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Current research on motivational sources of military interventions in civil wars frequently assumes that states intervene due to direct interests in the civil war country. However, this study argues that there exists a subset of interventions in which weaker powers intervene on behalf of interests which great powers hold vis-à-vis the civil war country. Using the logic of principal-agent theory in combination with arms trade data allows one to identify 14 civil wars which experienced the phenomenon of indirect military interventions. This type of intervention features a weaker power providing troops for combat missions, whereas its major arms supplier is only involved with indirect military support. The analysis is complemented with two brief case studies on the Moroccan intervention in Zaire (1977) and the Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic (2009). Both case studies corroborate expectations as deduced from the proxy intervention framework.

Recourse to force represents a highly controversial subject matter, given its political sensitivity, as well as the legal framework that authorizes it. At the present time, it has commonly been assumed that recourse to force is highly forbidden in International Law. However, modern history has shown that this rule is strictly a desiderate that may be unobserved in certain circumstances by states, with the tacit consent that the International Society has expressed through its inactiveness. Thus, are military interventions of foreign states within the territory of other states legitimate? If so, how can reasonable motives be regulated to legitimate such actions under International Law? In this context, is recourse to force infringing the notion of external sovereignty, that serves both at protecting the states’ identity and personality, as well as at preserving individuals from armed conflicts? The purpose of this paper is to find possible answers to these questions, considering the trends in contemporary geopolitics.

This paper analyzes the importance of Michael Walzer’s self-help test and discusses its importance as a link between a community’s internal con-flict and foreign military intervention. After a brief intro-duction to self-determination theory in Walzer’s philosophical thought describing selfdetermination and nonintervention principles within the presumption of state legitimacy, the paper examines the concept of selfhelp. Also, it addresses the particular features of this mechanism, examining the two le-vels of this test as well as the consequences of passing both. Then, the study discusses the importance of military intervention either counterintervention or intervention in contexts of secession as a guarantor of selfdetermination in the international realm. Finally, the paper challenges the philosophical connection established by Walzer between military victory and national representativeness through the study of the Syrian Civil War. The article concludes that the selfhelp test is a controversial yet interesting proposal combining the respect for selfdetermination commitment with military intervention in the protection of international stability.

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Do human rights organizations (HROs) aid the consolidation of democracy in post-authoritarian states? It is often argued that these groups contribute to accountability for past repression. Yet HROs can have unintended consequences if they threaten the interests of powerful domestic institutions. This paper develops a simple model of human rights activism in post-authoritarian states. Civilian governments in these states trade off support from the military and human rights activists which seek to punish the military. Counterintuitively, the model predicts human rights activists make amnesty for the military more likely, as activists tempt the government to punish the military and the military becomes more likely to intervene in politics. The model's implications are tested using a sample of post-authoritarian states from 1970-2010. Results show that more HRO influence increases the likelihood of amnesty laws and military involvement in government, though HROs may achieve justice through pathways such as truth commissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since September 2015 and the Russian military intervention in the country, the interests in Syria have been numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. The interests in Syria are numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. Russia, like the Allies and opponents of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, is fighting for geopolitical, geo-economic, or ideological reasons. The Middle East region finds itself shaken by the sharp resurgence of a confrontation between actors allied to the United States, other allies of Russia, and this Syrian crisis thus impacts the geopolitical configuration of the region. This paper presents an analysis of the Russian intervention strategy in Syria. We argue that Russia intervened in Syria to strengthen the already existing Russian-Syrian alliance, to curb extremist proliferation, and to take advantage of Syria's strategic position. The objective is to determine the reasons for the Russian military intervention in Syria related to energy and geo-economic interests. The Russian intervention in Syria was an ideal opportunity to draw closer to several powerful states in the region and a way to benefit from positive spin-offs on its arms market and hydrocarbon road plans. Despite the risks and costs associated with defending the Syrian regime, Moscow has secured its political and economic power in the Middle East.

