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This article focuses on the lack of full compliance with teaching ethno–racial relations education in Brazilian university undergraduate programs, particularly law programs. Teaching this topic was specified by the Conselho Nacional de Educação (CNE, National Education Council) in Resolution CNE/CP no. 01/2004. Although teaching ethno–racial relations education has not been a panacea for judicial sentencing based on racial criteria, we propose the working hypothesis that teaching it is a tool that can help catalyze a reduction in racist sentences by courts, for example, a defendant not fitting the stereotypical criminal pattern by being white or being assumed to belong to some criminal group for being black (preto) or brown (pardo). Through surveys at sixty-nine federal universities and documentary research into law program curricula, it was discovered that Resolution CNE/CP no. 01/2004 is not being fully or appropriately implemented at these institutions, a fact that may be enabling the continuance of race-based penal sentencing, which is illegal and extremely harmful to the black/brown Brazilian population. To prevent or minimize this problem, full compliance with Resolution CNE/CP no. 01/2004 is suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of GeSec: Revista de Gestao e Secretariado is the property of Sindicato das Secretarias e Secretarios do Estado de Sao Paulo (SINSESP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, as one of the branches of the Judicial Power in Indonesia, has the Supreme Court Regulation (PERMA) which is commonly abbreviated as PERMA. On October 10, 2022, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia issued Supreme Court Regulation Number 7 of 2022 concerning Amendments to Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2019 regarding Case Administration and Electronic Court Proceedings. In this PERMA, the use of registered mail is mentioned in conducting court summons. The research issues in this study are: 1.) How is the procedure for court summons using registered mail according to Supreme Court Regulation Number 7 of 2022 concerning Amendments to Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2019 regarding Case Administration and Electronic Court Proceedings? 2.) Is the use of registered mail for court summons under civil procedure law? This study is a library research, which involves studying books, legal texts, or other relevant information. The nature of this research is descriptive, where data presented is qualitative. It is descriptive because the results are narratively described with data sources including secondary data, which is obtained through the review of legal materials. The legal materials used by the researcher are categorized into primary and secondary legal materials. The data analysis method used is qualitative inductive analysis with an interactive model. The research findings show that court summons using registered mail according to Supreme Court Regulation Number 7 of 2022 concerning Amendments to Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2019 regarding Case Administration and Electronic Court Proceedings are carried out by sending summons letters through POS Indonesia. However, the use of registered mail for court summons is not in accordance with the provisions of civil procedure law due to non-compliance with the principles of the summons and its potential detrimental effects on parties, especially the Defendant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to seek the formation of laws and regulations regarding Citizen Lawsuits. Citizen Lawsuitis access for citizens to represent the public interest to file lawsuits in court based on unlawful acts by the government. Since the receipt of the Citizen Lawsuit filed byMunir CS,based on the abandonment of TKI in Nunukan by the Government of Indonesia, until now there has been no regulationregarding Citizen Lawsuits. The formulation of the problem used in this study is first, what is the urgency of establishing legislation regarding Citizen Lawsuit in Indonesia, and second, what form of legislation regardingCitizen Lawsuit is ideally implemented in Indonesia. The research method used is normative-juridical research. The results of this study show that the condition of the legal vacuum regarding Citizen Lawsuit results in the inconsistency of the Panel of Judges in interpreting formal requirements, namely notifications; therefore, it is necessary to make laws and regulations regardingCitizen Lawsuits to catch up with written law and prevent inconsistencies in court decisions. In conclusion, the legal basis used by the Judges panel in accepting the Citizen Lawsuit was based on Article 10 Section (1) and Article 5 Section (1) of Law number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power. Additionally, the Law of Civil Procedure should include the principle of Citizen Lawsuits, but since legislation takes time to pass, the Supreme Court can work around this by creating a PERMA. Suggestions from this research, it is necessary to make efforts to form regulations regarding Citizen Lawsuit, and it is necessary to research Citizen Lawsuit models in Anglo-Saxon countries to be used as reference material in formingCitizen Lawsuit regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the Soviet court verdicts under Article 122 of the Criminal Code of the Soviet Lithuania, which tried men for homosexual relations, as historical sources. The author argues that the documents stored in the contemporary archives remain programmed according to Soviet logic. The 20 verdicts examined reveal that in practice, men in Vilnius Lenin District were mainly tried for having relations with minors or for sexual coercion rather than consensual sexual relations. The testimonies in which the convicted men's traces of subjectivity can be detected are proposed to be defined as 'post-voice'. In some cases, these 'post-voices' reveal how the 'weak' resorted to their own tactics when they found