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The World Bank Group’s environmental and social safeguards are at the center of a heated debate regarding the legitimacy of their insertion in loan agreements. They also face important implementation problems. Nevertheless, environmental and social safeguards are instrumental vectors of sustainable development in Recipient countries through their insertion as conditionality in loan agreements. The question at stake is therefore how to reinforce the safeguards as effective vectors of sustainable development while avoiding sovereignty infringement and solving issues of noncompliance. For this purpose, this book aims at posing a diagnostic of the problems faced by this type of conditionality, through a classification of the conditionality and a systematization of its criticisms. Using three case studies to illustrate the findings, it proposes several avenues for change, such as a Human Rights-based harmonization of safeguards across Multilateral Development Banks, institutional changes in the World Bank Group to strengthen the support for environmental and social protection through the safeguards and, in order to determine the project’s eligibility for funding, a strict assessment of the suitability of the Recipient’s context for the implementation of the safeguards.

The present text aims to analyze the New Development Bank (NDB) established by BRICS as part of the group's financial architecture, focusing on the main motivations for its creation, ways of acting and governance structure. Although focused on providing credit for infrastructure and sustainable development projects and acting through different practices of financial institutions established after the Second World War, NDB still faces important challenges to meet those goals.

In January 2016, the People’s Republic of China became the 65th member country of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: a multinational financial institution created by the European Union and the European Investment Bank “to promote entrepreneurship and change lives” across the Mediterranean region, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Perhaps Chinese involvement in this European institution could be considered a surprising development, until we realize both the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which are generally seen as the major players, are constituted of over a dozen EU members. This complexity of relations is also evident throughout the rest of the multilateral development banks active in Asia. The aim of the article is to test the hypothesis that the cooperation between multilateral development banks not only provides the opportunity for the funding of various investment projects crucial to the world economy, but can also facilitate the achievement of the individual political goals of their members. The text offers a brief comparative analysis of the multilateral development banks that operate and interact in Asia, presenting the common ground for their financial cooperation, while attempting to identify ways of avoiding serious conflicts of interest. The real test of this hypothesis must take into account the political context in which these interactions take place. Publication is a part of the project: Regional Center for International Debate in Lodz 2017–2018 Project co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

This text aims to analyse the New Development Bank (NDB) established by BRICS as part of the group's financial architecture, focusing on the main motivations for its creation, ways of acting and governance structure. Although focused on providing credit for infrastructure and sustainable development projects and acting through different practices of financial institutions established after the Second World War, NDB still faces important challenges to meet those goals.

To what extent do the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank remain central today and how much influence do they still wield in shaping the global agenda? While several studies have traced the development of various intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), charting their growth and influence in international affairs, and assessing their prospects, few if any have compared IGOs across various fields. This paper aims to fill this gap by taking a closer look at three different policy fields to better understand the current architecture of global governance, the centrality of IGOs, the role of new and other actors, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of this "new" architecture. The authors find that, first, the emergence of new private players has significantly eroded the centrality of IGOs such that the course of global governance in health, trade, and development finance has changed irreversibly. Second, regional arrangements have overtaken global ones and nonstate actors have assumed more prominent roles. Third, this multiplicity of powerful players has led to some positive outcomes but also greater inefficiencies and redundancies. Fourth, developed countries have been pivotal in eroding the centrality of IGOs, but developing countries are taking on a greater role in global governance. Fifth, the new architecture can be described as one of diversification in global health governance, fragmentation in global trade, and variation in multilateral development finance. Global governance in the 21st century is thus characterized by a proliferation of actors and a decentralization of authority, an erosion of IGO centrality accompanied by a greater role for nonstate actors, developing countries, and by increased regionalism. Depending on the sector of governance, its inherent aims, and the nature of the actors involved, the new architecture may be one of variation, fragmentation, or diversification. While this new architecture is complex and might possibly lead to inefficiencies and redundancies, it allows a greater number of actors to participate, making it more representative of the current world order and making it possible to mobilize more resources to promote development.

The authors assess the role of the multilateral development system and the reforms needed to support the new global agenda. There is an urgency to the reforms. The coming decades will see the largest urban expansion in history. More infrastructure needs to be built in the next 15 years than the existing stock of infrastructure in the world. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are uniquely placed to support policy and institutional reforms and build institutional capacity, enhance the quality of projects and programs, and scale up for transformative change. They are the best mechanism today for leveraging public resources. By our calculations, each dollar of paid-in capital could reasonably translate into $50 of public investments if properly allocated. Despite these inherent strengths, MDBs are constrained by their financial and institutional capacities, effectiveness of instruments, and unclear mandates and governance shortcomings. The authors suggest MDBs do more in three client groups: (i) fragile states; (ii) high-debt countries; and (iii) upper middle-income countries, adjusting strategies and use of instruments in each case. With so many issues on the table, they believe that the greatest risk to the system lies in active inertia, a tendency to make changes on the margin that fall short of a collective response that is scaled to the task at hand. Individual MDBs each perform well, according to evaluation results, but their impact could be enhanced if they cooperated more as a system and developed scalable platform approaches. Major expansion is not feasible under current business and financial models. Shareholders need to reach consensus on capital and governance to unlock the financial potential and effectiveness of the MDB system.

Fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries. An ample literature has explained this fact and explored its consequences for aggregate cyclical fluctuations. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are an important source of finance for governments and therefore play a role in the execution of fiscal policy. In this paper, we assess whether MDB disbursements to the sovereign commove with government expenditure and with private sovereign lending, during different stances of fiscal policy and during fiscal crises. We find that multilateral lending to the sovereign is correlated with government expenditure and this correlation does not change if the government is running a surplus or a deficit. However, when the sovereign is having a fiscal crisis associated with unsustainable fiscal policy, this relationship disappears for Regional Development Banks (RDBs) and the World Bank (WB). Finally, we find evidence of synchronization between MDBs and IMF during fiscal crises.

