiverstein & Clark, 2009). Without the pretension to be exhaustive, here is a list of classic books on the idea that the body is a constitutive part of cognition: Varela, Thompson, & Rosch (1991); Clancey (1997); Clark, (1997); Lakoff & Johnson (1999); Rowlands (1999); Shapiro (2004); Gallagher (2005); Pfeifer & Bongard (2006). As a matter of terminology, although different labels have been used to identify and distinguish different views of embodiment, we will refer to them all by means of the common synthetic label ‘embodied cognition’ (Calvo & Gomila, 2008; Shapiro, 2014).

What determines the meaning of an utterance is a logical matter and as such must be treated independently of the bio-cognitive constraints that operate in our bodies. This thesis, whose great supporter was Frege, implies a clear notion of rationality that seems not to bear comparison with what we know on the limits of our rationality. Various theories (Kahneman and Tversky 1983; Gigerenzer et al., 1999), thematizing the need to consider our rationality beginning from the bio- cognitive constraints that our body imposes on a mass of information, can be of great utility for facing the problem of what type of rationality operates in phenomena of linguistic understanding (Ferreira and Patson 2007; Christiansen and Chater, 2016). From this picture it will clearly emerge that understanding is a performance of human organisms that cannot be described without considering the effective bio- cognitive constraints at work in our actions.

Neuroscientists and philosophers, among others, have long questioned the contribution of bodily experience to the constitution of self-consciousness. Contemporary research answers this question by focusing on the notions of sense of agency and/or sense of ownership. Recently, however, it has been proposed that the bodily self might also be rooted in bodily motor experience, that is, in the experience of oneself as instantiating a bodily structure that enables a specific range of actions. In the current fMRI study, we tested this hypothesis by making participants undergo a hand laterality judgment task, which is known to be solved by simulating a motor rotation of one's own hand. The stimulus to be judged was either the participant's own hand or the hand of a stranger. We used this task to investigate whether mental rotation of pictures depicting one's own hands leads to a different activation of the sensorimotor areas as compared with the mental rotation of pictures depicting another's hand. We revealed a neural network for the general representation of the bodily self encompassing the SMA and pre-SMA, the anterior insula, and the occipital cortex, bilaterally. Crucially, the representation of one's own dominant hand turned out to be primarily confined to the left premotor cortex. Our data seem to support the existence of a sense of bodily self encased within the sensorimotor system. We propose that such a sensorimotor representation of the bodily self might help us to differentiate our own body from that of others.

Embodied approaches to language understanding hold that comprehension of linguistic material entails a situated simulation of the situation described. Some recent studies have shown that implicit, explicit, and relational properties of objects implied in a sentence are part of this simulation. However, the issue concerning the extent to which language sensorimotor specificity expressed by linguistic constituents of a sentence, contributes to situating the simulation process has not yet been adequately addressed. To fill this gap, we combined a concrete action verb with a noun denoting a graspable or non-graspable object, to form a sensible or non-sensible sentence. Verbs could express a specific action with low degrees of freedom (DoF) or an action with high DoF. Participants were asked to respond indicating whether the sentences were sensible or not. We found that simulation was active in understanding both sensible and non-sensible sentences. Moreover, the simulation was more situated with sentences containing a verb referring to an action with low DoF. Language sensorimotor specificity expressed by the noun, played a role in situating the simulation, only when the noun was preceded by a verb denoting an action with high DoF in sensible sentences. The simulation process in understanding non-sensible sentences evoked both the representations related to the verb and to the noun, these remaining separated rather than being integrated as in sensible sentences. Overall our findings are in keeping with embodied approaches to language understanding and suggest that the language sensorimotor specificity of sentence constituents affects the extent to which the simulation is situated. © 2011 Elsevier Srl.

