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The article examines through the prism of the historical-philosophical worldview of G. Hegel the problem of the phenomenon of conscience on the material of classical ancient philosophy and its continuation in the Ukrainian philosophical tradition, embodied in the views of G. S. Skovoroda and P. D. Yurkevich. Different forms of posing the question of the essence of existence of such a phenomenon as conscience are given, and in what its difference and identity with morality, as a universal law. The goal was to trace a holistic line in the philosophical solution of this question and revolutionary and reactionary moments in the formation of the concept of conscience in different historical conditions. It is precisely the reconstruction by G. Hegel of the stage of formation of conscience in the ancient world that gives us a holistic understanding of the dialecticity of existence of conscience at different historical stages. For G. Hegel, the distinction between morality and moralism is obvious in the context of the problematics of conscience, which is an external and internal law (ideal) for a person. Therefore, a more specific formation and separation of the concepts of morality and moralism, opposition of tradition and conscience, as well as separation of social and personal ideal, will be the central lines of this article. This is a contradiction in the development of the ideal between the social and the individual, which is expressed in such a sensual phenomenon as conscience, which is vividly represented by the representatives of Ukrainian philosophy, such as G. Skovoroda and P. Yurkevich. Despite the common religious form of thinking about the universal, the ideal and the conscience, they solve this question of conscience in opposite ways: if for the first one it is an inner need, then for the second one - rather an external given law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this study, the concepts of civil disobedience and virtue were discussed in relation to Socrates who is known as the first philosopher to bring virtue into the interest of philosophy and claimed to be the first civil disobedient. In this context; Socrates' stance or attitude is discussed in association with virtue, obedience, disobedience and civil disobedience. A question about justice is carried out in relation to the content and meaning of the concept of virtue for Socrates. In addition, the discussion of law-morality is being mentioned in accordance with the path of pursuit of "law administering justice" which has a substantial space in the literature of civil disobedience. By making conceptual associations and ensuing discussions throughout the study, it is claimed that the concept of virtue has a key role in sustaining the law's position to reach justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, we outline the central thesis of our recent book: A Platonic Theory of Moral Education: Cultivating Virtue in Contemporary Democratic Classrooms. We argue that the ethical, epistemological, political, and metaphysical doctrines typically attributed to Plato are not doctrines Plato holds, or at least are not doctrines that he holds in the way he is interpreted to have done. We claim that if we understand Plato's relationship to these supposed doctrines better, we would discover that Plato's views are not wildly implausible or ill-suited for contemporary democracies and the schooling they provide for their children. Rather, they are plausible and well-suited to contemporary democratic education. This essay briefly outlines some of our reasons for holding this position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Plato is often regarded as a founding figure for Western philosophy, and specifically as the inventor of a way of doing philosophy grounded in critical, argumentative reason. This article asks whether Plato's practice of writing myths in his dialogues comes into tension with his canonical reputation. I suggest that resolving this tension may require us to revise our standing ideas about the nature of philosophy and its relationship to myth. Against interpretations that minimize the significance of Plato's myths to his philosophy, I argue that he may have constructed them deliberately as a form of philosophical discourse in their own right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (La Plata) is the property of Universidad Nacional de La Plata and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the connections between the arguments against the fear of death in Plato's Apology and the first book of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations. It argues that Cicero's dialogue adapts and develops Socrates' arguments and dialectical method. Cicero signals this debt through his philosophically loaded translation of Ap. 40c-42a at Tusc. 1.97-99. But Cicero also casts Socrates as a foil, drawing an important contrast between Socrates' philosophical stance and his own: while Socrates deploys irony to hide his view about the nature of death, Cicero advocates a particular form of skepticism that allows one to suspend judgment on certain matters, while nevertheless accepting certain ethically beneficial conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of shame (αἰσχύνη) plays a cardinal role in Plato's Gorgias. Plato works with this concept by dramatically influencing the characters' actions and discourses throughout the dialogue. It has the most frequent and most important position in the part in which Socrates discusses with the young Athenian politician Callicles. The study analyzes and interprets the ways in which Plato's Callicles worked with shame in his "opening speech" (482c4 - 486d1). The author focuses on the distinction between two functions of shame: (1) negative - (1.1) as an impulse to correct opinions, (1.2) as a consequence of lack of courage, (1.3) as a tool of the weak to control the "naturally strong" and (2) positive - as an instrument of discredit (Callicles' attempt to bring shame to Socrates). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant is compared with Socrates because the two philosophers have much in common. Both thinkers were central figures in their time. Kant revolutionised the philosophy of the modern period dealing with questions of ethics and epistemology; Socrates brought about a similar revolution in ancient Greek philosophy. The image of Socrates continues to inspire modern scholars, the main features of this image being rationality and publicity. Socrates is seen as an arch-rationalist and the founder of science and philosophy as a whole. Besides, he practised philosophy publicly, being an antipode of another ancient Greek philosopher, Pythagoras, whose doctrines were secret. Coming together in the image of Socrates, publicity and rationality mutually condition each other. This again is a feature shared with Kant who put forward the concept of the public and private use of reason. Today, the term “publicity” should be replaced by the more accurate term “openness.” Like publicity, openness implies accessibility of knowledge to the largest possible number of people. However, openness is a broader concept: it makes it possible both to explain the interconnection between the freedom of reason and its publicity advocated by Kant and to draw a demarcation line between Socrates and the Sophists who were also public intellectuals. Whereas the Sophists sought personal gain and popularity, Socrates viewed the practice of philosophy as a form of self-sacrifice for the good of society; this led the Sophists to relativism and Socrates to the discovery of rational thinking. The conclusion is that openness, interpreted as accessibility of knowledge and the possibility of its development, constitutes the key component of rationality.

