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When private international law lawyers discuss jurisdiction, focus is typically placed primarily on personal jurisdiction, and secondarily on subject matter jurisdiction. This article seeks to demonstrate that there is a third matter – what we can call scope of jurisdiction, or perhaps scope of remedial jurisdiction – that needs to be considered. Scope of jurisdiction relates to the appropriate geographical scope of orders rendered by a court that has personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. This question has gained far less attention to date. This article highlights why scope of jurisdiction is of particular importance in today's society dominated by constant, substantial and fluid cross-border interaction online, and discusses whether scope of jurisdiction is a separate issue or merely a sub-component of some other concept. Finally, it examines how we may impose appropriate limits on scope of jurisdiction.

The article sheds light on provisions of Codes of Civil Procedure of 1853 and 1860 concerning ordinary legal remedies. As this matter was codified for the first time, a necessity of amending and supplementing some provisions soon emerged. Those amendments and supplements, along with original provisions were examined in this paper. The author also deals with regulations on jurisdiction of Court of Appeal, Court of Cassation and Supreme court. Types and categories of ordinary legal remedies were scrutinized, as well as strict time limits within one should lodge an appeal and proper grounds for making an appeal. The author also responds to questions under which circumstances are ordinary legal remedies allowed, and what types of decisions a higher court can make after reviewing the correctness and reasonableness of a decision issued by a lower court. Shortly after enactment of the Code of 1853 it appeared that judicial procedure is too complicated, expensive and ineffective due to too many legal remedies and legal jurisdictions. That is the reason why the Supreme court as the highest court within the hierarchy of legal jurisdictions and as final court of appeal was abolished in 1860, when new Code of Civil Procedure had been passed. New codification envisaged Court of Appeal as second instance court and, at the same time, court of last resort. Regarding legal remedies, Code of 1860 introduced appeal as sole ordinary legal remedy.

Twenty-five years ago, in this Journal, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright argued that the structures of international law “privilege men.” As shown in Table 1, which summarizes data from a forthcoming article, on nine of twelve international courts of varied size, subject-matter jurisdiction, and global and regional membership, women made up 20 percent or less of the bench in mid 2015. On many of these courts, the percentage of women on the bench has stayed constant, vacillated, or even declined over time. Women made up a lower percentage of the bench in mid 2015 than in previous years on two-thirds of the courts surveyed.

The Constitution of Kenya provides that the sovereign power of the people shall be vested in the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, reflecting the democratic ideal that if power is concentrated in the hands of a few, it is prone to misuse. This provision aims to safeguard against arbitrary and capricious governance and the abuse of power. In the new constitutional order, there has been instances of tensions between the judiciary and the other arms of government. Unfortunate incidents of members of the Legislature referring to court orders as stupid and idiotic with blatant disregard for court orders have been witnessed. In a government whose legitimacy is vindicated by a court, it is ironical to observe a selective attitude towards respecting subsequent court orders. This paper aims to consider the disregard of court orders against the backdrop of the separation of powers and other relevant principles of constitutionalism.

This is an analysis of the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Nyamande v Zuva Petroleum. The article critiques the formalistic and conservative approach used by the Supreme Court in reaching its decision, as the Court failed to consider the important role now played by the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe. This is because Zimbabwe passed a new Constitution in 2013. The article briefly discusses the facts of the case, the reasoning and ruling by the Supreme Court and, in some detail, the failure by the Court to consider a number of fundamental human rights and freedoms which are embodied in the Zimbabwean Constitution. The article also outlines some important rights and principles that the Supreme Court ought to have considered but failed to do. It additionally briefly considers the legislative framework governing labour relations in Zimbabwe, particularly the Labour Act of Zimbabwe, with the aim of interrogating the correctness of the decision in light of the constitutional and legislative framework governing labour relations in Zimbabwe. Although the legislature has subsequently rectified the matter, it is still important to reflect on the mistakes made by the Supreme Court in order to prevent it from erring in the same manner in the future. It is important to note that there has to be some level of change regarding the manner in which judges interpret the law, particularly in light of the new Constitution. If the Constitution is to be worth anything more than the piece of paper it is written on, the judiciary ought to ensure that in all cases they adjudicate on the Constitution is considered. The Constitution should permeate all law, including statutory and common law.

