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Defence cases with an escalatory structure, in which the levels of violence between aggressor and defender start out as minor and then become major, even lethal, raise sharp problems for defence theory, and for our understanding of the conditions of defence: proportionality, necessity, and imminence. It is argued here that defenders are not morally required to withdraw from participation in these cases, and that defensive escalations do not offend against any of the conditions of defence, on an adequate understanding of them. No plausible interpretation of proportionality or necessity excludes defensive permissions in escalatory cases. Moreover, the structure of escalatory defensive cases also sheds useful light on permissible responses to conditional deadly threats. This is because we can analyse conditional deadly threats as disguised cases of escalation. Because defensive resistance is permissible in escalatory cases, it is also permissible in cases involving conditional deadly threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 24 February 2022 Russian invasion of – or 'special military operation' in – Ukraine has sent shock waves across the globe. In this editorial the Editors-in-Chief of JUFIL examine in detail the legal justifications advanced by President Putin for Russia's use of military force and subject them to scrutiny. Doing so highlights just how devoid of substance and credibility they are within the context of the jus ad bellum as it exists today. Furthermore, the Editors reflect on some of the broader questions that this use of military force poses for the jus ad bellum, including what the invasion of Ukraine says about the efficacy of the contemporary jus ad bellum and what is – or what might be – the ultimate impact upon the rules and norms governing the use of force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following a rocket attack that occurred at Erbil airport in Iraq, President Biden authorised the first use of military force since becoming President on 25 February 2021. This was legally justified on the basis of self-defence. On the face of it this seemed an innocuous justification. Yet, this article argues that through both downplaying the treaty source of the right of self-defence and its express requirement for an armed attack, as well as promoting a contextual and enabling form of necessity, the Biden administration's military action and ensuing strategy of legal justification place question marks over the meaning of, and even the requirement for, an armed attack. However, seeing the 25 February incident in the context of broader US and other state practice, while various attempts at diluting this requirement and the interpretation provided to it by the International Court of Justice have been sustained, others have clearly not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality requirements pertaining to the American airstrikes on 25 February 2021 against alleged Iran-supported non-state militia groups in Syria. From the limited publicly available information, the February airstrikes appear to be punitive rather than defensive. Consequently, this author concludes that the airstrikes were likely unnecessary as there was no situation of genuine emergency that required the USA to act when and where it did or else lose the ability to defend itself effectively. The necessity of targeting the militiamen in Syrian territory is also highly questionable. If not necessary, the airstrikes constitute unlawful armed reprisals. The proportionality of the airstrikes is moot, therefore, although the article proceeds to articulate certain challenges to assessing such proportionality if the necessity of the American response against an ongoing threat could be hypothetically established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 20-year Afghanistan conflict was called a 'forever war' but another significant use of military force has lasted much longer. Since 1986, US presidents have authorised air attacks beyond armed conflict zones. President Biden continued the practice beginning with a strike on Syria and later on Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan, where a drone cost the lives of seven children. US air wars are explained more by a policy of deterrence, than the lawful purpose of self-defence as permitted under international law. UN Charter Article 51 restricts force to when an armed attack occurs. The general principles of necessity, proportionality, and attribution provide further restrictions. The US has tried for 35-years to alter this law in line with deterrence policy but doing so is difficult under the doctrine of positive law. It is impossible under the doctrine of jus cogens that includes the prohibition on force and the exception for self-defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2017, the Egyptian armed forces conducted airstrikes against non-State targets in the neighbouring State of Libya in response to a series of attacks perpetrated against groups of Coptic Christians on Egyptian territory, killings later claimed by the self-styled Islamic State. In justifying its use of armed force, resort to which is generally impermissible in international law, Egypt purports to rely upon two exceptions to this general rule, namely: (i) authorisation on the part of the United Nations Security Council; and (ii) self-defence, while also invoking the doctrine of military assistance on request (or intervention by invitation). This article tests the legality of Egypt's airstrikes—which have yet to be subjected to scholarly attention—in light of the three foregoing justifications. In so doing, the article evaluates the implications of this use of force for the jus ad bellum, particularly the law regulating resort to force by way of response to an armed attack for which not another State, but a non-State actor, is responsible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article seeks to examine the use of the figure of self-defence in the practices of the Buenos Aires criminal justice system. As we will show with the analysis of some paradigmatic cases, through the use of this exceptional figure, this criminal justice system produces certain murders as non-criminal acts to, paradoxically, safeguard individual life as a hegemonic value. Moreover, we will observe that the use of this legal figure reveals that killings to protect private property may not have a criminal character either. This in turn suggests that private property is also a hegemonic value for this criminal justice system, and that the allegedly supremacy of individual life over private property in its value scale should be at least questioned.

