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This article provides a comparative analysis of the legal grounds for the deployment of the Russian Armed Forces in a series of conflicts in the Caucasus, namely in the disengagement between North Ossetia and Ingushetia (1992–1994), South Ossetia/Georgia (1992–2008), Abkhazia/Georgia (1994–2008), and in the Russian–Georgian War of 2008. The difficulties in codifying certain actions from the point of view of international law are detailed. The article discusses whether the political and military actions of Moscow in various Caucasian conflicts were driven and interconnected by one and the same logic, or were purely ad hoc fixes. Cases where Russia's actions have been legitimized by securing mandate from a regional intergovernmental organization are differentiated from cases where it has acted on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, as well as from the application in certain cases of Article 51 ("the right of individual or collective self-defence") of the UN Charter. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the deployment of the Russian Armed Forces abroad is considered in the context of, and in comparison with, a series of cases where force has been used in conflicts by coalitions under a UN mandate, as well as by NATO and some Western powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Centuries before being included in Hugo Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis and De iure praedae , the subject of reprisal was already being discussed in medieval literature. The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval and early modern practice and theory of reprisal as it developed before and during Grotius's lifetime. Its first part investigates a number of important foundational elements, such as the issues of definition and terminology, and the common characteristics of a reprisal case. In the second half, the author explores why reprisals were deemed to be a 'perversus mos' or 'bad custom' and how continued reliance on this practice was nonetheless justified by inserting it into the medieval just war doctrine. The paper does not provide a systematic study of Grotius's own engagement with medieval reprisal sources. Rather, it should be read in conjunction with another publication in this same volume, 'Grotius on Reprisal' by Randall Lesaffer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The research analyses law enforcement officials' (namely, police, rescue service, environmental protection, and local authorities)1 use of supervision measures and direct coercion and how this concept manifests in legal acts. The main focus is two-fold: the right and ability of the official to choose the proper means of direct coercion and the legal certainty regarding its use, especially when used in self-defence. The legal analysis adopts a comparative approach and the analysis is further supplemented by expert surveys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Temporality': Clarifying the Extent to Which Self-Defence, Defence of Property and Prevention of Crime Operate: R v Williams [2020] EWCA Crim 193 In relation to prevention of crime, any alleged robbery of W's property, or wounding of W, was complete before the victim fled from the flat. I Williams i , therefore, concerns W's renewed application for leave to appeal against his conviction on the basis that the learned trial judge erred in not leaving the defence of self-defence to the jury. In relation to prevention of crime, Flaux LJ confirmed that: 'This defence is only available in relation to preventing crimes in progress not in relation to reacting to crimes already committed' (at [21]). [Extracted from the article]

This article argues that the quest for 'peaceful coexistence', sometimes depicted as an inherent quality of Soviet foreign policy, rather reflects a re-interpretation of actual practice in the light of subsequent developments – in connection with the emergence of Joseph Stalin's doctrine of Socialism in one country. The latter was primarily inspired by tactical necessities rather than doctrinal dogmas. Even though Soviet Russia was perceived and sometimes acted as an outsider, if not a disrupting agent, until the accession of the USSR to membership in the League of Nations in 1934, Soviet foreign legal policy discourse in the 1920s and early 1930s, with its increasing focus on 'peaceful coexistence' and collective security rather than world proletarian revolution, contributed substantively to the emergence and development of modern ius contra bellum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At present, the activity of justifying oneself is mostly discussed in psychology, where it is typically viewed as a negative or at least regrettable activity involving changing one’s attitudes, beliefs, and feelings in order to minimize psychological threats arising from cognitive dissonance. Yet there is conceptual space, even a need, for an analysis of justifying oneself that is more content-neutral in nature. In this paper I provide such an analysis. Along the way I also briefly canvass some of the empirical work on self- justification in psychology and gesture towards issues surrounding the normative significance of the practice of justifying oneself.

The paper indicates instruments of possession protection as well as description of their distinctive or dependent character. The differences between an owner-like and a subsidiary owner have been defined. Self-help nature was shown as an operating tool without authorities' approval. A time relationship nature was described, which must occur between threat and action. Moreover, a variety of rights concerning real property and movable property was mentioned. Also a distinction between self-help and selfdefence was indicated. The development of self-help in Poland was described, as well as its progress from ancient times. Additionally, self-help was defined and its publication in provisions of Civil Code. Persons authorised to possession protection, were mentioned, including a term of owner, co-owner, holder, and a holder of precarium. The paper also describes premises concerning infringement of movable property and real property possession, as well as immediacy. Also a legal nature of an aggressor and a person entitled to protection was discussed.

