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A switch in congestion management nile in an electricity market may have positive or negative impact on the surplus of a market participant. As a number of wholesale electricity markets around the world either have already adopted or plan to implement Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) for energy and congestion management, it is necessary to study the economic impact of a change in congestion management in the Korean electricity market. However, the impact of congestion management on consumer costs and generator surplus has not been studied for the electricity market in Korea. This paper examines how a change in congestion management affects consumer costs and generator surplus in the Korean electricity market.

Generation expansion planning involves decisions on location and capacity of new generation, which may lead to adding or relieving congestion in transmission lines and to increasing or reducing competition in deregulated markets. Generation expansion may encounter congestion in the transmission network by constrained single-line flows as well as flowgate transfer capabilities. In this paper, a model to study the interaction between competition and transmission congestion on power generation expansion is proposed. The generation expansion problem is modeled as a Cournot competition game. Network transmission constraints are included in the optimal generation expansion problem to comply with power flow limits. Results from a five-bus power network and the IEEE 24-bus system are presented and discussed

In this paper, we investigate the cross-correlation behavior and multifractal characteristics of Indian electricity energy exchange rate time series of two extreme season's i.e. summer and winter through the recently developed multifractal detrended cross-correlation analysis method. For this purpose, we have collected the time series over 15 min time interval of the electricity market clearing volume and price before transmission congestion during peak summer i.e. month of May and peak winter i.e. month of December for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. The cross-correlation analysis was carried out between volume and price of summer and winter data. From our analysis, we observe a cross over in time scale s* of the fluctuation function and the scaling exponents were calculated for long term (>s*) and short term (< s*). For long term, cross-correlation behavior between price and volume show strong anti persistent behavior for both for summer and winter whereas in short-term, cross-correlation show persistent behavior for both summer and winter except summer in the year 2012. The multifractal nature is present in all the bivariate time series in all the years.

Electric power transactions are subdivided into pool transactions and bilateral contracts, as well as security transactions. A certain transaction level of, for example, bilateral contracts may affect pool transactions by causing transmission congestion and the like. In this paper, we discuss how both the market and the bilateral transaction participants share the operation cost and charge for using a network, taking account of power transmission loss allocation among generators. Following these discussions, we present an optimal scheduling method for pool participants. To ascertain the effectiveness of the proposed scheduling algorithm and to show how the bilateral contract level affects pool operation, we will demonstrate various simulation results for a model power system of an 8-unit 44-bus power system. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 158(2): 20–30, 2007; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/eej.20392

Reliable and efficient operation of deregulated electricity markets requires supply and demand elasticity. This paper presents incentive control of spinning reserves in electricity multi-markets using game theory. Interruptible load contracts (ILC) could reduce the amount of spinning reserve requirements during system contingencies such as transmission congestion. It is shown that the power utilities (PU) with ILC could increase their benefits in time-separated energy and spinning reserves markets (e.g., inter-temporal market gaming among day-ahead, hour-ahead and real-time markets).

In conventional power systems, upstream and downstream of power were distinct. However, due to the competition, power injection and sink can appear at unexpected locations, and cost sharing for such a new power system configuration must be considered. This paper proposes a scheme for transmission expansion cost allocation among electric market participants by using Core and Nucleolus concepts of game theory, which are developed particularly for the transmission users. A solution of the n-person cooperative game is adopted to distribute the line transmission expansion cost among the players. Congestion is assumed to be the transmission constraint, and expansion of transmission line is expected to relieve transmission congestion. A case study is illustrated to demonstrate the proposed method.

This paper describes the self-scheduling and energy bidding using augmented Lagrangian relaxation in competitive electricity markets. Transmission congestion is incorporated through locational marginal prices. Fuel and emission constraints are also considered in the model. This paper also represents the derivation of the energy bid curves as a function of generation schedule. An IEEE-RTS system is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

I test experimentally the predictions of neoclassical theory for a radial electricity market without rights to the transmission line, with rights that give the owner a financial right to a share of the transmission congestion charges collected by a network operator, and with physical rights which give the owner the exclusive right to utilize a portion of the transmission line. I find that physical rights lead to more “right” market signals, diminish some market-power, and remove an uncertainty about electricity transmission congestion better than financial rights or the absence of rights.

