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The article analyzes the necessity for economy in international lending programs in cooperation with International Monetary Fund. In the article is investigated stage of cooperation between Ukraine and IMF within programs of Systemic transformation loan, Extended Fund Facility program and «Stand-by» programs, critically analyzed each of the stages. Defined the fundamental aspects of economic development programs in 2015 offered by IMF, The proposals are given to further their development under conditions of globalization. The basic advantages and disadvantages of cooperation between Ukraine and IMF are submitted. Defined the main problems that are faced by Ukraine on its way to European integration, defined the role of IMF in this process. В статье проанализирована необходимость экономики Украины в международном кредитовании в рамках программ сотрудничества с Международным валютным фондом. Исследовано этапы проведения сотрудничества Украины с МВФ в рамках программ системного трансформационного кредита, программ расширенного финансирования и программ «Стенд-бай», критически проанализирован каждый из этапов. Определены фундаментальные моменты программ экономического развития на 2015 год, которую предлагает МВФ, предоставлены предложения их дальнейшего развития в условиях глобализации и возможные последствия от этого. Очерчены основные преимущества и недостатки сотрудничества Украины с МВФ. Выделены основные проблемы, с которыми столкнулась экономика Украины на своём пути к европейской интеграции та какую роль при этом отыгрывает МВФ. У статті проаналізовано необхідність економіки України в міжнародному кредитуванні в рамках програм співробітництва з Міжнародним валютним фондом. Досліджено етапи проведення співробітництва України з МВФ в рамках програм системної трансформаційної позики, програм розширеного фінансування та програм «Стенд-бай», критично проаналізовано кожний із етапів. Визначено фундаментальні моменти програм економічного розвитку на 2015 рік, які пропонує МВФ, надано пропозиції подальшого їх розвитку в умовах глобалізації і можливі наслідки від цього. Окреслено основні переваги та недоліки співпраці України з МВФ. Виділено основні проблеми, з якими стикається економіка України на своєму шляху до європейської інтеграції та яку роль при цьому відіграє МВФ.

DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30165ResumenLa legitimidad de los procesos de construcción de normas de alcance global es un elemento central al tiempo de difundirlas y efectivizarlas. En este contexto, los promotores de los nuevos modelos de cláusulas ICMA (International Capital Market Association), en uso del discurso de la gobernanza, realizaron un esfuerzo extendido por presentar su emergencia como el resultado de una matriz política de cooperación horizontal, particularmente amplia e inclusiva. Este artículo analiza la composición y dinámica de esta matriz con el objeto de mostrar quienes –como y porque– participaron en su redacción. De igual modo, la compara con aquella propia de la ONU dirigida a crear una solución alternativa a la de estos modelos, a fin de dar cuenta empíricamente quienes fueron sus principales excluidos. A contramano de lo que postula la literatura especializada, este artículo argumenta que los modelos-ICMA emergieron de una matriz política liderada y controlada por las elites del mercado de deuda soberana que se cerró estratégicamente hacia aquellos agentes con potencialidad de cambio sobre el régimen de reestructuraciones vigente. El artículo advierte sobre la posibilidad de que aquellos elementos del discurso de la gobernanza que promueven valores democráticos sean –como en el caso concreto– utilizados ideológicamente por las elites para presentar sus propios criterios regulatorios como legítimos y extenderlos a vastas extensiones del planeta.Palabras Claves: Gobernanza; Deuda soberana; Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI); Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU). AbstractThe legitimacy of the construction processes of norms of global scope is a key element in order to disseminate and enforce them. In this context, the promoters of the new ICMA clauses models, in use of the governance discourse, made an extended effort to present their emergence as the result of an open, inclusive and horizontally cooperative political matrix. This article analyzes the composition and dynamics of this matrix in order to show who –how and why– participated in the design of these models. Similarly, the article compares this matrix with that of the UN created for wording an alternative solution to ICMA-clauses, in order to empirically show who were the agents excluded from this matrix. Contrary to what the specialized literature postulates, this paper argues that the ICMA-models emerged from a political matrix led and controlled by the sovereign-debt market elites that were strategically closed to those agents with the potentiality for changing the current restructuring regime. The article warns that those elements of the governance discourse that promote democratic values can be ideologically used –as actually happened in the concrete case– by the elites to present their own regulatory criteria as legitimate and to extend them to vast areas of the planet.Keywords: Governance; Sovereign debt; International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations (UN).

DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30095ResumoO debate sobre Reestruturações da Dívida Soberana (RDS) está no centro da agenda de políticas econômicas globais. Em 2014, o FMI apresentou uma nova proposta contratual –como parte integrante de um conjunto de reformas– para organizar esses processos e permaneceu fora das discussões destinadas a elaborar um mecanismo estatutário dentro da ONU, o que acentuou as divisões existentes neste campo. Ao contrário da maior parte da literatura especializada que analisa os limites e potencialidades desta proposta do FMI em termos abstratos, este artigo faz isso através de um «jogo de posições nas disputas». Esta nova maneira de abordar o debate sobre RDS, que começa explicitando os pressupostos e os interesses desde onde os agentes falam neste campo, possibilita explicar por que existem não só opiniões diferentes, mas diretamente opostas, sobre o mesmo fato social (a nova iniciativa do FMI). Argumenta-se que esta proposta supera os modelos contratuais existentes, mas deixa aberto uma margem de incerteza sobre a correta organização das reestruturações futuras: a profundidade e as implicações de tal incerteza no mercado da dívida soberana assumem significados particularmente diferentes de acordo com a cosmovisão de cada uma das posições abordadas.Palavras-chave: Reestruturação da dívida soberana (RDS); Fundo monetário internacional (FMI); Cláusulas de ação coletiva (CACs); Cláusulas Pari Passu.AbstractThe Sovereign Debt Restructuring (SDR) debate is at the center of the global economic political agenda. In 2014, the IMF issued a new contractual proposal –as an integral part of a set of reforms– to organize these processes but remained outside of the discussions that promoted the creation of an SDR statutory mechanism at the UN, something which marked the existing divisions in the SDR field. Unlike specialized scholars that analyze the limits and potentialities of the IMF contractual proposal in abstracto, this article does it by means of a «game of positions in dispute». This new way of approaching the SDR debate, which starts by making explicit the assumption and interests from where the agents in this field speak, helps to explain why there are not only diverse but directly opposite opinions about the same social fact (the IMF new proposal). It is argued that this proposal improves the existing models of contractual clauses, but it leaves a margin of uncertainty about the correct organization of future restructuring processes: the Rev. Direito e Práx., Rio de Janeiro, Vol. XX, N. X, 2018, p. XX-XX. Alejandro Gabriel Manzo DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30095| ISSN: 2179-8966 3 depth and implications of this uncertainty in the sovereign debt market acquire particularly different meanings according to the worldview of each of the addressed positions.Keywords: Sovereign debt restructuring (SDR); International monetary fund (IMF); United nations (UN); Collective action clauses (CACs); Pari Passu Clauses.

DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30095 Resumo O debate sobre Reestruturacoes da Divida Soberana (RDS) esta no centro da agenda de politicas economicas globais. Em 2014, o FMI apresentou uma nova proposta contratual –como parte integrante de um conjunto de reformas– para organizar esses processos e permaneceu fora das discussoes destinadas a elaborar um mecanismo estatutario dentro da ONU, o que acentuou as divisoes existentes neste campo. Ao contrario da maior parte da literatura especializada que analisa os limites e potencialidades desta proposta do FMI em termos abstratos, este artigo faz isso atraves de um «jogo de posicoes nas disputas». Esta nova maneira de abordar o debate sobre RDS, que comeca explicitando os pressupostos e os interesses desde onde os agentes falam neste campo, possibilita explicar por que existem nao so opinioes diferentes, mas diretamente opostas, sobre o mesmo fato social (a nova iniciativa do FMI). Argumenta-se que esta proposta supera os modelos contratuais existentes, mas deixa aberto uma margem de incerteza sobre a correta organizacao das reestruturacoes futuras: a profundidade e as implicacoes de tal incerteza no mercado da divida soberana assumem significados particularmente diferentes de acordo com a cosmovisao de cada uma das posicoes abordadas. Palavras-chave: Reestruturacao da divida soberana (RDS); Fundo monetario internacional (FMI); Clausulas de acao coletiva (CACs); Clausulas Pari Passu. Abstract The Sovereign Debt Restructuring (SDR) debate is at the center of the global economic political agenda. In 2014, the IMF issued a new contractual proposal –as an integral part of a set of reforms– to organize these processes but remained outside of the discussions that promoted the creation of an SDR statutory mechanism at the UN, something which marked the existing divisions in the SDR field. Unlike specialized scholars that analyze the limits and potentialities of the IMF contractual proposal in abstracto, this article does it by means of a «game of positions in dispute». This new way of approaching the SDR debate, which starts by making explicit the assumption and interests from where the agents in this field speak, helps to explain why there are not only diverse but directly opposite opinions about the same social fact (the IMF new proposal). It is argued that this proposal improves the existing models of contractual clauses, but it leaves a margin of uncertainty about the correct organization of future restructuring processes: the Rev. Direito e Prax., Rio de Janeiro, Vol. XX, N. X, 2018, p. XX-XX. Alejandro Gabriel Manzo DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30095| ISSN: 2179-8966 3 depth and implications of this uncertainty in the sovereign debt market acquire particularly different meanings according to the worldview of each of the addressed positions. Keywords: Sovereign debt restructuring (SDR); International monetary fund (IMF); United nations (UN); Collective action clauses (CACs); Pari Passu Clauses.

DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30165 Resumen La legitimidad de los procesos de construccion de normas de alcance global es un elemento central al tiempo de difundirlas y efectivizarlas. En este contexto, los promotores de los nuevos modelos de clausulas ICMA ( International Capital Market Association ), en uso del discurso de la gobernanza, realizaron un esfuerzo extendido por presentar su emergencia como el resultado de una matriz politica de cooperacion horizontal, particularmente amplia e inclusiva. Este articulo analiza la composicion y dinamica de esta matriz con el objeto de mostrar quienes –como y porque– participaron en su redaccion. De igual modo, la compara con aquella propia de la ONU dirigida a crear una solucion alternativa a la de estos modelos, a fin de dar cuenta empiricamente quienes fueron sus principales excluidos. A contramano de lo que postula la literatura especializada, este articulo argumenta que los modelos-ICMA emergieron de una matriz politica liderada y controlada por las elites del mercado de deuda soberana que se cerro estrategicamente hacia aquellos agentes con potencialidad de cambio sobre el regimen de reestructuraciones vigente. El articulo advierte sobre la posibilidad de que aquellos elementos del discurso de la gobernanza que promueven valores democraticos sean –como en el caso concreto– utilizados ideologicamente por las elites para presentar sus propios criterios regulatorios como legitimos y extenderlos a vastas extensiones del planeta. Palabras Claves: Gobernanza; Deuda soberana; Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI); Organizacion de Naciones Unidas (ONU). Abstract The legitimacy of the construction processes of norms of global scope is a key element in order to disseminate and enforce them. In this context, the promoters of the new ICMA clauses models, in use of the governance discourse, made an extended effort to present their emergence as the result of an open, inclusive and horizontally cooperative political matrix. This article analyzes the composition and dynamics of this matrix in order to show who –how and why– participated in the design of these models. Similarly, the article compares this matrix with that of the UN created for wording an alternative solution to ICMA-clauses, in order to empirically show who were the agents excluded from this matrix. Contrary to what the specialized literature postulates, this paper argues that the ICMA-models emerged from a political matrix led and controlled by the sovereign-debt market elites that were strategically closed to those agents with the potentiality for changing the current restructuring regime. The article warns that those elements of the governance discourse that promote democratic values can be ideologically used –as actually happened in the concrete case– by the elites to present their own regulatory criteria as legitimate and to extend them to vast areas of the planet. Keywords: Governance; Sovereign debt; International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations (UN).

The main objective of this paper is to highlight the setting up and functioning principles of the AIIB, the rationales of its foundation and motivations of the 57 participating countries to join China. At the same time, the authors bring to the forefront a new way identified by emerging economies to mitigate the asymmetries of international financial system: the launch of new multilateral development institutions.

The latest global financial crisis has allowed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a spectacular comeback. But despite its notorious reputation as a staunch advocate of restrictive economic policies, the Fund has displayed less preference for austerity in recent crisis lending. Though widely welcomed as overdue, the IMF’s shift away from what John Williamson coined the ‘Washington Consensus’ was met with resistance from the European Union (EU) where it concerned Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The situation of hard-hit Hungary, Latvia, and Romania propelled unprecedented cooperation between the IMF and the EU, in which the EU has very actively promoted orthodox measures in return for loans. We argue that this represents a European rescue of the Washington Consensus. The case of Latvia is paradigmatic for the profound disagreements between an austerity-demanding EU and a less austere IMF. The IMF’s stance contradicts conventional wisdom about the organization as the guardian of economic orthodoxy. To solve this puzzle, we shed light on three complementary factors of (non)learning that have shaped the EU’s relations vis-à-vis CEE borrowing countries in comparison to the IMF’s: (1) a disadvantageous institutional setting; (2) vociferous creditor coalitions; (3) the precarious eurozone project.

UID/CCI/04667/2016 Em setembro de 2016 a Associação Portuguesa para os Direitos do Consumidores (Deco) realizou um inquérito para aferir o conhecimento que os portugueses tinham sobre as principais organizações nacionais e internacionais. Em antepenúltimo lugar ficou o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI). Dada a proximidade temporal entre a vinda do FMI a Portugal e a elaboração desse inquérito, consideramos pertinente analisar a imagem que os portugueses têm sobre a organização que figura entre as instituições de que os portugueses mais ouviram falar, através dos media, nos últimos anos. O desconhecimento dos portugueses relativamente ao FMI é notório nas respostas aos inquéritos, em que apenas 5% dos inquiridos classificaram de forma correta todas as afirmações sobre a instituição: o valor mais baixo dos países em estudo. In September 2016, the Portuguese Association for the Rights of Consumers (Deco) carried out a survey to determine the Portuguese’s knowledge about the main national and international organizations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was ranked second-last. Given the time proximity between the IMF’s visit to Portugal and the elaboration of that survey, we deemed appropriate to analyze that organization’s image for the Portuguese, as it is one of the institutions that the Portuguese have heard the most through the media, in recent years. Portuguese people’s ignorance about the IMF is obvious from the answers given to the surveys, whereby only 5% of the respondents correctly classified all the statements about the institution: the lowest value of the countries under study. publishersversion published

Under present conditions, the commercial networks are expanding, not only by the increase of turnover, but also by the increase of the circle of business entities, organisations and enterprises. No doubt, the economic processes should be stable, simple and neutral. The article by G. Abuseridze, the young Georgian scientist of law, deals with the mentioned problem areas. Pašreizējos apstākļos paplašinās tirdzniecības tīkli, ne tik daudz pieaugot apgrozījumam, cik paplašinoties darījumu subjektu lokam, tajos iesaistītajām organizācijām un uzņēmumiem. Nenoliedzami, ekonomiskajiem procesiem būtu jābūt stabiliem, vienkāršiem un neitrāliem. Minētajam problēmu lokam savu rakstu ir veltījis Gruzijas jaunais tiesību zinātnieks G. Abuseridze.