Within the present paper a new phenomenon has been elaborated - a phenomenon of expanding jurisdiction of the present international criminal courts. At the moment there are two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, one permanent International Criminal Court and several hybrid and internationalized international criminal courts. Ad hoc Tribunals are in the phase of transformation into the UN Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals, as a completely new forum, thus expanding Tribunals jurisdiction in a new direction. As for the International Criminal Court, desirable mode of its expanding is through the increase of its member states, in the overall list of member-states. What is happening in reality is that states are approaching ad hoc at the ICC's docket, as the situation directs them. Tendency in the realm of the international criminal judiciary is that creation of new international criminal courts is expected, although not warmly accepted. With the multiple international criminal courts existing, in the same ratione materiae jurisdiction, it is highly expected that the overlaps will occur as well as the expanding of the jurisdiction that is beyond the usual terms of norms interpretation. The focus of this paper is on a dilemma - whether such a situation will provoke coherence or chaos.

The article analyses the changes of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon to give preliminary rulings in the proceedings launched where a national court submits a reference for preliminary ruling when considering a criminal matter as well as on a request from a national court to interpret a legal act of the European Union or deliver an opinion on its validity. In addition, it investigates the preliminary ruling, the requirements to fulfil when presenting procedural documents, and conditions of applying special measures in organizing the proceedings. The analysis of the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union will also help to reflect the potential trends of its future development. On the basis of the analysis of the case-law of the Court of Justice, the following conclusion is made: after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and expiry of the transitional period, no restrictions have been left for national courts (irrespective of their position in the national legislative system) to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling before the Court of Justice of the European Union where preliminary questions are related to the area of freedom, security and justice, therefore, the following trend arises: national courts more often decide to use this opportunity of cooperation with the Court also when a criminal case is pending before a national court. In the process of a preliminary ruling the role of a national court is very important, as it, requesting for a preliminary ruling, not only initiates the opening of the process, but also the quality of procedural documents submitted by a referring court may determine the progress, duration and result of the proceedings. Therefore, the requirements and stipulations laid down accordingly in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and Recommendations to national courts in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings are very important. An active use of national courts of a possibility to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in cases where there are doubts as regards interpretation of the European Union legal acts in considering criminal cases and the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice contributes to the attaining of one of the main objectives laid down in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the European Union law throughout the Union.

The global financial crisis has caused the need for a stronger positioning of the European Court of Justice in the new model of economic governance in the European Union. The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice contributes in creating the optimal legal control mechanism of budget spending in the European monetary law and ensure maintenance of euro-zone fiscal framework. The role of the European Court of Justice in the EMU in earlier periods was secondary, but in times of crisis, it points to the growing need of Jurisdiction's extending in the field of monetary relations between member states and respect of convergence rules. Court's Jurisdiction in resolving of monetary and fiscal disputes is increasingly implemented in determining the legal nature of international agreements, whose ratio is economic stability, where the Judgments regarding complementarities of these legal documents with primary law provisions have the crucial impact on the future direction of national fiscal policies coordination. Although, the Court's Jurisdiction in this area is still underdeveloped and Judgments are often conditioned by pragmatism reasons, by development of credible macroeconomic dialogue between Court of Justice, European Central Bank and European Court of Auditors may establish conditions for fullfiling legal gaps in the performance of monetary and fiscal Jurisdiction of the Court.

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

In this article, we draw on a prominent model of public management to develop a preliminary theoretical approach to understanding the role of the chief justice in Supreme Court decision-making. In particular, we argue that the Court may seek legitimacy through greater unanimity and discuss how the leadership of the chief justice can facilitate that effort. We assess a hypothesis derived from this theory, showing greater agreement among the justices as the incumbent chief justice’s tenure in office increases. We argue that these results provide support for further attention to and development of a public administration-based approach to the study of Supreme Court decision-making. The application of public administration to judicial politics provides further evidence of management dynamics in American institutions.