The Northern Ireland Troubles was Britain's longest and largest post-war conflict, involving the deployment of some 300,000 military personnel over a 35-year period. Curiously, however, while the formal ending of the conflict in 1998 has generated profuse memorialisation in Northern Ireland, remembrance of the conflict in Britain has been conspicuously muted. This article uses newspaper reportage, popular cartoons, official reports and the records of a public campaign to explore the origins and evolution of negative attitudes towards the Troubles in Britain, focusing especially on reactions to military intervention during its early years. Where mainstream histories of post-war Britain emphasise popular 'indifference' to the Troubles in Britain, the article suggests attitudes to Northern Ireland reflected popular aversion, transmuted into apathy over the longer term as a result of an active and state-managed process of forgetting. These processes, it is suggested, continue to affect how Northern Ireland is perceived in the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presidents have significant incentives to mislead the public about the use of force. Under what conditions are members of the public willing to hold presidents accountable for what they say about military action? This article examines both spin and deceit at the micro-level to clarify when individuals are most likely to punish presidents for misinformation. Three survey experiments demonstrate that presidents incur political costs for misinformation, even when operations succeed. Introducing partisanship into the analysis then reveals that not all individuals are equally likely to punish all presidents—Republican leaders primarily concerned with their base have the most leeway to mislead. The findings highlight the dynamic nature of democratic accountability and domestic constraints on military force. Rather than a static institutional feature, the strength of accountability can vary across presidents and electoral coalitions. Additionally, the results show political costs are not limited to large-scale deception—even spin generates backlash. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ICC and R2P share the goal of ending atrocity crimes. Nonetheless, they operate quite differently. Recently, there has been increasing support for bringing the ICC within the R2P toolkits, hoping they will complement each other to achieve their shared goal. The Security Council put this idea into practice to deal with the 2011 crisis in Libya. However, the invocation of ICC against the backdrop of an evolving military intervention under the R2P mandate highlighted significant risks to its integrity and legitimacy. This paper argues that the invocation of ICC to constrain violence and to hold accountable the Libyan regime for atrocity crimes eventually resulted in legitimizing military intervention and regime change under the R2P mandate. The Libya case suggests that neither the push for complementarity nor a full separation between the ICC and R2P benefits the ICC. There needs to be a balance between full engagement and separation. Such an alternative rests on the ICC avoiding entanglement with R2P's military mandate, while maintaining close interaction with its non-military components through the Security Council. Lastly, the paper also points to areas in which the Council could play a more constructive role in cementing greater cooperation between R2P and the ICC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arab Spring was regarded with suspicion by Russian decision-makers, their worst fears were seemingly confirmed with the case of Libya in 2011 when NATO was seen as abusing the UN Security Council R2P mandate for the purpose of regime change. This had a great impact on Russia’s decision to support the Syrian government, when the regime change process began there. By the summer of 2015, the world was predicting the fall of the Syrian government, it was at this point Russia became directly and overtly involved with the fighting. The West tried to project a dire scenario that Russia would become embroiled in an Afghan-scenario, they made many guesses about the ‘true’ nature of Russia’s engagement, but largely failed to comprehend or understand the actual motivation. Despite negative Western projections, Russia has been largely successful in its aims and goals. Russia has consequently emerged as an external actor of significance and influence in the MENA region, which seems to be owed somewhat to taking the decision to become directly involved in Syria as a powerful broker. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the background of the 30th anniversary of the invasion of Panama by U.S. troops, this article analyzes cross-generational differences in how Panamanians evoke and signify this event. Panama's current climate is ideal to explore this topic, because 2019 also marked 500 years since the foundation of Panama City. This article focuses on how different generations revamp collective memory and relate a story that befits the circumstances of their time. Drawing on informal interviews, secondary data, and relevant aspects of family biography, it examines the interplay between generational drifts and subjective knowledge of Panama. This analysis spotlights how local and transnational processes intersect with biography, shaping perceptions of national history. By the end of the 20th century, U.S. militarized presence in the Panama Canal Zone gave way to a less conspicuous--yet no less significant--influence over Panamanian affairs. Thereupon, past generations' concern with sovereignty has been overshadowed by a growing focus on the country's integration in the global economy. While Panamanian millennials are not oblivious to recent U.S. armed intervention, their attitude towards this action is impersonal and dispassionate. Their perception of an increasingly faster course to meet the future dovetails with both a subjective distancing from