This study investigates the distributional effects of international organizations within their member countries. It addresses the issue empirically by examining the causal effect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs on income inequality. Introducing a new instrumental variable for IMF programs, I exploit time variation in the IMF’s liquidity and cross-sectional variation in a country’s probability of having a lending arrangement with the IMF. Using panel data for 155 countries over the 1973–2013 period, the results show that IMF programs substantially increase income inequality in democracies, while having no such effect in non-democracies. The size of this effect on democracies is smaller the more democratized the IMF’s decision-making processes are. These results are consistent with the theory that powerful, ‘democratically deficient’ international organizations that interfere in domestic politics are capable of restricting the responsiveness of democratic governments to the preferences of their citizens.

O objetivo deste artigo é compreender as razões da maior autonomia burocrática do Banco Mundial em relação ao Fundo Monetário Internacional. Acreditamos que as razões desta diferença residem na burocracia com expertise mais diversificada do Banco Mundial em contraste com a burocracia de expertise mais rígida do FMI. Uma burocracia mais diversificada aumenta as possibilidades de formação de coalizões com ONGs em torno de policies de interesses comuns. Essas coalizões aumentam os custos de intervenção dos Estados para alterar ou barrar as policies defendidas pelo corpo burocrático. Assim, quanto maior a diversidade de expertise da burocracia internacional, maior será a possibilidade de formação de coalizões com ONGs em torno de policies de seu interesse e, consequentemente, maior será sua autonomia burocrática. Do ponto de vista teórico, utilizamos a teoria agente-principal para discutir burocracias internacionais. Usamos o método comparativo com base em instrumentos qualitativos de análise e estatística descritiva. The main goal of this article is to understand why the World Bank has reached more bureaucratic autonomy than the International Monetary Fund regardless the fact that both have similar institutional structures. We believe that the reason for such difference is a more diverse expertise of the World Bank compared to the IMF. We claim that a more diverse bureaucracy increases the likelihood of coalition formation with NGOs. Such coalitions aim to support policies that are important for both the bureaucracy and the NGO's. Consequently, they increase the costs for both State intervention and State control over the organization. The higher costs of intervention and control allow bureaucrats to act more freely according to their interests. Hence, our hypothesis is the following: the more diverse the bureaucratic expertise, the more likely is the formation of coalitions between bureaucracy and NGOs, and the greater the costs for State control and intervention. Higher intervention and control costs, in turn, increase bureaucratic autonomy. We use mainly qualitative research methods with some descriptive statistics.

In 1996, the International Monetary Fund introduced its polices of good governance in order to rebrand the organization as an institution that promoted new policy practices such as financial integrity, transparency and anti-corruption. The same year, the IMF and Egypt agreed upon a Stand-By Arrangement that paved the way for massive liberalization and deregulation reforms, which were introduced over the following 14 years. Consequently, Egypt became one of the Fund's closest collaborators and associated IMF member countries in the Middle East. However, while Egypt made very considerable progress with job creation, budget deficit reduction and increased foreign direct investment, the country remained highly corrupt and poorly governed. The way Egypt was governed was indeed in sharp contrast to the IMF's good governance standards. Poor governance - including corruption, cronyism, social inequality and democratic restrictions - eventually led to the downfall of President Hosni Mubarak in January 2011. President Mubarak and his associates had agreed with many of the economic policy measures the Fund had suggested between 1996 and 2011, with the IMF praising the country's willingness to adjust through Executive Board discussions, economic reports and research. Why did the IMF remain so positive to the developments in Egypt when the country was so poorly governed, and what role did good governance really play it the relationship between Egypt and the IMF during this period? This thesis will discuss these subjects by analyzing how the IMF promoted its good governance policy practices towards Egypt between 1996 and 2011. If the Fund failed to promote good governance towards Egypt, was this failure a result of the IMF lacking data or were the Egyptian authorities unwilling to comply with IMF-suggested policy measures? This thesis will look into these subjects and attempt to understand how, and to what extent, the IMF's good governance polices were promoted towards Egypt between 1996 and 2011. Master i Historie MAHF-HIS HIS350