Мировой финансово-экономический кризис 2008-2009 гг. властно поставил перед мировым сообществом задачу реформирования международной экономической системы и привлечения к глобальному экономическому управлению динамично развивающихся стран с формирующимися рынками. Одну из ключевых ролей в процессах реформирования международной экономической системы и глобального экономического управления приобретает Китай как держава не только нарастившая свою экономическую мощь до уровня второй мировой экономики, крупнейшей торговой державы и держателя золотовалютных резервов, но и демонстрирующая готовность взять на себя соответствующую международную ответственность и начать задавать вектор мирового экономического развития. Содействуя совершенствованию существующих правил, норм и системообразующих институтов, Пекин одновременно предлагает миру новые, китаецентричные инициативы, наиболее известными из которых, но отнюдь не единственными, являются создание Азиатского банка инфраструктурных инвестиций и инициатива «Пояс и путь». В статье характеризуется участие Китая в реформировании международной экономической системы после азиатского финансового кризиса 1997-1998 гг. по настоящее время: выделяются основные формы участия Китая, мотивация и направления приложения его усилий. Прослеживая выдвигаемые, поддерживаемые и реализуемые Китаем инициативы и меры, предполагающие изменения в международной экономической системе, а также анализируя официальную риторику и внешнеполитическую деятельность китайского руководства, в статье делается вывод о взятом Пекином курсе на занятие одной из ключевых ролей в глобальном экономическом управлении и постепенное выстраивание китаецентричной системы международных правил, норм и институтов., The 2008 global financial crisis has become a turning point for the world community to realize the necessity to reform international economic system and to allow greater participation of leading emerging economies in the global economic governance. Given the huge economic might that China has accumulated and its willingness to assume greater international responsibilities and leadership functions, China can be regarded as one of the countries that play a key role in the processes of reforming the international economic system and global economic governance. Contributing to the improvement of the existing rules, norms and institutions, Beijing at the same time offers to the world its new, China-centered initiatives, to name a few, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and “Belt and Road” Initiative. This article characterizes China’s participation in the reforming of the international economic system after the 1997 Asian financial crisis till the present time with the focus on identifying major forms of China’s participation, its motivations and efforts’ emphasis. By reviewing initiatives and measures that China offers, backs and conducts in order to bring changes into the international economic system and by analyzing Chinese leadership’s official rhetoric and foreign policy activities, the article concludes that Beijing has set a course to assume one of the key roles in the global economic governance and to create China-dominated system of international rules, norms and institutions..

This article analyzes decentralization in the discourse of Multilateral Development Banks, which is presented in Latin America as a necessary step towards development – especially corcerning better public policies and democratization. However, the observation of empirical cases of decentralization and the analysis of other development bank’s discourse suggest that the ideia of decentralization as synonymous of development is overestimated. Esse texto discute a descentralização como uma questão que perpassa transversalmente a ideia da consolidação do federalismo de fato. Defende-se que a apologia por parte de alguns bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento a um modelo específico de federalismo com um número muito grande de prerrogativas descentralizadas tem a ver com a lógica da monocultura institucional, ou seja, a ideia de que existem arranjos institucionais que são aprioristicamente superiores e que podem e devem ser adotados em todos os lugares independentemente de suas idiossincrasias.

Special drawing right (SDR) valuation is done in terms of currency amounts of the four international reserve currencies, namely the US Dollar (USD), the Euro, the Japanese Yen and the pound sterling. Currencies included in the SDR calculations are determined on the basis of the value of export of goods and services over the past 5 years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Rule O-2(a) defi nes the value of the USD in terms of the SDR as the reciprocal of the sum of the equivalents in USDs of the amounts of the currencies in the SDR basket. Each USD equivalent is calculated on the basis of the middle rate between the buying and selling exchange rates at noon in the London market, or New York market or on the basis of euro reference rates published by the European Central Bank depending upon availability. For other currencies, SDR rates are based on SDR-USD rate and USD-other currency rate. Currency rates in terms of USD as reported by the issuing central banks is different from the SDR-USD rate based on London market, this difference cause the SDR to have different dollar values. It can potentially create spurious translation movements, even for a perfectly hedged position. In this study, we assess the impact of different exchange rate quotations for SDR calculations on SDR as a unit of account. Specifi cally we look at the long-run behavior and the short run dynamics of the difference between SDR as done by the IMF and on basis of London market and look at the implications for SDR as a unit of account and for currency risk management for multilateral development banks that use SDR as a unit of account.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have important functions in infrastructure projects. Besides their traditional lending role, they provide additional guarantees to private investors about the creditworthiness of the project. An empirical analysis is performed for the determinants of MDBs’ participation in infrastructure projects in developing countries using data from 1990 to 2007 obtained from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database and through limited dependent variable models. The results suggest that the participation of MDBs is higher for less populous and poorer countries, in line with past empirical findings, and where legal and financial systems are underdeveloped. However, neither political risk nor even respect for human rights seems to play an important role in explaining multilateral participation.

