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The article covers various issues related to the war in Afghanistan of interest to the U.S. It is said that the war was launched in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. and as part of an effort to remove the Taliban group from power. It also relates the developments that occurred in the country following the demise of the Taliban regime, one of which is the so-called Bonn Process. Strategies involved in the war are discussed in which the Afghan strategy focuses on sovereignty.

With a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort—often called "America's other war'—required greater national attention. For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan's neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO's relevance in the 21st century. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. In that first phase, U.S. and coalition forces, working with Afghan opposition forces, quickly removed the Taliban regime. After the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a multifaceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up GIRoA efforts to provide security, governance, and economic development. The three areas are generally viewed as interdependent and mutually-reinforcing—security is a prerequisite for some governance and development efforts, and longer-term, sustainable security requires both functional governance and economic opportunity. As one pillar of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan and international military effort aims broadly at defeating the remnants of the Taliban and other insurgents, securing the population, and helping extend the reach of the Afghan government. The international military effort includes both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the United States contributes troops, and the separate U.S.-led OEF mission. In his December 3, 2009, speech President Obama identified several objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan: (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda; (2) deny al Qaeda a safe haven; (3) reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government; and (4) strengthen the capacity of the Afghan security forces and government to better protect and serve population centers. To accomplish this, President Obama ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops to the region, which will bring the U.S. total to almost 100,000 troops. This deployment will be staged over several months, with the full additional complement being in country by the end of the summer 2010. Noting that Afghan operations continue to be an international effort, President Obama expressed confidence that some of 42 coalition allies will also be increasing their contributions. NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen echoed this confidence, stating that he expects NATO allies to contribute at least an additional 5,000 troops in 2010. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents report titled "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of June 8, 2010. Topics discussed include report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, U.S. national security strategy consists of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy and U.S. government strategy and aspects of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

With a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort-often called "America's other war"-required greater national attention. For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan's neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO's relevance in the 21st century. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. In that first phase, U.S. and coalition forces, working with Afghan opposition forces, quickly removed the Taliban regime. After the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a multifaceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up GIRoA efforts to provide security, governance, and economic development. The three areas are generally viewed as interdependent and mutually-reinforcing-security is a prerequisite for some governance and development efforts, and longer-term, sustainable security requires both functional governance and economic opportunity. As one pillar of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan and international military effort aims broadly at defeating the remnants of the Taliban and other insurgents, securing the population, and helping extend the reach of the Afghan government. The international military effort includes both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the United States contributes troops, and the separate U.S.-led OEF mission. The U.S. government faces key strategic and operational decisions about its further engagement in the war in Afghanistan. These may include clarifying U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and the region; defining clear strategic objectives based on those interests; determining which diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to adopt, and what resources to commit to support those approaches; prioritizing "Afghanistan" versus other national security imperatives; and helping marshal a coordinated application of international efforts. Avenues available to Congress for exercising oversight include authorizing and appropriating funding for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region; shaping policy through directive legislation; holding oversight hearings to assess policy execution; and adjusting Administration reporting requirements. This report provides analysis of current developments and future options concerning the war in Afghanistan. It will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a report related to concern of the U.S. Congress over war in Afghanistan, released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CSR) as of December 3, 2009. Topics discussed include the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) launched by the U.S. in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, efforts made by the U.S. to provide security, and economic development in Afghanistan, and international military effort in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime.