This paper analyzes the multilateral Brazilian foreign policy, making the country a regional pivot in Latin America, a leading nation among developing countries, and an emerging world power. Without the status of nuclear power, Brazil establishes asymmetrical alliances to earn a place in a reformed UN Security Council, but must contend the seat with accredited competitors, such as India, as well a strategic partner, and counteract some riotous neighbors, as Mexico and Argentina. Meanwhile, through the establishment and the membership in several international organizations and multilateral mechanisms, Brasília developes a worldwide policy, maneuvering between new and old alliances, and playing a 'winning and losing carambole game'. Will the chrysalis turn into a butterfly? Resumo Este trabalho analisa a política estrangeira multilateral do Brasil, fazendo o país um pivô regional na América Latina, una nação liderante entre os países em desenvolvimento e uma potência mundial emergente. Sem o estado de potência nuclear, o Brasil estabelece alianças estratégicas para ganhar um lugar num Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas reformado, mas tem que competir por este lugar com concorrentes acreditados, tal como a Índia, assim como um parceiro estratégico, e para contrapor-se à alguns vizinhos tumultuosos, tal como o México e a Argentina. Enquanto isso, através do estabelecimento e da afiliação a muitas organizações internacionais e mecanismos multilaterais, Brasília desenvolve uma política mundial, manobrando entre alianças novas e antigas, e jogando carambola com possibilidade de conseguir o perder. A crisálida vai virar borboleta?

Em setembro de 2016 a Associação Portuguesa para os Direitos do consumidores (Deco) realizou um inquérito para aferir o conhecimento que os portugueses tinham sobre as principais organizações nacionais e internacionais. Em antepenúltimo lugar ficou o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI). Dada a proximidade temporal entre a vinda do FMI a Portugal e a elaboração desse inquérito, consideramos pertinente analisar a imagem que os portugueses têm sobre a organização que figura entre as instituições de que os portugueses mais ouviram falar, através dos media, nos últimos anos. O desconhecimento dosportugueses relativamente ao FMI é notório nas respostas aos inquéritos, em que apenas 5% dos inquiridos classificaram de forma correta todas as afirmações sobre a instituição: o valor mais baixo dos países em estudo., In September 2016, the Portuguese Association for the Rights of Consumers (Deco) carried out a survey to determine the Portuguese’s knowledge about the main national and international organizations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was ranked second-last. Given the time proximity between the IMF’s visit to Portugal and the elaboration of that survey, we deemed appropriate to analyze that organization’s image for the Portuguese, as it is one of the institutions that the Portuguese have heard the most through the media, in recent years. Portuguese people’s ignorance about the IMF is obvious from the answers given to the surveys, whereby only 5% of the respondents correctly classified all the statements about the institution: the lowest value of the countries under study.

This work provides a comparative analysis of international financial institutions’ transparency policies and denounces their shortcomings and excessive prudence, and in the case of less formal cooperation bodies (such as the G-20 or the Financial Stability Board), the lack of attention to basic transparency concerns. The study shows that a higher degree of institutionalization calls for a more coherent and open transparency policy, as more structured institutions have at their disposal the appropriate resources and are more easily subject to pressure by the civil society. The IMF and the World Bank are clearly more transparent than informal cooperation fora such as the G-20 or the Financial Stability Board. As a development institution, the World Bank gets more benefits from transparency and it has achieved a remarkable level of procedural guarantees that could be set as an example for other international financial institutions, including the IMF. However, in practice, even in the World Bank there is excessive latitude for opaqueness.

This paper proposes an answer to the question of why social unrest sometimes occurs in the wake of an IMF Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Under certain circumstances, partly determined by a country’s comparative advantage, a nation’s elite may have an incentive to make transfers to the rest of society through government employment in order to quell social unrest. But under an SAP, the elite are constrained from making such transfers and consequently social unrest may arise. The paper proposes a framework from which a prediction can be made about the circumstances under which social unrest can be expected to occur. It then takes this prediction to the data and finds empirical support for it.

This work provides a comparative analysis of international financial institutions’ transparency policies and denounces their shortcomings and excessive prudence, and in the case of less formal cooperation bodies (such as the G-20 or the Financial Stability Board), the lack of attention to basic transparency concerns. The study shows that a higher degree of institutionalization calls for a more coherent and open transparency policy, as more structured institutions have at their disposal the appropriate resources and are more easily subject to pressure by the civil society. The IMF and the World Bank are clearly more transparent than informal cooperation fora such as the G-20 or the Financial Stability Board. As a development institution, the World Bank gets more benefits from transparency and it has achieved a remarkable level of procedural guarantees that could be set as an example for other international financial institutions, including the IMF. However, in practice, even in the World Bank there is excessive latitude for opaqueness.

This article examines the ‘new constitutionalism’ of the free movement of capital at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the global economic crisis. It is argued that the concept of new constitutionalism, as developed by Stephen Gill, is an indispensable concept to understand the still growing institutionalization of neoliberal policies in constitutions, laws, institutions, and regulations. The latest attempt to further extend the constitutionalization of the free movement of capital, one of the pillars of neoliberalism, is the IMF’s newly developed ‘institutional view’ on capital flows. This approach, while more pragmatic than earlier attempts, can be understood as a renewed effort to prevent emerging markets and developing countries from installing capital controls and deviating significantly from neoliberal policies. However, emerging markets and developing countries have opposed this new IMF framework. As such, the ability to further extend the new constitutionalism of the free movement of capital is severely weakened.