O presente trabalho analisa a atuação de Bancos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento (BMDs) em política social. Considerando os efeitos da globalização sobre o campo, estes atores vêm ganhando destaque na medida em que influenciam a política social doméstica de países em desenvolvimento por meio de empréstimos que transmitem as principais ideias e prescrições políticas geradas nestas organizações. Nesse âmbito, tem-se como objetivo identificar quais fatores influenciam a distribuição dos recursos financeiros em política social de um BMD. A hipótese central do trabalho é a de que existe relação positiva entre a capacidade estatal dos países e a alocação dos recursos financeiros de um Banco Multilateral de Desenvolvimento. Para tanto, utilizou-se uma abordagem ‘recipients-oriented’ (DIAS ET AL, 2016), que enfatiza fatores relacionados aos países clientes de tais bancos, responsáveis por implementar os projetos para os quais tomam os empréstimos. Desta forma, foi realizado um estudo de caso da atuação do Banco Mundial (BM) na América Latina e Caribe (ALC), entre 2008 e 2014, construído sobre a triangulação de estratégias quali e quantitativas de análise. A revisão bibliográfica e a análise documental deram conta da fundamentação teórica e análise do conteúdo das políticas propostas pelo Banco no período. Partindo da definição de capacidade estatal como capacidade de implementar políticas públicas (SKOCPOL, 1985), utilizou-se a tipologia de welfare gaps (CECCHINI; FILGUEIRA; ROBLES, 2014) como proxy de capacidade estatal para a realização dos testes estatísticos, aplicados sobre base de dados contendo informações sobre os projetos financiados pelo BM (WORLD BANK, 2015a). Os resultados obtidos demonstram que há relação positiva entre a capacidade estatal e a distribuição do financiamento do Banco Mundial em política social na América Latina e Caribe, no sentido que quanto maior a capacidade estatal dos países, maior a quantidade de aportes financeiros do Banco que estes obtêm. The following thesis analyses the role that the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) play in social policy. Given the globalization's effects on this field, these actors have been gaining prominence as far as they influence the domestic social policy of developing countries through loans that convey the main ideas and policy prescriptions generated in these organizations. In this context, the aim of this study is to identify what factors influence the distribution of financial resources in the social policy of the MDBs. The main hypothesis is that there is a relationship between the state capacity and the allocation of financial resources by the MDBs. For this purpose, a recipients-oriented (DIAS et al, 2016) approach has been used, emphasizing the features related to the borrowing countries of such banks, responsible for implementing the projects for which they are contracting these loans. Therefore, a case study was conducted on the World Bank’s (WB) operations in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), between 2008 and 2014, based on the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative analysis strategies. The bibliographic review and documental analysis assess the theoretical rationale and analysis of the content of the policies proposed by the Bank in the period. Based on the definition of state capacity as the capacity of implementing public policies (SKOCPOL, 1985), the welfare gaps typology (CECCHINI; FILGUEIRA; ROBLES, 2014) was used as a proxy of state capacity to perform the statistical testes, applied on the database containing information on the projects financed by the WB (WOLRD BANK, 2015a). The results obtained show that there is a positive relation between state capacity and the distribution of World Bank financing in social policy in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the sense that the greater state capacity of a country, the greater the amount of financial contributions obtained through the Bank.

The impact of the ongoing financial crisis on the availability of finance to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represents an important topic nowadays. The access to finance for SMEs is a major barrier for their growth, especially during severe conditions such as the global financial crisis. Financing the SMEs represents a priority for the most of the multilateral development banks. The aim of the paper is to analyze the activity of European multilateral development banks - European Investment Bank Group and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - in the support of SMEs. We found that SMEs financing increased during the period 2008-2011 and the international financial institutions took several measures in order to improve the SMEs access to finance.

This paper adopts a vulnerability perspective to look into some of the key developmental issues that have been raised in discussions following the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009. We contend that country vulnerability, defined as probability of shocks × ( exposure − resilience ), matters for future growth and poverty reduction. However, different ways of dealing with vulnerability all have specific advantages as well as downsides. First, coping with the aftermath of shocks can be painful and is inherently backward-looking. Second, prevention by reducing exposure is typically a long-term process. Third, increasing resilience through self-insurance often carries high opportunity costs. And fourth, market insurance and hedging may be politically sensitive and is largely unavailable to countries that need it most. Hence we argue for a multi-layered ‘therapy’, combining different approaches with attention to the short and long term, mindful of country specifics and with roles to play for both developing countries themselves and international actors. A tentative exploration of how vulnerability has been dealt with before and during the crisis suggests that, in some areas, important progress has been made. Nevertheless, and particularly for low-income countries, there is still a long way to go.

This Country Partnership Framework (CPF) presents the World Bank Group (WBG) program and the associated results framework for Lebanon for the period FY17-FY22. In a fragile and conflict-prone environment, this CPF aims at mitigating the immediate, and potentially long-lasting impact of the Syria crisis on Lebanon, while strengthening state institutions, addressing existing vulnerabilities, and bolstering efforts on longer term development challenges, all through interventions that foster inclusion and shared prosperity. The CPF will work through two focus areas as a way to renew the social contract between the state and the citizens: (i) expand access to and quality of service delivery; and (ii) expand economic opportunities and increase human capital. Through these two focus areas, the WBG will help Lebanon mitigate the economic and social impact of the Syria crisis, safeguard the country’s development gains, and enhance the prospects for stability and development in the coming years. The CPF will contribute to strengthening the relationship between the state and its citizens, a critical ingredient for peace and stability. The CPF will contribute to strengthening the relationship between the state and its citizens, a critical ingredient for peace and stability. The CPF benefited from a series of stakeholder consultations, including those held in connection with the Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) and the WBG Gender Strategy.

