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A study of the declining towns of the former USSR during the two intercensal periods of 1970 to 1979 and 1979 to 1987 reveals that the rate of decline during these two periods was much higher than that of 1959 to 1970. The Western regions had the maximum number of towns that experienced this high decline rate, in contrast to the previous decline, which occurred mainly in the Eastern regions. The declining towns were small coal-mining towns and towns which served as railroad junctions. People from these small towns migrated toward larger towns which had more industries.

Population characteristics of three major ethnic groups in the Russian city of Moscow are discussed. Factors such as nationality, age, sex and educational differences between ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Jews are taken into consideration in the study. The study covers a period of 10 years, from 1979 to1989, and explores the variations which have taken place in the 32 rayons whichdivide the city.

This article investigates economic region net migration patterns in the USSR during the 1979-89 intercensal period. Net in-migration and net migration rate increases (compared to 1970-79) occurred in both the western and eastern portions of the Northern USSR region, while net out-migration and rate declines occurred throughout the Southern USSR. Net in-migration again occurred to Siberia, especially Tyumen' Oblast, and there was a reduced rate of net out-migration from the Nonchernozem Zone and Central Chernozem Region of European RSFSR.

Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this case, a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons if facts and claims about morality entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. And, as I explain, there is a good case that facts and claims about morality do entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An American geographer specializing in population change and urbanization in countries of the former USSR analyzes spatial patterns of urban population change in Uzbekistan from 1989 to 1999, utilizing data from the 1989 USSR census and the latest official population estimates. The country's general urban population dynamics are examined first at national and oblast levels, with an emphasis on discerning effects of natural population growth vis-a-vis migration. The focus then shifts to individual urban centers and on identifying groups of rapidly growing, declining, disappearing, and new towns. The paper then explores linkages between towns of each type and their major economic functions. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O18, R12, R23.3 figures, 7 tables, 70 references, 4 appendices.

This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non-naturalism and quasi-realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non-naturalism and quasi-realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non-naturalism, quasi-realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non-naturalism and quasi-realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non-naturalism and quasi-realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non-naturalism, quasi-realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tracking the sources of particulate organic matter (POM) exported from catchments is important to understand the transfer of energy from soils to oceans. The suitability of investigating the molecular composition of POM by thermally assisted hydrolysis and methylation using tetramethylammonium hydroxide directly coupled to gas chromatography and mass spectrometry is presented. The results of this molecular fingerprint approach were compared with previously published elemental (%C, %N) and isotopic data (δ13C, δ15N) acquired in a nested headwater catchment in Piedmont region, Eastern United States of America (12 and 79 ha). The concordance between these results highlights this molecular tool as a valuable method for source fingerprinting of POM. It emphasizes litter as the main source of exported POM at the upstream location (80 ± 14 %) with an increasing proportion of stream bed (SBed) sediments remobilization downstream (42 ± 29 %), specifically during events characterized by high rainfall amounts. At the upstream location, the source of POM seems to be controlled by the maximum and median hourly rainfall intensity. An added-value of this method is to directly investigate chemical biomarkers and to mine their distributions in term of biogeochemical functioning of an ecosystem. In this catchement, the distribution of plant-derived biomarkers characterizing lignin, cutin, and suberin inputs were similar in SBed and litter, while the proportion of microbial markers was 4 times higher in SBed than in litter. These results indicate that SBed OM was largely from plant litter that has been processed by the aquatic microbial community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existence, populations and characteristics of 'closed administrative territorial formations' (CATF) or secret cities of Russia and other former Soviet Union countries, particularly Kazakhstan, were examined. Since 1996, 41 CATFs were designated and additional five settlements were established in 1998. These five secret cities were Mezhgor'ye of Bashkortostan, Bol'shoy Kamen of Primorskiy Kray, Raduzhnyy of Vladimir Oblast, Severomorsk of Murmansk Oblast and Shikhany of Saratov Oblast. Updated cartographic and population information were provided for these CATFs.

Our concepts of good simpliciter, good for, and good as a particular kind of thing must share some common element. I argue that all three types of goodness can be analysed in terms of the reasons that there are for a certain sets of agents to have pro-attitudes. To this end I provide new and compelling accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes that are more explanatorily illuminating than competing accounts and that evade the objections that undermine previous accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]