For the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2010, the Administration requested a total of $663.8 billion in discretionary budget authority. This includes $533.8 billion for the so-called “base budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—and $130.0 billion for what are termed “overseas contingency operations,” including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Administration also requested $75.9 billion in supplemental DOD appropriations for FY2009 to cover war costs. This amount, plus the $65.9 billion “bridge fund” for FY2009 emergency war funding included in the Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-252), brings the total appropriated for FY2009 war costs to $141.8 billion. The Administration’s DOD request, made public May 7, 2009, incorporated Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s April 6 recommendations concerning funding for several major weapons programs. While DOD long had been focused primarily on preparing for conventional warfare with cutting edge weapons like the Air Force’s F-22 fighter, Gates said, U.S. forces are sufficiently superior to potential adversaries that DOD can set less technologically ambitious goals for future conventional weapons. This would allow DOD to focus more resources on equipment better suited to the type of operations underway in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gates said. The FY2010 national defense authorization bills drafted by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees generally supported this shift in policy, which the Obama Administration’s budget request reflected. However, both committees added to their respective bills authorization to continue production of the Air Force’s F-22 fighter, and to continue development of an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Obama Administration—like the preceding Bush Administration—had planned to terminate both programs and had warned that a bill that continued either one would be vetoed. On June 25, the House passed by a vote of 389-22 its version of the FY2010 national defense authorization act H.R. 2647, which would authorize a total of $534.0 billion for the DOD base budget—$264.8 million more than requested—and $129.3 billion for war costs. The bill also would authorize $16.5 billion for defense-related nuclear activities of the Energy Department, which is $83.3 million more than requested. On July 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the authorization bill, S. 1390, which would authorize $534.6 billion for the DOD base budget, $129.3 billion for war costs, and $16.4 billion for the Energy Department. The Senate passed the bill July 23 by a vote of 87-7 after adopting several amendments, including two that would, in effect, end production of the F- 22 and terminate the F-35 alternate engine programs, as the Administration had requested. On July 30, the House passed by a vote of 400-30 its version of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) which would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget (covering all accounts except military construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs. As reported July 24 by the House Appropriations Committee, the bill would have continued F-22 production and the F-35 alternate engine programs. But the House adopted a floor amendment that would have the effect of terminating F-22 production. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported September 10 an amended version of H.R. 3326 which would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs. The committee bill funded neither continued F-22 production nor the F-35 alternate engine. During floor debate, which began September 24, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have eliminated $2.5 billion for the purchase of 10 C-17 cargo planes, which the Senate committee added over the Administration’s objection. The Senate is slated to resume debate on the bill October 5. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a report released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CSR) for the U.S. Congress as of August 25, 2008 on the role of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) role in foreign assistance. Topics discussed include the DOD's in humanitarian assistance and military training, its contribution in supporting foreign governments for national security, and the effects of DOD's activities on the U.S. foreign policy goals.

The article offers information related to national security system in the U.S. Topics discussed include the debate among scholars and practitioners on the need to reform national security, the importance of legislative mandates for documents of national security, and the role of U.S. Congress for legislation concerning security management.