Over the past decade, donors of foreign aid quadrupled their annual contributions to trust funds at the World Bank. This earmarking of contributions to donors' preferred recipient countries and issues has raised concerns about the alignment of trust funds with the performance-based allocations of aid by the International Development Association, the World Bank's concessional lending arm, and raises the question of the role of this new "multi-bi" aid channel. This study finds that the cross-country allocations of aggregate trust fund aid are poverty- and policy-selective. In this respect, they are much more similar to allocations from the International Development Association than from bilateral donors. The allocations of trust fund types that are more closely controlled by donor countries—recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds—are more strongly related to the strategic interests of donor countries than trust fund aid in general. Trust funds for health and education aid are poverty selective and positively correlated with the World Bank's assessment of the quality of countries' sector policies, while environmental trust funds are neither poverty selective nor correlated with the assessed quality of countries' environmental policies. Overall, the evidence indicates that multi-bi funds administered by the World Bank do not undermine the International Development Association’s allocation criteria.

About a third of development projects fail to achieve satisfactory outcomes, according to agencies' independent evaluation units. To a large extent, these outcomes appear to be baked into projects at their inception due to inadequate project design or relevance. This prompts questions about the diffusion of project design concepts: To what extent are better-designed or better-performing projects more likely to be emulated? Do factors of bureaucratic or political attractiveness -- such as ease of set-up and rapidity of disbursement -- play a role? To address these questions, this paper explores the use of methods from network science. It constructs a network graph of the relationship among the components of all World Bank investment projects initiated from 1996 to 2014, based on the semantic similarity of the component descriptions. It uses the network to assess the characteristics of projects that are more 'prolific' in the sense of having closely related followers, and as tool for visualizing diffusion of design concepts. This illustrative exercise defines a measures of project 'influence' on subsequent projects and tests simple, nonexclusive hypotheses about the determinants of influence. It finds no significant impact of project outcome or quality of entry (as independently rated) on 'influence.' Nor does ease of project preparation (as proxied by time from concept note to effectiveness) have any significant effect. However, very small projects (less than $10 million) have markedly lower 'influence' on average. This finding may have implications for the usefulness of small projects as pilots for subsequent scale up.

This paper analyzes influences on the credit standing of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), specifically the quality, diversification and single name concentration of their portfolios, and on the market practice known as Preferred Creditor Status (PCS), whereby sovereigns that default on other debt rarely fail to meet their obligations to MDBs. The paper examines how rating agencies assess MDB ratings, focusing in particular on how Standard & Poor's assesses capital as part of its MDB rating process. The results are compared with those implied by an industry-standard, ratings-based Credit Risk Model (CRM). Applying these methodologies to one specific MDB, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the paper shows that S&P's approach is highly conservative in its evaluation of single name concentration risk and makes insufficient allowance for PCS. Calibrating the CRM with risk-neutral distributions, the paper examines the effect of PCS on MDB funding rates and compares model-implied funding spreads with those observed in the market.

A multilateral development finance institution for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region represents the chance to create a strong pro-developmental actor – and energize the IGAD itself. Yet, the IGAD senior officials will need to look beyond the traditional development banking model if they hope to make an impact of the scale needed to drag these poorest of countries out of their poverty. In this paper, we argue for the design of a development bank modelled after successful role models – like the China Development Bank – instead of proven failures. A mix of government and private sector participation, a widely disbursed capital base, and a temporary base in London, will help ensure the proposed IGAD Communities Development Bank acts as bridge and vector of pro-developmental capitalism in the IGAD region.

A discussão dos elementos políticos, econômicos e financeiros relacionados ao debate sobre bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento (BMDs) se tornou ainda mais interessante com o surgimento de novas instituições multilaterais, como o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento do BRICS (NBD). Apesar de ainda não ter realizado empréstimos, o NBD desperta expectativas com relação a mudanças tanto em termos de método operacional como também de resultados. No entanto, pouco se sabe a respeito do significado da criação e da possibilidade de crescimento de um novo BMD governado por esses países emergentes. Quais são os desafios que o NBD irá enfrentar? Qual a sua capacidade de superar essas dificuldades? Quão distinta do Banco Mundial esta nova instituição será? Essas são as questões que norteiam esta dissertação, cujo objetivo geral é identificar e analisar os principais dilemas e obstáculos políticos e institucionais que os BMDs em geral, e em particular o NBD, encontram em suas trajetórias e a capacidade de superação dessas instituições. Esta pesquisa é desenvolvida através de um método que combina elementos teóricos e históricos, e avalia informações extraídas de documentos oficiais e discursos dos líderes dos BMDs estudados. A pesquisa é estruturada em cinco capítulos, além da introdução e das conclusões. A dissertação inicia com uma discussão teórica a respeito dos propósitos e processo decisório dos BMDs. O segundo capítulo é dedicado às questões financeiras referentes à captação de recursos, gestão de riscos e concessão de crédito dos BMDs. No terceiro capítulo, o objetivo é descrever a evolução do capital, da governança e do crescimento do Banco Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BIRD), mais conhecido como Banco Mundial, durante o período que se estende desde sua fundação até o presente. O quarto capítulo discute a forma como o BIRD administrou os riscos apresentando as principais características das suas políticas financeiras e de crédito ao longo da sua existência. O objetivo do quinto capítulo é analisar a criação do NBD, as características da sua estrutura de capital e de governança, as prováveis políticas financeiras e de crédito e as possibilidades de crescimento desta nova instituição, estabelecendo sempre um paralelo com a discussão anterior sobre os BMDs e com a história do BIRD. Na conclusão, são apresentados resultados que indicam potencial do NBD para crescer e contribuir com o financiamento do desenvolvimento a partir de um modelo diferente do que tem sido praticado historicamente pelo BIRD. The discussion regarding the political, economic, and financial aspects related to multilateral development banks (MDBs) has become more interesting with the appearing of new multilateral institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB). Despite still not having a history with lending, the NDB is expected to bring some changes in terms of operational method and results. Yet, the real meaning about the creation and possibility of growth of this new MDB, governed by emerging countries, is unknown. What are the challenges the NDB is going to face? What is its capacity to overcome the difficulties ahead? How different from the World Bank this new institution will be? These are the questions that guide this dissertation, whose general goal is to identify and analyse the main dilemmas and political and institutional obstacles that MDBs in general, and the NDB in particular, find in their trajectories and the capacity of these institutions to overcome the challenges. This research is developed through a method that combines theoretical and historical elements, and evaluates information gathered from official documents and speeches of leaders of the MDBs studied. The research is structured in five chapters, besides the introduction and the conclusions. The dissertation begins with a theoretical discussion about the purposes and decision process of MDBs. The second chapter is dedicated to financial questions regarding borrowing of resources, risk management, and lending. In the third chapter, the objective is to describe the evolution of the capital, governance, and loans growth of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), more commonly known as the World Bank, during the period which extends since its origins until the present. The fourth chapter discusses the way the IBRD managed its risks, presenting the main characteristics of its financial and credit policies. The objective of the fifth chapter is to analyse the creation of the NDB, the characteristics of its capital and governance structure, its most probable financial and credit policies, and the chances of growth of this institution, always establishing a parallel with the previous discussion regarding the MDBs and the IBRD. In the conclusion, the results are presented indicating the NDB potential to grow and contribute to development finance with a model that has some differences in relation to the historical practices of the IBRD.

