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China's relations with the Republic of Korea have undergone twenty years of remarkable development since the two countries established formal diplomatic relations in 1992. Since the political relationship was upgraded to a "strategic partnership" in 2008, with ever-deepening economic interdependence and intensive societal exchanges, the two countries have entered a new and more complicated stage. The ROK's closer economic relationship with China is now coupled with a closer security alliance with the United States, while intensified societal exchange is being accompanied by the decline of positive feelings in Sino-Korean mutual perceptions. While the two sides have been able to manage the fallout of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong tragedies in 2010, greater efforts are needed to place the relationship on a solid basis in the context of China's rise and the ROK's desire to find a larger international role for itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the relations between China and Korea. The authors talk about the diplomatic exchanges between China and South Korea, which celebrated 20 years of diplomatic relations in 2012, from the talks on the treatment of North Korean refugees by China to the issue of illegal fishing by China in Korean territorial waters. The article discusses China's efforts on stabilizing the North Korean economy and presents a history of China's relations with the Korean peninsula.

This article seeks to explain both China's motivations in, and South Korea's response to, the Koguryo controversy. It argues that it is necessary to take into account the role of national identity and domestic politics in explaining the controversy. China's claim is neither defensive nor offensive toward the two Koreas; rather, it is a logical consequence of a particular historiography in China that was developed in the twentieth century. Given the centrality of national identity construction in both countries, the conflict over Koguryo will be difficult to resolve in the future. To prevent future conflicts from reoccurring, both sides need to adopt a new perspective on history to move toward a shared history and cultural community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains principles and practices in China's foreign policy decisionmaking-- and their implications for its policy toward South Korea. The author argues that more serious attention should be paid to "democratic centralism" as a guiding principle of decision-making, even in foreign affairs. This principle favors consensus-building, coordination, and compromise in policymaking. As a result, China often suffers time-wastage and inertia on non-routine issues in its policymaking, which is quite different from the image of the top-down model. Reflecting the structure of Chinese policymaking, China's foreign policies are more likely to be risk averse, conservative, and prone to following status-quo policies. China prefers the status quo to renovation of its Korea policy. Instead of taking any new initiatives, China's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula is likely to adhere to its current policy priority of maintaining stability on the Peninsula. It is also noteworthy that China may gradually depart from its slow and reactive foreign policies to more proactive ones. As China becomes more capable of processing non-routine issues, while making them routine ones, more proactive policies will be realized although the gradual nature of Chinese decision-making is expected to remain intact for the time-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deterioration of Sino-South Korean relations following the attacks on the Cheonan and on Yonpyong Island in 2010 has again raised the question of Chinese intentions in the Korean peninsula. In this article, I explore Chinese netizen views of the two Koreas. Qualitative and quantitative evidence (in the form of a large-scale national Internet survey) provide convergent evidence that while Chinese netizens feel coolly toward both Koreas, they think and feel about them in very different ways. Chinese netizens appear to be profoundly disillusioned with a North Korea that refuses to adopt Chinese-style "reform and opening," which only reminds them of their poor and authoritarian past. However, recent high-profile historical and cultural disputes appear to have led to widespread Chinese dismay and even anger toward South Korea as well, which is perceived to be poaching on China's proud cultural heritage. These attitudes toward Korea are reflective of evolving Chinese understandings of what it means to be Chinese in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report on the international relations between China and Korea in late 2011. The commitment of China to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula following the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011 is highlighted. A chronology of events about the China-Korea relations from September-December 2011 is offered.

