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Purpose Safety signs are widely used to deliver safety-related information. There are many different types of safety signs. Although previous studies have paid attention to the design and effectiveness of safety signs, little attention has been devoted to investigating how people process the information conveyed by different types of safety signs. Accordingly, the current study is intended to explore the neural mechanisms underlying people’s perception of different types of safety signs. Methods Three types of safety signs (prohibition, mandatory and warning signs) were used in the study. We employed questionnaire and event-related potentials (ERPs) experiment with an implicit paradigm to probe how people perceive these three types of safety signs. Results Behaviorally, warning signs induced a higher level of perceived hazard than prohibition signs and mandatory signs, and prohibition signs induced a higher level of perceived hazard than mandatory signs. At the brain level, prohibition signs and warning signs led to reduced P2 amplitudes compared to mandatory signs. In addition, warning signs elicited larger N2 and N4 amplitudes than prohibition signs and mandatory signs, and prohibition signs elicited larger N2 and N4 amplitudes than mandatory signs, coinciding with the behavioral results. Conclusion Different types of safety signs led to significant differences in individuals’ hazard perception. Based on the neural results, we suggest that the processing of safety signs consists of two stages: the rapid detection of hazard information (indicated by P2) and the conscious integration of hazard information in working memory (indicated by N2 and N4).

This paper reviews the recent literature on the developmental effects of resource abundance, assessing likely effects and channels with respect to income inequality, poverty, education, and health. To date, this area has received less analysis although it is relevant to the Sustainable Development Goals agenda, as a significant number of the world poor live in African resource-rich economies. We argue that the presence of a natural resource sector per se does not necessarily translate into worse development outcomes. The natural resource experience varies to a significant extent. Countries with similar levels of resource rents can end up with significantly different achievements in terms of poverty, inequality, health, and education. The challenge is to explain the different natural resource experiences. A pivotal mechanism behind the developmental effects of the natural resources sector is the type of states and political institutions that resourceabundant economies develop.

States' fiscal capacity plays a pivotal role in developing economies, but it is less clear what its determinants are or what explains cross-country differences. We focus on the impact of natural resources. Standard arguments suggest that natural resources rents may reduce incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. However, political institutions that limit rulers' discretion over the use of resource revenues may mitigate or neutralize this negative effect. We investigate this hypothesis using panel data for 1995 to 2015 for 62 developing countries. The results suggest: (1) point-source resources are negatively associated with fiscal capacity, while diffuse resources are not; (2) developing economies with institutionalized executive constraints can neutralize the negative effect of point-source resources; (3) the effect of resource rents works mainly through institutions that make the tax system accountable and transparent. Thus it is possible to develop both fiscal capacity and the natural resources sector, without any trade-off.

This paper addresses two main questions: (a) Has European integration hindered the implementation of labour, financial and product market structural reforms? (b) Do the effects of these reforms vary more across sectors than across countries? Using more granular reform measures, longer time windows and a larger sample of countries than previous studies, we confirm that the euro triggered product but neither labour nor financial market reforms. Differently from previous studies, we find that: (a) the Single Market has similar effects to the euro, and (b) sectoral heterogeneity appears less important in explaining the economic impacts of reforms than country heterogeneity., CESifo Working Papers, 8582, ISSN:2364-1428, ISSN:1617-9595

Beginning in the late 1970s, China's economy delivered the largest growth spurt in recorded history. Striking discontinuity between recent outcomes and the economic experience of the prior 200 years invites portrayal of recent events as a "China miracle" that requires neither economic nor historical analysis. This overlooks deep institutional constraints arising from authoritarian rule and its supporting elite networks and fails to recognize the link between central government weakness and the origins of the recent boom. In both the pre-1949 treaty ports and in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the retreat of central control enabled episodes of economic openness and dynamism built upon 'bottom up' initiative and decentralized innovation. Historic legacies that shape political structures and individual behavior will continue to influence China's economic trajectory.

Using a new, global data base covering the years 1950 to 2015, we study the impact of sanctions on international trade and welfare. We make use of the rich dimensionality of our data and of the latest developments in the structural gravity literature. Starting with a broad evaluation by sanction type, we carefully investigate the case of Iran. Effects are significant but also widely heterogeneous across sanctioning countries. Moreover, they depend on the direction of trade. We also perform a counterfactual analysis which translates our partial equilibrium sanction estimates into heterogeneous but intuitive general equilibrium effects within the same framework.

