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The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors--in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria--these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ankara University SBF Journal / Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi is the property of Ankara University SBF Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article is inspired by the 2017 discussions on the future of Europe (in particular some of the ideas debated in the White Paper on the Future of Europe, published by the European Commission) and the events that took place in the crises and post-crises period (aftermath of the financial crisis, ongoing refugee crisis and the Brexit shock). It is particularly interested in the scenario of differentiated integration. In this regard, it observes how in the aftermath of the crises, there was a shift in the rationale of differentiated integration with objective (in)ability of the states taking a prominent role. It presents a federalist critique of this development, drawing on the work of Daniel Elazar, discussing the concepts of non-centralization, federal process and federal covenant in the context of the 2017 discussions in the EU.

It is common to consider mass politics and Eurosceptic politicization as 'post-functionalist' constraints that encourage differentiated European integration. This study argues that the relevance of Euroscepticism depends on who wins the domestic competition for government office. European mass politics are organized as delegation systems. These systems concentrate authority in the government and give little influence to parliaments and publics. If Eurosceptic parties reach the government, they will push for differentiation and even disintegration. If pro-EU parties succeed, uniform integration is likely to prevail. An empirical analysis of differentiated integration from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to the 2016 Single Resolution Fund shows that only government Euroscepticism – rather than opposition, extra-parliamentary, or popular Euroscepticism – encourages differentiation. This study explains how uniform integration can prevail even in ostensibly Eurosceptic countries. It suggests that the impact of Eurosceptic politicization depends on party competition and is often more limited than might seem at first sight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiation has become a durable feature of European integration but we know little about its effects on citizens. Does differentiated integration improve the democratic quality of the European Union and strengthen citizens' support – or does it promote political divides and foster citizens' alienation from European integration? This article develops a theoretical argument on the positive attitudinal effects of differentiated integration, contending that differentiation accommodates heterogeneous preferences in a diverse EU and strengthens citizens' ownership of European integration. A quasi-experimental analysis of public opinion of the 2015 Danish Justice and Home Affairs opt-out referendum demonstrates that the public vote increased citizens' EU efficacy, indeed. Eurosceptic voters in particular strengthen their belief that their individual voice counts in EU politics, suggesting that differentiation can have a positive effect on the perceived democratic quality of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Membership is central to the EU, as it is to any other international organisation. Withdrawal has assumed centre-stage through Brexit. While there is literature that is relevant to membership, most notably through academic discourse on differentiated integration, there is little more general inquiry concerning membership, the concept of which has importance and implications over and beyond more particular avenues of scholarship. This article examines the formal and substantive dimensions of membership and withdrawal in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of the Faculty of Political Sciences / Godisnjak Fakultet Politickih Nauka Beograd is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A decade ago, Nordic cooperation on security and defence matters gained momentum, having been largely absent from the map of Nordic cooperation during the Cold War and its aftermath. This article analyses developments along three dimensions of Nordic cooperation: military defence (focusing on the Nordic Defence Cooperation), civil security (in the form of the ‘Haga’ process), and political cooperation (through the implementation of the Stoltenberg report). Three observations stand out as a result: First, that the three dimensions are intimately related against the background of a common Nordic conceptualization of security; second, that there is simultaneously variation in significant respects (such as driving forces, scope, and degree of institutionalization); and third, that Nordic security and defence cooperation has developed in the context of European and transatlantic security dynamics and cooperation. The second part of the analysis seeks to interpret this picture from the analytical perspective of differentiated integration. The article ends with a set of reflections on the future of Nordic security and defence cooperation in light of the Coronavirus pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether Nordic administrative collaboration is still ‘alive and kicking,’ or whether it has been marginalized by increased integration into Europe and strong international reform trajectories. We analyse the scope and intensity of Nordic administrative collaboration from a structural perspective based on the perceptions of civil servants in the Norwegian central government. We also address the implications of Nordic collaboration for policy design and reform measures. The main conclusion is that Nordic administrative collaboration can best be described as differentiated integration. The scope of Nordic administrative collaboration is rather broad, and its internal structural features vary