The article analyses the concept of self-defence against non-state actors – terrorist groups. The events of last decades where non-state actors (terrorist groups) had carried out attacks amounting to armed attack in sense of Article 51 of UN Charter left a dilemma for states whether the right to self-defence encompasses as well actions against non-state entities. The state practice illustrated in present article supports the idea that self-defence is possible against whoever committed armed attack, be it a state or non-state entity. The article also discusses the standard of action against states harbouring terrorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conversation between Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga and Naz Khatoon Modirzadeh on the origins, objectives, and context of the 24 February 2021 'Arria-formula' meeting convened by Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short article considers the informal 'Arria formula' meeting of the United Nations Security Council convened by Mexico in February 2021. It offers a compressed analysis of many of the statements made during that meeting regarding the substantive issue of inter-state force against non-state actors, identifies important areas of disagreement, and concludes with some observations on the current state of the law and the path forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that culpability and responsibility are independent notions, even though some of the same facts make us both responsible and culpable. Responsibility for one's conduct is grounded in the strength of the agential connection between oneself and one's conduct. Culpability for one's conduct is the vices that give rise to that conduct. It then argues that responsibility and culpability for causing a threat are each grounds of liability to defensive harm independent of the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Military Challenges / Sodobni Vojaški Izzivi is the property of Sciendo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper points to the potential implementation of certain elements of aikido, especially levers, in self-defence. The specifics of certain elements of aikido enable their implementation in self-defence. Proper execution of aikido elements in technical terms is an important prerequisite for their effectiveness in self-defence. Good mastering when it comes to performing individual aikido elements, is necessary in order for them to be qualitatively connected into a meaningful whole, that is, a combination that will represent an adequate response in a particular problem situation. For that reason, insisting on the best possible execution of each individual element of aikido certainly leads to an increase in the chance for its efficient and purposeful implementation in self-defence.

Introduction: The police forces performance is demanding on well-timed and quick reaction. Single reaction time and choice reaction time are crucial when the jeopardy appears. Performing under stress in life-threatening situations needs a good level of stress tolerance. In our study, we used two non-specific, and two specific (shooting) tests to analyse the reactivity of police officer under different conditions. Material and methods: The research sample consisted of n=18 male Czech police training instructors. The group is unique as these police officers are specialised in the professional self-defence with focus on the coercive means use and shooting skills. Two standardized non-specific tests administrated with the Vienna Test System (VTS) by Schuhfried GmbH were used for data gathering. Single reaction time (SRT) was measured by the Reaction test, stress tolerance and choice reaction time (CRT) was measured by the Determination test. Two practical non-standardized shooting tests were used for the reactivity analysis in the goal oriented environment (shooting range). Results: The single reaction time among police training instructors was M=261.56±33.60 ms, which corresponds to the 66.28 percentile of age norm. Performance in the stress tolerance test also matches the average performance in population (M=45.56 percentile of correct reactions, M=61.67 percentile of incorrect reactions, M=51.44 percentile of skipped signals). According to the Pearson correlation coefficient, there is no correlation between single reaction time in the Reaction test and choice reaction time in the Determination test (r=-0.03). There is no correlation between single reaction time in the non-specific Reaction test and performance in the specific Shooting test 1 (r=0.06) and Shooting test 2 (r=-0.01). Conclusions: There is no relation between the results in the specific and non-specific reaction tests. Nonspecific tests of single reaction time and choice reaction time are suitable for a general assessment of motor abilities. Specific tasks need specific training and specific evaluation methods.