(2) whether, upon the evidence before the Crown Court, a I prima facie i case of self-defence was raised and, if so, whether the Crown Court erred in law (a) by not considering self-defence or (b) by dismissing the appeal; and In relation to question two, Kerr J found that there was no I prima facie i case of self-defence and, even if there were, the Crown Court was right to reject the defence. PC Millett's evidence of a swing of the appellant's arm to dislodge his grip on the arm could at the most amount to the appellant defending himself against the gripping of his arm. PC Millett's evidence of a swing of the appellant's arm to dislodge his grip on the arm could at the most amount to the appellant defending himself against the gripping of his arm. [Extracted from the article]

In the UN Charter system, the prohibition of use of force and threat of force was considered one of the essential foundations of the legal construction of the international society, being the result of a constant normative and historical evolution. The general rule prohibiting the use of force in the regulation of relations between states admits two exceptions to this principle, namely self-defence and recourse to force in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the Swedish constitutional framework for international military action. The constitutional provisions on self-defence and on the sending of armed forces to other countries are in focus. The provisions mainly concern the division of powers between the government and parliament and generally contain little substance. In the context of a relatively recent revision of the entire Swedish Constitution also the constitutional provisions on the government's power to deploy the armed forces were subject to review. In the end not much was changed, but several suggestions for change were put forward by the official commission of inquiry on constitutional reform. Even though the suggestions for change were for the most part rejected, they are discussed in this article as a backdrop to the rules that remained. An ambition to tie the Swedish constitutional regulation even closer to international law was part of the suggested change which was eventually approved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Street harassment is recognized as an 'everyday' form of violence against women. Influenced by contemporary sociologies of everyday life, this article examines women responses to street harassment, drawing on over 500 first person narratives submitted to the website of Hollaback London. The narrative structure highlights women's actions, which (like street harassment) have generally been considered inconsequential. Quantitative content analysis reveals the extent and variety of strategies employed by women, including speaking back, calling on others for help, physically fighting back, walking away and an array of 'small', everyday actions and gestures that aim to resist harassment. I argue that these responses comprise everyday self‐defence practice. Furthermore, the notion of narrative habitus is employed to argue that Hollaback narratives do not just describe harassment, but that reading narratives can generate dispositions for self‐defence. Narrative analysis reveals the way that satire is employed to make space for women's successful self‐defence. I argue that Hollaback narratives do not just offer storylines or scripts for resisting street harassment but foster a style for doing so. Analysis considers the limits to narratively motivated self‐defence. This research demonstrates that, in order to 'see' women's resistance, we need to pay close attention to the everyday as the site of both oppression and moments of liberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

United Nations Charter Article 51 obliges states to immediately report the use of self-defence to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Besides the wording in Article 51, there are no (codified) rules or guidelines on how states should report or what should be included in the report to the UNSC. Reporting on self-defence is predominantly based on the conduct of UN member states and how these actors interpret their obligations. This article analyses whether there is common conduct that could indicate subsequent practice by parties to the Charter regarding the format of reporting, the notion of immediacy in reporting and the quality of reports submitted to the UNSC. It was found that there is subsequent practice identifiable regarding the format of reporting, that there are reliable indicators on parallel conduct regarding the immediacy of reporting and common conduct when reporting on measures taken in self-defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Active in the Boston area from 1968 to 1974, members of the radical feminist organization Cell 16 advocated for a number of important causes, including martial arts training for women. In sparking the era's feminist self-defence movement, they argued that learning to fight was 'an absolutely necessary step in eradicating male supremacy and dominance'. Cell 16ers maintained that women had been conditioned to be docile, dependent, and 'pitifully weak', which not only made them easy targets for abuse, but also sustained their second-class status. More to the point, they recognized that denying girls and women opportunities in sport made them physically ineffectual. By developing 'physical competence', women could break free from the bonds that subjugated them to their subordinate roles. Theorized along the broader spectrum of physical competence, this analysis of Cell 16 offers an alternative way to think about why sport matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994--silence in interview--questioning under caution--adverse inference direction given to jury-- whether judge correct to do so--whether directions to the jury correct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyses the legal regulation of the use of force in international law in the context of three emerging Palestinian forms of struggle against Israeli occupation: the Knife Intifada, the disturbances at the border, and the launching of incendiary kites. It discusses what legal paradigms or concepts should regulate the type and level of force used in each situation – a question that is complicated by various dilemmas – and finally, appraises the Israel Defence Forces policies tailored in response. The article evaluates the applicability of two legal paradigms regulating the use of force in military operations – (i) the conduct of hostilities and (ii) law enforcement – as well as the concept of personal self-defence in international law and the escalation of force procedure. While the Knife Intifada clearly falls under the law enforcement paradigm, the disturbances at the border and the launching of incendiary kites raise more difficult legal questions. Categorising them under a paradigm of law enforcement is less straightforward, and may have undesirable ramifications for safeguarding humanitarian interests. The article argues that the use of force in the disturbances at the border and the incendiary kites cases should be regulated by the concept of self-defence and escalation of force procedure, and that the application of the self-defence concept should be adapted, mutatis mutandis , to situations of law enforcement and to situations of hostilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors briefly respond to various commentaries about an article they published in the journal regarding how courts administer justice in cases involving criminal defendants who were intoxicated during the commission of their crimes, particularly focusing upon the British case R v Taj. The article discusses legal concepts such as mens rea and self-defence.