This paper presents the formulation and features of the Price Based Unit Commitment (PBUC) in a deregulated power market. This model can be used by GENCOs in some deregulated markets where GENCOs are responsible for unit commitment, to commit and schedule their units for selling power, purchasing power, selling spinning and non-spinning reserves in order to maximize their own profit. Transmission congestion is incorporated through Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) in PBUC. This paper also represents the derivation of the bidding strategy as a function of generation schedule.

An analysis indicates that the financial point-to-point transmission rights auction implemented by the New York Independent System Operator may not work efficiently, and that rights sold in auctions may sometimes be greatly over- or under-priced.

KEYWORD: power block, multivariate linear regression model, adjust allocation algorithm ABSTRACT: output, transmission power and direction of each line about a network with a plurality of generating units and a number of main lines depends on the power grid structure and each generation unit. we get the approximate expressions of the output of each generator. When the transmission congestion appear, we study how to establish a safe and economical dispatching plan, and get output adjust allocation algorithm of the power unit when transmission congestion.

Under deregulated environment transmission congestion is managed in many different ways. Most utilities create; update their own rules of how the congestion is managed. The common output in most cases is temporary congestion relief and higher costs of energy to the end user. Transmission congestion problem is studied from different aspects, i.e. congestion relief, energy price reduction, congestion costs and cost recovery or payback period. The proposed method is tested on an 11 bus 380 kV real system. An analysis is carried out in order to evaluate the payback period for permanent congestion removal.

There has been recent discussion as to whether energy storage should be an active market participant that buys and sells power at wholesale prices or a passive entity like a transmission line. In the latter case, new market mechanisms must be developed to integrate storage into electricity markets. In this paper, we define financial rights for energy storage. As with financial transmission rights, risk-averse market participants can acquire the storage rights to hedge against nodal price volatility resulting from storage congestion. We demonstrate that the rights specify how a system operator can redistribute budget surpluses resulting from storage congestion, as flowgate rights do for transmission congestion. We also derive a tracing rule that enables power flows through transmission lines and storage to be decomposed into present and past nodal contributions.

This paper introduces a comprehensive analysis to quantify the potential savings in production cost due to consolidation of 32 U.S. Western Interconnection Balancing Authorities (BAs). Three simulation scenarios are developed: the current structure of Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) BAs, full copper-sheet consolidation, and full consolidation with transmission congestion considered. The study uses a WECC Transmission Expansion Planning Policy Committee model that was developed for the year 2020. The model assumes 8% wind and 3% solar energy penetration as percentage of total WECC demand in 2020. Sensitivity analyses are carried out to assess the impact of transmission hurdle rates between WECC BAs on potential benefits. The study shows that savings ranging from $440 million (2.4% of total one-year production cost) to $610 million (3.2%) per year in thermal unit production cost due to consolidation can be achieved. The copper-sheet consolidation scenario shows a further savings of $240 million (1.4%) per year.

Ramping products are planned or in effect in multiple power markets overseen by independent system operators (ISOs) in the United States (US). They are intended to provide flexibility in security-constrained economic dispatch, given higher uncertainty in net load (load minus non-dispatchable renewable power) due to higher wind penetration. When conventional generators respond to unforeseen wind ramps, transmission congestion can arise. In such situations, reserves may not be deliverable as power across the network. This paper presents an extension of the original Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) ramping capability formulation. The key characteristic of this proposed deliverable ramping capability formulation is that it recognizes the magnitude of net load uncertainty by location. An example is given in which the economic dispatch with deliverable ramping capability avoids congestion.

A real-time optimal dispatch (RTOD) algorithm is proposed in this paper by formulating a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem to determine dispatch quantities for a privately-owned energy storage system (ESS) operating in an open electricity market. A new mechanism is proposed and implemented in the optimization problem based on historical and forecasted information available to the ESS to prepare the ESS for possible congestion relief external commands. The performance of the RTOD is evaluated through studying of ESS operation for different possible cases, and the results are discussed. As an example of utility-scale ESSs, a compressed air energy storage (CAES) is used to evaluate the performance of the proposed technique. The investigation results reveal that the external congestion relief commands should be forecasted and incorporated as part of the RTOD to achieve optimal performance and higher financial benefits.