Throughout history, border walls and fences have been built for defense, to claim land, to signal power, and to control migration. The costs of fortifications are large while the benefits are questionable. The recent trend of building walls and fences signals a paradox: In spite of the anti-immigration rhetoric of policymakers, there is little evidence that walls are effective in reducing terrorism, migration, and smuggling. Economic research suggests large benefits to open border policies in the face of increasing global migration pressures. Less restrictive migration policies should be accompanied by institutional changes aimed at increasing growth, improving security and reducing income inequality in poorer countries.

Governments use tax expenditures to boost investment, innovation and employment. However, these schemes are largely opaque, costly and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They also frequently trigger unwanted side effects. In order to improve the performance of these tools, the authors present three concrete policy proposals: First, governments should increase transparency on tax benefits. G20 members should take the lead on this with frequent and comprehensive tax expenditure reports. Second, G20 governments should improve the design of tax incentives with the aim of minimizing the generation of windfall profits and negative spillover effects within and across (in particular, on poorer) countries. Third, governments should phase out tax expenditures that are environmentally harmful, including tax incentives for fossil fuels and other schemes that promote an unsustainable use of natural resources.

A well-established result in the literature is that Social Security tends to reduce steady state welfare in a standard life cycle model. However, less is known about the historical effects of the program on agents who were alive when the program was adopted. In a computational life cycle model that simulates the Great Depression and the enactment of Social Security, this paper quantifies the welfare effects of the program's enactment on the cohorts of agents who experienced it. In contrast to the standard steady state results, we find that the adoption of the original Social Security tended to improve these cohorts' welfare. In particular, we estimate that the original program benefited households alive at the time of the program's adoption with a likelihood of over 80 percent, and increased these agents' welfare by the equivalent of 5.9% of their expected future lifetime consumption. The welfare benefit was particularly large for poorer agents and agents who were near retirement age when the program was enacted. Through a series of counterfactual experiments we demonstrate that the difference between the steady state and transitional welfare effects is primarily driven by a slower adoption of payroll taxes and a quicker adoption of benefit payments during the program's phase-in. Overall, the opposite welfare effects experienced by agents in the steady state versus agents who experienced the program's adoption might offer one explanation for why a program that potentially reduces welfare in the steady state was originally adopted.

I subject some aspects of Roosevelt's "New Deal" to critical analysis, with particular attention to what is termed "liberal democracy". This analysis demonstrates the limits to reform, given the power of "vested interests" as articulated by Thorstein Veblen. While progressive economists and others are generally favorably disposed toward the New Deal, a critical perspective casts doubt on the progressive nature of the various programs instituted during the Roosevelt administrations. The main constraint that limited the framing and operation of these programs was that of maintaining liberal democracy. The New Deal was shaped by the institutional forces then dominant in the United States, including the segregationist system of the South. In the end, vested interests dictated what transpired, but what did transpire required a modification of the understanding of liberal democracy.

Social scientists have long been interested in the effects of social-political upheavals on a society subsequently. A priori, we would expect that, when traumas are brought about by outsiders, within-group behaviour would become more collaborative, as society unites against the common foe. Conversely, we would expect the reverse when the conflict is generated within-group. In our paper we are looking at this second form of upheaval, and our measure of within-group conflict is the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution (CR) that seriously disrupted many aspects of Chinese society. In particular, we explore how individuals' behavioural preferences are affected by within-group traumatic events experienced by their parents or grandparents. Using data from a laboratory experiment in conjunction with survey data, we find that individuals with parents or grandparents affected by the CR are less trusting, less trustworthy, and less likely to choose to compete than their counterparts whose predecessors were not direct victims of the CR.

The specific way the Athenians set up their democracy presents both theoretical and empirical challenges. Decisions were taken by majority vote in the Assembly. To keep politicians in line, the Athenians first used ostracism, which however was replaced by the graphe paranomon around 415 BCE. The latter provided that anybody who had made a proposal in the Assembly could be accused of having made an unconstitu¬tional suggestion, bringing a severe penalty if found guilty. We know of 35 such cases between 403 and 322. During the fourth century the notion of illegality was extended to a mere question of undesirability. Henceforth any decision by the Assembly could be overturned by the courts, but if the accuser failed to get at least 20% of the jury votes, he was punished instead. While these rules can be seen as a safeguard against bad decisions, they also provided the Athenian politicians with important information about the relative strength of their political support. This effect has not been analysed before, and it may help explain the relative stability of political life in classical Athens. Furthermore this analysis also contributes to our understanding of a curious but often overlooked fact, namely that the decrees of the Athenian Assembly to a great extent concerned honorary rewards, and the use of the graphe paranomon in turn was largely focussed on the honorary decrees.

