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INTRODUCTION. The article analyzes the consequences of coming into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017. This Treaty forbids use of nuclear weapons and its deployment on territories of states, which ratified it. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The article is based on the main international treaties, which regulate now the status of nuclear weapons – Non-proliferation treaty 1968, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017 and also Advisory Opinion of UN International Court of Justice 1996. RESEARCH RESULTS. Coming into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons subdivided states into two groups – the states-participants of this Treaty and states-non participants. On the territory of states-participants the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited and must be considered as war crime. On the territory of states- non-participants use of nuclear weapons preserves the same regime as before. This regime was considered by UN International Court of Justice in his Advisory Opinion on Legality of Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996. The article analyzes this Advisory Opinion. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Author comes to a conclusion, that all the legal foundations upon which is based this Advisory Opinion remains intact and also his central clause, according to which it is not forbidden for a state to use nuclear weapons when its survival is at stake. This situation may occur when such a state would be in armed conflict with a state or group of states – members of a military-political organization, which had much stronger military and economic potential. Also use of nuclear weapons is not forbidden against all members of this military-political organization.

In this article, the author, who is chief of the WMD Branch at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, explains how UNSCOM provided a foundational example of multilateral efforts to prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction and why it is incumbent on all countries to work together to follow and build on that example today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The purpose of this work was to determine what role NATO plays in the policy of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the modern world. The research primarily examined the threats that come from weapons of mass destruction and how it affects global security. As for research methods, to get reliable information. The methods of policy analysis and document analysis were used to analyze and describe the challenges faced by NATO in the non-proliferation policy of weapons of mass destruction. In order to obtain reliable and objective information, a wide range of documents, strategies, and scientific papers were analyzed. The mentioned study showed us that NATO's policy of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction faces many challenges and threats from aggressive states, terrorists, extremists, criminal groups, aggressive religious actors, and in the overall context, asymmetric and symmetric threats. The role of NATO is very important in the security policy of the alliance and the policy of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world. NATO should be able to protect global security from weapons of mass destruction threats through pragmatic policy and dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the United States is conducting experiments at its Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility to simulate the implosion of nuclear bombs and capture x-ray images of the process. Topics include examines these experiments are crucial because the United States ceased full-scale nuclear weapon tests in 1992 and signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996.

There is a significant threat to global health security due to synthetic opioids, illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF), and nefarious uses of pharmaceutical based agents (PBA). Since 2014, increased distribution of synthetic opioids including IMF into the US through China, India, and Mexico has resulted in devastating consequences to the average street drug user. Additionally, clandestine lab operations for pill manufacturing and distribution have increased, along with unintentional drug overdoses due to drugs being laced with fentanyl or some other synthetic opioid derivative. Naloxone has been shown to be an effective and useful tool for reversing signs and symptoms of synthetic opioid overdose, though additional doses may be required depending on the analog. In addition to the risk of overdose in US civilians, other state actors have utilized fentanyl and its analogs as incapacitants resulting in significant numbers of casualties. The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) have been on the front lines supporting federal law enforcement agencies with hazard identification and assessment. Physician Assistants (PA) are assigned to these units and provide the necessary skills and expertise to keep on scene personnel safe. This article aims to dispel some of the rumors and myths surrounding fentanyl in an effort to educate first receivers, first responders, and hospital providers. Lastly, this article provides a review of synthetic opioid production, overdose, hazards, treatment/countermeasures, decontamination for responders, and the potential use of synthetic opioids as WMDs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The azide anion (N3-) is highly toxic. It exists most commonly as sodium azide, which is used widely and is readily available, raising the potential for occupational incidents and use as a weapon of mass destruction. Azide-poisoned patients present with vomiting, seizures, hypotension, metabolic acidosis, and coma; death can occur. No specific azide antidote exists, with treatment being solely supportive. Azide inhibits mitochondrial cytochrome c oxidase and is likely oxidized to nitric oxide in vivo. Cytochrome c oxidase inhibition depletes intracellular adenosine triphosphate and increases oxidative stress, while increased nitric oxide causes hypotension