International audience; Recent neurophysiological and brain imaging studies have shown that the motor system is involved in language processing. However, it is an open question whether this involvement is a necessary requisite to understand language or rather a side effect of distinct cognitive processes underlying it. In order to clarify this issue we carried out three behavioral experiments, using a go-no go paradigm. Italian verbs expressing hand actions, foot actions or an abstract content served as stimuli. Participants used their right hands to respond. In Experiment 1, in which a semantics decision task with an early delivery of the go signal (during processing language material) was used, slower responses were found for hand action-related verbs than for foot action-related verbs. In Experiment 2, using the same task with either an early or a delayed delivery of the go signal (when language material had been already processed), no difference was found between responses to the two verb categories in the delayed delivery condition. In Experiment 3, in which a lexical decision task with an early delivery of the go signal was used, again no difference between the two verb categories was found. The present findings demonstrate that during language processing the modulation of the motor system crucially occurs while performing a semantics decision task, thus supporting the notion that this involvement is a necessary step to understand language rather than a side effect of upstream cognitive processes.

Much research suggested that recognizing our own body-parts and attributing a body-part to our physical self-likely involve distinct processes. Accordingly, facilitation for self-body-parts was found when an implicit, but not an explicit, self-recognition was required. Here, we assess whether implicit and explicit bodily self-recognition is mediated by different cerebral networks and can be selectively impaired after brain lesion. To this aim, right- (RBD) and left- (LBD) brain damaged patients and age-matched controls were presented with rotated pictures of either self- or other-people hands. In the Implicit task participants were submitted to hand laterality judgments. In the Explicit task they had to judge whether the hand belonged, or not, to them. In the Implicit task, controls and LBD patients, but not RBD patients, showed an advantage for self-body stimuli. In the Explicit task a disadvantage emerged for self-compared to others' body stimuli in controls as well as in patients. Moreover, when we directly compared the performance of patients and controls, we found RBD, but not LBD, patients to be impaired in both the implicit and explicit recognition of self-body-part stimuli. Conversely, no differences were found for others' body-part stimuli. Crucially, 40% RBD patients showed a selective deficit for implicit processing of self-body-part stimuli, whereas 27% of them showed a selective deficit in the explicit recognition of their own body. Additionally, we provide anatomical evidence revealing the neural basis of this dissociation. Based on both behavioral and anatomical data, we suggest that different areas of the right hemisphere underpin implicit and explicit self-body knowledge.

Observing actions made by others activates the cortical circuits responsible for the planning and execution of those same actions. This observation–execution matching system (mirror-neuron system) is thought to play an important role in the understanding of actions made by others. In an fMRI experiment, we tested whether this system also becomes active during the processing of action-related sentences. Participants listened to sentences describing actions performed with the mouth, the hand, or the leg. Abstract sentences of comparable syntactic structure were used as control stimuli. The results showed that listening to action-related sentences activates a left fronto-parieto-temporal network that includes the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (Broca's area), those sectors of the premotor cortex where the actions described are motorically coded, as well as the inferior parietal lobule, the intraparietal sulcus, and the posterior middle temporal gyrus. These data provide the first direct evidence that listening to sentences that describe actions engages the visuomotor circuits which subserve action execution and observation.

Picking up an object requires two basic motor operations: reaching and grasping. Neurophysiological studies in monkeys have suggested that the visuomotor transformations necessary for these two operations are carried out by separate parietofrontal circuits and that, for grasping, a key role is played by a specific sector of the ventral premotor cortex: area F5. The aim of the present study was to test the validity of this hypothesis by reversibly inactivating area F5 in monkeys trained to grasp objects of different shape, size and orientation. In separate sessions, the hand field of the primary motor cortex (area F1 or area 4) was also reversibly inactivated. The results showed that after inactivation of area F5 buried in the bank of the arcuate sulcus (the F5 sector where visuomotor neurones responding to object presentation are located), the hand shaping preceding grasping was markedly impaired and the hand posture was not appropriate for the object size and shape. The monkeys were eventually able to grasp the objects, but only after a series of corrections made under tactile control. With small inactivations the deficits concerned the contralesional hand, with larger inactivations the ipsilateral hand as well. In addition, there were signs of peripersonal neglect in the hemispace contralateral to the inactivation site. Following inactivation of area F5 lying on the cortical convexity (the F5 sector where visuomotor neurones responding to action observation, 'mirror neurones', are found) only a motor slowing was observed, the hand shaping being preserved. The inactivation of the hand field of area F1 produced a severe paralysis of contralateral finger movements with hypotonia. The results of this study indicate the crucial role of the ventral premotor cortex in visuomotor transformations for grasping movements. More generally, they provide strong support for the notion that distal and proximal movement organization relies upon distinct cortical circuits. Clinical data on distal movement deficits in humans are re-examined in the light of the present findings.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to investigate whether the excitability of the corticospinal system is selectively affected by motor imagery. To this purpose, we performed two experiments. In the first one we recorded motor evoked potentials from right hand and arm muscles during mental simulation of flexion/extension movements of both distal and proximal joints. In the second experiment we applied magnetic stimulation to the right and the left motor cortex of subjects while they were imagining opening or closing their right or their left hand. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded from a hand muscle contralateral to the stimulated cortex. The results demonstrated that the excitability pattern during motor imagery dynamically mimics that occurring during movement execution. In addition, while magnetic stimulation of the left motor cortex revealed increased corticospinal excitability when subjects imagined ipsilateral as well as contralateral hand movements, the stimulation of the right motor cortex revealed a facilitatory effect induced by imagery of contralateral hand movements only. In conclusion, motor imagery is a high level process, which, however, manifests itself in the activation of those same cortical circuits that are normally involved in movement execution.