We use daily transactional ledger data from the Bank of England's Archive to test whether and to what extent the Bank of England during the mid-nineteenth century adhered to Walter Bagehot's rule that a central bank in a financial crisis should lend cash freely at a high interest rate in exchange for "good" securities. The archival data we use provides granular, loan-level insight on the price and quantity of credit, and information on its distribution to particular counterparties. We find that the Bank's behaviour during this period broadly conforms to Bagehot's rule, though with variation across the crises of 1847, 1857 and 1866. Using a new, higher frequency series on the Bank's balance sheet, we find that the Bank did lend freely, with the number of discounts and advances increasing during crises. These loans were typically granted at a rate above pre-crisis levels and, in 1857 and 1866, typically at a spread above Bank Rate, though we also find some instances in the daily discount ledgers where individual loans were made below Bank rate in 1847. Another set of customer ledgers shows that the securities the Bank purchased were debts owed by a geographically and industrially diverse set of debtors. And using new data on the Bank's income and dividends, we find the Bank and its shareholders profited from lender of last resort operations. We conclude our paper by relating our findings to contemporary debates including those regarding the provision of emergency liquidity to shadow banks.

A marine arenicin-3 derivative, N4, displayed potent antibacterial activity against Gram-negative bacteria, but its antibacterial mode of action remains elusive. The mechanism of action of N4 against pathogenic Escherichia coli was first researched by combined cytological and transcriptomic techniques in this study. The N4 peptide permeabilized the outer membrane within 1 min, disrupted the plasma membrane after 0.5 h, and localized in the cytoplasm within 5 min. Gel retardation and circular dichroism (CD) spectrum analyses demonstrated that N4 bound specifically to DNA and disrupted the DNA conformation from the B type to the C type. N4 inhibited 21.1% of the DNA and 20.6% of the RNA synthesis within 15 min. Several hallmarks of apoptosis-like cell death were exhibited by N4-induced E. coli , such as cell cycle arrest in the replication (R) and division(D) phases, reactive oxygen species production, depolarization of the plasma membrane potential, and chromatin condensation within 0.5 h. Deformed cell morphology, disappearance of the plasma membrane, leakage of the contents, and ghost cell formation were demonstrated by transmission electron microscopy, and nearly 100% of the bacteria were killed by N4. A total of 428 to 663 differentially expressed genes are involved in the response to N4, which are associated mainly with membrane biogenesis (53.9% to 56.7%) and DNA binding (13.3% to 14.9%). N4-protected mice that were lethally challenged with lipopolysaccharide (LPS) exhibited reduced levels of interleukin-6 (IL-6), IL-1β, and tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) in serum and protected the lungs from LPS-induced injury. These data facilitate an enhanced understanding of the mechanisms of marine antimicrobial peptides (AMPs) against Gram-negative bacteria and provide guidelines in developing and applying novel multitarget AMPs in the field of unlimited marine resources as therapeutics.

The essay examines Spain’s colonial legacy in the long-run development of Spanish America. It surveys the fiscal and constitutional outcomes of independence and assesses the relative burden imposed by colonialism. Constitutional asymmetries between revenue collecting and spending agents constrained de facto governments’ power to tax. Inherent disparities embedded in the colonial fiscal system worsened with vaguely defined representation for subjects and territories and vexed their aggregation into a modern representative polity. Governments with limited fiscal capacity failed to deliver public goods and to distribute the costs and benefits of independence equitably. Growing indirect taxes, debt and money creation allowed them to transfer the fiscal burden to other constituents or future generations. Taxpayers became aware of the asymmetry between private contributions and public goods and hence favoured a low but regressive taxation. Comparisons with trajectories in the metropolis and the United States are offered to qualify this legacy. El articulo examina el «legado» del colonialismo español en el desarrollo de Hispanoamérica en el largo plazo. Discute el resultado fiscal y constitucional de la Independencia y estima la carga de la extracción relativa impuesta por el fisco colonial. Asimetrías constitucionales en los agentes que recaudaban impuestos y ejecutaban el gasto limitó de facto la capacidad fiscal de los gobiernos. Disparidades inherentes al propio sistema fiscal colonial agravaron esta poca capacidad con una representación política de súbditos/ciudadanos y territorios ambigua que problematizó su agregación posteriormente en un sistema político independiente cabalmente representativo. Gobiernos con capacidad fiscal limitada fracasaron en la provisión de bienes públicos y en la distribución equitativa de los costos y los beneficios de la independencia. Impuestos indirectos crecientes, deuda y creación de dinero permitieron a los gobiernos transferir el peso fiscal a otros sujetos políticos que los propios o a futuras generaciones. Los contribuyentes entendieron estas asimetrías entre contribuciones privadas y bienes públicos de modo de que favorecieron una baja pero regresiva fiscalidad. La comparación con la trayectoria fiscal de la ex – metrópolis y los Estados Unidos permiten ofrecer una calificación de este legado colonial.