and exacerbates oxidative damage. Here, we tested whether the cobalamin (vitamin B12) analog cobinamide, a strong and versatile antioxidant that also neutralizes nitric oxide, can reverse azide toxicity in mammalian cells, Drosophila melanogaster, and mice. We found cobinamide bound azide with a moderate affinity (Ka 2.87 × 105 M−1). Yet, cobinamide improved growth, increased intracellular adenosine triphosphate, and reduced apoptosis and malondialdehyde, a marker of oxidative stress, in azide-exposed cells. Cobinamide rescued Drosophila melanogaster and mice from lethal exposure to azide and was more effective than hydroxocobalamin. Azide likely generated nitric oxide in the mice, as evidenced by increased serum nitrite and nitrate, and reduced blood pressure and peripheral body temperature in the animals; the reduced temperature was likely due to reflex vasoconstriction in response to the hypotension. Cobinamide improved recovery of both blood pressure and body temperature. We conclude cobinamide likely acted by neutralizing both oxidative stress and nitric oxide, and that it should be given further consideration as an azide antidote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The alleged fifth domain of warfare has surfaced difficult definitional questions, disjoint in form, but not in effect. The convergence with the development of cyberwarfare tactics, such as hacking, jamming, or spoofing, has emerged as an Achilles’ heel for efforts to ensure the demilitarization of outer space. Standing on Articles III and IV of the Outer Space Treaty, the demilitarization campaign falls on antediluvian thresholds of ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’. Neither terms, however, have been metamorphosed for application to outer space. Added to this, the prohibition on only nuclear weapons and ‘weapons of mass destruction’ under Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty opens the Pandora’s Box in defining ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in the context of outer space. The application of our earthly understanding of ‘use of force’, ‘armed attack’ and ‘weapons of mass destruction’ to outer space would result in disasters, the vulnerability of which can even be exposed by a centimetre-sized high velocity projectile. This paper proposes the infusion of an effects-based approach to evolutionarily interpret these three terms in a manner that acknowledges contemporary threats in outer space. The definitional infrastructure so formulated thus proposes to detach earthly modules from extraterritorial realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The efforts of the international community to free the Middle East from weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) date back five decades ago. This process was initiated with Iran's proposal in 1974 and has not yet achieved its goals after almost five decades. The main question in this article is how to achieve a WMD Free Zone in the form of a regional arms control and disarmament regime in the Middle East. The answer is formed in the form of the hypothesis that despite the presence of Israel as the only possessor of nuclear weapons in the region and uncertainties about Iran's nuclear program, reaching a WMD-free zone will not be far from reach. Using the theoretical framework of international regimes, in this article the possible actions needed to create a WMD Free Zone will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In modern times, the papacy has consistently advocated peace, disarmament, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, limiting the scope of traditional just war theory, particularly in the era of weapons of mass destruction. However, no pope has gone as far as Pope Francis, who has stated that there is no such thing as just war and that "Only Peace is Just." This contribution examines how Francis expressed and developed his thought in the context of his humanitarian diplomacy and theological thinking during the first ten years of his pontificate. In the last part, I argue that the Ukraine war is a test for Pope Francis, who has repeatedly called for peace negotiations and condemned arms supply, while recognizing the moral right for Ukrainian self-defense. While this may seem contradictory, his policy shows Francis's deeper conviction that "war is always a defeat for humanity." More interested in peace-making and assisting victims than in doctrinal issues, Francis has not jettisoned the just war concept in theory, but has done so in his witness and actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on theory within anthropology and associated fields, I develop feralness as a lens for understanding the complexity of technological afterlives. Conceptual development proceeds through a case study of the relationship between Do-it-Yourself Biology (DIYbio), nonprofessional scientists experimenting with the established technology of recombinant DNA in new contexts such as garages and kitchens, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Absent the institutional controls of academia or industry, DIYbio has been perceived by the FBI as a potential threat to national security and is policed by the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. Though the FBI has tried to contain the spread and reach of DIYbio, it has, ironically, came to be one of the main instruments of DIYbio's global spread. In closing, I argue that feral technologies, those technologies with unexpected and potentially dangerous afterlives, are emblematic of the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Space warfare is warfare that takes place in outer space. It involves ground-to-space, space-to-ground, and space-to-space violence between nations or peoples. The violence can involve kinetic weapons, directed energy weapons, or electronic destruction. International law, specifically, the Outer Space Treaty and SALT I, currently bans weapons of mass destruction from being put into space, although one wonders if one country were to violate the ban whether others would follow suit. In this paper, I argue that that if there is a non-consequentialist morality of space war, then one country can unjustly attack a second