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In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the importance of formal measures of voting power and of the relevance of such measures to real life political issues. Nevertheless, existing measures have been criticized, especially because of their dependence on the unrealistic assumption that different coalitions have equal probabilities. In this paper we show that the classical problem of measuring voting power can be naturally embedded in information theory. This perspective on voting power allows us to extend measures of voting power to cases in which there are dependencies among voters. In doing so, we distinguish between two different notions of a given voter’s power—‘control’ and ‘informativeness’—corresponding, respectively, to the average uncertainty regarding the outcome of a vote that remains when all others have voted and the average uncertainty that is eliminated when only the given voter has voted. This distinction settles a number of well-known paradoxes and enables the study of voting power on the basis of actual political behavior at all levels.

Inspired by analyses of majoritarian systems, students of consensual polities have analyzed strategic voting due to barriers to party success, namely, district magnitude and threshold. Given the prevalence of coalition governments in proportional systems, we analyze a type of strategic voting seldom studied: how expected coalition composition affects voter choice. We identify Duvergerian behavior by voters targeted at the coalition formation stage. We contend that when voters perceive their preferred party as unlikely to participate in the coalition, they often desert it and instead support the lesser of evils among those they perceive as viable coalition partners. We demonstrate our argument using data on coalition expectations from the 2006 Israeli elections. We find an appreciable albeit differential effect of coalition expectations on voter choice. Importantly, results hold controlling for ideological and coalition preferences. Lastly, we explore a broad cross-national comparison, showing that there is less, not more, proximity voting where coalitions are prevalent.

We consider a two-period model of elections in which voters have private information about their policy preferences. A first-period vote can have two types of consequences: it may be pivotal in the first election and it provides a signal that affects candidates' positions in the second election. Pivot events are exceedingly unlikely, but when they occur the effect of a single vote is enormous. In contrast, vote totals always have some signaling effect, but the effect of a single vote is small. We investigate which effect – pivot or signaling – drives equilibrium voting behavior in large electorates.

We ask whether the absence of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere.We start by classifying voting mechanisms as simple and complex according to the number of message types voters can use to elect alternatives. We show that while in simple voting mechanisms the elimination of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere, this is no longer always true for complex ones. In complex voting mechanisms, voters’ optimal strategy may vary with the size of the electorate. Therefore, in order to interpret optimal voting as sincere for complex voting mechanisms, we describe the optimal voting strategy when voters not only have no information but also have no pivotal power, i.e., as the size of the electorate tends to infinity.

In this article, we analyse the possibility of extending the Moulin theorem to Condorcet voting correspondences. Moulin (1988) established that every Condorcet voting function suffers from the No Show Paradox, or Abstention Paradox, which means that in some voting situations some voters would achieve a better result by abstaining (in other words, could manipulate the election by abstaining). This problem is similar to that of extending the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem on voting manipulation through casting an insincere ballot to voting correspondences. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet voting correspondence there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some preferences could manipulate the election by abstaining. Another result states, by counterexample, that some Condorcet voting correspondences are free from the Abstention Paradox from the point of view of other types of voters.

Previous work on voting behavior in Congress leads to an expectation of stability in roll-call voting. Yet, there remains a degree of unexplained variability in roll-call voting. Utilizing a unique set of data from the 103rd Congress of vote switching on revotes, we seek to account for the random component of congressional voting. We offer four categories of variables to explain this instability: leeway effects, error correction, reduction in uncertainty, and bandwagon effects. While these variables explain some of the variation in vote switching, our findings show that the individual random component of roll-call voting may be more significant than previous theory has indicated.

International audience; The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

While theoretical work on strategic voting emphasizes the importance of elite messages in persuading minor party supporters to abandon their first preference, few empirical studies have examined this relationship. I argue that while poll results certainly increase the likelihood of changing one’s vote, explicit information signals can increase this probability even more. Furthermore, these effects will be moderated by the presence of a counter message and the sponsor of the explicit information signal. These hypotheses are tested with data generated from two experiments.

We study a model of costly voting over two alternatives, where agents’ preferences are determined by both (i) a private preference in favour of one alternative e.g. candidates’ policies, and (ii) heterogeneous information in the form of noisy signals about a commonly valued state of the world e.g. candidate competence. We show that depending on the level of the personal bias (weight on private preference), voting is either according to private preferences or according to signals. When voting takes place according to private preferences, there is an unique equilibrium with inefficiently high turnout. In contrast, when voting takes place according to signals, turnout is locally too low. Multiple Pareto-ranked voting equilibria may exist and in particular, compulsory voting may Pareto dominate voluntary voting. Moreover, an increase in personal bias can cause turnout to rise or fall, and an increase in the accuracy of information may cause a switch to voting on the basis of signals and thus lower turnout, even though it increases welfare.