The Joseon dynasty is recognized as being the most exemplary tributary state to the Ming dynasty of China. In particular, it is considered an ideal member of the tribute system, which is believed to have been established in its most orthodox form during the era of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). However, the historical facts demonstrate that Joseon Korea, though it fully observed the tributary rites, was an exceptional case. The evidence points to the fact that Ming China and most of its tributary states simply intended to maintain the status quo through the formation of superficial tributary relationships, while concealing any conflicts or opposing interests that may have existed. Thus, tributary relations were easily changeable and were based on the economic, cultural, and political benefits they represented. As the logic of the "tribute system" has emerged as a prominent topic of discussion, it has become neces- sary to take a cautious approach when it comes to regarding Joseon as a typi- cal example of this system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese popular nationalism has been spotlighted as a source of the 'China Threat' in interpreting the country's foreign policies by China scholars, especially, so-called constructivist pessimists. However, the applicability of this interpretation is quite limited when Sino-South Korea relations are examined. Though it is true that the anti-Korean sentiment of the Chinese has seriously grown in recent years, it has not affected the government's foreign policies to Korea. On the contrary, it has been played down or counter-balanced by the government, its media, and academics of China, as the period around the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when negative feelings surged, clearly illustrates. Chinese nationalism is not a threat to South Korea and cannot be generalized as a variable explaining Chinese foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the U.S. and China's policy towards North Korea and the limitations and dangers of the strategic patience policy that is based on a misinterpretation of the North Korean regime. North Korea, though incomparably economically worse than its neighbors, does not show signs of the severe economic distress it once did, signaling that it is doing reasonably well economically. Also discussed is the six party talks that led to an economic agreement between former South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the unraveling relations prompted by the policies of the conservative government of Lee Myung-bak, and the cold war mentality that exists in the Korean peninsula.

What has happened to North Korea-China relations since autumn 2009 is nothing less than a renewal of the alliance. This is a sea change, brought about first of all by the deterioration of Kim Jong Il's health and then by all the resulting turmoil of his regime's instability and difficulties. Both sides' policy behavior toward the other became a "new game," dictated by a sort of dire emergency, and placed them in a tightly fixed structure reducing much of the scope for a strategy adjustment. Pyongyang's new game has been characterized prominently by volatility or a malfunctioning of the "rational" policymaking capacity of the ailing dictator. Volatile desperation dominates behavior in the leadership succession, in military affairs, the nuclear arms program, its posture toward the United States and ROK, respectively, and in its relations with China. The new game can be defined as one between a volatile DPRK and a relatively loyal ally with an anxious strategy that is cornered in its relations with the ROK and the United States on the North Korean issue. China's relationship with the DPRK is the most complicated of all, and in a sense disabling. As to China-ROK cooperation on the North Korea issue, the above factors unfortunately dim the prospects; however, there is still reason for optimism if efforts continue to be made to find a resolution to the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the bilateral relations between China and Korea. It mentions the efforts of China and the U.S. to reduce tensions in north and south Korea through a call of resumption of inter-Korean talks in the U.S.-China Joint Statement as well as the resumption of Six-Party Talks that engaged in diplomatic exchanges with both Koreas. Moreover, Chinese officials showed concern over the possibility that South Korean military exercises may lead to military escalation.

Divergent responses to the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 have raised tensions in Northeast Asia. China's enabling response appeared to write North Korea a blank cheque for further provocations; but Beijing has in fact been constrained by fear of destabilisation of the Kim regime. The incidents have prompted a reappraisal of bilateral relations within the region - in particular, the South Korea-US alliance - and revealed the continuing importance of the Sino-US relationship in Korean peninsular security affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on China's foreign policy with respect to Korea. It highlights China's "new diplomacy" style of foreign policy, which involves economic diplomacy and responsible foreign policy. China's trade with Korea is discussed, emphasizing the cross-border cooperation between China and North Korea. Issues of unification and North Korea's nuclear program are noted, and the article questions whether China can solve the Korea problem within the international law framework.

China has long maintained a keen interest in events on the Korean peninsula, which Beijing considers to fall within the Sinic sphere of interest. The PRC has maintained a decades-long alliance with North Korea, and also achieved a rapprochement with South Korea, with whom China enjoys a burgeoning economic relationship. The PRC's pursuit of a 'two Koreas' policy has tested Beijing's diplomatic mettle during the past decade. In and of itself, the maintenance of strong ties to both Koreas represents a significant achievement. By reviewing recent developments in Chinese diplomacy towards the peninsula, this article highlights both the achievements and contradictions inherent in Beijing's two-Korea policy. North Korea has risked China's wrath by pursuing a nuclear deterrent, and by refusing to enact market reforms. In the case of the South, the government of Lee Myung-bak has strengthened its alliance with the United States and also sought to compensate for its growing economic interdependence with China by seeking free trade agreements with other states, including the US. The sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010 presents an opportunity to reflect on China's efforts to balance its ties with both Koreas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author discusses the involvement of Chinese military in a future war in Korea. The author explores Mao's personal proclivities toward military romanticism and China's role as a nonnuclear state as well as the role of Stalin and U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait. The author also cites the need to solve the problem of regional imbalance and to build trust between the U.S. and China as well as to persuade China to refrain from entering Korean conflict.

