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Much of the recent increase in party polarization in the U.S. Senate can be accounted for by the "Gingrich Senators," who I define as Republicans who served with Newt Gingrich in the House and then moved to the Senate. In previous research (Theriault 2008, Theriault and Rohde 2011), I find that the Gingrich Senators account for 75 percent of the polarization in the Senate since 1973 and 85 percent of the polarization since their ranks began service in the Senate in 1984. In this paper, I examine how it is that the Gingrich Senators have come to have had such a profound impact on the Senate. In short, I find that many more Republicans with House experience have run for the Senate in the Gingrich Era and that they have compensated for their more conservative voting record by raising more campaign funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the extent to which Democrats and Republicans disagree over policy in the U.S. Congress. No one disputes that the parties are increasingly voting differently from one another, but this papers calls into question the popular conception that the parties' policy stances are also becoming more divergent. An examination of cosponsorship reveals that bills, prior to being placed in the meat grinder of the legislative process, are as bipartisan now as they have always been. Furthermore, I present evidence that shows that it is the actual procedural machinations on the floor of both the House and the Senate that have driven the parties apart. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the controversy surrounding Iowa and New Hampshire's first-in-the-nation status in the presidential primary sequence, it is important to consider whether or not these two states deserve their highly coveted calendar positions. This issue is even more pressing in light of political science findings about how the results of the first primaries affect the final outcome of the nomination process. In this paper, we evaluate several criteria to see if Iowa and New Hampshire are as "special" as their proponents suggest. After briefly comparing Iowa and New Hampshire's demographic characteristics vis-à-vis those of the rest of the country, we use NES data to compare the political knowledge of Iowans and New Hampshirites to that of the mass electorate. Finally, we examine the election results in Iowa and New Hampshire to gain additional leverage on how their residents' votes are turned into representation. Our results are a mixed bag, though, in particular, we find that Iowans and New Hampshirites are not as knowledgeable nor as interested as their proponents suggest. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing divide between Republicans and Democrats in Congress is well documented, but its causes are not well understood. This article finds that almost the entire growth in party polarization in both chambers since the early 1970s can be accounted for by the increased frequency of and polarization on procedural votes. In comparison, final passage votes are relatively less frequent and not nearly as polarizing. Only when changes in the electorate interact with the legislative process can party polarization be properly understood and analyzed. This article also finds that the constituents' voices have become barely audible on procedural votes. These findings have important consequences in how procedural and final passage roll calls are voted on in Congress, viewed by the electorate, and interpreted by political scientists. This article argues that procedural voting needs to be taken more seriously by congressional observers and analyzed more carefully by political scientists if members are expected to view procedural votes as something more than "mere procedure." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role that redistricting has played in polarizing the parties in Congress. If you believe the political pundits, Redistricting plays the dominant role or, if you believe one prominent congressional expert, no role. In this article, I present four tests of the redistricting explanation. In aggregate, they suggest that redistricting has caused between 10 and 25 percent of the polarization that has grips the parties in Congress since the early 1970s. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines party polarization in Congress. Not new to this article is a demonstration that the parties are polarized and a description of some reasons why the parties have polarized. What is new to this article is a comprehensive assessment of the relative effect that each of these reasons has had on party polarization. Although both redistricting and the ideological migration and concentration of voters have polarized the parties, the biggest cause of party polarization has its roots within the institutions and procedures of the House and Senate; specifically, the manner in which roll call votes are structured and the issues being decided by those roll call votes. These changes, over the last 30 years, account for roughly half of the polarization in Congress. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two political parties in Congress are as ideologically distinct as they have been at any point in the last three decades. Scholars, analyzing the factors that have propelled this polarization, have come to different conclusions. Several recent studies find that fundamental shifts in party strategies inside Congress have polarized the parties (Collie and Mason 2000 and Roberts and Smith 2003), while others claim that the shift in the electorate has driven party divergence (Fleisher and Bond 2003 and Stonecash et al. 2003). This article takes two necessary steps back to analyze party polarization. First, I explore the underlying mechanisms that have given rise to the trend. Roughly one-third of the party polarization results from individual member adaptation while two-thirds come from the replacement of moderate members by more ideologically extreme members. Second, I discuss the extent of the polarization that has occurred. In short, the Congress is between 70 and 100 percent more polarized in the 106th Congress than it was in the 92nd Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two political parties in Congress are as ideologically divergent as they have been at any point in the last three decades. Scholars, analyzing the factors that have propelled this polarization, have come to different conclusions. Several recent studies finds that fundamental shifts in party strategies inside Congress has polarized the parties (Collie and Mason 2000 and Roberts and Smith 2003), while others claims that the shift in the electorate has driven party divergence (Fleisher and Bond 2003 and Stonecash et al. 2003). This article takes a necessary step back to analyze the congress-to-congress micro-level changes leading to these enormous macro trends. By analyzing the individual ideological changes, I find evidence for both the institutional and electoral explanations for party polarization. A more complete picture of how Congress has polarized helps explain why Congress has polarized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party polarization in Congress is at a modern high. For at least the last thirty years, Democrats have become more liberal and Republicans have become more conservative. This article does not dispute these claims. Instead, it offers three arguments suggesting that the impression left by the congressional polarization studies are a bit exaggerated. First, polarization has been the norm in congressional history. The parties were more polarized in the beginning of the twentieth century than they were at the end. Second, the rise in party polarization has not been as drastic in the last thirty years once both dimensions of the DW-NOMINATE scores are considered. Third, the rise in party polarization is much more dramatic than the rise in ideologue polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does an issue get on the legislative agenda? Political scientists - those studying both Congress and agenda setting - provide a variety of explanations. Though the analyses above from political scientists are insightful, and frequently theoretically and empirically interesting, no study yet has conclusively matched data with theory. Through an examination of 1015 bills over 27 congresses (80th to the 106th), from the presidential administration of Truman (1947) to Clinton (2000), this study takes on that daunting and Herculean task. Three findings stand out. First, almost three-fifths (58.6 percent) of the items on the legislative agenda are exogenous to the legislative process; that is, presidents and Congress are directly responsible for less than half of all the issues on the legislative agenda. Second, divided government suppresses the president's role in formulating the agenda and accentuates the role of individual members of Congress. Third, congressional initiatives are less than half as likely to become law as any other agenda-causing agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many politicians, political observers, and reformers have suggested that allowing non- or bi-partisan redistricting commissions to draw congressional district lines will make congressional elections more competitive and reduce partisan polarization within Congress. Even though such commissions strike at the power that political parties and elected officials exercise, they have been considered in 24 states since the 1999-2000 legislative sessions. In this paper, we combine an analysis of national patterns of bill introduction and consideration for this electoral reform with an intensive examination of legislative activity in four states (California, Colorado, Indiana, and Ohio). Our study suggests that both internal pressures, such as redistricting controversies, and external pressures, such as the existence of the initiative process, contribute to the consideration of redistricting commission legislation. Furthermore, the precise combination of internal and external pressures in a state leads these proposals to take one of two paths in the legislative process: a "partisan path" that is dominated by legislative insiders and inter-party wrangling and a "good government path" where outside interest groups exercise more influence and most of the debate surrounds an effort to "get it right." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]