En este artículo se pretende mostrar bajo qué perspectiva surge el siguiente problema para la interpretación del Eutifrón, del Laques, y del Cármides: ¿en qué sentido ciertas preguntas, que Sócrates formula en términos de “¿qué es…?”, son discutidas “a la luz de casos” en cada uno de estos diálogos? Para mostrar que esta interrogante es un problema, se justifican los tres criterios que rigen la selección del Eutifrón, del Laques, y del Cármides, para investigar esta investigación. Estos criterios son: (i) los diálogos suelen ser considerados como “diálogos de definición”, (ii) los diálogos suelen ser citados en discusiones a favor o en contra de “la falacia socrática”, (iii) se asume que en los diálogos se presentan casos. En la primera sección del artículo se muestra que, cierta manera de interpretar a estos tres diálogos como “diálogos de definición” tiene un problema, y que ese problema persiste en las interpretaciones de quienes discuten “la falacia socrática”. En la segunda sección se sugiere cierta manera de entender que, en los diálogos en cuestión, se presentan “casos”, aplicando el concepto de caso esbozado por André Jolles en su obra Einfache Formen. Por último, se defiende que, investigando si los casos de cada uno de los diálogos son “casos” en el sentido sugerido, se puede avanzar en una interpretación de estos textos más precisa que las interpretaciones consideradas en la primera sección.

Upbringing is a complex life process of building and developing a human being following his/her characteristics. For the process of upbringing to culminate in the formation of intellectually and morally complete and independent people, the question has always arisen as to what it is that makes it effective. The main intention of this paper is to present and analyze fundamental educational guidelines devised and posited by famous philosophers of antiquity –Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle who focused on achieving personal autonomy, without neglecting the fundamental characteristics of socially acceptable frameworks of morality. The paper will present the development of fundamental educational ideas in antiquity, with special emphasis on building the authentic individual and the citizen as one of the main instruments of upbringing both in the past and today.