This paper examines how Korea has studied and perceived modern China in the last 100 years, to address the need to identify and understand both the ways in which China and Korea have perceived each other and the transformations of their perceptions throughout history. The paper aims to analyze not only the production and dissemination of knowledge within institutionalized academia, but also from outside its confines, tracing the locus of the field of modern Chinese history in Korea to its colonial period. In particular, it examines the output of the field after the year 2000, focusing on the following: (1) political history in relation to formation of the modern nation-state; (2) traditional and modern dichotomy; (3) is China one?; (4) East Asian perspective and relativization of China; and (5) return of interest in Korea. In so doing, this paper asserts the necessity for a co-employment of the 'dual peripheral perspective,' namely that of the East Asia oppressed by the West in the Western-centric world order, as well as the peripheral perspective born of those oppressed by the hierarchy within East Asia, to reach a universal understanding of one another in China and Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses relations between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea, focusing on the relationship between Korean King Chungjong, and the Chinese Jiajing Emperor. It particularly comments on chinhasa, or voluntary congratulatory envoys sent from Korea to China. It examines court debates concerning congratulatory missions, including one to mark to the birth of the Jiajing Emperor's son. The author reflects on political strategy and affection in Chungjong and the Jiajing Emperor's relationship and analyzes Chungjong's political authority and his debates with Confucian moralists.

China's penetration of the world market has been impressive. This paper uses highly disaggregated Korean import data (from 1992 to 2008) to examine China's penetration of the Korean market in the context of the composition of value (the extensive and intensive margins) and the product type (homogeneous and differentiated) in trade. The increase in Chinese imports has been attributed to the rapid increase in the import of new products (the extensive margin) and of existing products (the intensive margin). However, the growth rate of new products decelerated in the 2000s. The growth in the intensive margin was due to quantity, not price. Chinese imports to Korea did not improve over the period in terms of quality. Although Chinese products became cheaper, they were more differentiated over time. Welfare gains were realized through the expanded introduction of new products from China. However, much of the gains from Korea's Chinese product import boom were realized in earlier years (1992–2000) because even though imported products became more differentiated, the increase in the extensive margin was lower in more recent years (2001–2008). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Korean-Chinese relations in the context of the framework of the strategic partnership that has been in place since the 1990s. The relationship was considered to share the same characteristics as those between China and Russia, China and India, China and Vietnam, and China and Pakistan—yet differed in terms of content and significance. Despite its strong non-alliance policy toward foreign nations, China still pushed through with the forging of a partnership with the Lee Myung-bak administration, which had just been launched under the newly reinforced ROK-U.S. alliance. This paper examines the reasons behind this partnership, theorizing that the significance hierarchy within the partnership had been weakened, and that the meaning of “strategic” had been expanded. Other reasons contributing to the forging of the new partnership between Korea and China included the following: counter-balancing the excessively pro-U.S. policy adopted by Korea and subsequent renewal of the strong ROK-U.S. alliance; a strategy to win over Korea to complete China's East Asian regionalism; continued cooperation with Korea to deal with North Korea and its nuclear ambitions; and, concern over direct U.S.-North Korean talks possibly leading to “excluding China” and measures to prevent this. Despite the current strategic partnership between Korea and China, the two countries show clear differences in their respective views of a unified Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korean issues, and mutual understanding; all of these will likely make the officialization of strategic interests a challenge for both countries from the mid- to long-term perspectives. To overcome such challenges, China may have to strike a balance between its traditional friendship with North Korea and the Korean-Chinese strategic partnership. For its part, Korea needs to find its own balance between the ROK-U.S. strategic alliance for the twenty-first century and the Korean-Chinese strategic partnership. Considering its weakness in terms of a clear sense of gravity and independence, Korea appears to require a considerable amount of time to deepen its partnership with China. At the same time, Korea needs to address the problems of coming up with its own strategic visions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is designed to analyze why Baekje, one of the Three Kingdoms in Korea that existed up to the latter part of the seventh century, became the first victim in diplomatic and military struggles among the Three Kingdom, including Goguryeo and Silla. The Samguk sagi (Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms) gives the impression that Baekje, by dint of its geographical location, had pursued the most active and shrewd diplomacy. Located in the southwest of the peninsula, Baekje enjoyed not only easy communication and transactions with China and Japan, but also could put pressure on relatively weak Silla and move to the north when Goguryeo engaged in struggles with Chinese dynasties over the Liao river. However, this paper concludes, from an international relations perspective, that Baekje became the first kingdom to lose its independence due to its clumsy management of alliances, lack of understanding of the foreign policy priority of Chinese dynasties, as well as inconsistent and self-centered diplomacy vis-à-vis China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses relations between Chŏson Korea and Qing China, examining the eighteenth century. It focuses on Yŏnhaengnok, or records of Korean envoys to China called Yŏnhaeng, and reflects on Korean interest in Chinese culture and civilization. The author considers Chinese intellectual influences, commenting on Korean interest in Northern Learning, or Pukhak, and evidential learning, or kojŭnghak. Chinese influences on the construction of Korea's Hwasŏng fortress are also explored.

