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152. Distributed Selfish Load Balancing

Author

Berenbrink, Petra, primary, Friedetzky, Tom, additional, Goldberg, Leslie Ann, additional, Goldberg, Paul W., additional, Hu, Zengjian, additional, and Martin, Russell, additional

Published
2007
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158. Ranking Games that have Competitiveness-based Strategies.

Author

Goldberg, Leslie Ann, Goldberg, Paul W., Krysta, Piotr, and Ventre, Carmine

Subjects
GAME theory, COMPETITION (Psychology), HIGHER education, CONTESTS, APPROXIMATION theory
Abstract

This paper studies — from the perspective of efficient computation — a type of competition that is widespread throughout the plant and animal kingdoms, higher education, politics and artificial contests. In this setting, an agent gains utility from his relative performance (on some measurable criterion) against other agents, as opposed to his absolute performance. We model this situation using ranking games in which each strategy corresponds to a level of competitiveness, and incurs an upfront cost that is higher for more competitive strategies. We study the Nash equilibria of these games, and polynomial-time algorithms for computing them. For games in which there is no tie between agents' levels of competitiveness we give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact equilibrium in the 2-player case, and a characterization of Nash equilibria that shows an interesting parallel between these games and unrestricted 2-player games in normal form. When ties are allowed, via a reduction from these games to a subclass of anonymous games, we give polynomial-time approximation schemes for two special cases: constant-sized set of strategies, and constant number of players. The latter result is improved to a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme when the constant number of players only compete to win the game, i.e. to be ranked first. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2010

159. Regression with input-dependent noise: A Gaussian process treatment

Author

Jordan, Michael I., Kearns, Michael J., Solla, Sara A., Goldberg, Paul W., Williams, Christopher K. I., Bishop, Christopher M., Jordan, Michael I., Kearns, Michael J., Solla, Sara A., Goldberg, Paul W., Williams, Christopher K. I., and Bishop, Christopher M.

Abstract

Gaussian processes provide natural non-parametric prior distributions over regression functions. In this paper we consider regression problems where there is noise on the output, and the variance of the noise depends on the inputs. If we assume that the noise is a smooth function of the inputs, then it is natural to model the noise variance using a second Gaussian process, in addition to the Gaussian process governing the noise-free output value. We show that prior uncertainty about the parameters controlling both processes can be handled and that the posterior distribution of the noise rate can be sampled from using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. Our results on a synthetic data set give a posterior noise variance that well-approximates the true variance.

Published
1997

160. Uncoordinated Two-Sided Matching Markets.

Author

Ackermann, Heiner, Goldberg, Paul W., Mirrokni, Vahab S., Röglin, Heiko, and Vöcking, Berthold

Subjects
MARKETS, ECONOMICS, PURCHASING agents, PROBABILITY theory, STOCHASTIC convergence
Abstract

Various economic interactions can be modeled as two-sided markets. A central solution concept to these markets are stable matchings, introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is well known that stable matchings can be computed in polynomial time, but many real-life markets lack a central authority to match agents. In those markets, matchings are formed by actions of self-interested agents. Knuth introduced uncoordinated two-sided markets and showed that the uncoordinated better response dynamics may cycle. However, Roth and Vande Vate showed that the random better response dynamics converges to a stable matching with probability one, but did not address the question of convergence time. In this paper, we give an exponential lower bound for the convergence time of the random better response dynamics in two-sided markets. We also extend the results for the better response dynamics to the best response dynamics, i.e., we present a cycle of best responses, and prove that the random best response dynamics converges to a stable matching with probability one, but its convergence time is exponential. Additionally, we identify the special class of correlated matroid two-sided markets with real-life applications for which we prove that the random best response dynamics converges in expected polynomial time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2008

161. A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets.

Author

Hutchison, David, Kanade, Takeo, Kittler, Josef, Kleinberg, Jon M., Mattern, Friedemann, Mitchell, John C., Naor, Moni, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Pandu Rangan, C., Steffen, Bernhard, Sudan, Madhu, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Tygar, Doug, Vardi, Moshe Y., Weikum, Gerhard, Deng, Xiaotie, Graham, Fan Chung, Ackermann, Heiner, Goldberg, Paul W., and Mirrokni, Vahab S.