Market flow is an important tool for electricity market entities to manage transmission congestion in real-time operations. It quantifies the impact of market operation on any constraint. The accuracy of market flow calculation is critical to ensure the efficient and equitable interregional congestion management including market-to-market coordination. In the paper, different market flow calculation logics are analyzed and compared. The mathematical proof is given to demonstrate the impact of logic changes on the market flow and loop flow. The numerical results on a 23-bus system are described to verify.

In the open access deregulated power market, fixed transmission rights (FTR) are proposed to facilitate the way to deal with transmission congestion issues. When these rights are utilized with locational marginal prices, they lead to an efficient use of the transmission system and assign prices to transmission system users based on the way energy is actually delivered. These rights are primarily proposed as purchased rights that can hedge congestion charges on constrained transmission paths. By holding an FTR, transmission customer gains advantageous features such as gaining a mechanism to offset the extra cost due to congestion charges when some lines are constrained, provide financial certainty, provide operational certainty and maximize efficient use of the system. To guarantee its availability to all parties on a non-discriminatory basis, these rights should have a mechanism to permit system users to buy, sell and trade FTRs. This mechanism is guaranteed by conducting an auction for these rights. On the other hand, trading these rights in secondary markets can self-arrange access across different paths, create long-term transmission rights and provide more commercial certainty. This paper introduces a mathematical model that covers FTR auction operation to model purchase, sale and base case FTRs. Some examples that show auction operations and some operations that are conducted after the action is finished are given in the paper to support the model.

Optimal re-dispatch to alleviate transmission congestion has been modeled as a nonlinear optimization program. A hyperbolic tangent function in the index of performance permits the dispatch of reactive power based on bids. A new approach to allocate the cost of congestion and losses to the nodes of the transmission network based on the nodes' responsibility is proposed. This approach overcomes some asymmetries of the locational marginal pricing methods.

The addition of a model of the consumer into the traditional optimal power flow (OPF) algorithm that minimizes supplier costs is investigated. The development of such a model is based on the solution of the OPF using an objective function for maximization of social welfare. A traditional OPF algorithm can be modified to solve the social welfare maximization problem by including price-dependent load models. This modification to the traditional OPF is intuitive and very simple. This modified OPF formulation facilitates simulation of spot markets for both real and reactive power. The algorithm is effective on systems of hundreds of buses, but small examples to compare the results to the traditional OPF are also insightful. The impact of price-dependent loads on systems with transmission congestion, increased fuel costs, and voltage problems can be studied.

We provide a tutorial review, by example, of how to calculate optimal bus prices and congestion costs for a simple power system, using the "DC" loadflow approximation. It is also shown how to calculate the marginal effect of changing the impedance of a transmission on total system costs, and how this can be used for transmission planning purposes. The role of long-term contracts for hedging and investment is discussed, and examples of hedging are given for various types of system participants.

Dynamic line rating based on real time meteorological data has been shown to be useful in transmission line capacity management. Based on a binary rating forecast, we propose a distributionally robust congestion management model that selectively uses dynamic ratings on critical lines and keeps the risk of thermal overloading below a prescribed level. A case study illustrates that the proposed model can effectively alleviate transmission congestion with a low error rate.

Analysis of market power in electricity markets is relevant for understanding the competitive development of the industry's restructuring and liberalization process, but in the existing literature, there is not an adequate consideration of line transmission congestion. The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to measuring market power in the Italian Power Exchange (IPEX), explicitly considering transmission line congestion. We construct a new measure of the residual demand curve to disentangle unilateral market power from congestion rent for the main Italian generators during the period April 2004 to December 2007. In Italy, this period was one of stable transmission network structure. Following the approach of Wolak (2003, 2009), we measure the unilateral market power with the Lerner index (LI), computed as the inverse of the residual demand elasticity. In conclusion, the correct modeling of the residual demand curve including transmission congestions enables us to compute the zonal LI and therefore more accurately measure the market power when congestion occurs. Our results show that various generators exercise market power only in specific zones. These findings provide deeper understanding of market outcomes in the presence of congestion, suggesting appropriate policy directions for market surveillance and competition regulation.