This study investigates the politics of appointments to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the court established under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to review secret federal government requests for warrants related to national security investigations. Since the FISA Court's creation, its members have been appointed entirely at the discretion of the Chief Justice of the United States, who selects FISA Court judges from among the pool of existing U.S. District Court judges. Using data on the common space scores of the federal district judges appointed to the court, and the limited information available on the court's decisions, we explore the implications of this, both for the ideological makeup of the FISA Court's judges and for the oversight function they perform. The results suggest that the court has become decidedly more conservative in recent years, far more so than the district courts overall, with potentially serious implications for its abilit...

This article argues that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Jaloud v. Netherlands adopted an attribution test in order to establish jurisdiction under Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It argues that this would not be the first time that the ECtHR has adopted an attribution test in order to establish Article 1 jurisdiction. Furthermore, the article challenges the proposition that the ECtHR’s adoption of an attribution test to establish jurisdiction is methodologically unsound and not in conformity with international law. It proposes moving beyond this debate and considering the real challenges that an attribution test of Article 1 jurisdiction poses for the future.

The Supreme Court dominates America’s legal establishment. Predicting its decisions has, arguably, and for all practicality, become an industry. The traditions of the court have endowed it with a teleological approach which makes predicting the court’s decisions difficult. On important decisions, especially those with political overtones, the Justices on the court show a strong preference to vote along partisan lines, in harmony with the party that nominated them onto the court - but not always. In a review of the court’s history, in key decisions Justices have departed from their more predictable partisanship. Our analysis shows that when judges depart from their predictable partisanship, they do so for fairly consistent, if not predictable, reasons: institution building. This paper argues that the Supreme Court behaves in a manner consistent with Max Weber"s social theory: that a bureaucracy will labor to perpetuate itself. The Supreme Court often makes decisions for the purpose of enhancing and perpetuating the institution of the Court itself. Because the Supreme Court is a national institution, at times “institution building” means nation building. This paper studies the tension of partisanship versus institution building in Supreme Court decisions: the dynamics of fission versus fusion, the tension that exist between these two poles and the mechanics of how this is worked out, creates arguably some of the greatest drama in the Court’s history as demonstrated in Marbury v. Madison and Bush v. Gore.

At a joint press conference in April of 2012, a reporter asked President Barack Obama to speculate on how the Supreme Court might rule concerning the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Ultimately, the president said, "I'm confident that the Supreme Court will not take what would be an unprecedented, extraordinary step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected Congress." (1) Whether or not this statement shaped the Court's decision in June to uphold the Act; the president's rhetoric fueled a debate in the popular media about the appropriateness of the president attempting to influence the Court by going public in this manner (e.g., Editorial Board 2012; Hartman 2012). This is so even though the president mentioned National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) on only two occasions prior to the Court's decision. The bulk of the president s attention to this case occurred after the decision, in dozens of stump speeches delivered during the 2012 presidential election campaign. These remarks are not the only high-profile instance of presidents targeting Supreme Court cases in their public rhetoric. President Obama famously raised concerns about Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) during his 2010 State of the Union Address and called on Congress to counteract Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Court's decision to invalidate the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. George W. Bush publicized his opposition to affirmative action prior to the Court's decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). (2) Even 50 years ago, President Johnson praised the Court's decisions in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) as he encouraged Congress to pass more expansive civil rights legislation. (3) Despite these examples of presidential speeches referencing Supreme Court cases, we lack a firm understanding of when, how frequently, and why presidents mention Supreme Court cases in their public statements. To date, most going public research that examines the interrelationships between the executive and judicial branches of government focuses on judicial nominations, not Supreme Court cases (Cameron and Park 2011; Holmes 2007, 2008; Johnson and Roberts 2004; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998; Maltese 1995a). In addition, only limited research shows that presidents increase their public attention to policy issues in response to Supreme Court cases on those issues (Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999; see Ura 2014). Moreover, despite the firestorm surrounding President Obama's comments delivered before the Court's ruling in the Sebelius case, we know next to nothing about how frequently presidents speak on pending decisions or whether they focus their public attention on decided cases. We remedy this state of affairs by investigating the frequency of both written and spoken comments on historic and recently decided Supreme Court decisions. To do this, we have cataloged the number of times per month that presidents mention Supreme Court cases in public comments from the Eisenhower to Obama administrations (1953-2012). We use these data to explore two significant topics. First, we analyze the timing of presidential references to Supreme Court cases to determine whether presidents mention cases pending before the Court or discuss cases after they have been decided. Because we find that presidents speak almost exclusively about Supreme Court cases after they have been decided, our primary research question asks: what explains the frequency of the president's monthly public commentary on decided Supreme Court cases? To answer this question, we build upon research that explains the number of presidential speeches over time (Eshbaugh-Soha 2010; Hager and Sullivan 1994; Kernell 1997; Powell 1999; Ragsdale 1984), which concludes, to varying degrees, that presidents speak publicly to bolster their reelection, historical legacies, and policy goals. …