Previous cautions--causing grievous bodily harm with intent-- provocation-- "excessive self-defence ". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine and discuss if the use of drones -when used as an offensive weapon to end the life of suspected terrorists- validly falls within the scope of application of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In order to do so, the requirements established by the mentioned Charter will be duly analysed. Consequently, we will be able to conclude if drones are or are not fulfilling the legal requirements requested by the right of self-defence, adjusting in the latter case the interpretation of international law to the particular national interests of some countries.

Roberto Ago, the International Law Commission’s second Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, defined self-defence as a faculté of a state to use force in response to an act of another state through which a breach of the principal obligation under Article 2(4) Charter is committed. On this basis, he then inserted a provision in Chapter V to Part One of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility expressing self-defence as a specific factual circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the use of force which constitutes a response to state aggression. This conception of self-defence, although misunderstood from the onset, remained in the backdrop of the study of the law of state responsibility for a considerable period. It was only dismantled during the reign of the last Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility, James Crawford. The last Rapporteur, at the onset, submitted that it is not the function of the Draft Articles to specify the content of the primary rules, including that referred to in Article 51 Charter. He then redefined the function of the circumstance of self-defence as that of precluding the wrongfulness of non-performance of certain obligations other than the general prohibition insofar as such non-performance is connected with the exercise of the right under Article 51 Charter.This contribution first scrutinises this paradigmatic shift and finds it to be symptomatic of the conviction on the part of Crawford that the notion of self-defence could also encompass the use of force against speculative threats of state origin as well as actual threats that emanate from individuals or groups which are disconnected from the organisation of any state. It then uses this finding as a springboard towards the examination of the controversy surrounding the notion of self-defence under international law. In that connection, it first outlines the findings of the World Court on the requirements of armed attack and attribution and describes the points of criticism which those findings have elicited. Next, it argues that state practice is unable to settle the controversy concerning the scope of the concept of self-defence and that the question whether or not valid invocation of Article 51 Charter must be preceded by a state’s breach of the general prohibition can be conclusively answered only as part of efforts geared to devising an explanatory account of self-defence which accurately translates its normative origins and which preserves its logical relations with the other, more ordinary but fundamental legal concepts. The study’s conclusion is that respect for such criteria demands that the notion of self-defence under international law be defined in line with Ago’s proposition, i.e. in terms of a de facto situation, recognised by a secondary rule, whereby the principal obligation under the primary rule contained in Article 2(4) Charter is pushed into abeyance to the detriment of a state which conducts itself in breach of that very same obligation in respect of another state; or, correlatively, in terms of a factual circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the use of force which constitutes a riposte to an unlawful armed attack of another state.

