151. Capital Requirements, Banking Supervision and Lending Behavior: Evidence from Tunisia
- Author
-
Brahim Guizani
- Subjects
Finance ,jel:D92 ,Sociology and Political Science ,business.industry ,jel:C63 ,Financial system ,Development ,Basel Accords ,jel:G21 ,Capital adequacy ratio ,jel:G28 ,Financial regulation ,Order (exchange) ,capital requirements, Basel Accords, dynamic model, banking supervision, non-performing loans ,Risk-weighted asset ,Capital requirement ,Systemic risk ,Economics ,Non-performing loan ,business ,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance - Abstract
This paper represents a contribution to the still meager literature on the impact of prudential regulation bank behavior in Tunisia. It aims to examine the effect of the capital requirements on bank credits during the period from 1999 through 2010 and to assess the effectiveness of the banking supervision policy in containing banking system’s risk. For this purpose a dynamic model is built and then an empirical regression is estimated. The results shows that regulatory capital framework has been binding bank lending in Tunisia during the period of study; well-capitalized banks have lent more than less-capitalized ones. Despite the apparent stringency of the bank regulator in Tunisia, banking supervision has been weakly effective in restraining banks’ overall risk. Further strengthening of the banking supervision policy is still needed on the part of the central bank of Tunisia; i.e., the bank regulator.
- Published
- 2014