significantly. Nordic collaboration is perceived to have more of an effect on policy design than on specific administrative reform means and measures. However, structural features also matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UK withdrawal from the EU - Brexit - poses particular challenges for Northern Ireland notably concerning its essentially invisible border with Ireland, an important feature of the peace process. With the EU having committed to finding 'flexible and imaginative solutions' during the withdrawal negotiations to address the 'unique circumstances on the island of Ireland', the UK and the EU agreed differentiated withdrawal terms in a dedicated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. These effectively keep Northern Ireland in the EU customs territory and, through a process of dynamic regulatory alignment, its internal market for goods. A unique but contested status - a 'place between' in the UK-EU relationship - has thus been conferred on Northern Ireland. The Protocol has some important shortcomings and implementation poses significant challenges yet also offers opportunities. How the challenges are met will play an important role in determining whether in 2024 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly vote to retain these arrangements. If they do not, politicians and officials will once again be faced with the question of how to avoid a physical hardening of the border on the island of Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 25 March 2017, the European Union celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, which established 'an ever-closer union' as a fundamental principle for European regional integration. Only four days later, the United Kingdom delivered an official letter triggering its withdrawal process from the Community. How could we comprehend Brexit integrative and disintegrative dynamics to the EU? The UK's decision to leave the EU alongside recent crises in the Community and the spread of Eurosceptic movements fostered studies about disintegration dynamics. This article presents the current debate about differentiated (dis)integration based on up-to-date related literature. Next, it proposes a framework to assess the recent shifts in the UK-EU relationship and its contradictory effects on the EU project. The main argument of the paper is that the UK's relationship with the European Union moved from an internal differentiated integration to a proposal of internal differentiated disintegration and, thereafter, to a process of external differentiated disintegration. Moreover, although Brexit means disintegration by one Member State, its effects on the EU project are mixed, initially promoting an integrative boom among the EU27 members, while at the same time neglecting disintegrating forces that could undermine the traditional European integration model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can the EU remain a transformative power without offering a full membership perspective? This question has triggered an intense debate among academics and practitioners alike. This article contributes to this debate by highlighting the conceptual relevance of Differentiated Integration (DI). We argue that DI offers an analytical concept to capture dynamics and processes often neglected in established approaches. This is especially so if one adopts a comprehensive understanding of DI, as we propose here. First, we focus on DI beyond EU borders, i.e. on external DI. Second, we argue that DI entails more than the inclusion of non-EU Member States in selected EU policies. Thus, external DI involves the extension of general integration dynamics (i.e. widening, broadening, and deepening) beyond EU borders. To illustrate our argument empirically, we analyse the Energy Community, an international organization initiated by the EU that has gone through significant processes of deepening, broadening and widening since its foundation. Overall, we maintain that external DI points to the EU's potential of exporting the general logic of integration beyond its borders. Applied in this comprehensive sense, DI can add to our understanding of the EU as a transformative power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year of 1989 was a turning point in Poland where communism ended and the transition to democracy began. In the next period, liberal democracy and adaptation to free market economy and new social identity structuring came forward in the country. Although returning to Europe was attempted to be painless, this was not possible. Poland's accession process to the European Union (EU) was controversial and the controversy continued after the accession. There was mutual scepticism between Poland and the EU. This scepticism has led Poland to favor only selective common policies, and thus, it has started to become an actor that nurtures the differentiation in European integration. Its preferences and practices that do not conform liberal democracy have led the EU to monitor Poland. This article tries to explain why Poland and EU relations have shifted towards differentiated integration in Europe, within a conceptual framework. The major argument of this article is that because a high level of interdependence and politicization exists between Poland and the EU, differentiated integration has become unavoidable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past and arguably the future of the European Union (EU) are characterized by Differentiated Integration (DI). Whereas a number of studies examine country variance in the realization of DI due to state-level characteristics, scholars have rarely addressed sector-specific differentiation. We select Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for such an analysis – the policy domain with the largest budget, most contestation in the Council of Ministers, most redistribution, and most differentiated legal acts. Building on liberal intergovernmentalism, we develop a demand and supply model to explain the number of opt-outs a country realizes in CAP legislation. We hypothesize