A provocateur does not pose a threat of harm. Hence, a forceful response to provocation is generally considered wrongful. And yet, a provocateur is often denied recourse to a self-defence justification if she defends herself against such a violent response. In recent work, Kimberly Ferzan argues that a provocateur forfeits defensive rights but this forfeiture cannot be explained in the same way as an aggressor's rights forfeiture. Ordinarily, one forfeits the right not to be harmed and to self-defend against harm by threatening to violate another person's rights. But provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights because they bring about the situation in which defence becomes necessary. As I argue here, positing these two types of forfeiture justifications is neither desirable nor necessary. I suggest a unified rights forfeiture account that grounds rights forfeiture in moral responsibility for an unjust threat. My account offers clearer distinctions than alternative unified accounts, which I briefly discuss. Furthermore, the account can provide better explanations of intuitively plausible judgements. A provocateur will have less extensive defensive rights than an innocent victim, but will not lose all her defensive rights simply because 'she started it.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-defence--Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 s. 76(4)(b)--mistaken basis for belief in self-defence--mistake self-induced--s. 76(5)--whether mistake "attributable to intoxication " [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Willem Van der Muelen (1659–1739), jurist and member of the Dutch urban elite, was the author of a huge and widely read commentary on Hugo Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis. Defined by the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico as a simple 'embellisher' of Grotius, but in recent times hailed as 'the Dutch Locke', Van der Muelen certainly deserves more attention. The essay will focus on the justification of political resistance to the sovereign, a particularly controversial issue both in early-modern political thought and in Grotius himself. I argue that Van der Muelen, far from being a simple 'embellisher' of Grotius, adopts a more radical view based on a strong individualistic and utilitarian anthropology, bridging the Scholastic and monarchomach ideas of resistance – to which he is still indebted – with modern natural law jurisprudence. Thus he offers an interesting companion to Locke as well as a source of inspiration for later commentators such as Jean Barbeyrac. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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According to the Law Enforcement Act valid in Estonia, the police are the only general law enforcement institution that has a right to use physical force, special equipment or a weapon. The allowed special equipment are handcuffs, shackles, binding means, service animal, technical barrier, means to force a vehicle to stop, water cannon, etc. Police service weapons are firearms, gas, electric shock weapon, pneumatic and cut-and-thrust weapons. Pursuant to the Environmental Supervision Act, environmental inspectors (hereinafter inspectors) of the Environmental Inspectorate (EI) can apply direct coercion with the means and in the extent stated in specific laws. From amongst the means of direct coercion, a competent official can only use physical force, handcuffs, a service animal and a firearm. Upon performing their duties stated by the legislator, there may be a situation in which the inspector may need to use more means than so far stated in specific acts of law. In 2014 there was a need to legalise the police official's self-defence regulation. The same should also apply for other public safety officials, incl. EI inspectors, who can risk their life and health while performing their professional duties. There is an analysis that shows that the number of means of direct coercion the EI inspectors can currently use is not enough to fulfil the tasks stated by the legislator. There is no regulation for the officials' right for self-defence and their direct coercion related training programme needs amending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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On February 26, 2012 George Zimmerman killed Trayvon Martin and in July 2013 he was found not guilty. Also, on July 19, 2018, Michael Drejke killed Markeis McGlockton and it was not until August 13, 2018 that he was arrested. These cases sparked a nationwide debate around castle doctrine, self-defence and stand your ground laws. Texas, Florida and many other states have these laws, which generally allow an individual to stand his or her ground, and meet force with force, even deadly, at any place he/she has a legal right to be. This study examines what these laws do and do not do. The results of the cost and benefit analysis of this study make it clear that self-defence law is enough protection for individuals in the face of attack. The "Stand Your Ground" law promotes unpredictable and uneven use of violence. The argument by proponents that the law deters crime is unfounded. This study makes several recommendations, among which are: repeal the existing law and remove statutory immunity to allow victims to seek compensation and justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The police forces performance is demanding on well-timed and quick reaction. Single reaction time and choice reaction time are crucial when the jeopardy appears. Performing under stress in life-threatening situations needs a good level of stress tolerance. In our study, we used two non- specific, and two specific (shooting) tests to analyse the reactivity of police officer under different conditions. Material and methods: The research sample consisted of n=18 male Czech police training instructors. The group is unique as these police officers are specialised in the professional self-defence with focus on the coercive means use and shooting skills. Two standardized non-specific tests administrated with the Vienna Test System (VTS) by Schuhfried GmbH were used for data gathering. Single reaction time (SRT) was measured by the Reaction test, stress tolerance and choice reaction time (CRT) was measured by the Determination test. Two practical non-standardized shooting tests were used for the reactivity analysis in the goal oriented environment (shooting range). Results: The single reaction time among police training instructors was M=261.56±33.60 ms, which corresponds to the 66.28 percentile of age norm. Performance in the stress tolerance test also matches the average performance in population (M=45.56 percentile of correct reactions, M=61.67 percentile of incorrect reactions, M=51.44 percentile of skipped signals). According to the Pearson correlation coefficient, there is no correlation between single reaction time in the Reaction test and choice reaction time in the Determination test (r=-0.03). There is no correlation between single reaction time in the non- specific Reaction test and performance in the specific Shooting test 1 (r=0.06) and Shooting test 2 (r=-0.01). Conclusions: There is no relation between the results in the specific and non-specific reaction tests. Nonspecific tests of single reaction time and choice reaction time are suitable for a general assessment of motor abilities. Specific tasks need specific training and specific evaluation methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]