Korean issues in recent history and current affairs have been a remarkable and varied factor with respect to global and regional security and in relations between the United States and China—arguably the most important bilateral relationship in today's world. The extraordinary events and remarkable developments that compose this saga merit review, including many forgotten, unknown, or ignored developments and details. This examination is based on the author's experiences in various capacities, official and independent, over two decades. Much of it derives from his extensive contacts, conversations, and candid exchanges with People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) government officials, military officers (active and retired), think-tankers, and other scholars and specialists. It describes the ups and downs of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and encompasses ROK-PRC and ROK-U.S. issues. The article concludes with a comprehensive analysis of the current debate in the United States and China on how to deal with North Korea and how to advise the Obama administration. The author lived the history, researched the intriguing details and startling twists and turns, and is now a constant close observer and sometimes active participant in the ongoing debate about how best to handle North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to understand China's changing strategic views on North Korea during Hu Jintao's era and to consider the implications for South Korea's policies toward North Korea and China. Sino-North Korea cooperation can be theoretically explained by the alliance transition theory, a modified one from the political realist perspective. The implications of the alliance transition theory are that China would strengthen its alliance with North Korea, seek to weaken the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and induce South Korea to cooperate with China, while preventing North Korea from getting close to the United States. However, it is noteworthy that even in China, there exist various groups of strategic thinking in international relations on China's roles in North Korean issues. North Korea's incessant provocations have effects on mobilizing the Developing Country Diplomacy School as well as the Rising Great Power Diplomacy School against North Korea. Such incidences would soon reverse the rule of thumb of North Korea's strategic value rising alongside regional tensions, calling into question in China, again, the strategic value of North Korea. China still maintains its previous policy priorities at askance, but since North Korea's second nuclear test, the contents have been changing reflecting the changing security environments and its recalculation of national interests. As the more the North Korean nuclear crisis deepens, threatening peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the more China would positively think over North Korea's contingency intensifying cooperation with the United States. In such transition, the stronger the rising great power thinkers, the less the diplomatic space for North Korea exists. North Korea would stop being a buffer zone but a strategic burden in their perspective, transforming China's relationship with North Korea from a special relationship to a normal state-to-state relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a study of "lantou," the name given to Chinese merchants who monopolized trade in the border area of China and Korea. They operated mainly in the city of Fengcheng, in Liaoning Province, and served an important function in the relationship between China and Korea during the Qing dynasty. This article begins with a search for the origin of lantou traders in the city of Fengcheng in archival documents. After the rise of the Manchus in China, trade in the region received a boost from Korea. The second section explains how their trade monopoly was established. The third section explains how lantou traders became officially recognized by both China and Korea during their diplomatic missions.