Panama's neocolonial history and a growing disconnect from the anti-imperialist discourse of past generations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Paz y Conflictos is the property of Revista de Paz y Confilictos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How does the oil wealth of a potential target state affect the likelihood of the US public favoring the use of military force? Recent studies suggest that public opinion on foreign policy is responsive to the core characteristics of target states, such as regime type and majority religion. This article advances this research agenda by examining the effects of intra-regime heterogeneity in respect of an important characteristic of target states: their oil wealth. To examine the relationship between oil wealth and US public opinion on war, we fielded a conjoint experiment with US citizens. Respondents chose between hypothetical pairs of target states that varied across seven different intra-regime characteristics. We found that that the oil wealth of a target exerts a statistically significant (albeit small) effect on public support for the use of force, independent of the effects of other regime characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since September 2015 and the Russian military intervention in the country, the interests in Syria have been numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. The interests in Syria are numerous and of great importance for the actors involved in this conflict. Russia, like the Allies and opponents of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, is fighting for geopolitical, geo-economic, or ideological reasons. The Middle East region finds itself shaken by the sharp resurgence of a confrontation between actors allied to the United States, other allies of Russia, and this Syrian crisis thus impacts the geopolitical configuration of the region. This paper presents an analysis of the Russian intervention strategy in Syria. We argue that Russia intervened in Syria to strengthen the already existing Russian-Syrian alliance, to curb extremist proliferation, and to take advantage of Syria's strategic position. The objective is to determine the reasons for the Russian military intervention in Syria related to energy and geo-economic interests. The Russian intervention in Syria was an ideal opportunity to draw closer to several powerful states in the region and a way to benefit from positive spin-offs on its arms market and hydrocarbon road plans. Despite the risks and costs associated with defending the Syrian regime, Moscow has secured its political and economic power in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Western and Chinese archival sources, the following paper explores the military intervention of freelance foreign adventurers, particularly a militia eventually known as the Ever-Victorious Army, in the waning years of the Taiping Rebellion (1860–1864). My goal here is not merely to retell the story of this force, or to reassess its contribution to the subjugation of the Taipings, a question already studied by several historians. Instead, I will analyze the complicated and ever-changing relationship between these adventurers and the powers around them: Qing local authorities, the imperial court in Beijing, and the various foreign countries, especially Great Britain. I argue that the opening for such a force as the Ever-Victorious Army was created by the need of all parties for informal cooperation against the Taiping while maintaining plausible deniability. Once this need had passed, the foreign military adventurers became redundant and could be discarded by their former sponsors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the political implications of the arms trade and transfers related to the conflict in Yemen, wishing to emphasize the nature and the impact of arms exports to states involved in ongoing military conflict to both the outcome of the military intervention as well as to the international norms regulating arms exports. Labelled as ‘the forgotten war’, the conflict in Yemen has failed to raise sufficient international attention as to amount for the scale of the humanitarian and political disaster that encompasses the country and negatively impacts the evolution in the region. Although the legitimacy of the conflict has generated a considerable amount of legal and academic debate, which was doubled by the numerous international organizations drawing attention to the worsening humanitarian situation, these actions have failed to produce enough momentum such as to consistently alter national practices related to arms exports and to determine a collective response under UN auspices.

Brazil is facing one of its most severe political crises since 2016, with several impacts in its gradual process of democratization. In this context, the main argument in this work is that many of the ghosts that scary the Brazilian society in the Twenty-First century are direct heirs of an unresolved (pre-constitutional) past, whose risks can be strongly perceived and whose solution is an urgent task. Every time there is political turmoil and a disturbance to the rule of law in the country, the support for democracy seems to dwindle. In this vein, this article aims to explore such contradictions and difficulties and how they still represent a threat to the Brazilian democracy through an analysis dedicated to the complex and ambiguous relation that the Constitution (and various of the Brazilian institutions, like the Supreme Court) has (have) established with the military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 until 1985. The authoritarian ghosts that up until now haunts the Brazilian reality, though inevitable due to the compromises that underpin it and the practices that stubbornly replicate the past into the very present, have at least to be disclosed and, as such, challenged by a learning process that only a militant memory is capable of making us aware of.