that the member states' demand for differentiation is driven by agricultural lobbyism and by the political receptiveness of governments; the supply-side is driven by member states' voting or bargaining power; and the realized differentiations are a consequence of the interaction of demand and supply. Using all differentiations in new CAP legal acts from 1993 to 2012, we test these hypotheses in a time-series cross-section design. We find that the domestic level of agricultural protectionism, conservative parties in government and voting power are robust predictors of the realization of differentiation in CAP. Our results support the general claim of liberal intergovernmentalism, that domestic societal and economic interests and political bargaining power shape the course of (differentiated) integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a normative assessment of parliamentary representation in fields of differentiated integration in the European Union. Based on three criteria of legitimate democratic representation, autonomy, accountability and equality, we evaluate four alternative representation models. These models comprise (I) complete representation of all members of the European Parliament (MEPs), (II) insider representation through the creation of new, regime‐specific assemblies, and (III) partial representation without and (IV) with inclusive deliberative stages. We find that the current system of complete representation, while honouring the principle of equality, violates autonomy and accountability in areas of differentiated integration. We therefore advocate a model of partial representation: MEPs elected in opt‐out states should not take part in EP voting but should be invited to participate in the deliberative stages of parliamentary decision‐making. This reconciles the principles of autonomy, accountability and equality, at least as long as there is no truly European electoral system in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU)-Turkey customs union (CU) has led to a significant level of integration between a non-member country and the EU and therefore represents an example of external differentiated integration. Turkey's relations with the EU, until recently, have been largely motivated by its membership objective. However, Turkey's membership prospects have recently been diminishing, due both to mutual estrangement because of Turkey's ever-deteriorating performance on EU-mandated reforms and the current difficulties challenging European integration. Under these circumstances, concerns regarding structural problems and conjunctural challenges have forced both parties to revise the CU. This study aims to explain how the parties should revise it to tackle the challenges posed by current economic relations. It argues that building broader and deeper economic integration with a certain degree of collective policy-making capacity will be crucial for furthering relations, which may thereby contribute to Turkey's accession process in a longer term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With high interdependence, politicization, and unlikely enlargement, alternative options for EU–Turkey relations beg for consideration. This article argues that, first of all, conceptualization of a new model of EU–Turkey relations must thoroughly account for the evolution of the European project away from uniformity and towards more differentiation as a result of both integration and disintegration pressures. Secondly, an extended model of external differentiated integration has a potential to foster new, more dynamic EU–Turkey relations. However, its practical implementation is constrained by a number of challenges and scope conditions related to preferences and interests of key actors, namely EU institutions, member states and Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this brief essay I shall reflect upon one of the options recalled by the recent White Paper of the European Commission and then supported by France, Germany, Italy and Spain in an informal meeting: namely asymmetry. This essay is structured as follows: in a first moment I shall recall how EU Treaties discipline the several asymmetric options present in EU law. In a second moment I shall explore the role acquired by asymmetry with the current European economic crisis. Eventually, I shall present some conclusions on the White Paper with regard to differentiated integration.

Initially, before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, differences in integration between members of the European Communities (EC; later the European Union) were relatively few and usually temporary in nature. The Schengen Agreement, the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation meant that the problem was becoming more and more important in the functioning of the EU—both in theory and in practice.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2017 2(1), 183-200 | On the Agenda | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Background: Scotland's place in the UK. - III. Scotland as part of the UK: the legal options around a special deal. - III.1. EU membership for Scotland as part of the UK? - III.2. Scotland in the single market as part of the UK? - IV. Scotland as an independent country. - IV.1. The path to an independence referendum. - IV.2. Accession to the EU. - IV.3. Accession to EFTA/EEA. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The UK's decision to leave the EU poses a particular challenge for Scotland where 62 percent of the population voted in favour of remaining. This has led to calls - amongst others by the Scottish Government - that Scotland should be allowed to either stay in the EU or at the very least in the EU's single market. In a first step this On the Agenda provides an analysis in how far a differentiated solution for Scotland as part of the UK would be legally possible and whether it would be practicable; in a second step the On the Agenda discusses the legal conditions under which an independent Scotland would be able to either join the EU or stay in the single market.