country's space vehicles. This in turn depends on property rights. But there is no adequate theory of property rights with regard to space war. Hence, there is no non-consequentialist morality of a space war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose--This paper discusses three workable solutions of the North Korean nuclear standoff: a preemptive strike, sanctions, and negotiations. Design/methodology/approach--The approach is qualitative and expository; it consults area studies, social science, and journalism; it observes past, current, and future geopolitical events; and it makes informed policy suggestions. Findings--Findings are that a variety of hardline policies to denuclearize North Korea by the United States, its allies, and the United Nations have failed. The U.S. has threatened to strike North Korea a considerable number of times for a variety of reasons since the Korean War (1950-1953). However, the U.S. has never conducted a preventive air strike or any other type of strike against North Korea despite the fact that North Korea has test-fired missiles, nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction. Since the Korean War (1950-1953), the U.S., its allies, and the UN have increasingly imposed economic sanctions against North Korea as the communist country has developed more advanced weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, they have failed to achieve their intended purposes. This means that dialogue is the only way to solve the North Korean nuclear standoff peacefully. Practical implications--To solve or alleviate the North Korean nuclear program, the U.S. and North Korea should work jointly to produce a win-win outcome with a high-level mechanism between the two countries. Such a joint effort is possible because the two sides share more common interests than differences in this regard. Originality/value--The value of this article lies in the explanation of why "negotiation" is the only way to resolve the North Korean nuclear program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential exists for charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against the perpetrators of the invasion of Iraq, namely, former Prime Minister Tony Blair and his entourage. The findings of the Chilcot Inquiry in 2016 do not rule out the International Criminal Court taking action, and this article argues that it is plausible for those leaders who took the UK to war to be prosecuted for breaching international human rights law and international humanitarian law. This is because, first, the UNSCR 1441 was not respected by the British government that gave UN inspectors more time to investigate if Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and, second, there is a measure of personal responsibility for those who gave the order for the invasion that has led to catastrophic consequences both in terms of human casualties and material damage in its aftermath. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this work was to determine what role NATO plays in the policy of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the modern world. The research primarily examined the threats that come from weapons of mass destruction and how it affects global security. As for research methods, to get reliable information. The methods of policy analysis and document analysis were used to analyze and describe the challenges faced by NATO in the non-proliferation policy of weapons of mass destruction. In order to obtain reliable and objective information, a wide range of documents, strategies, and scientific papers were analyzed. The mentioned study showed us that NATO’s policy of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction faces many challenges and threats from aggressive states, terrorists, extremists, criminal groups, aggressive religious actors, and in the overall context, asymmetric and symmetric threats. The role of NATO is very important in the security policy of the alliance and the policy of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world. NATO should be able to protect global security from weapons of mass destruction threats through pragmatic policy and dialogue.

The current US nuclear modernization program departs in several major ways from longstanding US nuclear policy: It elevates the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, includes plans for developing several new nuclear weapon capabilities, and resurrects former nuclear capabilities that past US presidents had wisely eliminated. Of all the Trump administration's nuclear modernization plans, however, the most destabilizing are probably the new, low-yield nuclear options and dual-capable systems that may be ambiguously nuclear or conventional. But the United States can still return to a smarter path - one that eliminates these specific nuclear weapons plans, and adopts a more measured nuclear rhetoric to match. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changes in US nuclear weapons policies introduced by the Trump administration have created new challenges for the US-China nuclear relationship. This is happening at the same time that the bilateral competition is turning increasingly serious and even hostile. As the most important external influencer of China's nuclear policy, the United States can take a number of steps to prevent this bilateral nuclear relationship from falling into a deeper, more negative cycle of action-and-reaction. Such an effort should include at least five elements: lead by doing (and demonstrate the right values); try to get a more accurate understanding of China; find a common framework for maintaining nuclear stability; start by reducing shared risks; and help China better understand US policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this interview with Bulletin editor-in-chief John Mecklin, nuclear arms control and nonproliferation expert Jon Wolfsthal provides his wide-ranging views on the current nuclear situation, how the new Congress might deal with US plans for a $1 trillion-plus modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and ways the inordinate cost of that modernization program might be reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]