The article addresses the question of jurisdiction criterion introduced in article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect to a territorial State. It is inspired by a relatively fresh judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan case – one of the two cases arisen out of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which were simultaneously decided in Strasbourg. The article’s aim is twofold. First, it reconstructs and discusses the methods applied by the Court in the sub judice case in question of territorial application of the echr and potential exemptions. Second, it searches for some general conclusions concerning the jurisdiction criterion in the Convention system. This is dictated by a conviction about usefulness of inclusion to a greater extent a perspective of territorial application of the echr into a debate over the jurisdiction concept, most frequently contextualised by its extraterritorial dimension.

A pesquisa tem como objetivo identificar se o desempenho do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) sobre o direito à saúde resulta em eficácia ou em simbolismo. O estudo foi feito por meio de uma pesquisa teórica e investigação empírica. A coleta de dados concentrou-se em sociologia teórica, dando destaque ao livro “Teoria de Sistemas”, de Niklas Luhmann, que foi usado na identificação da racionalidade legal, inclusão social, complexidade, contingência, justiça, e funções dos Tribunais, do Sistema Político e do Sistema Legal. Na referência teórica, a conceptualização da expressão: “simbólico” é extremamente rica, ao ponto de encontrar-se uma rotineira confusão semântica; para evitá-la, este trabalho abrange a tese desenvolvida por Marcelo Neves em seu livro: A Constitucionalização Simbólica, no qual ele desenvolve um debate sobre o simbolismo de normas constitucionais. Para a pesquisa empírica, pelos métodos de pesquisa, fez-se uma investigação documental, coletada dos principais precedentes do Supremo Tribunal Brasileiro. O resultado da pesquisa compôs um paradoxo. Descobriu-se que o Supremo Tribunal Federal, em um ponto de vista restrito aos litigantes, procura uma eficácia ilusória do direito à saúde, que é simbólica, tanto quanto o juiz de uma racionalidade exclusiva adjudicatória, negando-se, consequentemente, a ver a questão como distributiva, como um problema de distribuição de riqueza, que, em uma macro perspectiva, causa o risco de corrupção no sistema político para forçar a administração pública a distribuir uma riqueza que às vezes nem mesmo existe, e também exclui a maior parte da população, que não tem acesso a este Tribunal ou que indiretamente está pressionada considerando-se os recursos divergidos da saúde pública para concluir suas decisões.

This article examines the private law enforcement of English settlement and jurisdiction agreements where pre-emptive parallel proceedings have been commenced in the courts of another EU Member State. It will be argued that in The Alexandros T, the UK Supreme Court adopted a narrow and instrumental “mirror images” interpretation of the “same cause of action” issue in Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation which allowed the English and the Greek proceedings to continue in parallel. In cases where the strict tripartite test of Article 27 is not met, Article 28 with its discretionary power to stay in case of related actions is available as a more flexible alternative. It will be argued that the exercise of the discretion to stay proceedings under Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation was legitimately denied effect in order to accord deference to jurisdictional party autonomy. The Court of Appeal's decision clarifying that the claims for declarations and damages for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreeme...