What are the incentives for voters to vote strategically when legislative policy outcomes are constrained by a system of checks and balances? The policy-balancing theory supposes that moderate voters split their tickets because such splitting is the only way these voters can achieve moderate policy outcomes. I show that a different type of strategic voting, policy stacking, is characteristic of legislatures that endow the majority party with only limited institutional powers. Focusing on voting for the president and House of Representatives in the United States reveals that a substantial proportion of voters engage in policy-stacking behavior, but very few engage in policy-balancing behavior.

Despite well-known controversies surrounding electronic voting (e-voting), electronic voting systems are gradually replacing traditional paper-based ones in some developed countries. An anonymous e-voting system that can be used in elections with large electorates must meet various security requirements, such as anonymity, uncoercibility, tally correctness, completeness, unrecastability, verifiability, soundness, and honesty. In particular, the uncoercibility requirement is essential, since systems meeting this requirement can largely reduce the possibility of coercion and bribery in elections. If a voter obtains only one voting receipt in an electronic voting system, coercers or bribers can enforce the voter to show her/his voting receipt to identify whether the enforced voter followed their will or not. However, if a voter can obtain multiple receipts reflecting several possible intentions in an election, coercers cannot distinguish these receipts to decide how the voter actually voted. In this article, we analyze possible venues for successful coercion, and present ideas for developing an effective electronic voting protocol, allowing one to greatly reduce the chances of coercibility. This protocol is independent of the underlying cryptographic components, and it can be easily implemented in electronic voting systems. We use random oracle models to demonstrate that the proposed protocol possesses the necessary security features.

We propose a two-period model of a committee with sequentially voting members, who may differ in their degree of efficiency. In this model we examine whether the publication of the committee's voting records is desirable. We show that first-period welfare is higher if voting records remain secret because transparency induces less efficient committee members to vote in a socially suboptimal manner. In the second period, the impact of transparency is ambiguous. Overall welfare is higher under opacity in most cases. A transparent voting process may not induce herding, when the government's takes account of the exact sequence of votes.

Problems in the 2000 presidential election, especially in Florida, initiated a large-scale shift toward new voting technology. Using cross-sectional and longitudinal data, we report on the effects of changes in voting systems in Florida and Michigan. The variety of initial conditions and the numerous changes make these excellent case studies. We find that reforms succeeded in reducing the residual vote. Every change from old to new technology resulted in a decline in residual votes that was significantly greater than in areas that did not change voting equipment. The percentage of residual votes in the 2004 presidential race in localities that changed voting systems was well under 1 percent, representing a 90 percent reduction in error in Florida and a 35 percent reduction in Michigan. We run these analyses separately for undervotes and overvotes. Using ecological-inference techniques, we investigate the persistence of residual votes when technology changed and find very little persistence.

The enormous controversy over Florida’s 2000 presidential election focused everyone’s attention on ballots with no recorded vote in presidential races, but non-voting generally becomes greater farther down the ballot and the drop-off rate varies by type of machine. Ward-level data for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections in Ohio demonstrate that only looking at races at the top of the ballot is misleading. The rush to eliminate punch card ballots actually increases the number of non-votes for other offices than it reduces them for the presidential election at the top. Differential impacts of voting machines by race, gender, and age are also examined.

Based on quantum entanglement, secure anonymous ballot systems are introduced to realize voting among numerous candidates in this paper. By searching individuals, each voter may cast a vote for his desired candidates of which number may be more than one. Therefore, the system based on the proposed algorithm may be applied voting among many candidates, such as a network ballot with the development of a quantum network. Finally, the security of the present scheme is investigated.

Irish elections use a voting system called proportion representation by means of a single transferable vote(PR-STV). Under this system, voters express their vote by ranking some (or all) of the candidates in order of preference. Which candidates are elected is determined through a series of counts where candidates are eliminated and surplus votes are distributed.The electorate in any election forms a heterogeneous population: that is voters with different political and ideological persuasions would be expected to have different preferences for the candidates. The purpose of this article is to establish the presence of voting bloes in the Irish electorate, to characterize these blocs and to estimate their size.A mixture modeling approach is used to explore the heterogenecity of the Irish electorate and to establish the existence of clearly defined voting blocs. The voting blocs are characterized by thier voting preferences which are described using a ranking data model. In addition the care with which voters choose lower tier preferences is estimated in the model.The methodology is used to explore data from two Irish election. Data from eight opinion polls taken during the six weeks prior to the 1997 Irish presidential election are analyzed. These data reveal the evolution of the structure of the electorate during the election campaign. In addition data that record the votes from the Dublin West constituency of the 2002 Irish general election are analyzed to reveal distinct voting blocs within the electoate these blocs are characterized by party politics, candidate profile and political ideology. Irish Research Council for Science, Engineering and Technology National Institutes of Health (NIH)

We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms—the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness—over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative to that of May (1952). (JEL: D71)

Two game-theoretic arguments for the potential rationality of voting are presented. The first argument suggests that people make choices that allow the most favorable forecasts. People choose to vote inasmuch as they project their own choices between voting and abstaining more strongly onto members of their own political group than onto members of other political groups. Relevant evidence is reviewed and extended by new findings in a simulated public-goods dilemma. The second argument suggests that people preview how they will feel about each of the four possible scenarios generated by the conjunctions of their own choices (to vote or to abstain) and the election outcome (victory or defeat). They choose to vote inasmuch as they feel their own vote will not be wasted. The implications of both arguments for efforts to increase turnout are discussed.