The article deals with legal issues related to the use of armed force in international relations, examines modern doctrines of the use of force, studies the legal aspects of interference in the internal affairs of the state, the problems of the correlation of the principles of international law. The evolution of the category “aggression” and its international legal definition is investigated, as well as an analysis of the main provisions of modern concepts of the right to selfdefense in the context of a changed understanding of aggression.

Public international law has been developing and working with international humanitarian law & international human rights law together. As it developes, international law is renovating its nature from softer to harder. Although it is a great achievement to see that international (criminal) law has the influence to deal with some particular international criminals, however, the world is still far beyond from its ambition. Sometimes states are behaving very unusual against other states and using force for various reasons. While using force against other states is prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, states can use force under Article 51 if it is necessary for self-defence and only if it is approved by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, it is a question of fact that how a state can use force(s) and how it will be legitimate under several international laws? Hague law prohibits the use of new weapons and engine in the war because it seems disproportionate and unnecessary while the UN Charter is silent about the method of using force. Hence, it seems not clear that how a ‘force’ would be measured and will pass the ‘legality’ test. The indicator, thus remain unclear and very subjective.

On February 26, 2012 George Zimmerman killed Trayvon Martin and in July 2013 he was found not guilty. Also, on July 19, 2018, Michael Drejke killed Markeis McGlockton and it was not until August 13, 2018 that he was arrested. These cases sparked a nationwide debate around castle doctrine, self-defence and stand your ground laws. Texas, Florida and many other states have these laws, which generally allow an individual to stand his or her ground, and meet force with force, even deadly, at any place he/she has a legal right to be. This study examines what these laws do and do not do. The results of the cost and benefit analysis of this study make it clear that self-defence law is enough protection for individuals in the face of attack. The “Stand Your Ground” law promotes unpredictable and uneven use of violence. The argument by proponents that the law deters crime is unfounded. This study makes several recommendations, among which are: repeal the existing law and remove statutory immunity to allow victims to seek compensation and justice.

The evaluation of strike impact is important for optimal training, conditioning and tactical use. Therefore, the aim of this study was to evaluate ground and pound strikes, in terms of net force variability, across genders and performance levels. Eighty-one participants, professional men (n = 8, 37 ± 6 years, 195 ± 7 cm, 113 ± 27 kg), advanced men (n = 47, 26 ± 8 years, 180 ± 7 cm, 76 ± 11 kg), and advanced women (n = 26, 21 ± 1 years, 167 ± 6 cm, 61 ± 7 kg) performed three strikes from a kneeling position into a force plate on the ground. The elbow strike resulted in the highest impulse and the palm strike in the highest peak force for all three categories. These results support the recommendation that has previously been made to teach the palm strike to beginners and advanced tactical and combat athletes. The direct punch and elbow strike net force were characterized by a double peak curve, where the first peak variability explained 70.2–84% of the net force. The second peak was pronounced in professional men during elbow strikes, which explained 16% of net force variability. The strike type determines the impact net force and its characteristics, where palm strike is typical by highest peak impact tolerance and elbow strike by double force peak with high net force impulse.