Abstract

Congestion games are a well-studied model for resource sharing among uncoordinated selfish agents. Usually, one assumes that the resources in a congestion game do not have any preferences over the players that can allocate them. In typical load balancing applications, however, different jobs can have different priorities, and jobs with higher priorities get, for example, larger shares of the processor time. We introduce a model in which each resource can assign priorities to the players and players with higher priorities can displace players with lower priorities. Our model does not only extend standard congestion games, but it can also be seen as a model of two-sided markets with ties. We prove that singleton congestion games with priorities are potential games, and we show that every player-specific singleton congestion game with priorities possesses a pure Nash equilibrium that can be found in polynomial time. Finally, we extend our results to matroid congestion games, in which the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a matroid over the resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2007
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162. PAC-Learnability of Probabilistic Deterministic Finite State Automata in Terms of Variation Distance.

Author

Jain, Sanjay, Simon, Hans Ulrich, Tomita, Etsuji, Palmer, Nick, and Goldberg, Paul W.

Abstract

We consider the problem of PAC-learning distributions over strings, represented by probabilistic deterministic finite automata (PDFAs). PDFAs are a probabilistic model for the generation of strings of symbols, that have been used in the context of speech and handwriting recognition, and bioinformatics. Recent work on learning PDFAs from random examples has used the KL-divergence as the error measure; here we use the variation distance. We build on recent work by Clark and Thollard, and show that the use of the variation distance allows simplifications to be made to the algorithms, and also a strengthening of the results; in particular that using the variation distance, we obtain polynomial sample size bounds that are independent of the expected length of strings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2005
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169. The state of our parks

Author

Goldberg, Paul W.

Subjects
Travel, recreation and leisure
Abstract

Well, if the government says so, it must be true! That appears to be Jeff Crider's stance in his report on Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton's comments regarding our [...]

Published
2005

172. The complexity of gene placement.

Author

Goldberg, Leslie Ann, Goldberg, Paul W., Paterson, Mike, Pevzner, Pavel, Sahinalp, Süleyman Cenk, and Sweedyk, Elizabeth

Published
1999

176. Some Discriminant-Based PAC Algorithms.

Author

Goldberg, Paul W. and Ron, Dana

Subjects
*COMPUTATIONAL learning theory, *DISTRIBUTION (Probability theory), *MACHINE learning, *ALGORITHMS, *CHARACTERISTIC functions
Abstract

A classical approach in multi-class pattern classification is the following. Estimate the probability distributions that generated the observations for each label class, and then label new instances by applying the Bayes classifier to the estimated distributions. That approach provides more useful information than just a class label; it also provides estimates of the conditional distribution of class labels, in situations where there is class overlap. We would like to know whether it is harder to build accurate classifiers via this approach, than by techniques that may process all data with distinct labels together. In this paper we make that question precise by considering it in the context of PAC learnability. We propose two restrictions on the PAC learning framework that are intended to correspond with the above approach, and consider their relationship with standard PAC learning. Our main restriction of interest leads to some interesting algorithms that show that the restriction is not stronger (more restrictive) than various other well-known restrictions on PAC learning. An alternative slightly milder restriction turns out to be almost equivalent to unrestricted PAC learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2006

177. Solving product-mix markets and learning agents' preferences

Author

Lock, Edwin and Goldberg, Paul W.

Subjects
Computational complexity, Algorithms, Economics, Equilibrium (Economics)
Abstract