The article contains detailed information on the impact of globalization on the development of the global financial market, discussed ways of understanding the essence of financial globalization. В статье представлена информация относительно влияния глобализации на развитие мирового финансового рынка; рассмотрены пути понимания сущности финансовой глобализации. В статті наведено інформацію щодо впливу глобалізації на розвиток світового фінансового ринку; розглянуті підходи до розуміння сутності фінансової глобалізації

The wisest economic decision of United States in the 20th century was establishing the favorable international monetary system, and capturing the leadership position in it. This decision gave economic hegemony to the US for the next more than 7 decades. The continuation of this hegemony till the next decade seems difficult as the US economy is under continuous streams of recessions since 2007. On the other hand, Chinese economy is progressing with a very fast speed and is estimated to pass the US economy till 2025, in various aspects. Will the US be able to continue its leadership in the IMS? Will China replace US in the international monetary system? The answers to these questions have been explored by comparing the economic competitiveness of US and China, with respect to each other. The paper concludes that the change in global economic environment will compel US to share the leadership of international monetary system with China. This sharing will solve most problems of the current IMS, but will also birth some new problems., {"references":["D. Strauss-Kahn, \"Nanjing and the New International Monetary\nSystem\", iMFdirect, International Monetary Fund, 31 Mar 2011.\nAvailable online at http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2011/03/31/newinternational-\nmonetary-system/","R. Triffin, \"Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today and\nTomorrow\", New York, Random House, 1968.","N. Kaldor, \"The Dollar Crisis\", The Times, 6, 7, 8 September 1971.\n[reprinted in Kaldor, N. 1978, Further Essays on Applied Economics,\nNew York, Holmes and Meier]","\"The Role of the SDR in the International Monetary System\", IMF Staff\nStudy, Washington, DC, 1987.","D. Lipton, \"Refocusing the Role of the International Monetary Fund\",\nDiscussion paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,\nWashington, DC, 1999.","Isabelle Mateos y Lago, Rupa Duttagupta, and Rishi Goyal, \"The Debate\non the International Monetary System\", IMF Staff Position Note, IMF\nResearch Department, November 2009.","Richard N. Cooper, \"Necessary Reform? The IMF and International\nFinancial Architecture\", Harvard International Review, volume 30, Issue\n4, Winter 2009.","\"IMF Resources and the G-20 Summit\", IMF, Washington, DC, 11\nFebruary 2010. Available online at\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/sdrfaqs.htm","\"Currency Amounts in New Special Drawing Rights (SDR) Basket\",\nIMF, Washington, DC, 30 December 2010. Available online at\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/sdr/sdrbasket.htm\n[10] \"IMF Quota and Governance Reform--Elements of an Agreement\", IMF,\nWashington, DC, 31 October 2010. Available online at\nhttp://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/103110.pdf\n[11] \"Major foreign holders of US treasury securities\", US treasury\ndepartment, United States, 29 April 2011. Available online at\nhttp://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chartcenter/\ntic/Documents/mfh.txt\n[12] Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, \"China-s Holdings of U.S.\nSecurities: Implications for the U.S. Economy\", Congressional Research\nService, United States, 30 July 2009. Available online at\nhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf"]}