There is a distinct place for legal doctrinal methods in legal interdisciplinary research methodologies, but there is value to be had in expounding that place – in developing a deeper understanding, for instance, of what legal doctrinal analysis has to offer, wherein lies its limitations, and how it could work in concert with methods and theories from disciplinary areas other than law. This article offers such perspectives, based on experiences with an ‘advanced’ legal-interdisciplinary methodology, which facilitates a long-term study of the growing body of practice generated by citizen-driven, independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs) that are institutionally affiliated with multilateral development banks. The article demonstrates how legal doctrinal methods have contributed towards the design and development of a multipurpose IAM-practice database. This database constitutes the analytical platform of the research project and also facilitates the integration of various types of research questions, methods and theories.

Esse texto discute a descentralização como uma questão que perpassa transversalmente a ideia da consolidação do federalismo de fato. Defende-se que a apologia por parte de alguns bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento a um modelo específico de federalismo com um número muito grande de prerrogativas descentralizadas tem a ver com a lógica da monocultura institucional, ou seja, a ideia de que existem arranjos institucionais que são aprioristicamente superiores e que podem e devem ser adotados em todos os lugares independentemente de suas idiossincrasias., This article analyzes decentralization in the discourse of Multilateral Development Banks, which is presented in Latin America as a necessary step towards development – especially corcerning better public policies and democratization. However, the observation of empirical cases of decentralization and the analysis of other development bank’s discourse suggest that the ideia of decentralization as synonymous of development is overestimated.

Some multilateral agencies implement aid projects in a broad range of sectors, with aid disbursements showing a strong overlap with those of bilateral donors. The question then arises of why do bilateral donors delegate sizable shares of their aid to non-specialized agencies for implementation? This paper develops a game theoretic model to explain this puzzle. Donors delegate aid implementation to the multilateral agency (ML) to strengthen the policy selectivity of aid, incentivizing policy improvements in recipient countries, in turn improving aid’s development effectiveness. Bilateral donors are better off delegating aid to ML even when they are purely altruistic but disagree on how aid should be distributed across recipients. Key for our result to hold is that ML searches some middle ground among disagreeing donors. Aid selectivity—in terms of both policy and poverty—emerges endogenously and is credible, as it is the solution to ML’s optimization problem. Moreover, the model shows that if one sufficiently large donor is policy selective in its aid allocations, there is no need for other donors to be policy selective. The World Bank’s aid program for lower-income countries, the International Development Administration (IDA), is shown to fit the assumptions and predictions of the model. Specifically, IDA is a dominant donor in most of its recipient countries and is much more policy and poverty selective than bilateral aid. Donors view it as a public good, and contribution more to it when bilateral aid is less selective. Potential threats to IDA’s role as a dominant, policy-selective donor include the emergence of nontraditional donors, changes in voting shares, and traditional donors’ increasing use of earmarked contributions.

The rapid growth of trust funds at multilateral development organizations has been widely neglected in the academic literature so far. Using a simple illustrative model, this paper examines the choice by sovereign donors among various trust fund options. The authors contend that the choice among the different trust funds involves a fundamental trade-off: larger funds provide donors with the benefit of burden sharing. Conversely, each donor can better assert its individual preferences in a fund with fewer other donors. The theoretical considerations yield testable implications on a range of factors affecting this fundamental tradeoff, most notably the area of intervention of the trust fund and competing domestic interests of donor countries. Using a sample of World Bank trust funds, the paper examines the participation decisions of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee donors over the past decade. In line with the theoretical argument, preference homogeneity among donors as well as indicators for global activities and fragile states assistance are robust determinants of participation in (large) multi-donor funds. In contrast, donors tend to prefer single-donor trust funds in areas in which their national interests dominate. Although they could use bilateral aid for the same purpose, they often prefer to channel their contributions through trust funds at multilateral agencies. Donors thereby reduce their own administrative costs, while benefiting from the expertise of the multilateral agency. These findings confirm prior qualitative case studies and evidence from donor reports, suggesting that reduced reliance on single-donor trust funds—a costly instrument from the perspective of multilateral agencies—can improve the development effectiveness of aid.

This paper examines the micro and macro correlates of aid project outcomes in a sample of 3,821 World Bank projects and 1,342 Asian Development Bank projects. Project outcomes vary much more within countries than between countries: country-level characteristics explain only 10–25 percent of project outcomes. Among macro variables, country growth and the policy environment are significantly positively correlated with project outcomes. Among micro variables, shorter project duration and the presence of additional financing are significantly correlated with better project outcomes. In addition, the track record of the project manager in delivering successful projects is highly significantly correlated with project outcomes. There are few significant differences between the two institutions in the relationship between these variables and project outcomes.