This thesis addresses computational questions arising in auctions with multiple goods available in multiple quantities, with a focus on establishing the tractability of auction mechanisms used in practice. It presents algorithms and hardness results for solving these auctions with the goal of maximising social welfare or revenue, and develops procedures to facilitate participating agents in expressing their preferences in the auction's bidding language. The 'strong-substitutes product-mix auction' was originally designed for the Bank of England by Paul Klemperer and continues to be run at least monthly. It introduces a novel bidding language, which allows agents to submit sealed-bid strong-substitutes preferences over an arbitrary number of goods available in multiple discrete units. We study this language geometrically and computationally, and establish connections to related bidding languages in the literature. In order to solve the strong-substitutes product-mix auction for social welfare, we develop the first efficient algorithms to find market-clearing prices and envy-free allocations of supply to participating bidders. The latter, in particular, requires solving a novel constrained matching problem. By contrast, we show that solving the auction for maximum revenue is APX-hard even in special cases, and present initial algorithms for this. Agents participating in this auction may have trouble expressing their preferences in the auction's bidding language when faced with a large number of goods or non-trivial demand. Instead, they may be able to answer queries about their value of a given bundle or their demand at given prices. We propose algorithms that learn a bidder's preferences, assuming access to a demand or valuation oracle. In a special case currently implemented by the Bank of England, we present a linear-time algorithm. We also show super-polynomial lower bounds on the query complexity in the general case. Our algorithms constitute the first approach for bidders to express non-trivial preferences in these languages, lowering the barrier for participation in the strong-substitutes product-mix auction. In the related 'arctic product-mix market', originally designed for the Icelandic government by Klemperer, buyers use a conceptually similar bidding language to express preferences across multiple divisible goods in conjunction with monetary budgets. In this setting we present a new coincidence of the solution concepts of competitive equilibrium and optimal revenue: market-clearing prices are unique, and these prices maximise not only social welfare but also revenue. We also provide an algorithm to identify these prices.

Published
2021

178. Structural results for total search complexity classes with applications to game theory and optimisation

Author

Hollender, Alexandros, Koutsoupias, Elias, and Goldberg, Paul W.

Subjects
Computational Complexity, Theoretical Computer Science
Abstract

While the celebrated theory of NP-completeness has been very successful in explaining the intractability of many interesting problems, there still remain many natural and seemingly hard problems that are not known to be NP-hard. Several of these problems lie in the class of total NP search problems (TFNP), namely the class of NP search problems that always have a solution. Importantly, these problems cannot be NP-hard unless NP = co-NP. Notable examples of TFNP problems include FACTORING (given a natural number, compute its prime factorisation) and NASH (given a game, compute a mixed Nash equilibrium). In order to shed light on the complexity of these problems, researchers have attempted to classify them in various subclasses of TFNP such as PPAD, PPA, PPP, PLS, and CLS. A celebrated result in this line of research is the PPAD-completeness of NASH, yielding strong evidence that the problem is not polynomial-time solvable. In this thesis we provide new structural results for TFNP subclasses and show how they can be used to classify natural problems arising from application areas such as game theory and optimisation. In the first part of this work, we construct more powerful tools for proving membership in PPAD, as well as PPAD-hardness. We directly apply these tools to show that the Hairy Ball theorem from topology ("you can't comb a hairy ball flat without creating a cowlick"), as well as the equilibrium computation problem in First Price Auctions with subjective priors, are both PPAD-complete. In the second part of this thesis, we present our main result: the collapse CLS = PPAD ∩ PLS. We prove this surprising collapse by exhibiting the first non-artificial PPAD ∩ PLS-complete problem - a problem arising naturally from the famous gradient descent algorithm. Our result puts PPAD ∩ PLS on the map as a TFNP subclass that captures the complexity of natural problems. In the third and final part, we provide various structural results for the classes PPA-k (corresponding to arguments modulo k), including the first topological characterisations of these classes. As a direct application, we prove that NECKLACE-SPLITTING with k thieves - a notorious problem in combinatorics and fair division - lies in PPA-k under Turing reductions.

Published
2021

179. PAC-learning geometrical figures

Author

Goldberg, Paul W.