This article analyses the recent Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention in the Gambia, primarily focusing on possible legal bases for the enforcement action. It examines the political situation following the release of the election results and details the international response to the post-election situation in the Gambia. Among the legal bases assessed include United Nations Security Council authorisation of regional enforcement action under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter through Resolution 2337 (2017), intervention by invitation and consent through prior treaty. In so doing, the article also illuminates the plausibility that the ECOWAS military intervention may be considered as unilateral enforcement action, a point further stressed through an analysis of prior ECOWAS interventions, most notable, the interventions into Sierra Leone and Liberia. Moreover, the intervention in the Ivory Coast following the 2010-2011 post­election crisis is also examined in showcasing the situational similarities between those in the Ivory Coast and those in the Gambia. In so doing, the article inter alia, explores the international legal framework pertaining to the prohibition of the threat and use of force; analysing its nature as well as exceptions to it. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, read together with Article 53, therefore form the backbone of the contribution.

Attaher Zacka Maïga was born on 10 May 1963 in Bia, Bourem Cercle, Gao Region, Mali. He has spent his life in the service of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, joining the Mali Red Cross as a volunteer in 1987 before working for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as a nutritionist in a pilot centre for nutritional recovery and education in Bourem from January 1988 to June 1990. In 1990 and 1991 he acted as consultant to a number of organizations, including World Vision and UNICEF. In April 1992, Attaher Maïga joined the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a "resident" (i.e. local) employee. Since then, he has held many positions. From 1996 to 2000, he was in charge of the Gao office, which employed almost 100 staff, both resident and "mobile" (expatriate). He then took charge of the ICRC's programmes in northern Mali from 2001 to 2006, ran the organization's office in the Malian capital Bamako from 2007 to 2008 and was responsible for the Mali communication programme between 2009 and 2011. From November 2011 to November 2014, he was head of the ICRC's northern Mali sub-delegation, one of the first resident employees to lead an ICRC sub-delegation. Since 2015, Attaher Maïga has been Networking Coordinator for the ICRC's Mali delegation. In 1996, Mr Maïga initiated the ICRC's post-conflict programmes in his country, covering the fields of agriculture, veterinary services and health. In 2009, he launched a pilot migrant project in Kidal, northern Mali. These much-appreciated initiatives resulted in his being invited to participate in the 2010 Montreuil meeting, which laid the foundations for the reforms currently underway. Attaher was the first Mali focal point for the ICRC's Unit for Global Affairs. This role gave him a deeper understanding of trends in the Islamic world and enabled him to help the ICRC adjust its dialogue with Jihadist armed groups. Our interview with Mr Maïga highlights his extensive experience with one of the oldest humanitarian organizations and is an opportunity for him to share his understanding of the ICRC's interaction with the armed groups that controlled northern Mali in 2012, when he was representing the ICRC in the region. Attaher Maïga holds a degree in public administration from the Institut de Gestion et des Langues Appliquées aux Métiers, Bamako. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through an original survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of the Turkish population, this article demonstrates that respondents who are primed on the immorality of the use of force against others are substantially more willing to support only conditional military intervention in a civil war in another country. Further statistical analyses reveal that the activation of moral beliefs largely depends on the degree of approval of the moral statement and previously held foreign policy predispositions on isolationism. These findings contribute to the research on priming and public opinion regarding the use of force in general and, in particular, interventions in civil wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once considered artifacts of history, research on coups has burgeoned recently. Most studies focus on decisions to stage coups, considering factors like individual benefits, organizational interests, and government legitimacy. Less work considers what happens following coups. This article considers the political trajectory of states following coups. We argue that external reactions to coups play important roles in whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival. We test our argument by considering how international responses to coups from states and international organizations influence coup states' political trajectories. Our findings indicate that international actors play key roles in determining democracy levels of coup-born regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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What factors explain the institutional shape of military interventions spearheaded by France? This article suggests that Intervention Entrepreneurs are the deciding agents. To secure the viability of their intervention proposal, they select an intervention venue based on pragmatic grounds. Most importantly, they carefully study possible domestic and international opposition to their intervention plans and conceive institutional intervention choices accordingly. The result is an ad hoc selection of intervention venues with little impact of political ideology, norms, organisational interests, or historical learning. Moreover, on many occasions, little attention is paid to which intervention format would most benefit the peace and prosperity in the conflict theatre in the medium to long term. The article illustrates this argument by tracing French institutional decision-making for interventions in Chad/CAR, Mali, and Libya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars argue that the 1991 Gulf War, when