EU’s economic and political challenges open a new page of the European integration history. The Eurozone crisis and challenges presented by Brexit enhanced scholars from various countries to analyze and rethink about the future of the European integration and EU as a whole. The paths of the differentiated integration present a specific interest in this article. This kind of integration is becoming more and more popular among politicians and researchers in their affords to demonstrate a pragmatic approach how to re-start the integration process. This article will outline the issues framed by the differentiated integration in Italy, a founding member of the European Union. Moreover, it presents an attempt to apply the principles of differentiated integration to some of the politics: political and economic governance in the EU. The article poses the question to what extent the political fluidity will be necessary in order for the EU to still remain solid tackling common economic and political challenges. The article presents the opinions of the Italian scholars and politicians referred to the differentiated integration. The first part of it theorizes the concept of differentiated integration and presents an evolution of scholars’ thoughts starting from the mid-90s. The second part of the article reveals the challenges of the EU, the European integration process and the implications on the Italian Republic. It tries to show how Italy manages to overcome the present integration challenges.

What consequences will Brexit have for EU defence integration? Answering this question, the article analyses the new visions for the future of EU defence that emerged in the debate after the Brexit vote. In doing so, the paper moves beyond institutionalism and argues that a practice approach to Brexit paves the way for a deeper understanding of EU integration as a social process and of the effects of Brexit. Through a study of the debates and concrete developments in EU defence since the Brexit referendum, the article shows how defence - an area already subject to differentiation - has enabled innovative visions for defence integration in post-Brexit Europe across three dimensions: the military, the political and the economic. Building on this analysis, the paper concludes on the possible consequences of Brexit for EU defence and the value of a practice approach to differentiated defence integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiation is becoming an increasingly salient feature of European integration. The multifaceted European crisis and the subsequent Brexit vote (paving the way for a ground‐breaking case of differentiated disintegration) have led scholars and practitioners to think about the consequences of differentiated integration. This article draws on five empirical models of differentiation experienced by countries both inside and outside the EU: the European economic area model, the Danish model of (quasi‐)permanent differentiation, the Swedish model of de facto differentiation, the instrumental model and the Brexit process of differentiation. It addresses the different risks and opportunities that each of these models entail. The article also introduces the contributions to this symposium, which aims at paving the way for future research on the consequences of differentiation in light of Brexit. This article is part of the 2019 Symposium titled 'Responding to Brexit: Differentiated integration and disintegration in the European Union', which also includes On the Methodology of Studying Differentiated (Dis)integration: Or How the Potential Outcome Framework Can Contribute to Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Opting In or Out by Marian Burk and Dirk Leuffen (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12958), The End of Exceptionalism and a Strengthening of Coherence? Law and Legal Integration in the EU Post‐Brexit by Paul James Cardwell (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12959), Differentiated (Dis)integration in Practice: The Diplomacy of Brexit and the Low Politics of High Politics by Øyvind Svendsen and Rebecca Adler‐Nissen (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12960) and Rethinking Britain's Role in a Differentiated Europe after Brexit: A Comparative Regionalism Perspective by Philomena Murray and Alex Brianson (https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12961). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With Brexit imminent, the debate on the need for differentiated integration (DI) by means of opting-out has gained new momentum. At the same time, non-member states decide to adopt European Union (EU) rules as exemplified by the European Neighbourhood Policy. In light of these opposing observations, we examine the EU's disposition to supply DI. We outline the strategic interactions of the EU member states or non-members in the context of two forms of DI: opting-out and inducing-in. In the case of opting-out, EU member states can refrain from adopting EU rules; inducing-in refers to providing non-member states with incentives to adopt EU rules. We show that the information asymmetries inherent to the strategic interactions result in a situation in which the EU is likely to supply opportunities to opt-out for member states to a much greater extent than necessary. Furthermore, the EU is likely to offer more compensation to non-member states in exchange for adopting EU rules than it would actually need to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the British referendum to leave the European Union and the European Commission's 'White Paper on the Future of Europe', it is not only time to take stock of the existing literature on differentiated integration, but also to rethink the perimeters of disintegration. We argue that phenomena such as Brexit embrace forms of differentiation which trigger the need for conceptualizing differentiated disintegration altogether. This article first sketches the path of the scholarly debate in a chronological way to grasp the breadth of existing literature. Second, it discusses differentiated disintegration as a potentially new area for research. Mapping several scenarios for future research, we propose that differentiated (dis)integration needs to be conceived as a negotiated, but profoundly path‐dependent process, which is structurally locked‐in, and deeply