Subjects
621.382
Abstract

The thesis studies the following problem: given a set of geometrical figures (such as planar polygons), each one labelled according to whether or not it resembles some 'ideal' figure, find a good approximation to that ideal figure which can be used to classify other figures in the same way. We work within the PAC learning model introduced by Valiant in 1984. Informally, the concepts under consideration are sets of polygons which resemble each other visually. A learning algorithm is given collections of members and non-members of a concept, and its task is to infer a criterion for membership which is consistent with the given examples and which can be used as an accurate classifier of further example polygons. In order to formalise the notion of a concept, we use metrics which measure the extent to which two polygons differ. A concept is assumed to be the set of polygons which are within some distance of some fixed central polygon. In the thesis we work most extensively with the Hausdorff metric. Using the Hausdorff metric we obtain NP-completeness results for several variants of the learning problem. In particular we show that it is hard to find a single geometrical figure which is close to the positive examples but not to the negative examples. This result holds under various assumptions about the specific geometrical figures under consideration. It also holds for several metrics other than the Hausdorff metric. Despite the NP-completeness results mentioned above we have found some encouraging positive results. In particular, we have discovered a general technique for prediction. (Prediction is a less demanding learning model than PAC learning. The goal is to find a polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input a sample of labelled examples and is then able to predict the status of further unlabelled examples in polynomial time).

Published
1992

180. Learning Equilibria of Games via Payoff Queries.

Author

Fearnley, John, Gairing, Martin, Goldberg, Paul W., and Savani, Rahul

Subjects
*MACHINE learning, *GAME theory, *EXPERIMENTAL literature, *STRATEGIC planning, *COMPUTATIONAL learning theory
Abstract

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to players. The aim is to find an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium of the game, based on these observations. It is usually assumed that the strategy profiles may be chosen in an on-line manner by the algorithm. We study a corresponding computational learning model, and the query complexity of learning equilibria for various classes of games. We give basic results for exact equilibria of bimatrix and graphical games. We then study the query complexity of approximate equilibria in bimatrix games. Finally, we study the query complexity of exact equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. For directed acyclic networks, we can learn the cost functions (and hence compute an equilibrium) while querying just a small fraction of pure-strategy profiles. For the special case of parallel links, we have the stronger result that an equilibrium can be identified while only learning a small fraction of the cost values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2015

181. On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities

Author

Mirrokni, Vahab S., Roch, Sebastien, Sundararajan, Mukund, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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182. The Ring Design Game with Fair Cost Allocation : [Extended Abstract]

Author

Fanelli, Angelo, Leniowski, Dariusz, Monaco, Gianpiero, Sankowski, Piotr, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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183. The Competitive Facility Location Problem in a Duopoly: Connections to the 1-Median Problem

Author

Saban, Daniela, Stier-Moses, Nicolas, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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184. Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation

Author

Fiat, Amos, Levavi, Ariel, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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185. Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games

Author

Cohen, Johanne, Dürr, Christoph, Thang, Nguyen Kim, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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186. Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions

Author

Sivan, Balasubramanian, Syrgkanis, Vasilis, Tamuz, Omer, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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187. Limited Supply Online Auctions for Revenue Maximization

Author

Krysta, Piotr, Telelis, Orestis, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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188. Convergence Analysis for Weighted Joint Strategy Fictitious Play in Generalized Second Price Auction

Author

Yao, Lei, Chen, Wei, Liu, Tie-Yan, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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189. Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies

Author

Dhamal, Swapnil, Narahari, Yadati, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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190. Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games

Author

Bilò, Davide, Gualà, Luciano, Proietti, Guido, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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191. Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network

Author

Bhattacharya, Sayan, Korzhyk, Dmytro, Conitzer, Vincent, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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192. Homophily in Online Social Networks

Author

Tarbush, Bassel, Teytelboym, Alexander, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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193. Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preference

Author

Zadimoghaddam, Morteza, Roth, Aaron, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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194. Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects

Author

Feldman, Michal, Tamir, Tami, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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195. Budget Optimization for Online Campaigns with Positive Carryover Effects

Author

Archak, Nikolay, Mirrokni, Vahab, Muthukrishnan, S., Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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196. Ad Allocation for Browse Sessions

Author

Bhalgat, Anand, Gollapudi, Sreenivas, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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197. Choosing Products in Social Networks

Author

Simon, Sunil, Apt, Krzysztof R., Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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198. Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate Truthfulness

Author

Leung, Samantha, Lui, Edward, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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199. Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits

Author

Dütting, Paul, Henzinger, Monika, Starnberger, Martin, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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200. What I Tell You Three Times Is True: Bootstrap Percolation in Small Worlds

Author

Amini, Hamed, Fountoulakis, Nikolaos, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, and Goldberg, Paul W., editor

Published
2012
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