themselves in the judicial and political power field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The social changes felt by the modern world have awakened in man the desire to realize rights, which will result in changes in the defining contours of the concept of access to justice. In turn, this evolution of the understanding of access to justice in Brazil will have a direct impact on the Judiciary, especially given the persistent demand culture. Add to this the implementation of rushed practices, both by the Judiciary itself and by the Legislative Branch, which, in an attempt to provide rapid responses to society's demands, further suffocate the already dying justice system. Thus, the present research aims to stimulate academic discussions about a possible crisis in the Judiciary as a result of the expansion of the defining boundaries of access to justice. In short, the aim is to: bring together some considerations about the expansion of the concept of access to justice in contemporary Brazil and stimulate reflection on the crisis faced by the Judiciary based on the polysemy of this guarantee. This is bibliographical research, promoted under the critical socio-legal method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common-law interpretive methodologies memostly nonbinding, but some interpretive methodologies are seen as binding preced€nt. This Aitide offers an explanation for this state of affairs. Whereas the extant scholarship on common-law interpretive methodologies offers descriptive accounts (often assuming that common-law methodologies are per se nonbinding) and normative analysis, this Article fills a gap in the literature 14 providing a realist explanation for the legal landscape of binding interp-etive methodologies. It identifies whether a methodolog, is rule-like, and whether it increases judicial legitimag and/or court power as "pull factors-that is, incentives that might attract judges to recognize interpretive methodologies as binding. It also identifies high stakes (i.e., broad methodological scope) and constitutional argumentation over methodologies as "push factors"-that is, obstacles to finding methodologies to be binding. This approach explains the current landscape of int€*etive methodologies and also enables predictions about the stability of existing binding interpretive methodologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court's apparent transformation of the major questions doctrine into a clear statement rule demanding clear congressional authorization for "major" ageng actions has already had, and will continue to have, wide-Tanging impacts on American public law. Not the least of these is the impact it will have on the enterprise of statutog interpretation. Indeed, while it is easy to focus on the policy repercussions of a newly constrained Congress cund newly hamstrung administrative state, this Article argues that equally important is the novel precedent that is set in this particularfonnulation of a clear statement rule, which stands almost entirely alone in its structuml features. With the exception ofthemuch-maligned absurdity doctrine, the new majoT-questions-doctrine-as-clear-statement-mle is the only substantive canon that combines two extreme design elements of canons:.first, a weakielationship to existing authoritative constitutional law, and, second, unbounded potential applicability. While courts and scholars have accepted or created many canons that have one or the other of these extreme features, they have conspicuously avoided combining these two features in any new canonperhaps because the combination exponentially increases the potential inte*renee of canons with Congress's exercise of the legislative power. This avoidance has helped to keep the Coulfs use of substantive canons within recognizable boundalies that pieserue a limited role for thejudician. Now that the modern Court has, for the f·rst time, taken this step in the Tecognition Of a new canon, it is time to assess the limits of canons in a system of limited judicial power. This Article undertakes that project,. finding that the major questions doctritte's novel features are a tell of serious theoretical and constitutional injirmities. #' canons can take on this unique combination offeatures. there are no Speed brakes to stop the unraveling of the faithful agent model at the center of standa,-d textualist and intention, alist accounts of the judicial power to interpret statutes. If such canons could. be justified at all, it would only be under a more dynamic statutcny interpTetation approach that explicitly departs from legislative supremag, but the extremibi of the major questions doctrine potentially goes bgond partnership to judicial takeouer of the legislative power, putting significant p'resswe euen on these justifications. In sum, the major questions doctrine's novel step in the law of interpretation mises new questions about the limits ofsubstantive canons. It is not enough jor the Court and defenders of the doct'rine to identify the major questions doctrine as a canon; they must explain why newly recognizing this form of canon is consistent with core theoretical, normative, and constitutional commitments in our legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article cites different forms of opposition to the U.S. Supreme Court. History shows records of presidential defiance of federal court orders, including Thomas Jefferson's threat of retaliation to any judicial order to install opposition party member William Marbury as justice of peace in Washington, D.C., and Franklin Delano Roosevelt's threat of defiance of challenges to his decision to take the U.S. off the gold standard. Ordinary noncompliance by policymakers to judicial decisions include use of workarounds, reliance on political enforcement, and haggling with courts over the terms of judicial demands. It also suggests that judicial authority in the U.S. is not absolute, but exists within politically constructed bounds, not between the rule of law and its absence.