During World War II the United States rapidly transformed its economy to cope with a wide range of scarcities, such as shortfalls in the amounts of ocean shipping, aluminum, rubber, and other raw materials needed for the war effort. This paper explores the mobilization to see whether it provides lessons about how the economy could be transformed to meet scarcities produced by climate change or other environmental challenges. It concludes that the success of the United States in overcoming scarcities during World War II without a major deterioration in living standards provides a basis for optimism that environmental challenges can be met, but that the unique political consensus that prevailed during the war limits the practical usefulness of the wartime model.

We present the first attempt to construct a long-run historical measure of subjective wellbeing using language corpora derived from millions of digitized books. While existing measures of subjective wellbeing go back to at most the 1970s, we can go back at least 200 years further using our methods. We analyse data for six countries (the USA, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain). To highlight some results, we find a positive short-run effect for GDP and life expectancy on subjective wellbeing. An increase of 1% life expectancy is equivalent to more than 5% increase in yearly GDP. One year of internal conflict costs the equivalent of a 50% drop in GDP per year in terms of subjective wellbeing. Public debt, on the other hand, has a short-run positive effect. Our estimated index of subjective wellbeing generally does not feature any positive trend, which is consistent with the Easterlin paradox, although we caution against long term analysis given the historical variation of written texts (which parallel similar issues with historical GDP statistics).

When in the year 2009 Radoslaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt, architects of the Eastern Partnership project, launched the ambitious scheme of bringing the six post-Soviet countries closer to the EU, they could hardly predict that in nearly five years the tremendous diplomatic, political efforts to design an effective soft power approach would find itself on the verge of failure. In this relation, Poland’s role in bringing the EaP countries under the umbrella of the project long before becoming the EU member, however, most productively since joining the organization, could not be underestimated. Despite a complicated historical legacy with some of the EaP members, namely, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Poland together with the Baltic countries turned out to be a vocal proponent of bringing the former ones under the initiative, aiming to empower them with the leverage against Russia’s successful efforts to destabilize the region and preserve domination in its immediate neighbourhood. Nevertheless, taking into account the changes in Poland’s political climate, namely, victory of the Law and Justice Party in both presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015 as well as its pessimist stance towards effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership project, the question arises whether Poland’s voice still matters in the future of the EaP and whether it sees itself as the moving force of the project.

One of the intriguing questions of our times is the importance of the centralization and nationalization campaigns of the 2nd and 3rd Orbán-government carried out since 2010. In an earlier working paper - Mihalyi (2015) - I demonstrated that similar policy steps were occasionally taken in other post-socialist countries, too. It is also a known fact, that the subsequent Hungarian governments in the 1990-2010 period were also forced in some cases to renationalize already privatized firms - although the main trend of policies was privatization. However, in my earlier work a logical question was ignored, namely why this U-turn has been so far so easily accepted by the Hungarian society at large and many opinion leaders both on the political left and political right. One conceivable answer is that this is what the Hungarian people have been accustomed to. The history of the past 300 years was nothing else but a sequence of nationalizations and confiscations, and the milestones of this have been taught with proud already in the elementary schools for generations. From the perspective of the present paper, it doesn't matter whether the nationalizing governments could have made different decisions; whether they were pressed by outside forces or acted independently. It will be shown that the decision-makers were both prisoners of their own epoch and the ideology of their social classes, but at the same time they were also authoritative diffusers of their own ideologies through politics, education and the media. The subsequent asset redistributions in the modern economic history of Hungary aimed at accelerating the country's economic development and catching up with the more advanced economies. Unfortunately the decision-makers didn't realize that these measures - nolens volens - undermined the idea of private property, the rule of law and the trust vis-à-vis the state itself.