The development community is increasingly accepting the importance of evidence, feedback, and learning. Some of which is generated through research, monitoring, and self-evaluation during policy-making, program design, and implementation. Others come from feedback from people directly affected by interventions who have gained a greater voice, be it through third-party feedback mechanisms, social media, beneficiary surveys, or otherwise. And, there is independent evaluation. At the World Bank Group, the independent evaluation group (IEG) has over the past years deepened the evidence that can help development finance succeed in translating the sustainable development goals (SDGs) into actions and results. This paper brings together insights from a cross-section of relevant evaluations that cover various aspects of the large, multifaceted agenda of the SDGs and their financing needs.

Global alliance for vaccines and immunization (GAVI) is the third largest multilateral in the health sector. It has a single-purpose mandate, to increase access to immunization in poor countries. The World Bank is a founding partner to GAVI and remains a major partner, particularly at a financial level by supporting operations of two major innovative financial mechanisms on its behalf. The Bank’s most significant contribution is a key role in the establishment and management of two innovative financing mechanisms (International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) and Advanced Market Commitment (AMC)) that have contributed one-third of GAVI’s financial resources from 2000 to 2010. The relationship with GAVI has been collegial and constructive in countries where there is engagement, but in many countries the Bank is not substantially involved in immunization. This review concludes that the status quo leaves organizational synergies untapped, and that stronger Bank involvement, drawing on its strengths in sustainable funding for immunization, addressing inequities in access to immunization, investments in health systems strengthening, and donor coordination in health can help achieve greater development results.

This paper aims to analyze the relationship between Brazil and major Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) between 1990 and 2012. For this purpose, three MDBs were considered, namely, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, World Bank), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB ) and the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), later renamed to Development Bank of Latin America. In order to obtain a better understanding about the working rationale of these international financial institutions, the paper begins by examining their operational and administrative procedures, as well as raising issues related to their strategies, products and financing conditions. More specifically, with regard to these three banks, the work analyzes the dynamics of loans and financial flows in sectorial, geographic and institutional terms. It also seeks to give an account of strategies implemented in accordance with Country Strategy Papers developed by each of these institutions. Since 1990, the volume of loans to Brazil grew significantly, totaling nearly USD 86 billion in the stated period, a result of long-standing partnerships that were able to resolve, mainly after the economic stabilization in 1994, several disagreements experienced before 1990, especially with the IBRD.

Triangular cooperation is a relatively recent mode of development cooperation. It normally involves a traditional donor from the ranks of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an emerging donor in the South, and a beneficiary country in the South. It has received increasing international attention because of particular advantages it is said to provide. At the same time, it poses several risks that could further complicate international development cooperation. To make full use of its potential, it is important to conceive it as a learning process, to identify the interests of the three parties involved, and to apply the internationally agreed principles of aid effectiveness. When these principles are applied, triangular cooperation can enrich international development cooperation.

GFDRR was established in September 2006 as a global partnership of the World Bank, UN agencies and bilateral donors, located in World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC. Its missions are (a) to mainstream disaster reduction and climate change adaptation (CCA) in country development strategies, and (b) to foster and strengthen global and regional cooperation among various stakeholders under the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system. GFDRR supports the implementation of the UN 2005-2015 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). This international agreement in relation to disaster risk reduction (DRR) arose from a 168-nation UN conference held in Kyoto, Japan, in 2005. The key player for coordinating the implementation of HFA is the UNISDR bureau with headquarters in Geneva and eight regional offices worldwide. Another UN agency with operational responsibility for UN disaster related work is the UNDP-BCPR. These two UN agencies and GFDRR have complementary goals, creating potential for collaboration among the three organizations, but also calling for care in monitoring the risk of overlapping work among them and other DRR actors. UNISDR was a founding partner of GFDRR and UNDP-BCPR became a permanent observer to GFDRR in 2008.

The corporate scorecard provides information on the Bank's overall performance and results achieved by its clients against the backdrop of global development progress. The scorecard facilitates dialogue between management and the board on progress made and areas that need attention. The four-tier scorecard covers the full spectrum of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA) activities. The corporate scorecard uses an integrated results and performance framework, which is organized in a four-tier structure that groups indicators along the results chain Two of the tiers track elements of development results (tiers one and two), and the other two capture elements of performance (tiers three and four). As the summary shows, the corporate scorecard monitors, at an aggregate level, whether the Bank is functioning efficiently and adapting itself successfully (tier four), and whether it is managing its operations and services effectively (tier three) to support countries in achieving results (tier two) in the context of global development progress and priorities (tier one). It presents a high-level view and is not intended to provide country or activity-level information.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are an innovative institutional model to channel financing and knowledge to developing countries. In Latin America, the balance of forces between competition and collaboration among MDBs and other sources of development finance have formed a system that is decentralized and client-oriented. The author analyzes three types of relationships between MDBs to show areas of strength in their operations and future potential, using a great amount of quantitative data from the annual reports and financial databases of MDBs that the FORO Nacional Internacional research program has been tracking periodically.

