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The concept of psychic bisexuality appeared early in the history of psychoanalysis (in Freud’s letter to Fliess dated 6th December 1896), and undoubtedly played a role in the discovery and description of the Oedipus complex in both its positive and negative aspects. But it has not, perhaps, been allowed to give its full measure, in particular in the analysis of pre-Oedipal development and the working of the mind in this early period. It is true, of course, that Melanie Klein’s description of the early stages of the Oedipus conflict constituted a decisive step in the exploration of the early phases of psychic bisexuality. I feel, however, that a further step remains to be taken - that of examining the relevance of the idea of psychic bisexuality at the most primitive levels of the origins of the mind and the deep-seated strata of the psychic apparatus, as Tustin suggested. These are the configurations which lie at the root of narcissism and support individuation and they correspond to what W.R. Bion called the container, Bick the psychic skin and D, Anzieu first the skin-ego then the psychic envelope, this implies that we consider three levels where psychic bisexuality is involved and where the problem of integrating masculine and feminine aspects arises first, the psychic envelope, then part-object relations, and, finally, whole object relations.

Este trabalho parte do seguinte ponto de vista: o autismo é um estado primitivo tanto ontogenética quanto filogeneticamente, limite entre o natural e o humano. É um estado contemporâneo à constituição do aparelho psíquico, pois este é autístico no tempo de sua constituição fílogenética. Por isso, é possível dizer que o autismo é paradigma do aparelho psíquico. This work starts from the following point of view: autism is a primitive state, a limit between the natural and the human. It is a state that comes together with the constitution of the psychic apparatus since this is autistic in the time of its phylogenetic constitution. Therefore, it is possible to say that autism is a paradigm of the psychic apparatus.

Este artigo inicia fazendo algumas reflexões sobre o sentido de corpo para a psicanálise, partindo do princípio de que ele é distinto do da Biologia. Traz para o foco da discussão, o homem como ser de linguagem e analisa a forma de inscrição das experiências no aparelho psíquico. Situa a problemática do perverso na imagem que ele guarda da castração do corpo do Outro. Por fim, apresenta as contribuições trazidas por Rey-Flaud quanto aos níveis de perversão, de acordo com a maneira do perverso lidar com o objeto. Este artículo principia haciendo algunas reflexiones sobre el sentido de cuerpo para la psicoanalisis, partindo del principio de que él es distinto do de la Biologia. Plantea como foco de la discussión el hombre como ser de lenguaje e analiza la forma de inscripción de las experiencias en el aparato psíquico. Ubica la problemática del perverso en la imagen que él guarda de la castración del cuerpo del Outro. Por fin presenta las contribuciones aportadas por Rey-Flaud cuanto a los niveles de perversión, de acuerdo com la manera de lidar com el objeto. Dans cet article nous developpons dans um premier moment, quelques refléxions sur le sens qu’a le corps pour la psychanalyse. Nous partons de l’idée que ce sens est distinct de celui conçu par la Biologie. La discussion est centrée sur l’homme en tant qu’un être de language. Nous analisons comment les expériences s’inscrivent dans l’appareil psychique. La problematique du pervers est posée autour de l’image qu’il retient de la castration du corps de l’Autre. Pour finir, nous présentons les contributions apportées par Rey-Flaud quant aux niveaux de perversion. Pour cet auteur ces niveaux sont en rapport avec la manière dont le pervers utilise l’objet. The first part of this paper is concerned with the treatment given to the body in psychoanalysis assuming that a distinct point of view from that of Biology is taken. It brings into focus man as a language carrier and investigates the forms of inscription of experiences in psychic apparatus. It relates the aspect of the perversion to the image man keeps form outer body castration. Finally, it brings the contributions form Rey-Flaud as to levels of perversion as according to the manner the perverse individual deals with the object.