In my view, globalization is a process that has taken place episodically since approximately the beginning of the 16th century. Previously, there were a number of attemps at globalization, which however failed to attain the precondition of regular commercial and communicative relationships among the parts of the globe; nor did they lead to the kind of stable multilateral interdependence that later took place (Osterhamme/Petersson). In chronologically sequenced chapters, I briefly present the driving forces and the consequences of globalization. In the respective chapters, Chinas highly variegated role is explored: from the first attempt at globalization in the 14/15 centuries, which was of an expansive nature; in the first push at globalization from 1500, China was increasingly in retreat; during the surge of globalization in the 19th century, China was an almost insignificant push-toy of the European powers; and in the current situation China may be characterized as a tardive beginner, yet then advancing to a leadership role. In concluding I undertake a framework for understanding the so-called "Chinese Economic Miracle", for which the German term Wirtschaftswunder may readily be substituted. The highly differential significance of China for these various phases of globalization is an arresting example for my hypothesis that globalization may not unreasonably be regarded as a market-driven and invariably politically-fashioned process.

This paper investigates the interplay between cultural traditions and policy effectiveness. It explores the differential impact of a large development program (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno), implemented for four decades, starting in the 1950s, to stimulate convergence between Italy's South and the more developed North, on municipalities with different histories. Namely, we consider a sample of municipalities located on either side of the historical border of the Kingdom of Sicily, whose legacy is considered, from Putnam (1993) onwards, to be a prime-facie cause of Southern Italy's underdevelopment. Having been part of the Kingdom of Sicily is associated with a negative impact of development policies, but only when the allocation of development funds through the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno suffered from low quality of governance and was driven by political considerations rather than by efficiency ones.

Why are some countries more successful at carrying out post-conflict reconstruction programmes than others? Why has Sierra Leone been more successful in the reform of its armed forces than Liberia has after the end of the Mano River Basin wars? This paper argues that the diverging outcomes are explained by the extent to which post-conflict regimes reflected the distribution of power on the ground in the two countries. Sierra Leone's transition regime reflected the distribution of power between forces on the ground and led to a consultative process that resulted in a moderate reform programme. But the earlier input of key local actors made implementation less difficult. In Liberia the transition regime was built on a repudiation of local power realities. This led to a non-consultative process that resulted in a very radical reform programme. But this lack of consultation has severely compromised the implementation of the reforms.

This essay reviews the historical and ongoing role played by trade in sustained high growth and human development progress, and makes the case that the post-2015 development agenda should include considerations related to trade rules and supply-side capacity. Given the strong links between trade-led growth, economic upgrading, and poverty reduction, the paper argues that trade led economic growth must be prioritised in the post-2015 development agenda.

This paper examines how the adoption of the Australian ballot (AB), and ipso facto, the transition from the nominal to effective secret vote, shaped the nature of party politics in Brazil. Engaging the literature on political clientelism, the impact of the AB on three outcomes is studied: 1) the ideological leanings of voters at the ballot box; 2) the degree of electoral control enjoyed by local vote brokers; and 3) the capacity of citizens to effectively participate in the electoral process. In order to get leverage on these issues, the paper utilizes an original dataset -painstakingly assembled from regional electoral archives- which contains municipal-level vote returns for federal deputy and senate contests during the period before and after the AB's introduction in Brazil (1958-1962). The dataset exploits the fact that the AB was introduced at different times in different states and for different offices in the country, thereby creating an unprecedented opportunity to assess the impact of this institution. Using a triple difference-in-difference procedure, the study finds that the AB: 1) shifted the ideological balance of power from Right to Left; 2) did not greatly weaken the hand of vote brokers; and 3) greatly increased the proportion of wasted votes cast in elections.

This paper uses a linguistic tree, describing the genealogical relationship between all 6912 world languages, to compute measures of diversity at different levels of linguistic aggregation. By doing so, we let the data inform us on which linguistic cleavages are most relevant for a range of political economy outcomes, rather than making ad hoc choices. We find that deep cleavages, originating thousands of years ago, lead to better predictors of civil conflict and redistribution. The opposite pattern emerges when it comes to the impact of linguistic diversity on growth and public goods provision, where finer distinctions between languages matter Desmet gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Comunidad de Madrid (PROCIUDAD-CM), and the Spanish Ministry of Science (ECO2008-01300). Ortuño-Ortín gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science (ECO2010-19596). Wacziarg gratefully acknowledges financial support from Stanford University's Presidential Fund for Innovation in International Studies and from UCLA's Center for International Business Education and Research Publicado