There is a growing, still highly inchoate debate among practitioners and scholars, including participants from across the political spectrum, concerning the need to reform the U.S. government's national security system. Reform proponents argue that much of the current architecture was designed to meet the global security challenges of the post-World War II context, and may not be appropriate for addressing 21st-century challenges. That architecture includes the organizations, structures, and processes that govern decision making, budgeting, planning and execution, and congressional oversight of national security activities. National security strategic guidance documents, including formal strategies and other forms of guidance, are a key element of that system. National security strategy for the U.S. government can theoretically serve several distinct purposes: [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing community of interest, including Members of Congress, senior officials in the executive branch, and think-tank analysts, is calling for a reexamination of how well the U.S. government, including both the executive branch and Congress, is organized to apply all instruments of national power to national security activities. The organizations and procedures used today to formulate strategy, support presidential decision-making, plan and execute missions, and budget for those activities are based on a framework established just after World War II. That framework was designed to address a very different global strategic context: a bipolar world with a single peer competitor state, the Soviet Union, which was driven by an expansionist ideology and backed by a massive military force. Six decades later, in the wake of 9/11, many observers and practitioners note, the United States faces greater uncertainty and a broader array of security challenges than before, including non-state as well as traditional state-based threats, and transnational challenges such as organized crime, energy security concerns, cyber attacks, and epidemic disease. The "outdated bureaucratic superstructure" of the 20th century is an inadequate basis for protecting the nation from 21st century security challenges, critics contend, and the system itself, or alternatively, some of its key components, requires revision. Doubts about the adequacy of the system to meet 21st century security challenges have been catalyzed by recent operational experiences, including Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and responses to Hurricane Katrina. In the view of many defense and foreign affairs analysts, these operations revealed deep flaws in the ability of the U.S. government to make timely decisions, to develop prioritized strategies and integrated plans, to resource those efforts, and to effectively coordinate and execute complex missions. Such shortcomings, some argue, have had a deleterious impact on the success of those missions and on the reputation of the United States as a reliable partner. Should these "national security reform" debates continue to gain momentum, Congress could choose to weigh in by holding hearings to clarify identified problems and to consider the advantages and risks of proposed solutions; by developing legislation ranging from a new National Security Act to specific changes in executive branch organization, authorities, or resourcing; or by considering adjustments in Congress's own arrangements for providing holistic oversight of national security issues. The purpose of this report, which will be updated as events warrant, is to help frame the emerging debates by taking note of the leading advocates for change, highlighting identified shortcomings in key elements of the current system, and describing categories of emerging proposals for change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During its first session, the 110th Congress provided emergency appropriations of $86.8 billion for the Department of Defense and $2.4 billion for international affairs, mainly for activities related to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those amounts, $70 billion for defense and all of the $2.4 billion for international affairs were provided in the FY2008 consolidated appropriations bill, H.R. 2764, which the President signed into law, P.L. 110-161, on December 26, 2007. Congress left unresolved, however, the status of a substantial amount of additional FY2008 emergency funding that the Administration had requested. In all, Congress did not act on about $102.5 billion requested for the Department of Defense and $5.4 billion for international affairs. Congressional leaders have said that they plan to bring up a bill providing additional supplemental appropriations for FY2008 sometime this spring. Now, the House Appropriations Committee plans to begin marking up a supplemental bill the week of April 21. The bill may include some or all of the remaining amounts the Administration has requested for defense and international affairs and also funding for additional domestic as well as defense and international programs. The bill may become a vehicle for a renewed debate about troop withdrawals from Iraq. Other issues may include whether to provide reconstruction assistance to Iraq as loans rather than grants and whether to require that military units be stationed at home for at least as long as they are deployed abroad. There may also be debate about unrequested funding for C-17, C-130, and F-22 aircraft, and perhaps for some other programs, that Congress may consider adding to the bill. It is also possible that the supplemental could become a vehicle for an economic stimulus package, including extended unemployment benefits and other measures. This CRS report will be updated regularly to report on congressional action on remaining supplemental appropriations. For congressional action on FY2008 supplemental funding provided through December 2007, see CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes, which will not be updated further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the Bush Administration, was to remove the regime, including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term objective included helping Iraqis build "a new Iraq that is prosperous and free."1 In October 2002, Congress had authorized the President to use force against Iraq, to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq," and to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."2 Over time, the focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to the more openended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. With that shift in focus, the character of the war has evolved from major combat operations to a multifaceted counter-insurgency and reconstruction effort. The next major marker in the development of U.S. Iraq strategy and practice is likely to be the update reports to the Congress from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) General David Petraeus, expected in early April 2008. A second major marker is the expected signing of a "security framework agreement" between the governments of the United States and Iraq, due by July 31, 2008, and aimed at delineating the parameters for the presence of U.S. personnel in Iraq after December 31, 2008. The most important short-term OIF issue for the Congress concerns the next steps after the surge -- the military strategies and approaches to be adopted in Iraq after U.S. forces draw down to the pre-surge level. How OIF experiences to date are evaluated -- including policy decision-making, planning, and execution of both the major combat and post-major combat efforts -- are likely to have a significant bearing not only on further U.S. government decisions about Iraq policy, but also on broader, longer-term U.S. strategic concerns. Some of these include the future U.S. military footprint in Iraq, Iraq as a U.S. national security concern, the future of the U.S. military force, and the distribution of roles and responsibilities among U.S. government agencies in complex contingencies. This report is designed to provide background and analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom to support consideration of these short-term and long-term issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the U.S. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) launched on March 20, 2003 for the removal of the regime in Iraq. Topics discussed include the war planning, major combat operations, and security challenges. Also mentioned are the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), civil and military partnership, and issues for the U.S. Congress.

The article discusses the context for the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by the Department of Defense (DOD). Factors that influenced the review process include the global security environment, fiscal constraints, and U.S. policy choices designed to address those issues. Information on the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) released by the DOD in January 2012 is presented.