This article responds to Anh Le's critique of my Journal of Military Ethics article entitled "The Morality of Retributive Targeted Killing." Le argues that while retribution can in theory function as justification, purely retributive targeted killings cannot be found in practice. Moreover, pointing to the virtue of charity, which partly underpins my right intention argument, Le holds that it would be unmerciful to kill wrongdoers for past crimes if the acting state knows that those individuals do not pose a future threat. In response, I demonstrate that whilst focusing on the retributive rationale, I did not deny that other rationales play a role in targeting decisions. Rather, my intention was to direct attention to retributive uses of force that are nowadays oftentimes justified as self-defence. Additionally, I started from a different understanding of the relationship between charity and justice, which has an impact on the risk assessment just combatants should make in capture attempts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of a Grotian moment remains rather obscure in international law. On the one hand, it can refer simply to an empirical fact which galvanises the ordinary law-making processes, whether treaty-making or State practice, resulting in major shifts in international law. On the other hand, a Grotian moment might be seen as an event so significant that it results in an extraordinary shift in international law without full adherence to the processes for law-making. The former understanding has little legal significance, while the latter, which would be legally significant, would be controversial and without legal basis. Against this background the article discusses the intersections between peremptory norms and Grotian Moments. It does this by looking at the intersection between the two concepts as well as the intersection between Grotian Moments, on the one hand and, on the other hand, particular jus cogens norms. With respect to the former, for example, the article will consider whether the high threshold of peremptory status facilitates and hinders Grotian moments. With respect to the latter, the article will consider particular norms that have been said to have shifted on account of the Grotian moments, namely the right to use of force in self-defence as well humanitarian intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The main aim of the study was to find out the impact of special coordination training on the level of technical skills in the field of self-defence on a policeman during basic vocational training. Method: The studies used the classical experiment method and the parallel group technique. The study was carried out using the classic experiment with a pre-test (1st measurement) and post-test (2nd measurement), and included the following groups: research (experimental teaching shaping coordination skills) and control (traditional teaching). Results: In both the experimental and traditional training groups, there was an improvement in the rating of defence against each of the three attacks. Simple effects analyses were performed, which showed that the increase in self-defence skills was higher in the experimental training group than in the traditional training group. Conclusions: Experimental training, which takes into account the development of coordination skills in its training, contributes to a better improvement of the ability to repel an attack than traditional training. A higher level of skills in the field of repelling an attack on a policeman allows for the conclusion that without the need to increase the number of hours of program training, it is possible to more effectively prepare policemen to act effectively, adequately and safely during an intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adherents to the so-called 'negative equality' principle agree that an exception exists in the form of the doctrine of counter-intervention. This exception is, however, seen as operating asymmetrically, in that while states are permitted to counter-intervene in support of governmental regimes they are not permitted to intervene in support of non-state opposition groups should the governmental regime be in receipt of prior assistance in the context of the civil war. The purpose of this article is to probe the asymmetrical interpretation of the doctrine of counter-intervention in testing whether it can be said to stand up to scrutiny, as well as explore the possibilities for a symmetrical interpretation of the doctrine and the legal and policy issues involved in extending it in this way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of moral sunk costs pervades decision-making with respect to war. In the terms of just war theory, it may seem that incurring a large moral cost results in permissiveness: if a just goal may be reached at a small cost beyond that which was deemed proportionate at the outset of war, how can it be reasonable to require cessation? On this view, moral costs already expended could have major implications for the ethics of conflict termination. Discussion of sunk costs in moral theorizing about war has settled into four camps: Quota, Prospect, Addition, and Discount. In this paper, I offer a mathematical model that articulates each of these views. The purpose of the mathematisation is threefold. First, to unify the sunk costs problem. Second, to show that these views differ in the nature of their justifications: some are justified qualitatively and others quantitatively. Third, to clarify the differential force of qualitative and quantitative critiques of these four views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The depiction and description of body techniques of combat have always been a part of martial arts culture. For example, self-defence techniques of the Israeli system of Krav Maga have routinely been depicted and described in books. More recently, the dissemination of similar knowledge has been presented within emerging modern technologies such as online videos and blogs. We argue, however, that such approaches limit and may even harm the development of professional judgement and decision making of self-defence coaches. By focusing on (a) the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge and (b) the complexity and non-linearity of self-defence situations, we point out the limitations of the depicted and described knowledge in these media (or channels) of communication. In essence, we argue that the focus on providing procedural knowledge to coaches promotes a view that self-defence skill development is linear. These foci ultimately will limit the adaptability of the coach in creating effective skill development programs for practitioners who need to be able to cope with complex dynamics of real world violence.