This paper illustrates how heuristics affect theory construction through the use of a case study of the early development of psychoanalysis. Freud borrowed the heuristic starting points of his research program for the neuroses directly from traditional and recent biomedical thought, but not without adapting these biomedical search schemes for the purpose of theory construction at a psychological level. He abandoned the requirement of a specific pathological anatomical change for each disease and introduced the requirement to look for a specific psychic pathological mechanism for each psychoneurosis. This new criterion led him to a mechanization of the mind and the construction of a general theory of the psychic apparatus.

The enlightened concept of sexuality (especially sexual drive) can be qualified as a biological one, because, the base frame of reference is naturalistic. Drive is the voice of Nature and hence the object of desire coincides with what is considered natural and virtuous. By contrast, the Freudian concept of sexuality can be termed as metabiological, as the basic reference structure is linguistic. Freud conceives drive as a force which in each individual in mediated by chain representations (significant signs) stored in the psychic apparatus. This would explain the peculiarity and diversity of human desire. This metabiological concept of sexuality also is present in the Freudian distinction between the interest of the individual and those of the species, or between human impulse and drive and biological instinct., La concepción ilustrada de la sexualidad (y en particular del deseo) puede ser calificada de biología porque su referencia esencial es naturalista; el deseo es la voz de la Naturaleza, y, por tanto, lo deseable coincide con lo natural y lo virtuoso. Por el contrario, la concepción freudiana de la sexualidad puede ser calificada de metabiológica, pues su referencia esencial es lingüística. Freud concibe el deseo como una fuerza que en cada individuo está mediada por las cadenas de representaciones (significantes) almacenadas en su aparato psíquico, lo que explicaría la peculiaridad y la diversidad de los deseos humanos. Esta concepción metabiológica de la sexualidad aparece también en la distinción freudiana entre los intereses del individuo y los de la especie, o entre las pulsiones humanas y los instintos biológicos.

It is argued that Freud was not, as Sulloway (1979) contends, a "crypto-biologist" of the mind, but rather a cultural anthropologist of the mind. Freud's genetic conception of the psychic apparatus was neither exclusively nor critically derived from biology. Rather, it was based on an anthropogenetic approach to the archaic heritage of mind inspired in part by the moral philosophy of Nietzsche. The idea of tragedy was the unifying theme of Freud's cultural interpretation of evolutionary psychology. The historical search for the primal origins of neurosis led Freud to the unavoidable conclusion that neurosis was in the beginning a prehistoric moral dilemma which, over the course of mental evolution, eventually evolved into guilt, discontent, and neurosis as modern-day phylogenetically endowed facts of life. Freud (1930) made it clear that the source of man's biological and cultural evolutionary progress--self-denial--was also responsible for the tragedy of the human condition, namely, repression, eternal psychic ambivalence, and chronic mental illness. He believed that neurosis began, as Nietzsche (1887) exclaimed, with the "reduction of the beast of prey 'man' to a tame and civilized animal..." (p. 42). For both Freud and Nietzsche, the cause of the human tragedy was not merely the fall from Nature, but the inexorable knowledge that Man's denial of his biological heritage was the very basis for being human.

Freud reformulated his model of the psychic apparatus because certain clinical observations did not fit into the earlier framework of his theory. In the new theory, he emphasized the role each element plays in psychic conflict. Because Freud philosophically was committed to a materialistic, nonteleological, biologically based theory, he carried over into the new formulations some of the metapsychological assumptions of the earlier theory. It is suggested that this transposition is responsible for some of the confusion concerning the application of the structural theory. It is proposed that if a more strict usage of the concept of metapsychology with more precise conceptualization is employed, some of the problems connected with the application of the structural theory may be overcome.

The human being may be considered to have mental transitional spheres in which the sifting, transforming, intensifying, and inhibiting of stimuli are initiated. Stimuli essential to the development of the psychic apparatus are converted in the mental transitional spheres into a form that will enable them to exert the appropriate influence on the ego. Optimal ego development cannot take place without the proper functioning of these spheres. Thus, the mental transitional spheres are essential for the development of psychic functions and defenses.

This article summarizes today's critical thinking on such major psychoanalytical concepts as the sexual and aggressive drives, the Oedipus complex, the psychic apparatus, and the unconscious. It distinguishes between concepts that have lost validity and those that are of ongoing clinical value.