Congestion management is an integral part of a properly designed electricity market. Transmission congestion becomes more and more an operational challenge for existing European energy markets. A market redesign is required in order to effectively cope with the increasing congestion due to high penetration of renewable energy resources that are far away from load centers. Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is proven to be a viable mechanism to achieve market-based congestion management. The basic model of Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) is reviewed. Experiences of implementing similar LMP systems at different regional transmission organizations in the United States are shared. Options and various elements of redesign for EU power system based on the model of LMP are discussed.

The capacity reservation open access transmission tariff proposed by the FERC is entirely compatible with a competitive bulk power market. Using a point-to-point reservation approach that does not depend on tracking actual flows, capacity rights trading could be coordinated through the system operator. The capacity reservations would be fully tradeable and would fully support the competitive market.

This paper analyzes the incentives for electric grid investment that result from various proposed transmission network property regimes. In particular, we focus on “transmission congestion contracts” within a contract network regime such as proposed by William Hogan. We formalize a rule for awarding these new property rights to investors and show that, under certain conditions, this contract network approach can effectively deter detrimental investments, some of which are encouraged under other regimes. However, when these conditions are not met, market participants may still find it profitable to undertake network alterations which are detrimental to the network as a whole.

The complex externalities associated with grid modification have convinced many that a regulated body must plan grid modifications. But an appropriate rule for allocating “transmission congestion contracts” to those who provide grid improvements might allow a decentralized, profit-driven “market” to carry out this difficult function efficiently.

High penetrations of wind and solar generation on power systems are resulting in increasing curtailment. Wind and solar integration studies predict increased curtailment as penetration levels grow. This paper examines experiences with curtailment on bulk power systems internationally. It discusses how much curtailment is occurring, how it is occurring, why it is occurring, and what is being done to reduce curtailment. This summary is produced as part of the International Energy Agency Wind Task 25 on Design and Operation of Power Systems with Large Amounts of Wind Power.

We investigate the impact of FTR in a grid with high penetration of renewables. In particular, we consider a two stage stochastic model with strategic market players and different forms of FTR and WPP integration policies. The proposed model captures startup and ramping constraints as well as information constraints faced by the SO and the market players. Based on this model we examine the impact of FTR and evaluate the extent to which FTRs hedge against price risk from transmission congestion under the current protocol that Wind Power Producers(WPPs) are allowed to participate in the real-time market. We also suggested a protocol to solve the revenue adequacy problem caused by the current protocol.

Transmission system congestion is serious issue for the Independent System Operator (ISO) as it violates the various operating limits of the system. It may also cause increase in the electricity prices. Due to congestion in the transmission network some of the power transactions dispatch may be cancel out. In some cases, Independent system operator tries to alleviate the transmission congestion by real and reactive power rescheduling of generators and in worst cases by curtailment of loads. This paper presents an optimal location of TCSC for reducing the congestion cost in the restructured electricity market. In this paper the most effective generators and loads are selected on the real and reactive transmission congestion distribution factors (TCDFs) values. This paper presents an impact of TCSC on the amount of rescheduling of power and decreasing the congestion cost after placing it optimally in the system. The study has been carried out for pool transactions on 75-bus Indian system.

In a deregulated electricity market, transmission congestion results in break system security and increase system cost. Congestion in the transmission lines is one of the technical problems that appear particularly in the deregulated environment. One of the important tasks of Independent System Operator (ISO) is congestion free power system in a deregulated era. Generator rescheduling is one of the techniques adopted by ISO to mitigate transmission congestion in a deregulated electricity market. Rescheduling is done in an Optimal Power Flow (OPF) framework to minimize the overall congestion relief cost. Firstly, generators are chosen based on their generator sensitivity factor (GSF). Secondly, Particle Swarm Optimization is used for rescheduling those selected generators. The proposed algorithm is applied on IEEE 39 Bus New England test system.

During the two-year project period, the project team has engaged in the development of WINS and applied it to several congestion and wind integration studies. In summary, researches in this project on wind integration include (1) Development of WINS; (2) Transmission Congestion Analysis in the Eastern Interconnection; (3) Analysis of 2030 Large-Scale Wind Energy Integration in the Eastern Interconnection; (4) Large-scale Analysis of 2018 Wind Energy Integration in the Eastern U.S. Interconnection. The education activities in this project on wind energy include (1) Wind Energy Training Facility Development; (2) Wind Energy Course Development. The research resulted in 33 papers, 9 presentations, 9 PhD degrees, 4 MS degrees, and 7 awards.