The article examines the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review mandate under Section 119 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Requirements under the mandate include conducting the QDR every four years and during the first year of every presidential administration, delineating a national defense strategy, and submitting a report based on the review.

The article presents arguments over the strategy for the execution of a military operation of a no-fly zone. It articulates the grand strategic-level goals for the imposition of any no-fly zone and outlines the considerations in creating a military strategy designed to support the grand strategy. It reports no-fly zone cases including the 2011 Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya, Operation Northern Watch (ONW) in northern Iraq, and Operation Southern Watch (OSW) in southern Iraq.

The article offers a background on the Afghanistan war. It states the core goals for the war and enumerates the subsequent constraints imposed on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign. It mentions the concern raised by practitioners and observers about the potential risks of the campaign.

The article discusses the origins of the war in Afghanistan. It is said that while the war was triggered by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it also occurs against the backdrop of three decades of Afghan history. Prior to the war, the country has been invaded by the Soviet Union in December 1979 yet the former withdrew in 1989 due to the mujahedin forces. It recalls that there was a civil war between the Taliban group and the ethnic groups of the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Actions taken by the U.S. against the Taliban and al Qaeda groups are mentioned.

The article presents an overview of the war in Afghanistan. It notes that the war was launched in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. and intended to remove the Taliban from power. It discusses the impact of the war on major stakeholders which include the Afghan government and people and the U.S. government. One debate regarding the involvement of the U.S. in the war concerns its national interests in the Afghan region while another concerns the prioritization of the war against its other national security imperatives.

The article provides information on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a strategic review process carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD) every four years. Factors that influences the QDR process conducted in 2013 include changes in the strategic environment, fiscal constraints, and adjustments in the strategic direction of the DoD.

The article discusses the purposes served by the national strategy security for the U.S. government. It explains the a national security strategy can provide guidance to the internal processes of administrative agencies and it can provide the executive branch with an important tool for internal decision making.

The article discusses the costs of establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone. Several important parameters are taken into account in estimating the costs of a no-fly zone including specific military tasks, geography of the adversary's country, and extent of the mission creep. A table presented shows the costs to the U.S. government of U.S. participation in a variety of air operations in the 1990s such as Operation Noble Anvil in Yugoslavia and Operation Southern Watch in Iraq.

The article addresses the issue of U.S. congressional authorization for the establishment of a no-fly zone. It outlines the scope of the power of the U.S. president as commander-in-chief and his duties under the War Powers Resolution passed by the Congress in 1973. It presents the provisions under Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the provisions under the United Nations (UN) Charter on UN authorized operations.

The article provides a summary of clarifications regarding partnership in national security between U.S. and Japan. At U.S. Defense Department, partnership reportedly refers to various civilian and military activities in support of national security. It is stated that it may be difficult for U.S. agencies to judiciously prioritize partnership requirements against those for other national security missions without clear articulation of the "ends" of partnership in support of national security.

A bibliography on the subject of the war in Afghanistan is presented which includes the articles "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," by Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians," by Susan G. Chesser and "Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments," by K. Alan Kronstadt, all published in the periodical "Congressional Research Service."

The article discusses the developments made in the country following the removal of the Taliban regime. It notes that the political void left by the Taliban has led to the launch of the so-called Bonn Process and the creation of an Afghan Interim Authority. Hamid Karzai has been elected head of the Afghan Transitional Authority. It mentions the varying effects of the end of the regime to the Afghan people which include the end of some specific forms of repression and return of displaced people to their homes.

An afterword to the report "War in Afghanistan: Campaign Progress, Political Strategy, and Issues for Congress," published by the U.S. Congressional Research Service is presented.

People that the author would like to thank for their assistance in the creation of the report "No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal Considerations for Congress" are mentioned.

A list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports is presented including "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications," by Jennifer L. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed, "Congressional Use of Fund Forcing Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments," by Richard F. Grimmett, and "U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force," by Grimmett.

Contact information is presented of author Catherine Dale, a specialist in internal security.

The article offers the contact information of author Catherine Dale who also serves as a specialist in international security.