Maturation and development of the psychic apparatus have become a sphere of central focus and many conclusions have been reached regarding the sequence of such development, the types of structuralization effected, the role of conflict, and the impact of the environment with specific reference to objects. The exploration of the mother-child relationship disclosed the influence of stimulation on primitive ego states and led to numerous theoretical conclusions which are particularly important not only for "normal" development but for the understanding of certain forms of psychopathology commonly seen and often referred to as character disorders. Geleerd (1956) reaches some retrospective conclusions concerning the early neonatal phases of development. As Freud (1914) postulated, she also feels that the fantasy of being all powerful is associated with the infantile stage before the differentiation between ego and nonego. From her clinical material she derives the fact that when the child realizes that neither he nor his mother are omnipotent, he is overcome by a rage of self-destructive proportions. An adult who reacts in this way is fixated at an omnipotent level and is unable to master both inner and outer stimuli. Boyer (1956) believes that in order to develop beyond the stage of omnipotent organization the child is dependent upon the amount and types of stimuli the mother supplies. A well-functioning mother supplies just the right amount of stimulus and is able to act as a supplementary barrier against traumatic excitations either in

FREUD'S use of the concept of homeostasis, in the hypothesis that 'the nervous system is an apparatus having the function of abolishing stimuli ',' is of great interest, not only because it represents the pessimistic core of his materialism but also because it appears to anticipate by a quarter of a century the notions of cybernetics. Although it is usually overlooked in psycho-analysts' expositions of psycho-analysis, it is the unifying concept that links together the wish-fulfilment explanation of dreams,2 the defence-mechanisms of the ego 3 and the repetition compulsion.4 It also led Freud by a fallacious argument, to the notion of the death-instinct.? Dreams, according to Freud, were the efforts of the sleeping 'psychic apparatus' to cancel or compensate for stimuli which threatened to awake it. If the thirsty sleeper did not dream of drinking his thirst would awaken him : therefore he dreams of drinking.6 Later, Freud explained the various 'defence mechanisms' by which the ego defends itself against the demands of the instincts (repression, sublimation, etc.) as the efforts of the central nervous system to escape these internal stimuli : being unable to escape by flight, as it would from external stimuli, it has resort to these means of abolishing, or at least reducing their impact.' This was twenty years before W. B. Cannon 8 invented the word 'homeostasis' 9: but the notion is clearly developed in Freud's mind.'0

The author presents results of a study of psychological reactions of patients undergoing renal transplantation. The study identified a kind of "emotional transplant": the image of the kidney becomes part of the psychological structures present in the psychic apparatus, finally becoming merged with the individual's self-representations.

Se para os romanos, posição significava lugar onde uma pessoa ou coisa estaria colocada, para os gregos, a noção de posição é de natureza muito mais relacional. Da posição determinada pela postura do corpo, diferenciavam pelo menos duas outras: a do historiador, que não inventa, apenas ouviu falar por aí, e a do teatro, que mostrava o corpo humano em um estado natural de pathos (sofrimento). Ao se pensar o psiquismo e o aparelho psíquico como prolongamentos do sistema imunológico e já que, segundo o autor, pathos é sempre somático, a psique é, seguindo a tradição socrática, estritamente corporal. É próprio, pois, à Psicopatologia Fundamental, reconhecer a existência de múltiplas posições corporais-discursivas e reconhecer que aqueles que ocupam outras posições reconheçam a especificidade de sua posição. A partir do conceito de posição, e seus desdobramentos em pathos e logos, o autor desenvolve sua concepção de Psicopatologia Fundamental. Si pata los romanos “posición “ significaba un lugar adonde una persona o cosa estaria colocada, para losgriegos Ia noción de posición era de naturaleza mucho más relacional. Partiendo de Ia posición determinada por Ia postura dei cuerpo se diferenciaban, por 10 menos, otras dos: Ia dei historiador que no inventa, apenas escuchó Ias cosas por ahí, y Ia dei teatro que muestra el cuerpo humano em su estado natural de pathos (sufrimiento). Al considerar el psiquismo y el aparato psíquico como prolongamientos dei sistema inmunológico y una vez que, según el autor; pathos es siempre somático, la psiqué es – siguiendo la tradición socrática – estrictamente corporal. Es próprio pués de Ia Psicopatologia Fundamental reconocer Ia existencia de múltiples posiciones corporales-discursivas e intentar que aquellos que ocupan otras posiciones reconozcan Ia especificidad de su posición. Partiendo dei concepto de posición y de sus desdoblamientos en pathos y logos, el autor desarrolla su concepción de Psicopatologia Fundamental. If for the Romans “position “ meant a place where a person or object would lie, for the Greeks this notion was much more relational in nature. Starting from the position determined by the posture of the body, there were at least two other ones: that of the historian, who doesn't make things up but just heard about them around and that of the theatet; which reveals the body in its natural state of pathos (suffering). When psychism and the psychic apparatus are considered as extensions of the immunological system and once, according to the authol; pathos is always somatic, the psyche is – following the socratic tradition – strictly physical. It is thus proper of Fundamental Psychopathology to recognize the existence of – multiple body-discourse positions and to try to have the specificity of its position recognized by other positions. Starting from the concept of position and its developments in pathos and logos, the author presents his conception of Fundamental Psychopathology.