This article considers why China has continued to support multilateral efforts to develop the Tumen River Delta region despite the failure of these efforts to achieve significant economic results. It argues that China has sustained its critical role in Tumen development because the project has served multiple objectives consistent with China's approach to managing its security along its land borders, and in this case its border with the Korean peninsula—an approach which sees its domestic and international security objectives as not only linked but closely intertwined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Russia share a concern with the evolving political, military, and economic situation on the Korean peninsula, which borders both countries. In terms of relative influence in Pyongyang, however, Beijing enjoys a clearly dominant role, while Moscow often struggles to maintain even a supporting position. One development that might further increase this gap is the abrupt decrease in recent Chinese purchases of Russian defense technologies and weapons systems. The major reason for this transformation has been that the Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing much more sophisticated armaments. Moscow now confronts the choice of either accepting a greatly diminished share of the Chinese arms market or agreeing to sell even more advanced weapons to Beijing. In addition to threatening existing force balances in East Asia, such transfers could further strengthen China's ability to compete for sales on third-party markets. Thus far, surging Russian arms sales to other countries have allowed Russian policy makers to accept the decreasing Chinese military purchases rather than risk the transfer of new technologies. Even so, the threat to Russian arms exports presented by the global recession may cause more Russians to seek short-term profits by allowing the sale to China of even their most advanced systems, which would make China and even more formidable competitor for sales to North Korea and other third-party markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relations of China and Korea as of 2009. It states that Kim Jong-Il's talks with former U.S. President Bill Clinton and Hyundai Chairperson Hyun Jung-Eun in August 2009, State Councilor Dai Bingguo in September 2009 and Premier Wen Jiabao in October indicated North Korea's shift toward diplomacy. Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Hu Jintao held a summit meeting after Lee's proposal for dealing with North Korea.

The success of coastal China in mobilizing resources from the overseas Chinese community has been well documented, and is deemed to have played an important role in the expansion of the Chinese economy. This article adopts a new approach by looking at the issue from the point of view of an ethnic minority border region. It explores the mobilization of the Korean minority's transnational ties in the service of local economic development in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, located in Jilin Province at the North Korean border. These pursuits are conceptualized as "transnationalism from above," whereby the local government focused on mobilizing, institutionalizing, steering and controlling transnational activities in support of its own specific goals. How were these linkages built up and how did the government balance between the positive and negative, or the "sweet and sour" aspects of transnational ethnic capital transfers? The study points to a new mechanism for economic development that is emerging along China's borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is written against the backdrop of widely discussed changes in Japanese foreign security policy in the 2000s—changes often attributed to an intensifying North Korea threat and growing rivalry with China. Employing Walt's notion of “threat” (in effect, offensive power plus aggressive intentions), the thesis of this article is that China and North Korea could be construed as increasingly threatening to Japan. The antithesis is that changes in Japanese foreign security policy have rather taken place within the context of a public discourse that has increasingly framed China and North Korea as “threats.” The article demonstrates that, while Chinese military capability has burgeoned in the past decade, North Korea has experienced something like military stagnation. Moreover, although both actors have histories of foreign aggression, their respective official discourses lack aggressive intentions vis-a-vis Japan. The article also demonstrates that while Japanese government sources have kept framing North Korea as a threat or a grave security concern, China has merely been depicted as “in need of further attention.” To understand these ambivalent results, the article introduces the synthesizing idea that a North Korean “threat” might serve as a “perfect excuse” for changing Japanese foreign security policy in the face of what could obviously be construed as a more pressing China threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mediating regional conflict in Asia is a delicate art. It requires an acute understanding of the unique mediation culture in the region. China's mediation in the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula reveals key elements of this art and offers useful lessons. China's experience illustrates that an influential but neutral and harmony-oriented mediator is critical in the Asian context. It is equally essential for the mediator to (1) abide by the principle of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs while maintaining active intervention as dispute escalates, (2) stand ready to nudge those being mediated toward action when necessary to advance peaceful negotiations, (3) establish an optimal environment to foster communication and reduce hostility between the major parties in dispute, (4) serve as an honest broker but remain firm in its own position and cautiously take initiatives to guide the talks, (5) advocate a step-by-step approach to the negotiation process, and (6) aim for the outcome of negotiations to be a give-and-take agreement. Although Asia is a conflict-prone region, Asians traditionally confuse mediation with meddling. As a result, non-Asians often try to serve as mediators for Asia. For more effective mediations, it is essential that Asians rediscover their useful mediation skills and that non-Asians better understand the Asian art of mediation when they act as mediator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the status of China-Korea relations as of June 2009. It states that China deems North Korea's missile launch on April 5, 2009 a frame of the tensions between its emerging role as a global actor with increasing international duties and prestige and a commitment to North Korea as an ally with whom China shares historical and ideological ties. It is noted that China serves as the biggest trading partner of South Korea, accounting for 23% of exports in this period. Korean firms will participate in the Korean Products Show 2009, Beijing.