Fight books can be much more than repositories of knowledge or cornerstones of tradition. In some cases they may also reflect fundamental changes in the intellectual and social life of a society and even attempt to change the latter for the better. This is very much true for the works of William Hope (1660-1724). In eight printed books the Scotsman covered a wide range of topics connected to smallsword fencing and duelling. He employed early scientific methods when developing his school of swordplay, reflected on the social implications of fencing, introduced the notion of “sport for better health” into early modern fencing, and sought to institutionalise fencing in order to curb violence. As a whole this reflects the mindset of the early Enlightenment as it started to flourish in Hope’s native Scotland during his lifetime. This paper will answer the question of how the early Enlightenment influenced a set of remarkable Scottish fight books from the early modern period.

The aim of this article is to describe the mechanisms of the genesis and functioning of martial arts from the historical point of view, as a product of continuous exchange of knowledge, on both regional and international levels. The article responds to contemporary trends in the research of martial arts. It is not strictly focused on any geographical area or historical period; rather, it attempts to outline the general facts applicable to most combat systems of the world, by taking into account the similarities of various techniques. For this purpose, the focus of the author is mainly on modern Japanese martial arts. However, the article is also based on the traditions of European martial arts’ masters, which are well known to us, as well as on the worldwide historical development of martial arts.

Given the increasing role and use of cyberspace in our daily lives, it is important to consider the large-scale dynamics of the cyber forum. Shifting the focus from individuals to nation states as participants that engage in activities in cyberspace raises doubts over the status of nations in this domain. Do they continue to remain sovereign entities on such a platform? Do they have the right to defend themselves against attacks from other nations? These questions have been subject to a lot of debate in the context of international law. The aim of this paper is to study the implications of the principle of state sovereignty and selfdefence in cyberspace. The paper focuses on two prime considerations of sovereignty and self-defence in the context of cyberspace and its link to international law. Thus the scope is limited to concepts such as territorial jurisdiction, sovereignty, attribution and selfdefence. While doing so, the researcher seeks to answer questions such as, Is international law applicable to cyberspace? Can cyberspace be called a sovereign domain? Do principles of territorial jurisdiction apply to cyberspace? How does the attribution mechanism work in cyberspace? Under what circumstances are states permitted to exercise the right of self-defence against cyber attacks? and What are the deficiencies in international law governing cyberspace?

The Article will examine the parameters of state-sponsored terrorism through an evaluation of the tenets of state responsibility. Under customary international law, States are not perpetrators of terrorism because terrorism is a penal offence and states are not subjects of international criminal law. Nonetheless, General Assembly resolutions repeatedly condemn States that undertake and/or support acts of terrorism. It reflects the absolute prohibition on the use of force except in reaction to a conventional armed attack and the seeming metamorphosis and fluidity of the traditional understanding.

In recent years the power and reach of prominent hacker groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec has been clearly demonstrated. However, in a world where hackers are able to wield significant online power, can they do so ethically as legitimate agents? To answer this question this paper will develop an ethical framework based on the premise that hackers have exhibited instances where they have acted to protect people from harm at a time when there was no one else to do so. At its core this paper will argue that political hacking can be justified when it is done to protect the vital interests of oneself or others. Moreover, it will also argue that just because hackers are outside the state does not automatically discount them as ethical actors and that when the state fails to protect people – whether it is due to a lack of ability, political will or because the state is the source of the threat – hackers can fill the void. In order to achieve this, first it is necessary to highlight the space for hackers to operate; second, guide hacker activity by creating an ethical framework detailing what actions are justified towards what end; third, to offer mechanisms that can aid in reaching these ethically justified decisions; and as a result, inform further ethical debates on how to react to these political hackers. This means that the framework can be used to both justify and condemn hacking depending on the circumstances, allowing those on the outside to distil and evaluate a political hack, both past and present, while guiding hacker collectives by providing clearer ethical tools for determining the appropriate agendas and methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To enhance their strategic position, some spacefaring States are engaged in exploiting legal lacunae of international space treaties. Consequently, there is an increase of militarization of outer space. As an instance of such activities, an anti-satellite (ASAT) test by India