The role of active tool use in the remapping of space in hemispatial neglect patients has been extensively investigated. To date, however, there is no evidence that observing tool use can play a role in the remapping of space in hemispatial neglect patients. In this study, a patient with a severe hemispatial neglect in near but not far space and twelve healthy controls were asked to bisect near and far lines using a laser pen. The task was performed both before and immediately after sessions in which they merely observed the experimenter bisecting near and far lines with a stick. During the observation session, participants were either holding an identical stick or empty-handed. Results, in both the neglect patient and healthy controls, showed that observing the experimenter bisecting line while holding the same tool, produces a remapping of the far space into the near space. This result was particularly evident in the neglect patient where observing line-bisection task extended the spatial deficit from the near to the far space. Our results provide new empirical support to the idea that the space around us is not mapped in merely metrical terms, rather it seems to be deeply impacted by both action observation and execution.

Ciò che viene detto trae il suo significato dal non detto che le parole dette mostrano senza dirlo. Questa complessa relazione semantica viene studiata con l'aiuto di Freud e Wittgenstein.

The posterior inner perisylvian region including the secondary somatosensory cortex (area SII) and the adjacent region of posterior insular cortex (pIC) has been implicated in haptic processing by integrating somato-motor information during hand-manipulation, both in humans and in non-human primates. However, motor-related properties during hand-manipulation are still largely unknown. To investigate a motor-related activity in the hand region of SII/pIC, two macaque monkeys were trained to perform a hand-manipulation task, requiring 3 different grip types (precision grip, finger exploration, side grip) both in light and in dark conditions. Our results showed that 70% (n = 33/48) of task related neurons within SII/pIC were only activated during monkeys' active hand-manipulation. Of those 33 neurons, 15 (45%) began to discharge before hand-target contact, while the remaining neurons were tonically active after contact. Thirty-percent (n = 15/48) of studied neurons responded to both passive somatosensory stimulation and to the motor task. A consistent percentage of task-related neurons in SII/pIC was selectively activated during finger exploration (FE) and precision grasping (PG) execution, suggesting they play a pivotal role in control skilled finger movements. Furthermore, hand-manipulation-related neurons also responded when visual feedback was absent in the dark. Altogether, our results suggest that somato-motor neurons in SII/pIC likely contribute to haptic processing from the initial to the final phase of grasping and object manipulation. Such motor-related activity could also provide the somato-motor binding principle enabling the translation of diachronic somatosensory inputs into a coherent image of the explored object.