conditioned by pre‐existing organizations and institutions of European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though differentiation has become a core feature of the EU, the grand theories have focused almost exclusively on uniform integration. In this article, we derive hypotheses about differentiated integration from liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and postfunctionalism. In an analysis of EU treaty making between 1992 and 2016, we find evidence that heterogeneity of both wealth and identity, integration in the area of core state powers, and pre-existing differentiation drive differentiated integration. A comparison of the explanatory power of the grand theories shows that neo- and post-functionalism explain the differentiations that member states obtain in EU reform treaties more convincingly than liberal intergovernmentalism. A synthetic model performs best, however. The grand theories also leave noteworthy variation unexplained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has European integration affected some of Europe's defence firms more than others? Specifically, what explains the co-existence of national, transnational and European champions in this industry? This article develops answers to this question from two complementary angles. First, through examining the business models and turnover of the four largest companies in Europe (BAe Systems, Airbus, Thales, and Leonardo), it shows that firms who mostly produce military goods are less likely to undergo strong European integration. Second, using an original database on the social backgrounds of these firms' board members, two further hypotheses are tested. Using data on higher education and careers, on the one hand we show that the relationship of board members to their respective state varies from close (Thales and to some extent Airbus) to distant (BAe Systems and Leonardo). On the other, our data reveals that when the careers of these actors are frequently internationalised, this correlates to either strong European integration at the level of the firm (Airbus and Thales) or, alternatively, strong Transatlanticism (BAe Systems or Leonardo). The article as a whole thus both opens up new avenues for research on the defence industry, whilst adding political economy and sociological dimensions to existing scholarship on differentiated European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few years there have been important initiatives to favour greater harmonization among EU member states' defence-industrial policies. However, EU countries sometimes decide to cooperate in the development of defence-industrial projects, to maintain defence procurement on a national basis or to import extra-EU armaments. To investigate the simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition, focusing on how the process of differentiated integration shapes European defence-industrial governance, this paper assesses Italian participation in two major European armaments organizations (OCCAR and the European Defence Agency), as well in two new EU initiatives in this sector (PeSCo and the European Defence Fund). Specifically, this analysis focuses on national state-arms industry relations as a crucial explanatory variable in the formation of Italy's preferences towards defence-industrial cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New developments in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), such as PESCO or the European Defence Fund (EDF), challenge the differentiated integration framework put forward by Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen and Berthold Rittberger: this policy is not and may have never been a case of low vertical integration and uniform horizontal integration. This paper presents an amended version of their framework based on constructivist institutionalist accounts of European integration. First, it discusses their explanatory variable. Rather than interdependence per se, this paper argues that it is the construction of interdependence that matters in order to understand integration. Second, rather than focusing on primary EU law, which often obscures many policy dynamics, this paper builds on legal, institutional and practice-level elements of CSDP. Based on these changes, this paper argues that national and European actors have constructed interdependence in this policy domain, by tying together armament-related issues with single market regulation and by linking armament-related issues with CSDP's operational-military requirements around the issue of capabilities. These processes explain CSDP's policy-making hybridity, i.e. the combination within CSDP of a more intergovernmental policy-making mode (especially but not restricted to operational-military elements) with more supranational elements (especially but not restricted to industrial armament-related elements), as well as its horizontal differentiation. The conclusion discusses the theoretical implications of policy-making hybridity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue aims at contributing simultaneously to two key literatures within analysis of the European Union (EU) which, until now, have developed in isolation of each other: one on differentiated integration, the other on defence policies in Europe. In so doing, it also brings together different theories of political economy and, thereby, more general analyses of politics and international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being one of the founders of the European Union (EU), France has always wanted to take the lead in shaping the European integration process. In this article, I argue that there are two major reasons why the variable geometry model is so much promoted by France. First of all, it is because of the effects of accession of Central and Eastern European countries. The second reason is that France misses the bygone small Europe where the French voice was more decisive than it is now. The idea of differentiated integration has been revived in France due to the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis that has provoked many tensions within the EU and shown even more clearly that the French economy lacks competitiveness. Therefore, French proposals how to reform the Eurozone are very often linked with the attempts to build a small core of Europe within the large EU. The aim