Transmission operating and planning procedures in Europe and elsewhere are changing in response to the new challenges posed by wind integration. Evolving procedures for managing transmission congestion and augmenting transmission capacity in Europe and Alberta are summarized and contrasted.

Energy storage systems that are properly placed on the transmission system can be used to relieve transmission congestion [1]. Similarly, storage on distribution can be used to reduce peak loads [2]. The reduction in currents produced by congestion relief and peak reduction may also result in a decrease in line losses. Further efficiency improvements could be realized by optimizing the placement and scheduling of energy storage for loss reduction and efficiency improvement.

According to the European Commission, Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish network operator, might have violated competition rules by limiting cross-border transmission capacity to relieve congestion within Sweden. Eventually, the case was settled and Svenska Kraftnät offered commitments to address the Commission’s concerns. As an interim remedy, it committed to reduce transmission flow of electricity on internal network bottlenecks primarily by introducing national measures and by not reducing interconnection capacity. As a final remedy, Svenska Kraftnät agreed to split the Swedish market into multiple price zones. Congestion within Sweden would then be solved by adjusting the prices of those zones. We analyse the economic effects of the alleged abuse and the remedy package. We make three observations. Firstly, it might be socially optimal to reduce cross-border capacity in response to internal congestion. Hence, without an in-depth economic analysis the Commission risked preventing efficient behaviour. Secondly, the interim remedy of handling internal congestion primarily by national measures is not socially optimal, and it cannot be ruled out that it reduces overall welfare. Thirdly, even though splitting the market into price zones may improve allocative efficiency within Sweden, it does not prevent Svenska Kraftnät from potential manipulation of cross-border transmission capacity.

In November 2011 Sweden abolished the uniform national electricity price and introduced separate price zones. This was the result of an antitrust settlement between the Commission and the Swedish network operator, which was accused of discriminating between domestic and export electricity transmission services and segmenting the internal market. Based on this case, we show how the Commission uses competition law enforcement to foster market integration in the energy sector. We find that, even though the Commission’s action under competition rules was contrived and lacked economic depth, the commitment package provides an economically sound, longterm solution to network access and congestion management in Sweden. Such a quick and far-reaching change of Swedish congestion management could not have been achieved by Swedish policymakers or enforcement of the EU sector-specific regulation.

According to the European Commission, Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish network operator, might have violated competition rules by limiting cross-border transmission capacity to relieve congestion within Sweden. Eventually, the case was settled and Svenska Kraftnät offered commitments to address the Commission’s concerns. As an interim remedy, it committed to reduce transmission flow of electricity on internal network bottlenecks primarily by introducing national measures and by not reducing interconnection capacity. As a final remedy, Svenska Kraftnät agreed to split the Swedish market into multiple price zones. Congestion within Sweden would then be solved by adjusting the prices of those zones. We analyse the economic effects of the alleged abuse and the remedy package. We make three observations. Firstly, it might be socially optimal to reduce cross-border capacity in response to internal congestion. Hence, without an in-depth economic analysis the Commission risked preventing efficient behaviour. Secondly, the interim remedy of handling internal congestion primarily by national measures is not socially optimal, and it cannot be ruled out that it reduces overall welfare. Thirdly, even though splitting the market into price zones may improve allocative efficiency within Sweden, it does not prevent Svenska Kraftnät from potential manipulation of cross-border transmission capacity.

According to the European Commission, Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish network operator, might have violated competition rules by limiting cross-border transmission capacity to relieve congestion within Sweden. Eventually, the case was settled and Svenska Kraftnät offered commitments to address the Commission’s concerns. As an interim remedy, it committed to reduce transmission flow of electricity on internal network bottlenecks primarily by introducing national measures and by not reducing interconnection capacity. As a final remedy, Svenska Kraftnät agreed to split the Swedish market into multiple price zones. Congestion within Sweden would then be solved by adjusting the prices of those zones. We analyse the economic effects of the alleged abuse and the remedy package. We make three observations. Firstly, it might be socially optimal to reduce cross-border capacity in response to internal congestion. Hence, without an in-depth economic analysis the Commission risked preventing efficient behaviour. Secondly, the interim remedy of handling internal congestion primarily by national measures is not socially optimal, and it cannot be ruled out that it reduces overall welfare. Thirdly, even though splitting the market into price zones may improve allocative efficiency within Sweden, it does not prevent Svenska Kraftnät from potential manipulation of cross-border transmission capacity.