It is an open question whether the motor system is involved during understanding of concrete nouns, as it is for concrete verbs. To clarify this issue, we carried out a behavioral experiment using a go-no go paradigm with an early and delayed go-signal delivery. Italian nouns referring to concrete objects (hand-related or foot-related) and abstract entities served as stimuli. Right-handed participants read the stimuli and responded when the presented word was concrete using the left or right hand. At the early go-signal, slower right-hand responses were found for hand-related nouns compared to foot-related nouns. The opposite pattern was found for the left hand. These findings demonstrate an early lateralized modulation of the motor system during noun processing, most likely crucial for noun comprehension. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

Schizophrenia spectrum has been associated with a disruption of the basic sense of self, which pertains, among others, the representation of one's own body. We investigated the impact of either implicit or explicit access to the representation of one's own body-effectors on bodily self-awareness, in first-episode schizophrenia (FES) patients and healthy controls (HCs). We contrasted their performance in an implicit self-recognition task (visual matching) and in an explicit self/other discrimination task. Both tasks employed participant's own and others' body-effectors. Concerning the implicit task, HCs were more accurate with their own than with others' body-effectors, whereas patients did not show such self-advantage. Regarding the explicit task, both groups did not exhibit a self-advantage, and patients showed a higher percentage of self-misattribution errors. Neither self/other nor implicit/explicit effects were found in both groups when processing inanimate-objects. We propose that FES patients suffer of a disturbed implicit sense of bodily self.

We tested the hypothesis that the body self-advantage, i.e., the facilitation in discriminating self versus other people's body-effectors, is the expression of an implicit and body-specific knowledge, based mainly on the sensorimotor representation of one's own body-effectors. Alternatively, the body self-advantage could rely on visual recognition of pictorial cues. According to the first hypothesis, using gray-scale pictures of body-parts, the body self-advantage should emerge when self-body recognition is implicitly required and should be specific for body-effectors and not for inanimate-objects. In contrast, if the self-advantage is due to a mere visual-perceptual facilitation, it should be independent of the implicit or explicit request (and could be extended also to objects). To disentangle these hypotheses, healthy participants were implicitly or explicitly required to recognize either their own body-effectors or inanimate-objects. Participants were more accurate in the implicit task with self rather than with others' body-effectors. In contrast, the self-advantage was not found when an explicit recognition of one's own body-effectors was required, suggesting that the body self-advantage relies upon a sensorimotor, rather than a mere visual representation of one's own body. Moreover, the absence of both self/other and implicit/explicit effects, when processing inanimate-objects, underlines the differences between the body and other objects.

Previous studies demonstrated the human ability to implicitly recognize their own body. When submitted to a visual matching task, participants showed the so-called self-advantage, that is, a better performance with self rather than others' body or body parts. Here, we investigated whether the body self-advantage relies upon a motor representation of one's body. Participants were submitted to a laterality judgment of self and others' hands (Experiment 1 and 3), which involves a sensory-motor mental simulation. Moreover, to investigate whether the self-advantage emerges also when an explicit self processing is required, the same participants were submitted to an explicit self-body recognition task (Experiment 2). Participants showed the self-advantage when performing the laterality judgment, but not when self-recognition was explicitly required. Thus, implicit and explicit recognition of the bodily self dissociate and only an implicit recognition of the bodily self, mapped in motor terms, allows the self-advantage to emerge.

Many authors have proposed that facial expressions, by conveying emotional states of the person we are interacting with, influence the interaction behavior. We aimed at verifying how specific the effect is of the facial expressions of emotions of an individual (both their valence and relevance/specificity for the purpose of the action) with respect to how the action aimed at the same individual is executed. In addition, we investigated whether and how the effects of emotions on action execution are modulated by participants' empathic attitudes. We used a kinematic approach to analyze the simulation of feeding others, which consisted of recording the “feeding trajectory” by using a computer mouse. Actors could express different highly arousing emotions, namely happiness, disgust, anger, or a neutral expression. Response time was sensitive to the interaction between valence and relevance/specificity of emotion: disgust caused faster response. In addition, happiness induced slower feeding time and longer time to peak velocity, but only in blocks where it alternated with expressions of disgust. The kinematic profiles described how the effect of the specificity of the emotional context for feeding, namely a modulation of accuracy requirements, occurs. An early acceleration in kinematic relative-to-neutral feeding profiles occurred when actors expressed positive emotions (happiness) in blocks with specific-to-feeding negative emotions (disgust). On the other hand, the end-part of the action was slower when feeding happy with respect to neutral faces, confirming the increase of accuracy requirements and motor control. These kinematic effects were modulated by participants' empathic attitudes. In conclusion, the social dimension of emotions, that is, their ability to modulate others' action planning/execution, strictly depends on their relevance and specificity to the purpose of the action. This finding argues against a strict distinction between social and nonsocial emotions.

Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas—areas active during the execution and the observation of an action—previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically., Functional magnetic resonance imaging is used to explore the responses of premotor cortical areas to observing the actions of others

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and a behavioral paradigm were used to assess whether listening to action-related sentences modulates the activity of the motor system. By means of single-pulse TMS, either the hand or the foot/leg motor area in the left hemisphere was stimulated in distinct experimental sessions, while participants were listening to sentences expressing hand and foot actions. Listening to abstract content sentences served as a control. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded from hand and foot muscles. Results showed that MEPs recorded from hand muscles were specifically modulated by listening to hand-action-related sentences, as were MEPs recorded from foot muscles by listening to foot-action-related sentences. This modulation consisted of an amplitude decrease of the recorded MEPs. In the behavioral task, participants had to respond with the hand or the foot while listening to actions expressing hand and foot actions, as compared to abstract sentences. Coherently with the results obtained with TMS, when the response was given with the hand, reaction times were slower during listening to hand-action-related sentences, while when the response was given with the foot, reaction times were slower during listening to foot-action-related sentences. The present data show that processing verbally presented actions activates different sectors of the motor system, depending on the effector used in the listened-to action.

The involvement of the sensorimotor system in language understanding has been widely demonstrated. However, the role of context in these studies has only recently started to be addressed. Though words are bearers of a semantic potential, meaning is the product of a pragmatic process. It needs to be situated in a context to be disambiguated. The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that embodied simulation occurring during linguistic processing is contextually modulated to the extent that the same sentence, depending on the context of utterance, leads to the activation of different effector-specific brain motor areas. In order to test this hypothesis, we asked subjects to give a motor response with the hand or the foot to the presentation of ambiguous idioms containing action-related words when these are preceded by context sentences. The results directly support our hypothesis only in relation to the comprehension of hand-related action sentences.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to localize brain areas that were active during the observation of actions made by another individual. Object- and non-object-related actions made with different effectors (mouth, hand and foot) were presented. Observation of both object- and non-object-related actions determined a somatotopically organized activation of premotor cortex. The somatotopic pattern was similar to that of the classical motor cortex homunculus. During the observation of object-related actions, an activation, also somatotopically organized, was additionally found in the posterior parietal lobe. Thus, when individuals observe an action, an internal replica of that action is automatically generated in their premotor cortex. In the case of object-related actions, a further object-related analysis is performed in the parietal lobe, as if the subjects were indeed using those objects. These results bring the previous concept of an action observation/execution matching system (mirror system) into a broader perspective: this system is not restricted to the ventral premotor cortex, but involves several somatotopically organized motor circuits.

In this investigation we studied the influence of object velocity on the transport and on the grasp components of prehension movements directed to approaching objects. Three experiments were carried out. In the first experiment six subjects were required to reach and grasp a sphere that approached them with a constant velocity. The effects of four velocities were studied. The results showed that the end point of the arm movement changed with object velocity: nearer the body with higher than with lower object velocities. Transport velocity increased with movement amplitude and the deceleration phase decreased in duration with higher object velocities. On the contrary the grasp component was not affected by object velocity. The second experiment was a control experiment carried out in order to verify whether a possible influence of object velocity on the grasp could be revealed in an experimental condition in which grasp planning relies without doubt on visual computation of all object features. In this experiment object velocity and object size were randomly varied. The results showed that the grasp was not influenced by object velocity, whereas it was sensitive to changes of object size. The third experiment had the two-fold aim of establishing (1) whether transport velocity was influenced by object velocity once the location in space at which the object had to be grasped was fixed and (2) whether the grasp kinematics differed for prehension movements directed respectively to stationary or to moving objects. Results showed that the first part of the transport is affected only by distance, whereas the deceleration phase decreased with increasing object velocity. This last result suggests that subjects minimized object displacements in order to grasp the sphere correctly. The grasp component differed between the conditions of stationay and moving stimuli only in the relative timing between finger aperture and closure phases. The closure phase decreased in the condition of moving stimuli. The results of the three experiments indicate the dependence of transport parameters on object velocity, whereas grasp parameters appear to be unaffected.