Answerable only to the courts that have the sole authority to grant or withhold the right to practice law, lawyers operate under a system of self-regulation. The self-regulated legal profession staunchly resists external interference from the legislative and administrative branches of government. Yet, with the same fervor that the legal profession defies non-judicial oversight, it has subordinated itself to the controlling influence of a private interest. By outsourcing the mechanisms that dictate admission to the bar, the legal profession has all but surrendered control of the most crucial component of its gatekeeping function to an unregulated industry that profits at the expense of those seeking entry. The judicial outsourcing of the bar exam has privatized bar admission in ways that can be detrimental to the goal of public protection and damaging to those seeking licensure. The manner in which state courts have fostered privatized bar admission brings into question whether the delegation of judicial power is consistent with Constitutional prerogatives. This Article applies the lenses of multiple political-economic theories to the normative framework of attorney self-regulation and bar admission. In so doing, it seeks to identify justifications for outsourcing an exclusive judicial power that is essential to the goals of self-regulation. This Article ultimately questions whether the legal profession has surrendered, or will soon lose, the ability to regulate itself. The Article concludes with multiple recommendations to reverse the directional flow of power in attorney licensure in a manner that will yield more transparency and public accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign relations and national security law scholars devote significant attention to the expansion of executive power resulting from broad delegations of statutory authority or inaction by Congress and from the considerable deference that courts often afford the executive in cases challenging its actions in the spheres of foreign affairs and national security. Recent decisions of the Roberts Court, however, make clear that scholars should pay just as much—and in some respects perhaps more— attention to the expansion of judicial power. In this essay, I show why by comparing the Court’s statutory analyses in two cases from the first full term of the current six-justice conservative majority and explicating the larger jurisprudential shift that they portend and its import for the future of statutory foreign affairs and national security governance in the 21st century. The vision of the distribution of federal powers that the Court telegraphs in these two decisions—one involving a grant of executive authority in the Clean Air Act and the other a check on executive authority in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—does not bode well for statutory foreign affairs governance in a democracy and in an increasingly complex global landscape. I use my critique of the Court’s “structural” constitutional avoidance reasoning in statutory interpretation—that is, based on federal separation of powers—to provide a fresh perspective on the role of the Court in foreign affairs and national security governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Standing is generally framed as a doctrine about plaintiffs. The basic question, the Supreme Court has said, is "whether the plaintiff is the proper party" to invoke the federal judicial power. Asking that question tends to obscure a natural corollary: Against whom? This Article attends to the other side of the "v." It argues that suits against private parties should be treated differently from suits against government officials for standing purposes because these two types of suits raise different structural concerns. Notwithstanding its focus on plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that standing is "built" on the "single basic idea" of "the separation of powers. " When a government official is sued, a particular structural problem arises: If a court entertains the suit, it will be put in the position of supervising another branch of the government. And without some sort of injury requirement, the political branches might be subjected to continuous judicial oversight. As a historical matter, Article III standing doctrine developed primarily in this context. But the structural concern prompted by that context is absent when one private party sues another private party. There is no prospect that such a suit will yield a remedy against a government official. The suit may, of course, raise other constitutional problems, but those other problems should not be shoehorned into standing--an avowedly transsubstantive jurisdictional doctrine that derives from Article III. This theoretical claim is bolstered by a striking fact: Until 2020, the Supreme Court had never dismissed a case for lack of Article III standing when the defendant was a private party on the ground that the injury alleged was insufficient. And, as it followed this pattern, the Court was notably more generous in recognizing standing in cases against private parties than in cases against governmental parties. But the Court recently broke this pattern. In two closely divided opinions, the Court held--for the first time--that private parties could not sue other private parties because the injuries alleged were inadequate. Congress's attempt to authorize those suits thus violated Article III. This paper critiques those decisions, situates them in the broader arc of the development of standing law, and surveys the prospects for doctrinal reconstruction. To do so, it proposes a novel framework to return the law of standing to its historical and conceptual moorings. Under that framework, standing doctrine should not limit Congress's (or the states') power to authorize lawsuits between private parties in federal court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the phenomenon of judicial corruption as a factor that negatively affects the legitimacy of the judiciary, which is based on the public’s trust in the court and judicial protection. It was established that the fight against corruption in the judiciary is a global trend, as