of these proposals is to help France to compete within the Common Market and globally. Moreover, many French people believe that this kind of EU would help fulfil the idea of Europe-puissance with the leading role of France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the intergovernmentalist account, differentiated integration is an institutional design helping to overcome negotiation deadlock caused by international heterogeneity. Heterogeneity of state preferences, dependence and capacity creates demand for differentiated integration. Whether differentiated integration will actually be realized, however, also depends on the supply of viable and mutually beneficial solutions for all participants in differentiation. The size of the integrationist group needs to be large enough to provide the collective good and achieve economies of scale; externalities between the differentially integrated groups must be weak; countries need to be in a favourable institutional bargaining position. The article focuses on theory, but also discusses empirical findings and policy proposals on differentiated integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses the future of Europe as one of differentiated integration. It argues that this future takes the form of member-states' overlapping participation in the EU's many policy communities, making for a soft-core Europe, as an alternative option to the hard-core around the Eurozone. The article contends that this multi-clustered Europe is the only feasible future, given the challenges facing the EU from its many crises, its problems of governance, and the difficulties of decision-making against a background of increasing politicization. But such differentiation is not without its problems, given EU decision-rules, the interconnectedness of policy arenas that can spell problems of spillover, and the need for deeper integration in some policy areas (e.g., migration) while others may benefit from less or more highly differentiated integration (e.g., Eurozone). Institutional reforms would also be necessary to ensure a positive future of differentiated integration: While the EU would continue to require a single set of institutions, it would need modified decision-rules to allow for more (and less) differentiation depending upon the area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) is a community based on the rule of law. EU member states have committed themselves to uphold the rule of law and to respect the primacy of EU law. Yet today, the EU legal order is threatened by the emergence of increasingly autocratic member state governments, particularly those in Hungary and Poland, who routinely violate the fundamental rule of law principles on which the EU is based. This article assesses whether the model of differentiated integration can be applied to help the EU address this rule of law crisis. In recent years, many analysts have called on the EU to embrace a model of differentiated integration as a way to address its many challenges, and some have suggested that versions of differentiation might help the EU resolve tensions with its member states concerning the rule of law. By contrast, this article will argue that differentiation in the rule of law and the theory of constitutional pluralism that some use to justify it are neither normatively desirable nor practically feasible models. In short, we must reject differentiated integration when it comes to rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to articulate conceptually the varieties of international co-operation in which states take part. In theories of international relations, international co-operation is generally analysed either through instances of multilateral collaboration (EU, UN, NATO), through bilateral alliances (Franco-German relationship), or through "minilateral" clubs (G7). Yet the literature does not offer a concept for linking these three models of international co-operation. Nevertheless, in practice, states simultaneously use varieties of international co-operation to address global public problems such as climate change, migration crises, and the fight against terrorism. To address this shortcoming, it is necessary to shift the focus from each type of international co-operation to their "interstices", in order to identify the relations between the types of international co-operation and their reciprocal effects on decisions taken by the state. It is to do this that the concept of "flexilateralism" has been developed. This neologism describes the policy through which a state simultaneously implements varieties of international co-operation to address a public problem. A state's "flexilateral" policy, or flexilateralism, is operationalised by revealing four varieties of international co-operation: bilateralism (co-operation between two states), minilateralism (co-operation within an exclusive group of states), multilateralism (co-operation within an inclusive group of states), and unilateralism (no co-operation). The concept of flexilateralism is applied through the case of France's defence procurement policy in the context of the Brexit negotiations. By taking seriously varieties of international co-operation, the concept of flexilateralism goes a step further to explain the policy-making and implementation of state's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(1), 139-148 | European Forum Insight of 16 April 2016 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The Schengen Protocol and the position of Ireland and the United Kingdom. - III. Distinguishing "limited cooperation" from a full"taking part" in the Schengen acquis. - IV. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) In case C-44/14, Spain v. European Parliament and Council, the Court of Justice of the European Union has had the opportunity to clarify the scope and effects of the British and Irish opt-out in the Schengen area. The Court held that a limited cooperation with those countries by means of international agreements in an area of the Schengen acquis, that does not apply, notoriously, to Ireland and the United Kingdom, does not infringe Art. 4 of the Schengen Protocol. By upholding the legality of such agreements, the judgment introduces some flexibility in dealing with opt-outs, while at the same time confirming that an unrestrained à la carte approach would not be tolerated.