43 σ., Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πολυτεχνείο--Μεταπτυχιακή εργασία. Διεπιστημονικό-Διατμηματικό Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών (Δ.Π.Μ.Σ.) "Μαθηματική Προτυποποίηση στις Σύγχρονες Τεχνολογίες και στην Οικονομία", Η εργασία αυτή αναλύει τον Τουρκικό Τραπεζικό τομέα πριν και μετά την έλευση του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου (ΔΝΤ) κατά την περίοδο 1998-2010. Το πρώτο μέρος εξετάζει τη διακύμανση των πέντε βασικών μακροοικονομικών δεικτών, συνολικής ανεργίας, το Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν, Εθνικό ΔΤΚ, το ακαθάριστο χρέος και των καθαρών εξαγωγών αγαθών και υπηρεσιών για την περίοδο που αναφέρεται. Η μακροοικονομική αστάθεια ήταν σημαντική κινητήρια δύναμη της τραπεζικής κρίσης. Η κρίση ξέσπασε όταν η Τουρκία ήταν μετά από συναλλαγματικών ισοτιμιών με βάση το πρόγραμμα αποκλιμάκωσης του πληθωρισμού οδήγησαν και μηχανικής από το ΔΝΤ. Το ΔΝΤ έχει ασχοληθεί με τη μακροοικονομική διαχείριση της τουρκικής οικονομίας τόσο πριν όσο και μετά την κρίση. Το δεύτερο μέρος αναλύει το τουρκικό τραπεζικό σύστημα, πριν και μετά την έναρξη της ανταλλαγής επιτοκίου με βάση το πρόγραμμα αποπληθωρισμού υπό την καθοδήγηση και τον έλεγχο του ΔΝΤ. Τουρκικά Τραπεζικό Σύστημα, δεν ήταν μόνο ένας από τους κύριους παράγοντες αλλά και το κλειδί ενεργοποίησης των κρίσεων του 2000 και του 2001, που συνεχίστηκε για τρία χρόνια. Το εύθραυστο τραπεζικό σύστημα έχει τις ρίζες της στην υψηλή δανειακών αναγκών του δημόσιου τομέα και ο τρόπος που χρηματοδοτούνται. Οι κανονισμοί που αποβλέπει κυρίως στην αναδιάρθρωση των κρατικών τραπεζών, την επίλυση της κατάστασης των ανθυγιεινών τραπεζών σύμφωνα με την SDIF, την ενίσχυση ιδιωτικών τραπεζών και παρέχοντας ένα καλύτερο πλαίσιο για τη ρύθμιση των τραπεζών. Ως αποτέλεσμα, υπήρξαν δύο διαφορετικά είδη διχοτόμησης: Ιδιωτικός έναντι κρατικών τραπεζών και εντός των ιδιωτικών τραπεζών. Η Βασιλεία II προσέφερε ένα σημαντικό σημείο αναφοράς για αυτούς να ακολουθήσουν. Τα αποτελέσματα της οικονομικής και λειτουργικής αναδιάρθρωσης του τραπεζικού συστήματος έχουν παρατηρηθεί, όπως η βελτίωση των δεικτών κερδοφορίας στο σύνολο του τομέα., This paper analyzes the Turkish Banking Sector before and after the departure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the period 1998-2010. The first part examines the variation of five basic macroeconomic indicators, Total Unemployment, Gross Domestic Product, National CPI, Gross Debt and Net Exports of Goods and Services for the referring period. The macroeconomic instability was important driver of the bank crisis. The crisis erupted when Turkey was following an exchange-rate based disinflation program led and engineered by the IMF. The IMF has been involved with the macro management of the Turkish economy both prior and after the crisis. The second part analyses the Turkish Banking System before and after the inception of the exchange rate-based disinflation program under the guidance and monitoring of the IMF. Turkish Banking System, was not only one of the main factors but also the key trigger of the crises of 2000 and 2001, which went on for three years. The fragile banking system has its roots to the high public sector borrowing requirement and the way it was financed. The regulations mainly aimed at restructuring state banks, resolving the situation of the unhealthy banks under the SDIF, strengthening private banks and providing a better framework to regulate banks. As a result, there were two different types of dichotomization: Private versus state banks and within the private banks. Basel-II provided an important benchmark for them to follow. The results of the financial and operational restructuring of banking system have been observed as an improvement in the profitability ratios of the whole sector., Χρήστος Ε. Δουκάκης

The article contains detailed information of the cooperation between International monetary fund and Ukraine. В статье приведена информация о сотрудничестве Украины с Международным валютным фондом. В статті наведено інформацію щодо співробітництва України з Міжнародним валютним фондом.

The International Monetary Fund's recent claims concerning its impact on public health are evaluated against available data. First, the IMF claims that health spending either does not change or increases with IMF-supported programs, but there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Second, the IMF claims to have relaxed strict spending requirements in response to the 2008–9 financial crisis, but there is no evidence supporting this claim, and some limited evidence from the Center for Economic Policy Research contradicting it. Third, the IMF states that wage ceilings on public health are no longer part of its explicit conditionalities to poor countries, as governments can choose how to achieve public spending targets; but in practice, ministers are left with few viable alternatives than to reduce health budgets to achieve specific IMF-mandated targets, so the result effectively preserves former policy. Fourth, the IMF's claim that it has increased aid to poor countries also seems to be contradicted by its policies of diverting aid to reserves, as well as evidence that a very small fraction of the Fund's new lending in response to the financial crisis has reached poor countries. Finally, the IMF's claim that it follows public health standards in tobacco control contrasts with its existing policies, which fail to follow the guidelines recommended by the World Bank and World Health Organization. The authors recommend that the IMF (1) become more transparent in its policies, practices, and data to allow improved independent evaluations of its impact on public health (including Health Impact Assessment) and (2) review considerable public health evidence indicating a negative association between its current policies and public health outcomes.

The IMF and World Bank have over the years gained a stronghold in African economic policies. This is mainly due to the borrowing and lending relationship between the continent and these sister organizations. This paper seeks to address the negative effects that the IMF imposed Structural Adjustment policies have on the struggling economies of African countries and propose a solution to this problem. The paper also seeks to explore possible alternatives to taking IMF, World Bank loans and gives examples of countries who have explored such options successfully.

People living in low-income countries require protection from the economic and social impacts of global economic competition, yet, historically, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) fiscal austerity programs have weakened the potential for redistribution both within poor countries and between rich and poor countries. The current development paradigm's focus on “sustainability” is an obstacle to developing systems of global social protection and an impediment to future progress. Reforming IMF policy conditionality and democratizing the IMF's decision-making processes will be necessary for offsetting growing inequalities in health financing among poor nations.