The Brussels I Regulation Recast has improved the efficacy of jurisdiction agreements in favour of the courts of the Member States of the European Union. It has also imported from the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements a new rule on substantive validity for jurisdiction agreements. Both reforms are welcome but raise new questions for the interpreter.

The paradigm of the jurisdiction agreement designates a single, exclusive forum, allowing each party to determine, in advance of a dispute, the forum for litigation. The principles governing the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements are largely designed for this model. Some parties draft agreements that differ from this model, including agreements that purport to nominate multiple courts with “exclusive” jurisdiction, and unilateral optional agreements giving one party an option to select the forum after a dispute arises. These features raise the question of whether principles developed for the exclusive model regulate jurisdiction agreements that depart from it. This article explores the approach to exclusivity under the Hague Choice of Court Convention, the Brussels I Recast, and at common law. We demonstrate that non-uniquely “exclusive” and unilateral optional jurisdiction agreements are uncomfortably accommodated within and inconsistently treated by these regimes, comparing, particularly, the accept...

In the very first decision reported in the Commonwealth Law Reports, Griffith CJ, Barton and O'Connor JJ mooted whether an appeal lay to the Court from a judgment given after the coming into force of the Constitution but before the coming into force of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The Constitution, from 1 January 1901, vested the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the High Court and made provision for the appellate and other jurisdiction of the Court. But only the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), from 25 August 1903, 'actually constituted' the apparatus and the machinery of the Court; the appellate jurisdiction 'could not, of course, be exercised' before then. The question presented, 'one of difficulty and importance', ultimately did not need to be resolved because leave to appeal would be refused on other grounds in any event.3 Nonetheless, the Court articulated the reasons that supported each of the competing views of the operation of ss 71 and 73 of the Constitution. There was said to be much force in the contention that the jurisdiction of [the lower courts] was, from the first, intended to be subject to the right of appeal to the High Court, and that that right, being a right conferred by the Constitution itself upon suitors, could not be lost or taken away by mere inaction of the Parliament.

Over the past sixty years, the size of the Supreme Court's docket has varied tremendously, growing at some points in time and shrinking at others. What accounts for this variation in the size of the docket? We focus on two key strategic factors—the predictability of outcomes within the Court and whether justices consider the potential actions of other political institutions—and assess whether these factors help to explain the variation in docket size over time. We discover that uncertainty and institutional constraints prevent the Court from choosing cases with complete freedom, even after accounting for other potential influences on the size of the Court's docket.

PENNOYER v. Neff (1) may be just a vague memory from Civil Procedure class in law school, but no doubt every lawyer remembers learning the same fundamentals of personal jurisdiction. To sue a defendant in a particular forum, a plaintiff must show personal jurisdiction over the defendant in compliance with that forum's long-arm statute and the Constitution's Due Process Clause. Personal jurisdiction comes in two forms--specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. While specific jurisdiction likely got ample airtime on the intricacies of "minimum contacts" and "stream-of-commerce," general jurisdiction typically was reduced to a single sound bite: "continuous and systematic" activities by a corporation in a particular state were sufficient to subject that corporate defendant to general jurisdiction in that forum. Civil Procedure professors were not the only ones, however, to give short shrift to general jurisdiction. In a nearly 70 year period, the Supreme Court issued scores of opinions featuring specific jurisdiction to a mere three opinions on general jurisdiction. Thus, general jurisdiction played little or no role in the defense strategy of large companies conducting business on a national scale. Unless the plaintiff named the wrong corporate entity as a defendant, most companies conceded personal jurisdiction in every state because they were doing business in every state; companies (and courts) usually accepted the prevailing general jurisdiction mantra of "continuous and systematic" to be sufficient. In January 2014, however, the United States Supreme Court catapulted general jurisdiction into the spotlight and turned conventional wisdom on its head about the reach of general personal jurisdiction with its eight-Justice majority decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. (2) The Supreme Court eliminated the "continuous and systematic" test and gave Civil Procedure professors, district courts, and most importantly, corporate defense counsel a new sound bite with powerful teeth: a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only where it is "at home." (3) The two paradigm places a corporation is "at home" are its state of incorporation and its principal place of business. Consequently, general jurisdiction now should be an essential element of corporate defense strategy in any case in which specific jurisdiction is lacking as to one or more plaintiffs. I. The Beginning: International Shoe and Its (Sparse) Progeny The Supreme Court's 1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (4) laid the foundation for general personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants. The Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of personal jurisdiction and the limits placed on it by the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court issued the often-quoted rule of specific jurisdiction that the defendant need only have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" (5) But for a corporate defendant, the Court explained that "the continuous operations" in the forum state could be "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it in causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." (6) The parameters of this early formulation of general jurisdiction, however, remained unclear. And in the nearly 70 years that followed International Shoe, the Supreme Court decided only two general jurisdiction cases. A. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining In the first case, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining, (7) the Supreme Court formalized International Shoe's "continuous and systematic" activities test. (8) Plaintiff Perkins, a nonresident, sued a foreign mining company in Ohio for dividends she claimed as a stockholder and for damages resulting from the company's alleged failure to issue stock certificates to her. (9) The mining company was organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, where it operated profitable gold and silver mines. …