Azerbaijan is a secular, majority-Shiite, oil and gas-rich country whose per-capita income quadrupled in real terms during the period 2004-10. While rising incomes have reduced poverty, steps towards a more secure, diversified economy are held back by a public sector that rests on vested interests, patronage-based incentive structures, and ingrained patterns of behavior that include significant rent extraction, particularly from the non-oil economy, with minimal checks and balances from Parliament, the private sector, and civil society. Bank engagement in Azerbaijan at the country level focused on areas which had government support. Some modest results have been achieved, even though in many cases modern laws and practices were adopted without adequate plans for implementation. At the project level, the Bank has supported the strengthening of project implementation units (PIUs) and tools for monitoring, and governance and institutional filters have signaled that Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) processes need to be embedded in the Bank projects. At the sector level, the Bank's work was highly relevant in supporting oil revenue transparency, primary education, roads, and the development of safeguards. It was substantially relevant in public financial management, and private sector development and procurement. Bank engagement was moderately relevant in decentralization, civil service reform, and accountability institutions.

Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest and most densely populated countries, and subject to annual cyclones and flooding. Despite these challenges, it benefits from strong economic growth, good performance on health and education, and poverty reduction, alongside weak governance and pervasive corruption. The reasons include strong macroeconomic policy, pro-poor spending, credible elections, export growth and remittances, improved capacity for managing natural disasters, and a stronger civil society than comparable countries. After over a decade of intense engagement with the Bank on governance, Bangladesh adopted in 2006 a governance-oriented Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) with four main objectives: to improve implementation capacity; to 'tackle corruption' by fully operationalizing the Anti-Corruption Commission; to lay the foundation for comprehensive legal and judicial reform; and to strengthen 'voice, empowerment and participation.' The choice of a wide range of instruments and areas of intervention was appropriate, given the political instability at the time of 2006 CAS preparation. The Bank signaled it was ready to engage in all areas, and could scale up or pull back depending on emerging political and bureaucratic commitment. The 2006 CAS yielded mixed results, and the subsequent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) has been more selective on GAC issues. At the project level, governance has been a key priority, in line with the South Asia region's heavy emphasis on GAC-in-Projects. Investments in GAC-in-primary education, a local government project, anti-corruption efforts in the power sector, and projects strengthening the investment climate have yielded positive results. Investments in GAC-in-roads projects have had mixed results in terms of effectiveness. GAC activities were mainly adopted prior to the 2007 GAC strategy. Although Bangladesh was a Country Governance and Anticorruption (CGAC) country, the country team chose not to use CGAC funds because the country had already been intensively using GAC approaches well before the GAC strategy was adopted.

Moldova has suffered over the last two decades from rising poverty, territorial secession, armed conflict, and the spillover effects of a regional financial crisis, with declining population size and life expectancy, and an economy approximately one-half of what it was in 1990. The return of the Moldovan Communist Party (PCRM), which won two major elections after 2001, contributed to increasing centralization of governmental authority along with a reform agenda that emphasized greater state control over the economy, fiscal support to state enterprises and collective farms, land consolidation, economic protectionism, and the tolerance of monopolies in industry and energy. At the same time, the government has increased social expenditures, and taken major steps to improve public financial management. Bank engagement was moderately effective at the country and project levels, and substantially effective at the sector level. There was progress in several aspects of public financial management (PFM). Regulatory streamlining has reduced costs to business, although resistance to civil service reform has left much work to be done. The Bank has also helped achieve progress on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) issues in primary education, roads, and private sector development. Education progress is highly uneven across regions, for example, overweight trucks continue to tear up roads, and private investment is not enough to make a dent in high unemployment. A graduated approach to country systems and road sector technical audits help address GAC issues at the project level. The overall impact of GAC strategy implementation was moderate. The GAC committees set up at the regional and sectoral Bank department levels are particularly useful mechanisms for disseminating practices from the GAC Council. Staff has been proactive in using Country Governance and Anticorruption (CGAC) resources. However, three applications for window one funding were not approved, reducing the ability of this small program to seize opportunities.

Este artículo tiene por objetivo analizar las estrategias de difusión-imposición y el contenido del neoliberalismo en las provincias y municipios de Argentina tomando como marco de referencia el caso Córdoba. A tal fin se divide en dos grandes partes: una primera, en la cual se presentan una serie de categorías analíticas destinadas a mostrar las estrategias que los agentes centrales utilizan a la hora de difundir-imponer el neoliberalismo en la era de la globalización y los rasgos sobresalientes de las reformas neoliberales de primera y segunda generación. La segunda, en la que se realiza un análisis socio-histórico del campo político cordobés y jurídico-dogmático de las normas a través de las cuales se dio forma al proyecto del Estado nuevo y al Pacto fiscal del año 2000. The objective of this article is to analyze the strategies of difusion/imposition and the content of the neoliberalism in the provinces and municipalities of Argentina using the "Crrdoba's case" as a case of reference. It is divided in two main parts: the first one, presents the strategies that the central agents use to spread/impose the neoliberalism in different parts of the planet and the main features of the neoliberal reforms of first and second generation; the second one, makes an historical analysis of the political field of Córdoba and a juridical analysis of the norms that gave form to the process of the "New State" and the "Fiscal Pact" of 2000. Cet article vise à analyser les stratégies de diffusion et le contenu d'imposition du néolibéralisme dans les provinces d'Argentine et les municipalités en prenant comme référence le cas de Cordoba. À cette fin, cet article sera divisé en deux parties principales: la première, qui est une série de catégories d'analyse visant à montrer les stratégies utilisées par les agents dans la diffusion imposée par le néolibéralisme dans l'ère de la mondialisation et principales caractéristiques des réformes néolibérales de la première et deuxième génération. La seconde, qui est une analyse du champ socio-historique-de la politique de Cordoba et dogmatique des règles juridiques à travers lequel a été façonné le projet nouvel Etat et le pacte fiscal de 2000. Este artigo visa analisar as estratégias de divulgação e conteúdo de imposição do neoliberalismo nas províncias da Argentina e municípios, tomando como referência o caso de Córdoba. Para este fim, eswte trabalho esta dividido em duas partes principais: a primeira, que é uma série de categorias de análise destinados a mostrar as estratégias que as plantas utilizam para agentes em impostar o neoliberalismo na era da globalização e características mais salientes das reformas neoliberais de primeira e segunda geração. A segunda, que é uma análise do campo sócio-histórico do político em Cordoba e dogmáticas das regras legais através dos quais moldaram o projeto novo estado e do Pacto Fiscal de 2000.

