ive set. The intrinsic character of an event-particle is expressed in terms of certain physical properties of nature at an instant. And these physical properties are expressed in terms of material objects (electrons, etc.). The physical character of an event arises from the fact that it belongs to the field of the whole complex of such objects. From another point of view we can say that these objects are nothing else than our way of expressing the mutual correlation of the physical characters of events.'0' Intersecting moments, abstractive sets, and scientific objects, respectively, endow event-particles with their three fundamental characteristics. We now consider the last of these three factors, scientific objects. It should be stated at once that electrons and molecules are but two types comprising what are called "material objects," a piece of wood in a chair, etc., being also a material object. Scientific objects are material objects exhibiting pronounced definiteness and permanence, these characters being even more present in electrons than in a molecule.'02 A third characteristic of scientific objects is their imperceptibility. . ..no one has seen a single molecule or a single electron, yet the characters of events are only explicable to us by expressing them in terms of these scientific objects.103 In The Principles of Natural Knowledge Whitehead expresses the same view: Scientific objects are not directly perceived, they are inferred by reason of their capacity to express these characters [the characters of events in their capacity of active conditioning events for sense-objects], namely, they express how it is that events are conditions. In other words they express the causal characters of events.'04 This brief statement reminds us that like the extrinsic character and the positional character of an event-particle, the intrinsic character of an event-particle is at least partly conceptual in its origins. This qualitative feature is derived from the ingression of an object "not disclosed in sense-awareness but known by logical inference as necessarily in being,"''05 that is, "not posited by senseawareness ... [but] known to the intellect."'06 The non-natural character of scientific objects depends upon their lying beyond what is given in sense-awareness, and this fact Whitehead confesses in one passage in Th6 Principles of Natural Knowledge. Now electrons-in so far as they are ultimate scientific objects and if they are such objects -do not satisfy the complete condition for recognisability.107 We remember that recognizability is what defines objects as distinct from events, events being "apprehended." Moreover, it is interesting to notice in this connec1olOp. cit., p. 193. 1020p. Cit., pp. 171-172. 1O3Op. cit., p. 171. 104PNK, P. 95. 1O6CN, p. 126. 106Op. cit., p. 125. 107PNK, p. 98. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.148 on Tue, 12 Jul 2016 05:22:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 162 NATHANIEL LAWRENCE tion that Whitehead does not always place such undivided confidence in what logic and thought require as he does in the passage cited above. Indeed we may well be sceptical as to these ultimate entities at points, and doubt whether there are any such entities at all. They have the suspicious character that we are driven to accept them by abstract logic and not by observed fact.'08 The atomic character of nature which is traceable to ingredient objects is, however, achieved by scientific objects, even though they are beyond perception. "A molecule requires a minimum of duration in which to display its character. "09 It is possible therefore that for the existence of certain sorts of objects, e.g. electrons, minimum quanta of time are requisite. Some such postulate is apparently indicated by the modern quantum theory and it is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of objects maintained in these lectures."' The minimum quantity of time which the method of extensive abstraction would not permit us to discern, for that method has as a fundamental postulate the denial of the presence of a "smallest event" in an abstractive set, is thus required by the ultimate objects of science in order that they may be present in nature, either as "situated" in events or as "located" in an abstractive element. As long as entities inferred from events comprising abstractive sets be regarded not merely as "ideal" and "abstract" in character, but also as conceptual, that is, instrumental in bringing precision and simplicity to the analysis of nature, in rendering nature (as the terminus of sense-awareness) intelligible, and not present in nature, there is no conflict. There is ample evidence for such interpretation of Whitehead. But when we try to make of these inferred entities things actually present in nature, in the face of insisting that there is but one nature"' and that nature is what we are aware of in perception,"12 then conflicts arise. Scientific objects then become as genuinely ingredient in nature as, let us say, the sense object "red"; the events they occupy are as actual as the event which is last month's plane crash, and we encounter a host of difficulties and contradictions, for both objects and events have been extended beyond the limits imposed on them by the character of the means by which they were obtained. They are illegitimately transferred from what sense-presentation requires us to think to the realm of sense-presentation itself.