The Colombian Constitutional Court has gained a high reputation around the world. In a country that is plagued by the war on drugs, violence, inequalities, and corruption, the court has managed to strengthen the rights of the displaced and homeless victims of these conflicts, women, workers, sick persons, and other underprivileged social groups. The trust of the citizens in the court therefore is high, which is reflected in the constantly growing number of constitutional complaints and judicial reviews. By proving its independence, the court has also earned the respect of politicians. However, the court took on this role only gradually, and had to learn from mistakes made at the beginning. This article presents not only the history and the most important achievements of the court from its founding to the present, but also addresses the challenges it faces.

In Koushal v Naz the Indian Supreme Court overturned a High Court judgment which had declared unconstitutional section 377 of the Indian Penal Code criminalising ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’. In doing so, it has rebranded gay and transgendered Indians as criminals. This case note explores some of the structural problems that led to this judgment. The first problem is the transformation of the Indian Supreme Court into a populist, quasi‐legislative, institution that sees itself as a tool of governance. This has put significant pressure on its counter‐majoritarian role. The second relates to the sheer size of the Court's docket (given its wide jurisdiction and lax standing rules), coupled with the Indian legal academy's inability and unwillingness to continuously demand judicial fidelity to the law. These factors have led to the normalisation of unreasoned or poorly‐reasoned judgments and a breakdown of stare decisis.

The paper deals with recent rulings of the European Court of Justice regarding the international jurisdiction of European courts in connection with infringements over the Internet. The aim of the paper is to illustrate a shift in the judicature of the Court and the need for a recast of the special jurisdiction provisions in the Brussels I Regulation. The main focal point is the ruling in the case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG, which contain s two surprising con clusions . Firstly, the intentions of the alleged infringer to target a certain jurisdiction are not to be taken into consideration. The decisive connecting factor is solely the fact that the harmful event may occur within the jurisdiction of the court. Secondly, the actions of a n independent third party can now establish the jurisdiction for a suit against the alleged infringer. Th is has been the subject of two other recent cases C-387/12 Hi Hotel HCF Sparl v Uwe Spoering and C-360/12 Coty Germany GmbH v F i rst Note Perfumes NV. In both of these cases the sole actions of the alleged infringer would not suffice to establish the jurisdiction of the court in question. T he paper tries to evaluate these rulings in light of procedural fairness and the traditional interpretation od special jurisdiction provisions.

The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the firststage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.