the United States worked hard to secure approval from the United Nations (UN), set a precedent for legitimate military intervention that other states, especially other liberal democracies, subsequently felt compelled to follow. France, however, continued to intervene unilaterally in its traditional African sphere of influence for several years, without seeking approval from the UN or regional bodies. Even after France drew widespread opprobrium for its support of a murderous regime in Rwanda, French leaders deployed thousands of combat troops unilaterally on various missions. This article relies on original interviews with French policymakers as well as on primary documents to make the case that the 2002–04 Côte d'Ivoire intervention finally steered French Africa policy towards greater multilateralism. It drove home the danger that unilateral interventions could fuel anti-French sentiment among African audiences, undermining France's regional influence. Ultimately, therefore, concerns about African acceptance more than broader international pressure led France to fully embrace new norms of legitimate intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some military deployment decisions lead to high levels of political contestation, whereas others do not? Or, put differently, when does parliamentary consensus on the use of force abroad exist? In this article, we aim to answer this question by focusing on the varying levels of consensus in national parliaments when taking military deployment decisions. We do so by examining conditions that were derived from research on the domestic-level determinants of the use of force, parliamentary voting, and opposition behaviour. These conditions were included in an integrated theoretical framework, which we tested with fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of our analysis show that the international legal status and the objectives of the military operation are of crucial importance for explaining the pattern of political contestation. However, domestic variables need to be taken into account as well to fully explain the level of political contestation of military deployment decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cold War period witnessed transformation of Turkey in terms of political, economic, socio-cultural and military dynamics as well as many countries in the world. One of the main developments in Turkey in this period was the gradual dominance of military authority over civilian authority. As a result, two military interventions and one military memorandum took place in two decades between 1960 and 1980. The impact of the US in military interventions in Turkey since May 27, 1960 is a hotly debated issue in Turkish politics and society. It is seen that the global conjuncture and Turkey's foreign policy objectives as well as Turkey's domestic politics and dynamics played roles in military interventions during the Cold War. The aim of this article is to analyze the relationship between the US and military interventions in Turkey during the Cold War in the light of primary sources such as American and British archives and secondary sources which have not been used so far. This paper mainly argues that military interventions in Turkey coincided with problems or crises in Turkish-American relations and after these interventions the US influence in Turkey gradually increased and Turkey was reoriented to US-centric policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Strategic Universe Journal / Univers Strategic is the property of Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Institute for Security Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Much ink has been spilled on the pros and cons of U.S. president Barack Obama's decision not to strike the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad after that regime launched a deadly chemical weapons attack in 2013. Often missing from those debates, however, are the perspectives of Syrians themselves. While not all Syrians oppose Assad, and not all opponents endorsed intervention, many Syrian oppositionists resolutely called for Obama to uphold his "red line" militarily. As part of the roundtable "The Ethics of Limited Strikes," this essay analyzes diverse expressions of such opinion and finds that they highlight three dimensions of the ethical case for limited strikes against Assad. First, they remind us that the ethical context of the red line question was many Syrians' sense of abandonment by the international community. Second, they emphasize the ethical stakes of the limited strikes; namely an opportunity to hold the Syrian regime accountable, weaken it from within, and thus change the equation of the war. Third, they make sense of the ethical consequences of the nonintervention outcome, and especially its effect in deepening civilians' despair, accelerating extremism, and convincing Assad and his allies that they could kill with impunity. These views controvert both legalistic arguments precluding military intervention and assumptions that U.S. intervention is always imperialist and warmongering. In this case, consideration of the case for military intervention from the viewpoint of those on whose behalf the intervention would have taken place challenges us to think deeply about circumstances in which limited strikes might be not only ethically justified but also imperative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what circumstances will the public support military intervention in other countries? Recent answers have focused on the importance of identity and attachment to one's nation to explain variation in public support. We posit that some segments of the public are more willing than others to support military action even when there is perceived risk due to a psychological attachment to veterans. We distinguish kinship, geographic, and psychological forms of propinquity and argue that the psychological attachment of an individual to a group drives disparate attitudes about military force when their group is threatened. Using a unique national data set, we examine public attitudes across a range of hypothetical and actual military interventions and find that psychological attachment, measured using identity fusion, helps to explain the pattern of support across interventions. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings on the use of force literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]