In John Hughlings Jackson’s time neurology emerged as a subspecialty of medicine. Jackson himself, being almost entirely dedicated to the brain sciences, contributed heavily to this development, and in a number of aspects his work was of central importance.

The respective roles of cognition and motivation in activating and directing human behavior have often been an issue with contradictory solutions in the history of psychology. For some ancient philosophers, the higher forms of “appetite” were so intimately related to rational intelligence that the mere understanding of what is “good” was assumed to move the individual to volition and action. More recently, ideodynamic and ideomotor theories also emphasized the dynamic role of representational cognitive contents. According to Freudian concepts, on the contrary, cognition and behavior dynamics are localized in two opposite zones of the “psychic apparatus,” so that the cognizing ego is practically devoid of dynamics, whereas the id is cognitively blind. Others have tried to eliminate both cognitive and motivational variables from the behavioral field, while at the present time an unrestrained comeback of “cognitive psychology” tends to interpret motivation in terms of cognitive processes and to obscure the impact of dynamic variables. It is my purpose in this theoretical contribution to disentangle some of these perplexities and to show, on the conceptual level, how both cognitive and motivational functions play their role in behavior dynamics. At the same time, I would like to emphasize their interaction. In fact, the conceptual distinction between cognitive and dynamic aspects in behavioral functioning should not obscure their integrated activity.

The Project for a Scientific Psychology of 1895 represented an attempt to fuse a sophisticated theory of the psychic apparatus with the concepts needed to explain the structure and aetiology of hysterical symptoms. In the first section of this chapter we will be concerned with the precise function of the ‘zone of language’ in ‘a machine that in a moment would run of itself’. (Freud (1950a) Origins, (20 Oct 1895) p. 129). A general account of the Project, impenetrable as it will remain, is necessary.1

Freud was a materialist, and at an early stage of his psychological inquiries attempted to construct an explicitly physiological psychology based on the interaction of neurons. This attempt, by now well known under the title ‘Project for a scientific psychology’, was abandoned shortly after Freud sent the draft to Fliess in October 1895. And when he learned in 1937 that Marie Bonaparte had unearthed the manuscript, he sought to have it destroyed. His subsequent theories were of an entirely different character, for they contained only psychological terminology and did not refer explicitly to neuron interaction. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of structural continuity between the earlier and later views, and Freud continued to be convinced that the psychic apparatus which he was investigating and describing in mentalistic terms was in its true nature a physical system – though too little was known about neurophysiology to permit anyone to think about psychology in physical terms. That is why Freud felt it necessary to abandon the line of investigation represented by the Project . The question therefore arises in what sense it is possible to think about a physical system in mentalistic terms, taken from the vocabulary of experience, perception, desire, etc., without having any idea of the physical significance of those descriptions.