evidenced by numerous international documents. They, in particular, emphasize the priority of eradicating judicial corruption, as it undermines the rule of law, which is the cornerstone of pluralistic democracy, calls into question equality before the law and the right to a fair trial, and undermines the legitimacy of all state authorities. Judicial corruption stands in the way of the stable functioning of the rule of law. It was noted that corruption discredits any power institution, and as for the judiciary, it destroys its basic value - a person’s faith in the justice of the court, the justice of the court process and the court decision. It not only undermines trust in the judiciary, negatively affecting its authority. Judicial corruption causes social stratification, causing sharp negative reactions in society in relation to the professional community of judges. Based on the analysis of scientific sources, it was concluded that there are no unified approaches to the definition of judicial corruption or a standardized understanding of its manifestations. At the same time, according to the authors, the priority for research should be issues of praxeological direction: the causes of judicial corruption, its typical manifestations, consequences, measures of counteraction and struggle. In conclusion, it is stated that judicial corruption, characterized by the specificity and nature of a special danger for the stable functioning of the state, has many manifestations (bribery, extortion, nepotism, etc.) and reasons (structural, economic, political, social, personal). Therefore, all researchers are united in the issue of the need for a consistent and comprehensive policy of countering and fighting judicial corruption. All three key subjects must be involved in its implementation: the state, society and the judicial system, whose actions depend on the legitimacy of the judiciary in the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos is the property of Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Administración Pública is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the constitutionality of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court's (hereinafter SCC) authority to overrule its prior precedents. The authors argue, contrary to the assertions of the predominant conservative approach in Egypt, that bestowing the SCC with such an overruling power neither violates the Constitution nor undermines fundamental legal principles such as the principles of equality, legal certainty, or the justified expectations of litigants. Indeed, we make the argument that the Court's ability to overrule its prior precedents seems to be the most conceivable and plausible way to correct the Court's past mistakes or inaccuracies. We finally claim that endowing the court with such overruling power enhances the constitutional protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and strengthens the Court's credibility not only via other public authorities, but also via public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frederick II Roger of Hohenstaufen, raised and educated in the context of the Arab-Norman civilization of Sicily, gave his kingdom a highly innovative character, with successful directions and attitudes. His intense and complex action of renewal manifested itself in various fields of knowledge, through a moralizing and cultural legislative activity to which the emperor entrusted his judicial and executive power in the Regnum Siciliae. But what is often overlooked about the Swabian's personality is that he exercised some principles of solidarity and justice which, perhaps, show a slightly different man, with feelings of humanity, fearful of God and of the Church. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia Agraria is the property of Historia Agraria and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Irish Migration Studies in Latin America is the property of Society for Irish Latin American Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What is 'a court of a similar status to the High Court' and does it have the power to declare an Act of Parliament or executive conduct constitutionally invalid in terms of Section 172 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996? In this article I attempt to provide an answer to these questions. First, in defining a court of a similar status to the High Court, I defend the High Court's constitutional significance over courts established by statute. I argue that the power to invalidate Acts of Parliament and executive conduct inheres in the High Court because it is a lowercase-c constitutional court as opposed to a statutory court whose powers are limited to only those vested by a statute. This, I argue, has implications for a statutory court's competence to exercise the Section 172 power, contrary to the Constitutional Court's own jurisprudence. Beyond this, I argue that the phrase 'a court of a similar status to the High Court' merely indicates that that court has powers similar to those of the High Court when exercising its inherent jurisdiction in order to act equitably and reasonably in fulfilling its functions and nothing more. Second, I turn my attention to the jurisprudence of the Special Tribunal which has recently declared itself a court possessed of the Section 172 power and explain why, as a matter of constitutional law, it cannot possess the power of judicial review. Third, I will propose a framework for understanding the constitutional jurisdiction of courts other than, and courts of a similar status to, the High Court by drawing on and critiquing decisions of the Constitutional Court that have often been contradictory and poorly reasoned, and that have caused the confusion now pervasive in specialist court jurisprudence. I will conclude by arguing that the distinction between constitutional courts and statutory courts on the one hand, and between courts and tribunals on the other hand, as well as the allocation of the Section 172 power, recognises constitutional courts as a constitutive part of the state's ultimate political authority which is not subject to revocation by Parliament through legislation, and that our understanding of constitutional jurisdiction should reflect that. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to review the concept of judicial immutability as a fundamental criterion for evaluating the national judiciary system and to ascertain the distinctive features of selecting qualified candidates for judgeship. Additionally, the present condition of the judiciary formation will be examined, alongside identifying the essential economic requirements necessary and sufficient to promote the development of the judiciary system in Ukraine. A scientific discussion of the problem of creating an impartial and transparent procedure for the formation of the judiciary. It is noted that the principle of judicial immutability as a basic criterion for assessing the national judicial system is implemented through: 1) the normatively defined age limit of a judge; 2) a non-alternative list of cases in which a judge may be transferred to another position (including a lower one) without his consent; 3) the established procedure for bringing a judge to disciplinary responsibility; 4) an extensive system of bodies performing organisational, administrative and control functions; 5) provision for the assessment of a judge's activity by independent public bodies (the Council for Public Integrity); 6) available competitive selection for the position, except for the cases established by law. It is found that the current state of formation of the judiciary can be defined as unsatisfactory, which is due to the following reasons: 1) unstable functioning of the institutions responsible for the competitive selection of candidates for vacant positions of judges; 2) inhibition of the judicial reform as a result of the introduction of the legal regime of martial law; 3) decrease in the quality of the financing of the judicial system due to the unstable political and economic situation in the country; 4) lack of an effective algorithm for bringing judges to disciplinary responsibility; 5) an excessively extensive system of subjects for assessing the compliance of candidates for the position of a judge with the requirements set forth in regulatory and legal acts. Results. It is established that the peculiarities of the qualification selection of candidates for the position of a judge include: 1) selection of judicial candidates based on three criteria (competence; professional ethics; integrity); 2) differentiation of subjects for assessing the compliance of a candidate for the position of a judge with a certain criterion defined by law; 3) lack of clear procedural requirements for the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine as a body tasked with the formation of the judiciary; 4) predominance of discretionary powers of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine as the main basis for consideration by the High Council of Justice of recommendations on appointment of a candidate for the position of a judge. It is specified that the economic component of the system of career advancement of judges requires solving such problems as: 1) timely identification and elimination of corruption risks and threats, which should be carried out not by branching the bodies involved in the evaluation of candidates for the position of a judge, but by improving the qualification selection procedure; 2) improving the secondment procedure as a temporary transfer of a judge to another court of the same level and specialisation, which became particularly relevant in connection with the introduction of a special legal regime of martial law and the temporary occupation of certain areas of the state; 3) improving the procedure for attracting international donors for financial support to the judiciary and standardising the procedure for obtaining and using such funds.

The subject of this study is the institute of prosecution in domestic criminal proceedings. In the first part of the article, the author explores the concept of accusation. Approaches are considered in which the accusation was identified both with a criminal suit and with criminal prosecution. The second part of the presented work is devoted to the types of charges and the criteria for their differentiation. A summary analysis of the positions of modern, Soviet and pre-revolutionary researchers of law on this issue is given. Various types of charges are considered depending on the subject entitled to its implementation. Particular attention is paid to the so-called public prosecution, which was supported by citizens who were not endowed with this right ex officio. Based on the study, the author comes to the conclusion that the adversarial model of the criminal process is characterized by the presence of various types of charges, as well as various subjects entitled to its implementation. At the moment, in the Russian criminal process there is a so-called “prosecutor’s monopoly” on the prosecution, which is somewhat limited by the presence of a private prosecution. However, a small number of offenses classified as private prosecution, as well as the number of criminal cases in this category considered by the courts, does not change the existing paradigm. Thus, the existing procedure does not fully correspond to the adversarial model of the criminal process.

El encarcelamiento en 2021 del rapero Pablo Hasél ha dejado múltiples interrogantes abiertos respecto el funcionamiento de la justicia y el desarrollo del Estado de derecho en España. En este ensayo utilizaremos este caso para introducirnos en cómo los procesos de patrimonialización se han apoyado en el poder judicial para depurar aquello que es digno de ser parte del patrimonio. Todo ello, en un momento donde los nuevos contextos digitales provocan nuevas estrategias por parte del poder en su tendencia a establecer un abuso de la memoria y el olvido. Para dilucidar esta disposición social nos centraremos en cómo el poder judicial se sitúa como esencial para: negar a ciertas prácticas sonoras no convenientes el estatus jurídico de cultura de referencia; objetivar ciertas prácticas sonoras para aislarlas de su contexto y apropiarlas al relato que pretenden; y por último, pervertir el lenguaje para asociar ciertos conceptos como el de violencia a géneros musicales como el rap.