The aim of this paper is to disentangle the different forces shaping Argentine immigration policy from 1870 to 1930. Although immigration restrictions increased over time Argentina remained relatively open to mass migration until the 1930s in contrast with the United States. The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that there were economic reasons to restrict immigration prior to the 1930s, namely rising inequality and a declining demand for workers. Labour in Argentina would have been better off with a more restrictive immigration policy since 1900. However, labour interests could not be translated into Parliament in a direct way as in countries with a wide electoral franchise and high political participation like the United States. In Argentina a large share of workers did not have the right to vote simply because they were foreigners. Those negatively affected by massive immigration developed alternative actions: general strikes, labour unrest and violence. Political and social fear finally pushed those who had more to gain from an abundant supply of labour to introduce immigration restrictions.

Like the rest of the world, Spain has suffered frequent financial crises and undergone several changes in its regulatory framework. There have been crises that have been followed by reforms of the financial structure, and also troubled financial times with no modification of the regulatory and supervisory regime. In various instances, regulatory changes have predated financial crises, but in others banking crises have occurred without reference to changes in the regulatory regime. Regulation and supervision has been usually absent in the XIXth century, while in the XXth century policy makers have been more active and diligent. Moreover, all major financial crises have been followed by intense financial restructuring, although as elsewhere banking restructuring and interventions not always have been successful (in fact, the cases of failures and mixed results overcome the successful cases). The paper provides a short history of the major financial crises in Spain from 1856 to the present, and also reviews the main financial reforms and the distinctive regulatory regimes that have been in place in this last 150 years time span.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of land concentration prompted by the distribution of disentailed church land during the second half of the 19th century on the accumulation of human capital in early 20th century Colombia1. Using existing primary sources on the process of land disentailment and the 1912 National Census at the municipal level, descriptive statistics and econometric evidence show a significant and negative relationship between the amount of disentailed land during the 1870s and literacy and school enrolment rates of males in 1912. El documento tiene como objetivo analizar los efectos que tuvo la concentración de tierras desamortizadas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX sobre la acumulación de capital humano, a principios del siglo XX en Colombia. Utilizando las fuentes primarias existentes sobre el proceso de desamortización de tierras y el Censo Nacional de 1912 a nivel municipal, las estadísticas descriptivas y los ejercicios econométricos muestran la existencia de una relación negativa y significativa entre la cantidad de tierra desamortizada durante la década de 1870 con la tasa de alfabetismo y la proporción de hombres matriculados en la escuela en 1912.

This paper proposes a new method to measure ethnolinguistic diversity and offers new results linking such diversity with a range of political economy outcomes -- civil conflict, redistribution, economic growth and the provision of public goods. We use linguistic trees, describing the genealogical relationship between the entire set of 6,912 world languages, to compute measures of fractionalization and polarization at different levels of linguistic aggregation. By doing so, we let the data inform us on which linguistic cleavages are most relevant, rather than making ad hoc choices of linguistic classifications. We find drastically different effects of linguistic diversity at different levels of aggregation: deep cleavages, originating thousands of years ago, lead to measures of diversity that are better predictors of civil conflict and redistribution than those that account for more recent and superficial divisions. The opposite pattern holds when it comes to the impact of linguistic diversity on growth and public goods provision, where finer distinctions between languages matter Desmet gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Comunidad de Madrid (PROCIUDAD-CM), and the Spanish Ministry of Science (ECO2008-01300). Ortuño-Ortín gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science (SEJ2007- 67135). Wacziarg gratefully acknowledges financial support from Stanford University's Presidential Fund for Innovation in International Studies and from UCLA's Center for International Business Education and Research

This study provides an economic analysis of the post-War institutions of the European tenancy markets. Two representative types of market interventions are analyzed: the introduction of compulsory terms in the tenancy contracts and rent control. First of all this study offers a description and an analysis of the recent history of those institutions. The cases of Spain (as a benchmark), Italy, Finland and UK are analyzed more in depth, as examples of "big reformers" during the 20th century, in order to extract some general conclusions about the evolution of the European institutions in the last decades. Then the effects of those interventions are theoretically explored by adapting a model of tenancy markets (Basu and Emerson, 2000). The results show that the analyzed institutions potentially entail negative effects for the European tenancy markets. Those effects are consistent with the tendences observed during the second half of the 20th century in the different european markets.