In November 2011 Sweden abolished the uniform national electricity price and introduced separate price zones. This was the result of an antitrust settlement between the Commission and the Swedish network operator, which was accused of discriminating between domestic and export electricity transmission services and segmenting the internal market. Based on this case, we show how the Commission uses competition law enforcement to foster market integration in the energy sector. We find that, even though the Commission’s action under competition rules was contrived and lacked economic depth, the commitment package provides an economically sound, longterm solution to network access and congestion management in Sweden. Such a quick and far-reaching change of Swedish congestion management could not have been achieved by Swedish policymakers or enforcement of the EU sector-specific regulation.

We are proposing SCUC to identify annual congestion in large scale grid. Our approach was tested on the WECC grid and the results obtained from this test were mapped on a Geographical Information System (GIS). This mapping was used to visually locate the congested transmission lines in WECC. By linking the transmission congestion information with other cost information in WECC, our approach allows for viewing the price of electricity at various WECC locations. Our approach provides efficient solutions for proactively identifying bottlenecks in WECC, understanding congestion patterns in bulk power grid network, studying hourly LMPs at WECC, developing efficient power-generation capacity and transmission line planning, and developing efficient integration of power grids with renewable energy resources such as wind and solar generation.

Wind energy resources, unlike dispatchable central station generation, produce power dependable on an external irregular source, the incident wind speed, which does not always blow when electricity is needed. This results in the variability, unpredictability, and uncertainty of wind resources. Therefore, the integration of wind facilities to utility electrical grid presents a major challenge to power system operators. Such integration has significant impact on the optimum power flow, transmission congestion, power quality issues, system stability, load dispatch, and economic analysis. Due to the irregular nature of wind power production, accurate prediction represents the major challenge to power system operators. This chapter investigates the usage of Grey predictor rolling models for hourly wind speed forecasting and wind power prediction.

Transmission Congestion is a critical phenomenon of system operation under the electricity market. As a risk mitigation instrument, without changing the realtime dispatch and operation of the system, Financial Transmission Right (FTR), already been applied in electricity market of certain countries and regions, provides a solution to the transmission congestion problem in a novel term. At the same time, FTR also provide the risk management instruments for the participant of the market. This paper describes the profile of the American PJM FTR in detail, state the patterns of the American PTM FTR market based on the basic theories of FTR, and analyze the annual and monthly auction process of Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs), the auction process of FTRs and settlement mechanism of the FTR in the FTR market. These analysis provide important references for the future development of the Chinese FTR market.

Conventional optimization technique suggests that marginal unit generation sensitivity (MUGS) may be calculated based on perturbation at optimality. The calculated MUGS however only applies to the perturbed operating point. Often times it is not advisable to apply this local information to predict generations at another loading level with considerable load change, and therefore another calculation has to be performed to obtain the generation and its sensitivity at that loading level. It is of high interest to obtain a global pattern of the sensitivity in a wider range of loading levels, which bears great potential in applications such as congestion prediction and LMP calculation. Existing work have shown MUGS can be well approximated by a linear function of load. In this paper, explicit formulations are derived for some special cases and show that MUGS is precisely a linear function or constant in those cases. The usefulness of MUGS is demonstrated with two applications, congestion prediction and LMP (sensitivity) calculation. Based on MUGS, optimal load shift factor (OLSF) is proposed to facilitate predicting future binding constraints such as transmission congestions. As a function of MUGS, LMP and its sensitivity can be easily obtained.

The major subject of this paper is the analysis and simulation of market-based coordination of variable resources with storage systems such as aggregated Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs). Starting from our recent work on modeling and model predictive scheduling of conventional generation, variable generation, and battery storage systems, we further develop in this paper a look-ahead multi-layered simulation platform which (1) takes into account of the transmission congestion; and (2) co-optimizes individual participants' profits from both energy and regulation services markets. In contrast with today's operation software, the proposed scheduling framework could improve the overall system efficiency while observing the transmission network constraints. We illustrate the improved operational efficiency in a modified IEEE 14-bus system.