This paper presents three broad propositions regarding imagery. First, imagery partakes of processes central to human functioning. Second, control over imagery constitutes control over a large part of a person’s total psychic apparatus. Third, intervention methods based on imagery therefore have great power. The paper is not intended as a comprehensive or critical review but rather as a broad overview intended to highlight the argument.

Current literature dealing with narcissistic character disorder attempts to differentiate between mature relating with consensually validated whole objects and immature, more primitive relating with mirroring and validating selfobjects. In the latter case the object is especially valued for its role in buttressing a damaged or fragile self. The persistence into adult life of this more primitive relating to selfobjects can be viewed as a restitutive attempt, a healing by second intent. Through such a mechanism, attempts are made to make good deficits left by perceived failures of the primary object. These attempts include the setting up of relationships with figures whose empathic capacity is in some way sensed to be corrective, and the setting up of relationships with selfobjects which are in part created by the subject to provide himself with the kind of validating selfobject which has been longed for, yet never experienced. Winnicott conceives of transitional experience as an intermediate area allowed to the infant between primary creativity and objective perception based on reality testing. Transitional relating usefully clarifies the concept of selfobjects in emphasizing its common features with the transitional object. Transitional objects and selfobjects both contain the idea that the psychic apparatus is equipped with self-healing capacities. They tell us something about the nature of those self-healing capacities. The mental apparatus, as the physical apparatus, can attempt to heal itself in the face of injury or disease. The mechanism of that psychic healing may have to do with the importance of transitional phenomena and illusory experience in permitting the relinquishing of omnipotence and grandiosity which goes hand in hand with the formation and consolidation of the structurally mature self. An understanding of the transitional area can facilitate the therapist's work in helping certain patients overcome immature and fixed character traits often associated with narcissistic psychopathology. The psychopathology of transitional experience is reviewed and the importance of play in the therapeutic situation is stressed. Evidence is presented for the existence of a common neurophysiological substrate for play and transitional experience. This discovery is deemed evidence supporting our thesis of the importance of the transitional area in fostering psychic growth and in promoting healing in the analytic situation. Case material is described to illustrate these points. The relationship of psychosomatic symptomatology to transitional experience is discussed and illustrated with clinical case material.

Summary We have proposed psychoanalytic metapsychology as a useful explanatory tool for investigation of drug effects upon the psychic apparatus. All six metapsychological points of view: (1) genetic; (2) dynamic; (3) topographic; (4) structural; (5) economic; (6) adaptive, were brought to bear upon the psychic events in connection with drug use. Psychopharmacology can be seen as composed of two major divisions: A. Pharmacology —site, mode of action, etc.; and B. Metapharmacology —the application of the above six metapsychological points of view to the phenomenology and interpretation of drug response. This approach provides an overlapping frame of reference for psychopharmacology and psychoanalytic psychiatry, and permits the psychoanalytic psychiatrist to use his skills in an integrated approach to treatment.

In psychoanalytic theory, space metaphors are frequently used to describe the psychic apparatus. As for time, it is traditionally invoked under the heading of timelessness of the unconscious, more aptly described as the resistance of the repressed to wearing away with time. This paper examines how the insertion of time into psychic events and structural differentiation form a single process. After looking into the parallelism between phenomenological and psychoanalytic views of time and differentiation, the author draws a distinction between two time categories: chronological versus actual. A clinical example is presented.

Freud and Breuer proposed the concept of splitting of the mind and described it in various clinical cases and the concept was later developed in studies by Klein, Kohut, Kernberg and others. These basic clinical findings were also confirmed by later studies using Rorschach projective test documenting that splitting in mental structures may be observed in phantasies and associations reflecting cognitive and affective contents related to conflicting interpretations of objects, other persons and the self. Altogether these data indicate that splitting represents a specific form of dissociation resulting from a conflict that leads to splitting of the ego and other parts of the psychic apparatus into separated subsystems. In this context, splitting and dissociation do not mean different terms even they are used in different contexts for description of specific conditions that may occur in various mental disorders.