The objective of promulgation of the New York Convention, 1958, was to ensure the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Member States. Contrary to the letter and spirit of that objective, certain provisions enshrined in the Convention have given room to national courts for un-harmonized interpretation, thereby causing undesirable delay in the enforcement of awards. Article V(1)(e) represents one such provision that has been subject to different treatments by the courts at distinct jurisdictions. A widely endorsed international interpretation seemingly exists parallel to a parochial one adopted by a few jurisdictions, including Pakistan. The decision given in the Taisei v A.M. Construction Co. by the Lahore High Court further consolidates the position of Pakistani courts in this regard. However, the matter is now pending adjudication before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. It remains to be seen whether the Apex Court will nullify the High Court’s ruling and proceed to deposit a new precedent in conformity with international arbitral practice. Pakistani Recognition and Enforcement of (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Awards) Act (2011) Pakistani Arbitration Act (1940) (New York) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) Taisei Corporation v AM Construction Co (Pvt.) Ltd , Lahore High Court (2012) Bharat Aluminium Co v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service, Inc , Supreme Court of India (2012) Hitachi Ltd v Rupali Polyester and ors , Supreme Court of Pakistan (1998)

This article considers the role of jurisdiction in supporting private claims for the cross-border recovery of cultural objects from an EU member state. In particular, this article considers a new, “sui generis” special jurisdiction rule in Article 7(4) of Regulation EU 1215/2012, the Brussels I Recast Regulation. Article 7(4), inter alia, enables “(A) person domiciled in a Member State to be sued in the courts of another Member State […] as regards a civil claim for the recovery, based on ownership, of a cultural object as defined in point 1 of Article 1 of Directive [93/7/EEC] initiated by the person claiming the right to recover such an object, in the courts for the place where the cultural object is situated at the time when the court is seised”. This special jurisdiction rule is a welcome development towards facilitating the return of a cultural object from the place where it is seized (for example where there is market demand or when the object is in transit), to a party asserting ownership. In practice the utility of this special jurisdiction rule will depend upon its scope and interpretation by the Court of Justice together with its ability to offer a “counterbalance” to Article 4 and the other special grounds of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Recast Regulation. This paper concludes that this special jurisdiction rule is a key step towards an EU-led “transnational policy of protection of cultural property”, which may require further approximation of EU private international law in the future.

Universal jurisdiction in international law allows states to exercise jurisdiction over particularly egregious conduct regardless of connection to the crime or its perpetrators. Universal civil jurisdiction (UCJ) is similar except that it applies civil, rather than criminal, jurisdiction, but to similar conduct. This article assesses the recognition of universal civil jurisdiction and finds that it is dubious at best. There is considerable evidence against the recognition of universal civil jurisdiction in international law: several states have explicitly and vehemently voiced their opposition to instances of exercise of UCJ. There is very limited evidence in favour of the recognition of UCJ in international law: rigorous analysis of over one hundred international and municipal decisions and instruments commonly cited in favour of UCJ reveals that few of these instruments actually provide such support. On balance, therefore, UCJ is not recognised in international law, or, at best, finds very limited recognition in international law.

The writing of a majority opinion is the most important task for judges and justices on collegial courts because they must be able to explain and justify the court’s decision in a way that will be understood by other legal and political actors. For state supreme court justices, we argue that the opinion-writing process is driven by the information the opinion author has as well as internal institutional constraints. In this article, we examine the length of opinions produced by state supreme courts to determine whether there are differences in the opinion-writing process between elected and appointed courts. Using an original dataset comprising all education cases decided by state supreme courts from 1995 to 2005, we find, consistent with our expectations, that elected justices appear to be more concerned with audiences external to the court in writing opinions, whereas appointed justices are more likely to respond to internal constraints and conditions.

Central to the debate over whether or not to elect judges is the tension between judicial independence and accountability. Though we think of independent courts as being less constrained in their decision making, even highly independent judiciaries can be constrained by their legislative and executive counterparts. In this article, I examine one avenue of constraint—court-curbing legislation. I argue that court independence should increase the use of this legislation, as the other branches of the state government seek to check the power of the court. I find that court curbing is driven more by political conditions than the methods of selection and retention.