In the last decade of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, global economy has been exposed to the increased instabilities and global financial disequilibria, which outgrew in some of the countries in the region in global financial and economic crises. However, because of the huge misfortunes of the IMF in solving the financial crises and in fostering the development of the developing countries, there is great need for a radical reform of the IMF as well as the international financial system. Our goal in this paper is to highlight the role and significance of the IMF. It is possible to define the process of the reform of this institution and because of that we would like to show an agenda for the reform of the IMF by specifying the main directives of the reform draft. Therefore we shall divide this paper in two parts. In the first part of the paper, we shall discuss the importance of a possible reform of the Fund, which helps IMF to accomplish its goal and additionally suggest the directives for possible reform of the IMF. The second part of the paper shall discuss individually each directive of possible reform of the IMF which, in humble opinion of many economists, needs to reform its methodology of work and adopt new mechanisms, which should help manage the international monetary system effectively and later, provide a strong base for its (global financial system) development in the future., U posljednjem desetljeću XX-og i početkom XXI-og stoljeća, globalna ekonomija bila je izložena pojačanim nestabilnostima i financijskim neravnotežama, što je prouzrokovalo da u većini zemalja i regiona nastanu ekonomske, odnosno financijske krize. Zbog velikih neuspjeha MMF-a u obavljanju svojih regularnih aktivnosti, generalizirala se potreba za kompletnom reformom ove međunarodne financijske institucije, a samim time i globalnog financijskog sustava. Stoga, cilj ovog rada je ukazati na značaj i ulogu Fonda u financijskom sustavu i globalnoj ekonomiji, uopće. Također, u radu smo utvrdili i definisali program procesa reforme ove institucije, te ćemo u tom kontekstu predstaviti najznačajnije smjernice tog preliminarnog drafta. Rad smo podijeli u dva dijela: prvi dio koji ukratko obrazlaže ključne razloge za reformu MMF-a, a drugi dio se odnosi na konkretne odrednice koje bi trebale biti uvrštene u potencijalni program reforme. Po uvriježenom mišljenju većine ekonomista, Fondu su potrebni novi instrumenti i metodologija rada, što bi mu u konačnici pomoglo da efikasnije upravlja globalnim financijskim sustavom i osigura čvrstu osnovu za njegovo dalje funkcioniranje i razvoj.

Esta modesta reflexión invita a una discusión enmarcada en categorías analíticas que podrían ayudar a superar ciertas limitaciones propias de este tipo de debates en el pasado. Al mismo tiempo, en esta intervención sugiero ciertas líneas cruciales en la construcción de una alternativa para el país en el contexto de la relación de fuerzas internas y externas. Creo que es fundamental orientar la discusión del rol del Estado en torno a la construcción de un nuevo régimen de acumulación que favorezca el ‘empoderamiento’ de la gente, el ensamblaje de una nueva identidad digna y solidaria en América Latina y el desarrollo radical de ciudadanía.

International audience; The conditionality employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its lending policy is one of the main themes of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our analysis is based on the idea that the IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. More precisely, we explain that most of the criticisms concerning conditionality should be analyzed through what we agree to call the institutional failures of IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at two complementary levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second deals with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries. Although the first level failures have been particularly well studied via the international public choice approach, those of the second are, at best, often reduced to a simple statement. However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is not without implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by including an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship between conditionality and domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante conditionality emanating from the public choice approach, which tackles the first level of failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed that suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process.

Luego de la caída del Gobierno del Coronel Gutiérrez, en nuestro país se inició el debate en torno a su futuro político. Como siempre el tema fundamental que vuelve al tapete de la discusión es el de la gobernabilidad y no puede ser de otra manera cuando vivimos una permanente inestabilidad política que atenta a la condición necesaria para avanzar en el desarrollo. Se ha pretendido sostener que el tema de la gobernabilidad en nuestro país pasa por la necesidad de fortalecer a la función ejecutiva y más concretamente las atribuciones del Presidente de la República, en nombre del régimen presidencial. Sin embargo la experiencia histórica demuestra que el tema de la gobernabilidad no tiene que ver exclusivamente con la organización de la institucionalidad del Estado, sino fundamentalmente, con la lucha y búsqueda consecuente por erradicar la pobreza, el desempleo, atención a las necesidades básicas de la población, democratizar el acceso a los servicios públicos, fortalecimiento del aparato productivo, manejo ético de los asuntos públicos, la defensa de la Constitución y particularmente de los derechos humanos.

La disyuntiva planteada en torno al futuro financiamiento del país se halla enmarcada dentro de dos opciones: ceder a la presión del FMI y de los acreedores internacionales y locales de la deuda pública -aumentando las cargas a la población- o emprender acciones para recuperar la cartera vencida de las instituciones financieras sometidas a control estatal y así establecer las cuentas de quienes participaron en dichas operaciones. La opción que asuma la administración del Coronel Lucio Gutiérrez nos dará luces respecto a las intencionalidades de cambio o de continuidad.