represents a strategic move to enhance its deterrence capability rather than earnestly adhering to international space law. Such actions can potentially increase the element of uncertainty in international law, particularly the international space law. The pursuit of military strategic interests in space has increased the possibility of an arms race in space. This article argues that ASAT tests not only violate certain principles of international law but also undermine the efforts for arms control and disarmament in the outer space. In this regard, an effective role of the international community is required to curb the arms race imperative for a safe and sustainable outer space environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ministry of the Interior has twice proposed to amend the laws that allow city and rural municipality (local government) law enforcement officials to apply additional measures and use direct coercion. The aim of the study was to specify what state supervision measures and means of direct coercion are necessary for law enforcement officials of the Tallinn Municipal Police Department (hereinafter referred to as MUPO). That is also the case in a health crisis, during which police assistance cannot always be relied upon. Officials from different MUPO services were surveyed, and the heads of their departments were interviewed. The analysis of the surveys showed that MUPO inspectors have the capabilities and motivation to contribute more effectively to the protection of public order in the most populous city in Estonia. What became evident was the expectation of amending the laws, both with the need to add specific measures to the Law Enforcement Act, the Liquid Fuel Act, the Public Transport Act, and the Traffic Act and, if necessary, by granting the right to use direct coercion to local government law enforcement officials. The right of self-defence of local government law enforcement officials needs to be regulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When conflict arose between Iraq, Iraq's US-led allies, and the terrorist group ISIL in 2014, legal scholars paid close attention. Amid the fighting these scholars tried to determine if the States getting involved, including Denmark and Norway, did so on the basis of a belief in the validity of the 'Unable or Unwilling'-doctrine of self-defence. While some States were clear on this matter, Denmark and Norway both seemed ambiguous and hesitant – and were therefore habitually deemed sceptics of the doctrine. This article demonstrates, however, that this conclusion cannot be sustained. This insight is put forward, firstly, to correct a misleading narrative about the 'Unable or Unwilling'-doctrine, and, secondly, to caution against relying on State practice and statements when doing so tells an uneven story and leads to disconnects between what States do and what they say – especially when there are palpable political reasons for States to resist clarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In the recent case of R v. Taj, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upheld the conviction of a defendant who, in a psychotic delusional state, mistook his non‐threatening victim to be a terrorist, violently attacking him. The law typically allows honest mistakes (even if unreasonable) as a basis for self‐defence (in this case the defence of others). However, because Taj's delusions were found by the court to have been caused by voluntary alcohol consumption, special legal (prior‐fault) intoxication rules were applied to block his defence; Taj was convicted and sentenced to 19 years imprisonment for attempted murder. Argument We focus here on the simple question—what does it mean to be intoxicated? On the facts, Taj did not have drugs active in his system at the time of the attack, but the court nonetheless insisted that Taj's delusional mistake was 'attributable to intoxication'; namely, to drink‐ and drug‐taking in the previous days and weeks. This extended conception of intoxication was questionably distinguished from psychosis induced by withdrawal. Furthermore, the court was unreceptive to evidence of a long‐standing, underlying mental health disorder. We argue that the court's expanded view of intoxication is problematic, in that intoxication‐induced psychosis cannot be sharply distinguished from other causes such as mental disorders; and even if it could be distinguished, it should not give rise to blame and punishment in the same way as does conduct induced by chemically active intoxicants ('drug‐on‐board'). Conclusion: The courts' expansion of the definition of intoxication is both legally and forensically problematic, introducing legal vagaries where the clinical science is already vague; and with intoxication frequently interlocking with historic intoxication and secondary or comorbid mental health conditions, the decision risks inappropriately and/or over‐criminalizing defendants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ban on the use of force in current international law is of mandatory character. The only exceptions are actions under the auspices of the UN Security Council and self-defence. The article addresses the issue of the use of force, with particular emphasis on cyberspace. As the nature of the conflicts has changed in recent years as well as the space where the individual operations have been moving, a number of fundamental questions arise in this context, which the authors will try to answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is aimed at determining the international legal content of the situation of execution, application and termination of the Ukrainian-Russian international agreements in the context of the ongoing