This article assesses the social positions of the plaintiffs and defendants who appeared before a small claims court, namely the Peacemaker court (Vredemakers) of the city of Leiden in the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century, a low threshold law court that boasted a quick and inexpensive procedure. Analysis of the social positions of the court's plaintiffs and defendants helps reveal the extent to which lower social groups actively made use of it. The article is based on linkage between a sample of users of the Peacemaker court during the years 1750–54 and a census of 1749 comprising socio-economic data for the entire Leiden population. The court clientele of the Peacemaker court was distinctively elitist. The court was thus first and foremost a forum for an inner group of more well-to-do households who were firmly established in the local community. The Peacemaker court was notably inexpensive and simple in its procedures, yet lower social groups remained markedly reticent to file complaints there, ...

In this article, we present and test a market-based model of news content about state courts of last resort. We test our theory by examining newspaper coverage of decisions in death penalty cases. Our empirical results indicate that news elements of drama, novelty, and sensationalism influence coverage of state high courts' death penalty cases rather than traditional indicators of legal salience. News content either anywhere in a newspaper or on its front page is influenced by similar factors, but front-page coverage is more sensitive to dramatic conviction reversals and the rarity of executions in a given state. Our results suggest that traditional explanations of the relationship between crime and newsworthiness have limited impact on media attention given to state supreme courts. Media coverage of state high courts is instead associated primarily with the behavior of the court and its justices.

In an article published in Volume 28, Number 1, pp 63–76 in the LCIA Arbitration International, Dr Ola O Olatawura contended that sections 34 and 57 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Cap A18 LFN 2004 limit litigation in arbitration matters to only first instance courts and that appellate courts lack the jurisdiction to entertain appeals from arbitration matters in Nigeria. This rejoinder re-examines the article written by Dr Olatawura and contends that the conclusions reached by him fail to take into account the fact that Nigeria has a written constitution, the constitution is supreme, judicial powers are vested in the courts established by the constitution, the jurisdiction vested in both the state and federal high courts (first instance courts) and the appellate system in Nigeria. The conclusion of this rejoinder is that both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear appeals from the first instance courts in arbitration matters in Nigeria and that the jurisdiction is not extra-legal.

The UK Supreme Court has considered, for the first time, the effect on an insurance claim of a ‘fraudulent device’ – the embellishment of that claim. In doing so, it has also clarified the ambit of the doctrine of utmost good faith, which for centuries has underpinned UK insurance contracts. The extent of the uncertainty which has hitherto surrounded this area of law can be seen by the fact that the opinion of four Supreme Court judges prevailed, notwithstanding the opposing views of five judges, one in the High Court, three in the Court of Appeal and one in the Supreme Court. This briefing note discusses the Supreme Court’s recent judgement in Versloot Dredging BV and another v. HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG and others.

The Supreme Court of the United States stands at the head of the nation’s judicial system. Created in Article III of the Constitution of 1787 but obscured by the other branches of government during the first few decades of its history, the Court came into its own as a co-equal branch in the early 19th century. Its exercise of judicial review—the power that it claimed to determine the constitutionality of legislative acts—gave the Court a unique status as the final arbiter of the nation’s constitutional conflicts. From the slavery question during the antebellum era to abortion and gay rights in more recent times, the Court has decided cases brought to it by individual litigants, and in doing so has shaped American constitutional and legal development. Composed of unelected justices who serve “during good behavior,” the Court’s rise in stature has not gone uncontested. Throughout the nation’s history, Congress, the president, and organized interest groups have all attempted to influence the Court’s jurisdiction, composition, and decision making. The Court’s prominence reflects Americans’ historically paradoxical attitudes toward the judiciary: they have often been suspicious of the power of unelected judges at the same time that they have relied on independent judicial institutions to resolve their deepest disputes.

In the Caribbean two sub-regional integration movements, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), are developing and strengthening their regional economic regimes. CARICOM is assisted by the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), a court that serves two distinct roles. Under its appellate jurisdiction the CCJ acts as a final court of appeal; under its original jurisdiction the CCJ acts as an international, treaty-interpreting tribunal. After providing a brief overview of the two Caribbean regional integration movements, the chapter examines the potential of judicial enforcement of treaty rules through the CCJ, particularly in the context of conflicting national legislation. It also scrutinises the practical problems of a closer co-operation regime for CARICOM, in light of recent OECS initiatives, and finishes with concluding observations.