This case study summarizes the findings of desk reviews and a field visit carried out in January 2011 as part of IEG's evaluation of the 2007 Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy. The case study sought to evaluate the relevance and effectiveness of Bank support for GAC efforts over the FY2004-10 period, to assess the contributions of 2007 strategy implementation, and to identify early outcomes and lessons. This Background Paper is based on findings of the mission that visited Liberia in January 2011. The team is particularly grateful for informative meetings with officials from the Government of Liberia, Bank staff, and members of civil society. The evaluation aims to help enhance the Bank's approach to governance and anticorruption and to improve its effectiveness in helping countries develop capable and accountable states that create opportunities for the poor. Pursuant to this objective, the evaluation assessed the relevance of the 2007 GAC strategy and implementation plan, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of implementation efforts in making Bank engagement with countries and other development partners more responsive to GAC concerns. It also sought to identify early lessons about what works and what does not in helping to promote good governance and reduce corruption. The Liberia case study is based on an extensive desk review as well as a field visit to Monrovia from January 17-22, 2011. It evaluates the relevance and effectiveness of Bank support for governance and anticorruption efforts since the launch of the Bank's GAC strategy in 2007. It elaborates on a desk review of the GAC responsiveness of the Bank's Liberia program and reviews the following GAC entry points: core public sector reform (public financial management and decentralization); demand for good governance (including social accountability issues); GAC in the road sector; and the investment climate. The case study also examines the extent to which the Bank's GAC Strategy has made a difference in staff attitudes toward addressing GAC issues in their operational work. The mission interviewed government, Bank, donor, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) staff based in Washington and in Monrovia.

Cambodia is one of the world's most open economies, sustaining high levels of growth in an environment of relatively weak governance. Emerging from a legacy of genocide and civil conflict, the country has sought to address human and social capital deficits across sectors, weaknesses in public finance, and corruption. Despite improvements in access to basic services, governance constraints persist and may threaten gains from economic integration. Over the 2004-10 period, the Bank's engagement on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) issues in Cambodia was not defined by a single, overarching priority or entry point (such as core public sector management, natural resource management, or service delivery). Rather, the Bank was opportunistic, opting to support the government's GAC efforts across multiple sectors and institutions. The relevance of this opportunistic approach is judged to be moderately relevant. The Bank's objectives on public financial management (PFM) were highly relevant given Cambodia's nontransparent and weak public expenditure management and limited capacity. The Bank's response to sectoral governance weaknesses such as red tape, inefficiencies, and other forms of rent-seeking in customs is rated modest given the need for the government to implement its World Trade Organization commitments. The Bank's project level engagement is rated as moderately relevant. As a basis for reinstating suspended projects, portfolio-wide measures included the use of an Independent Procurement Agency (IPA) for the International Development Association (IDA) procurements, and the implementation of Good Governance Frameworks (GGF) for all IDA projects.

This note, prepared as background for the G20 submission, explores the potential for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase the volume of climate financing by leveraging and intermediating resources, through two main avenues: leveraging shareholder capital through the MDBs non-concessional windows, by raising debt from capital markets to finance climate investment; and mobilizing and 'pooling' concessional flows to support climate investment beyond the MDBs own balance sheets. The note is organized along these two lines, with the aim of providing some insights into the feasibility for MDBs to mobilize resources to leverage a significantly larger volume of climate financing assistance. The next section of this note provides information on how MDBs can support concessional flows to climate investments through pooling of external concessional flows beyond traditional balance-sheet capital. Leveraging shareholder capital and mobilizing and-pooling concessional flows are two potential avenues through which MDBs can leverage and intermediate resources to ultimately increase the volume of climate financing. The experience gained by the MDBs and their clients and donors from implementing these financing arrangements should provide helpful lessons for the development community as it considers how to develop the green climate fund and other future climate change initiatives.

The Bank's environmental agenda has evolved gradually since the 1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s, the main focus was on mitigating the potential environmental damage associated with investment projects using environmental impact assessments (EIA). This approach was formalized in the Bank's environmental assessment (EA) requirements, which today consist of a set of individual environmental policies and procedures. Recent evaluations of the Bank's safeguards policy implementation reveal that shortages in environmental safeguards specialists and inadequate skills mix, among other factors, are affecting the quality of safeguards implementation. This report recommends strengthening the environmental safeguards career track to help elevate the profile of safeguards specialists and provide opportunities for career advancement in the course of doing safeguards work. The report also recommends that there be an organizational restructuring to enhance the Bank's capabilities for conducting effective safeguards work. Furthermore, the report recommends developing a comprehensive training program that will enhance the safeguards skill mix and increase the effectiveness of safeguards support at the Bank. This report also recommends adopting a categorization methodology that reduces reliance on procedures requiring subjective judgments. Next, the report recommends the creation of a systematic program for measuring, reporting, and evaluating the effects of safeguards implementation. It also recommends a move towards substantive compliance and environmental sustainability principles for the safeguards framework. This report also recommends disseminating knowledge of policy instruments, besides environment impact assessments, that are able to produce similar or better outcomes than the Bank's safeguard policy requirements. The design and implementation of instruments for environmental policy can be pursued with a more risk-based and differentiated approach, based on country or borrower capacity. In addition to the mitigation of negative impacts, this report recommends institutionalizing the enhancement of positive impacts and client capacity building measures into the safeguards framework.