China's role in the North Korean nuclear issue has undergone major change in recent years. In the initial years of the Six-Party Talks, China's role was central as facilitator, arbiter, and host of the diplomatic process. However, since 2007 the U.S.-North Korea bilateral relationship has been the dominant factor in Korean nuclear diplomacy, largely marginalizing China and the other three powers involved in these efforts. As a result, China has been confined principally to hosting the talks and to rubber-stamping agreements already achieved between Washington and Pyongyang. China continues to seek an uneasy balance among three vital interests: (1) ensuring peace on the peninsula; (2) fostering North Korea's denuclearization; and (3) seeking to preserve a continued relationship with North Korea. But it has yet to develop a full strategy for reconciling these interests and managing its policy priorities. However, China has accelerated its economic and political ties with both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Beijing therefore seems well-positioned for the peninsula's longer-term evolution, including its hopes that North Korea will ultimately move toward a more “reformist” orientation and a much-diminished emphasis on military power in its national strategy. But the dilemmas in Chinese policymaking persist, with Beijing able to influence but not control the major uncertainties, especially those related to North Korea's future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the possible causal relationship of order in Northeast Asia and the peace and instability within it. Three major types of order in Northeast Asia's history are reviewed and are found to be replete with wars, suffering and instability. Peace in the current order in Northeast Asia tends to be temporary and vulnerable because of its Cold War legacies and other factors. The paper argues that regionalism as an alternative order may make for longer peace and stability in Northeast Asia because of its openness and inclusiveness. The paper interprets how China sees regionalism as a process, and how the social and political construction of a new regional order may unfold itself in the region, taking China-Korea and China-Japan relations as two cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the second part of this article, we analyze the United States' Pacific strategy and the development of the situation in China and Japan, including these nations' relations with the Korean government. Attention is given to Russia's future role in Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Six Party Talks on North Korean nuclear issues have been ongoing since August 2003. They have not prevented North Korea from having nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the goal to de-nuclearize the Korean peninsula has been agreed upon by all six countries, including North Korea. Whether these talks will reach that goal is unclear and uncertain. However, the talks have brought the six countries, or at least the United States, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Russia, closer in terms of regional security. All six have agreed to an official dialogue on a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. This dialogue is useful and encouraging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the factors which contributed to the nuclear crisis in North Korea (NK). Most important is the engagement or hard-line policy approach of the United States which most likely will impact the domestic politics. The role of China is critical in the mediations. The policy of South Korea will also affect the response of NK to pressure on its nuclear program.