The Socratic Method known as elenchus is the method used in Plato’s earlier dialogues namely Socratic dialogues. This method was a response to the sophists’ claim about the teaching of the virtue. Socrates used this method to disclose their ignorance. Through questioning and answering, he tried to make others aware that the searching for knowledge and virtue is achievable in a dialectical process and in relation to the other. The Socratic Method is not a simple method of dialogue, but it also points to the finitude of human understanding and, consequently, to the nature of philosophical thinking. From Socrates’s viewpoint, philosophy means the love of knowledge, and the claim on absolute knowledge is nothing more than an illusion. Through question and answer, Socrates tries to challenge other’s claim of knowledge and put them on the path of searching for knowledge. Thus the Socratic Method can play a powerful role in teaching. In Socrates’s thought we observe the interconnectedness of elements, all of which are understood in relation to each other. The doctrine of recollection, elenchus, dialectical art, question and answer and so on are among these elements. In this paper, while paying attention to these elements we will try to examine the nature of the Socratic Method.

The present essay is a study and an analysis of important theoretical principles that we might find in Protagoras. Subject of this dialogue are moral virtues: their unity/plurality and teachebility or unteachebility. Virtues generally are wisdom, justice, piety, temperance and courage. Reading Protagoras and studying its parts with some points taken from other dialogue Meno, can light on the former; because Meno’s theory of anamnesis (teaching or knowledge is recollection) as a perspective describes the meaning of to teach or teaching (Meno, 79-80). Protagoras wanting this meaning and only takes teaching as a transition of arts and virtues from the elder to the young. Our disscution of Socrates and Protagoras's ideas on education is not only based on their differences and contrarieties but also on their similarities and intractions: coversations that are going between the philosopher and the sophist depict a relative convergence of their opinions on the education of the young. Symbol of the mentioned convergence is the principal view that emerges at the end of Protagoras; Socrates suppose and say we (I and Protagoras) must revise our opinions until arrive at a consequence on the teachebility or unteachebility of the virtues: if virtue is knowledge (wisdom), then it is teachable. (Protagoras, 361a-c). This result is at the same time repeated in Meno (87) and is one of theoretical principles.