interstate conflict. Attention is paid to the impact of the conflict on the participation of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in collective agreements, both universal and regional, as well as on aspects of the validity and application of bilateral interstate, intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements. The specifics of the application of collective and bilateral Ukrainian-Russian agreements due to the circumstances of the conflict are highlighted. The universal norms of international law applicable to the validity of interstate treaties in the conditions of interstate armed conflict are studied. Peculiarities of application of the requirements of international humanitarian law to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict are characterized. The issues covered in the article did not have extensive research until 2014 and were considered either in the dimension of a particular industry (for example, legal cooperation) or subject (agreements on the stay of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine), as well as in the measurement of Ukraine’s succession. After the beginning of the Russian aggression, fundamental studies of the state of contractual relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation were studied in the fundamental works of the prominent domestic international lawyer Olexander Zadorozhny, but his tragic untimely death suspended the development of the relevant key area of domestic legal doctrine. The purpose of the article is to establish, taking into account the requirements of universal international law and the relevant collective and bilateral treaty framework, the specifics of validity, application and termination of Ukrainian-Russian international treaties in the face of ongoing Russian aggression, and develop appropriate recommendations for public authorities. At the same time, the issue of the impact of the situation of interstate conflict on the application of bilateral agreements should be distinguished from the issue of application of such agreements in the temporarily occupied territories by the parties to the conflict and the use of bilateral agreements to obtain political and legal benefits. The conclusions state that modern universal international law does not have an imperatively defined approach to aspects of the validity of international treaties in the context of interstate armed conflict. Enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, the mechanisms of termination, suspension, withdrawal from the treaty should be assessed in the light of the provisions of Article 73 of this convention, which provides for additional dispositiveness of the state’s actions in relation to its own treaties in conditions of armed conflict. Approved by the UN Commission on International Law in 2011, the Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, as the doctrinal regulator, are important primarily in considering the specifics of situations of aggression and selfdefence, as well as for the list of agreements, that cannot be terminated in conflict. This situation leaves a certain amount of discretionary for actions of Ukraine to establish the validity or invalidity of certain categories of bilateral agreements with Russia. Ukraine’s practice of terminating bilateral and collective agreements due to Russian aggression is sustainable. At the same time, Ukraine’s procedures for withdrawing from bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation remain too bureaucratic and therefore excessively slow. Currently, the situation of the conflict in a significant number of cases is considered by Ukraine as a factor influencing the situation of application of the agreement, rather than as a reason for its termination or suspension. The situation of the interstate conflict has practically not affected the situation of Ukraine’s observance and implementation of collective and universal agreements, with the exception of the CIS agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principle of necessity as applied to self-defence requires the use of the least harmful defensively effective means of thwarting a wrongful threat. Yet –so I argue – a harm can be excessive even when it is the least harmful way of dealing with the threat at the time of the attack. I therefore propose a historical view of the requirement of necessity. Historical necessity requires the selection of the least harmful means to thwart a future attack at the point in time at which we have a solid presumption that the future attack will take place. This may happen considerably before the time of the attack. Once you fail to acquire or preserve the least harmful defensive option for thwarting a future attack you may come to be irrevocably in breach of necessity. The paper tackles a number of objections to the view proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores two recent cases. The first, where a woman from a culturally and linguistically diverse background (Rinnabel Blackmore) was killed by her abusive partner and the second, where an Aboriginal woman (Jody Gore) killed her abusive partner. In both cases, we consider the implications of using a social entrapment lens, which focuses on coercive control, the limits of the family violence safety response and the role of structural intersectionality to understand the form of violence the woman faced before being killed by her abuser or killing her abuser. We show how a social entrapment framework can reveal relevant facts and improve understanding of the dynamics of violence and might have led to different actions and decisions by the agencies and individuals responding to the violence in these cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]