This article contextualizes the emergence of the Chinese claim over the historical ownership of Koguryo in the politics of historiography in China. Contemporary Chinese historiography from which the Chinese state and populace draw core identities has never been fully fixed or stabilized. Regardless of the temporal distance from the present, Chinese pasts are continuously constructed and re-memorized based on contemporary sociopolitical needs. Compared to the pre-reform eras, broadened social spaces in China have made the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly over historiography untenable. In that sense, the future of East Asian regional order or Sino-Korean relations is highly unpredictable, if not unstable, due to the continuously changing Chinese national identity. With radical nationalization of China's imperial past, the next generation in China may favor actions to alter the status quo. National and state identities informed by "historical facts" are hardly negotiable or changeable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we argue that Chinese influence on the North Korean nuclear quagmire has become more limited while U.S. influence has grown larger than that of China. Since Kim Jong Ii saw his country ~ nuclear program as the ultimate guarantee of his regime's survival, he was not susceptible to dissuasion by the Chinese, who he distrusted. Repeated Chinese warnings and diplomatic pressure failed to dissuade North Korea from conducting missile and nuclear tests. US. coercion, on the other hand, could directly threaten Kim Jong Il's political survival, while US. appeasement would ease his insecurity. Thus Pyongyang did not listen to Chinese warnings but manipulated China's mediation to perform what might be described as nuclear brinkmanship to attract the attention of the United States. China had no choice but to attempt active mediation in order to maintain regional stability and consolidate its own geopolitical interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the sources of Chinese foreign policy in a particularly important case—recent policy toward North Korea. It surveys that policy in several areas: the economic backdrop, leading the six party talks, permissive support for United Nations Security Council measures, signals—some rhetorical, others more tangible—warning against future transgressions, and some coercive measures that impose costs on North Korea today. In sum, it finds Beijing has wielded a number of coercive tools aimed a North Korea, while avoiding excesses that might lead to spirals on the peninsula or regionally. Defensive realism best explains this policy, both in the aggregate and in detail in many cases. Offensive realism, strategic culture, and bureaucratic politics approaches do a particularly poor job of explaining outcomes in what shozuld be for each of them a relatively easy case. This has important implications for understanding the sources of Chinese foreign policy in other areas. Further, on North Korea policy, while it is important for American policy makers to recognize that Beijing is not working fundamentally at cross-purposes to Washington's own goals, it is also important to recognize that Beijing has mixed motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the election of Lee Myung-Bak as president of South Korea. Lee Myung-Bak is a conservative who is not expected to follow the policies of the former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. These administrations were friendly with China and engaged in peace talks and nuclear nonproliferation agreements with North Korea. Hu Jintao, President of China, sent his foreign minister, Wang Yi, to meet with Lee to establish a good transition. Lee also sent his foreign minister, Geun-hye, to meet with Hu Jintao. China and South Korea have grown more interdependent as trade, diplomacy, and investments have increased.

The article offers information on the Hongwu Emperor, Kwŏn Kŭn, and the poetry of late 14th century diplomacy. It mentions that in 1396 a diplomatic severance evolved between the Chŏson government and its Chinese counterpart. Relative to this, the Ming court took offense at poorly worded diplomatic exchanges and stopped all contact with Chŏson as a result. To rectify the situation, court official and scholar Kwŏn Kŭn volunteered to go to China to settle the dispute. This article underscores Kwŏn Kŭn's trip to China and his exchange of poetry with the Hongwu emperor.

Fearing war on the Korean peninsula as a result of the current nuclear crisis, China has attempted to restrain its risk-taking ally in North Korea and push it toward a negotiated solution. In the process, Beijing has reneged on security commitments made in its bilateral alliance with Pyongyang. We should not be surprised by this behavior because China has acted similarly in other alliances with Asian neighbors. In particular, the PRC has demonstrated a wariness of being dragged into unwanted conflicts, has (since the economic reforms began in 1978) placed its own strategic economic development interests over fulfilling security pledges to allies, and has taught unruly allies a lesson for defying Chinese interests and advice by allowing them to be bloodied in combat. China's refusal to honor its security commitments in order to restrain North Korea and avoid entrapment in an undesired war raises the issue of the future of this alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the participation of Ming Taizu, founder of the Ming dynasty, in Korean politics and the meaning he had in the history of Korea. A historical perspective on the early Ming and post-Ming dynasty is presented, along with the problems encountered by Taizu during the period and his enshrinement. The author argued that Korean leadership could not respond to the new world order effectively due to its spiritual reliance on the Ming emperors, including Ming Taizu. He added that the views of Korean on Ming Taizu is associated with their views on the Ming dynasty.