At Statesman (Plt.) 291a–c and 303c–d, Plato compares the so-called statesmen of all existing constitutions to a motley crew of lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other beasts, and the entire section of the Statesman devoted to law and constitutions (291c–303c) to a satyr-play of sorts. This paper argues that these thought-provoking images are best understood as literary devices which, in addition to other dramatic elements in the Theaetetus and Sophist , help to bolster the unity of the Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman trilogy and its apologetic agenda concerning Socrates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that Socrates appropriated a traditional discourse characteristic of Athenian law courts and politics keyed to the concept of protection (boētheia). More specifically, I argue that Socrates aimed at protecting the Athenians, though not directly, but indirectly, namely via his life-long endeavour to serve (boēthein) Apollo. I thus read Plato's Apology as a political text, though not "political" in the sense of Socrates being suspect of overthrowing democracy, as sometimes claimed, but "political" in the sense that Plato's Socrates latched on to this concept of boēthein in the Apology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socrates' use of performative contradiction against sophistic theories is a recurrent motif in Plato's dialogues. In the case of Plato's Theaetetus and Gorgias, Socrates attempts to show that Protagoras' homo mensura doctrine and Gorgias' doctrine of the power of logos are each performatively contradicted by the underlying activity of philosophical dialogue. In the case of the Theaetetus, Socrates' strategy of performative contradiction hinges on Protagoras' failure to perform in the way that he theorized the sophist performing—namely, being able to change appearances through logoi (Theaetetus 166d–167d). In parallel fashion, Gorgias' account of the power of rhetoric is performatively contradicted by the orator's inability to prevail over Socrates, instead resorting to insincere responses to Socrates' questions in order to save face—a dialogical "performance" that ties directly to Socrates' portrait of Gorgianic rhetoric as a matter of pandering to the audience (Gorgias 460a–465a). Plato's aim in dramatizing these performative contradictions, I argue, is to illuminate both the proximity between Socrates and the great sophists, particularly with respect to Socrates' practice of elenchos, but also the distance between Socrates and the sophists in how they conceive of our situatedness within the world of human concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Dergisi is the property of Justice Academy of Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper I present a comparative analysis of the knowledge discovery process applied by Socrates and the contemporary life coach. On one hand, I will use the method of in-depth analysis of selected (Socratic) dialogues by Plato, and on the other one of coaching practice and coaching values formulated by the International Coach Federation. The term "care of the self" (epimeleia heautou) appears in the Socratic dialogues, Alkibiades I and Apology of Socrates, and this term is juxtaposed with the coaching idea of "being resourceful". "Taking care of yourself" is about constantly gaining knowledge about yourself. This knowledge is extracted by Socrates and, in contemporary terms, by a life coach. The process of uncovering knowledge involves certain key elements that are shared by both the Socratic method and modern life coaching: establishing a relationship, a purpose and relevant questions. The analysis of each of these elements leads us to the conclusion that the key value of coaching, "the resourceful state of the coach and the coachee", has its roots in ancient philosophy - in the wisdom of Socrates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinua Achebe, as an icon of African Literature, has distinguished himself as a teacher par excellence and enjoys world acclaim as "the bestselling author.... (and) among the most powerful and original writers in English fiction" (Publisher's blurb). A simple answer to the 'secret of fiction' of his success as a master artist lies in his unique style of storytelling. This paper, therefore, explores two features of his style which pervade his entire fiction, namely, jurisprudence and pedagogy. The classroom teacher of English Literature or Literature in English will demonstrate his teacher competence by drawing attention of his learners to the stylistic devices used in a literary text and explains how they enhance literary corpus. The stylistic devices are consciously or unconsciously woven into a literary work to make thematic statements. The burden of this essay is poor communicative competence of Nigerian leaners of English, the nation's official language. Another problem is the learners' poor reading culture, which results in poor storytelling. The paper is not unaware of other features of Achebe's style, which he has harnessed to teach his infinite audience. It must be pointed out though that this essay does not say the final word on the features of Achebe's style for examination in this essay. The novels of Achebe that are used for this analysis are Things Fall Apart and No Longer at Ease while the paper adopts literary research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, shame culture was considered a powerful weapon for maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, it was also considered anti-democratic. Yet nowadays, in the hands of the weak, it has become a powerful weapon for challenging the status quo. It appears that the efficiency of shame has increased in an allegedly shameless society. This article seeks to clarify such conundrums by employing the largely forgotten dialectic of the self to highlight the difference between "being ashamed" within one's inner self and "feeling shamed" in one's outer self, as evinced in the usages of two different words for "shame" in Hebrew and Greek. By contrasting Socrates with Diogenes the Cynic, this approach shows not only why not being able to be ashamed within one's inner self is a sign of a totalitarian self but also why such a self can become more vulnerable to external acts of shaming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mevzu is the property of Ali Sever and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Humanitas: International Journal of Social Sciences / Uluslararasi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Humanitas: International Journal of Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Plato's inquiry and analysis of courage have been carried out in many dialogues, from the early Apology to the Laws, which indicates the great importance that the Athenian philosopher attached to this question. Besides, courage is treated in numerous different contexts —with different interlocutors, different topics and different objectives— which give rise to a large number of approaches from which a fairly complete picture of Plato's understanding of what Plato meant by courage (andreía) can be inferred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims at conceptualising the notion of embarrassment as a negativistic figure of thought that takes the experience of one's own non-sovereignty as a starting point and emphasises an engagement with situations of not-knowing. This consideration is clarified in discussion with the figure of Socrates or with the philosophical attitude of Socrates. Because the negativistic thrust of the conceptualisation undertaken is reminiscent of irony, the paper then addresses the question of what distinguishes embarrassment understood as a figure of thought from irony. For this purpose, Kierkegaard's reading of Socratic irony is drawn upon. It is shown that irony is inherently a negativism, which in the last consequence aims at a retention of rights; but this is exactly what embarrassment avoids, because, as the article shows, it is not a negativism of strength, but of weakness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La educación tiene una vasta historia que la ha hecho transitar por diferentes posturas epistemológicas, pragmáticas y ontológicas, situación que ha enriquecido su acervo teórico y práctico. La filosofía es, entre otras, una de las ciencias en las que se ha apoyado la educación parar reflexionar sobre su ser y su hacer. Especialmente, uno de estos sustentos actuales es el pensamiento filosófico sobre el diálogo, que ha ayudado a fortalecer la corriente de la educación dialógica tanto desde su aporte como desde su crítica, aspectos inherentes a la reflexión filosófica. Sin embargo, es evidente que esta corriente de la educación no ha considerado lo suficiente la postura de la mayéutica socrática en su reflexión. Por ello, este artículo tiene como objetivo proponer unos elementos a la educación dialógica desde el estudio de la mayéutica socrática, para lo cual se utiliza una metodología de enfoque cualitativo y de corte hermenéutico. Los principales resultados de la investigación muestran que la educación dialógica amplía su horizonte desde los supuestos socráticos de la mayéutica en dos aspectos particulares: en primer lugar, la mayéutica invita a recuperar la pregunta y la capacidad de preguntarse, y, en segundo lugar, demuestra que el conocimiento para ser significativo debe ser una conquista y un descubrimiento del propio estudiante mediado por el diálogo consigo mismo, con los otros y con lo otro.

Con el presente artículo me gustaría referirme a la ética como ethos y, al mismo tiempo, como conducta de la vida. Entendida como conducta de la vida, la ética tiene originalmente su representante en Sócrates, cuya influencia ha determinado, especialmente a través de los diálogos de Platón, la historia del pensamiento occidental. Considerada como ethos, toda educación filosófica, o la implementación de una genuina filosofía de la educación, tiene que ver entonces con el desarrollo de la personalidad desde la primera aparición de la conciencia, no sólo los hábitos. Lo que propongo aquí es la autoconstitución y la autoformación, a partir de la lectura de La apología de Sócrates, de una educación filosófica que aspiraría a integrar en la conducta de la vida el ethos de cada individuo. Esta unidad constitutiva implica ya una relación de igualdad en los términos, no precisamente de identidad. Tanto en la ciudad como dentro del aula, la educación filosófica debe ser el resultado de una experiencia completa, integral, inclusiva, pero no totalitaria. Por tanto, es necesario volver a examinar las condiciones de posibilidad de la enseñanza de la filosofía desde la aproximación a la elaboración de un concepto más o menos sistemático de la educación eminentemente afín a la experiencia de la ciudadanía sin la que no existiría la filosofía.

In the Symposium of Plato, Socrates reports that Diotima once described to him a process of initiation by which a lover rises from desiring one beautiful body to catching sight of what seems to be the Platonic form of beauty. Scholars have debated whether the lover is to make this ascent by a rational process or a non-rational one, or by both working either in concert or independently. This paper argues that love leads and guides a process in this initiation that necessarily involves rational activity. No teaching is necessary or appropriate, so that the process is an example of learning without being taught. The philosophical insight that results is life-changing, but it does not amount to the kind of knowledge that would fully satisfy a Socratic seeker after knowledge.

In his two works from the 1970s, Patočka proposes a very personal way that the spiritual crisis, which manifests itself as a techno-scientific reality of Gestell, can be overcome. Patočka argues that the only way to escape spiritual decline is through sacrifice. This study examines how the ethical is represented in Patočka’s philosophy. It focuses on his two main concepts of sacrifice and care for the soul and explores the relationship between them. Through a close reading of Plato and Europe (1973), ‘Four Seminars’ (1973), and his essay ‘The dangers of technicization’ (1973), this study reveals how Patočka proposes that the ethical can be implemented within the realm of the political. Drawing a parallel between Socrates’ and Patočka’s lives and fates, this study points to the significance of ethics in political life – both in the ancient Greek polis of Socrates’ time and in communist Czechoslovakia in Patočka’s time. This approach highlights the influence that the philosophy of Socrates had on Patočka’s thinking.

La búsqueda y el tratamiento de la valentía han sido llevados a cabo por Platón en numerosos diálogos, desde la temprana Apología hasta las Leyes, lo que indica la gran importancia que el filósofo ateniense concedía a esta cuestión. Por otro lado, la valentía es tratada en numerosos contextos diferentes —con diferentes interlocutores, diferentes temas y diferentes objetivos— que dan lugar a un nutrido número de aproximaciones a partir de las cuales cabe construir una visión bastante completa de lo que Platón entendía por valentía (andreía).