The use of Internet voting in public elections has been challenged based on claims that it is biased against minorities and lower income voters. Although previous research has supported these claims, we find that race and other socioeconomic factors do not affect the choice of Internet voting when it is used as an absentee voting method. Using individual-level vote data from the 2004 Michigan Democratic Primary, we model the two-stage decision-making process that voters face where they must first decide to cast an absentee ballot and then decide what ballot to use (Internet or mail). Our findings show that Internet voting is not more biased than other absentee voting methods, although younger voters are much more likely to choose to vote online.

Electronic voting systems were developed, in part, to make voting easier and to boost voters' confidence in the election process. Using three new approaches to studying electronic voting systems—focusing on a large-scale field study of the usability of a representative set of systems—we demonstrate that voters view these systems favorably but that design differences have a substantial impact on voters' satisfaction with the voting process and on the need to request help. Factors associated with the digital divide played only a small role with respect to overall satisfaction but they were strongly associated with feeling the need for help. Results suggest numerous possible improvements in electronic voting systems as well as the need for continued analysis that assesses specific characteristics of both optical scan and direct recording electronic systems.

In this paper, I study elections where voters are strategic. I find that the commonly used voting rules, such as Plurality Rule, Majority Rule, Approval Voting, and Single Transferable Vote, do not always select the Condorcet Winner and suffer from multiple equilibria. Multi-stage voting rules offer a way to get around this problem. I introduce two voting rules—Multi-Stage Runoff and the Nominate-Two Rule—that select the Condorcet Winner as the unique equilibrium outcome under mild conditions. I show that a third class of voting rules—Binary Voting Trees—also select the Condorcet Winner.

We give a characterization of majority voting rules with quorums in the framework of May (Econometrica 20:680–684, 1952)’s seminal article. According to these voting rules, an alternative is socially chosen if and only if it obtains the relative majority of votes and the total number of voters not abstaining reaches the quorum.

Previous election reforms designed to increase turnout have often made voting more convenient for frequent voters without significantly increasing turnout among infrequent voters. A recent innovation—Election Day vote centers—provides an alternative means of motivating electoral participation among infrequent voters. Election Day vote centers are nonprecinct-based locations for voting on Election Day. The sites are fewer in number than precinct-voting stations, centrally located to major population centers (rather than distributed among many residential locations), and rely on county-wide voter registration databases accessed by electronic voting machines. Voters in the voting jurisdiction (usually a county) are provided ballots appropriate to their voter registration address. It is thought that the use of voting centers on Election Day will increase voter turnout by reducing the cost and/or inconvenience associated with voting at traditional precinct locations. Since 2003 voters in Larimer County, CO hav...

Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful communication. Specifically, I show that for any voting rule truthful communication can only be achieved if all voters will agree on the preferred outcome in any state.

Compulsory voting laws have consistently been demonstrated to boost electoral participation. Despite the widespread presence of compulsory voting and the significant impact these laws appear to have on voting behavior, surprisingly little effort has been devoted to analyzing how mandatory voting alters the decision-making calculus of individual voters in these systems. Moreover, studies that investigate the influence of compulsory voting laws on electoral participation generally treat these policies monolithically, with scant attention to the nuances that differentiate mandatory voting laws across systems and to their consequences for voting rates. Analyses that explicitly and empirically examine the effects of penalties and enforcement are surprisingly rare. This study aims to fill that void by adapting rational choice models of participation in elections for compulsory voting systems. I find that the level of penalties countries impose for non-compliance and the degree of penalty enforcement impact turnout rates. Voters in mandatory voting systems abstain least when both the penalties and the likelihood of enforcement are high, and abstain most when both meaningless.

Recent events highlight primary type as an institutional variable that merits further examination in the economics literature on voter turnout. Using panel data for U.S. gubernatorial elections and treating primary type as a proxy for candidate deviation from the median voter, we test whether primary type changes voter turnout and whether that change is dominated by instrumental or expressive voting. The results show that states with more open primaries tend to have greater voter turnout in general elections, and that this increase reflects the effect of open primaries on expressive voting.

Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability. However, if the rule is 'difficult' to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is intrinsic to the rule or some cognitive sense specific to the set of voters, then one might not observe manipulation in practice. We evaluate this hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We conclude that one voting rule, due originally to Condorcet, is indeed behaviorally incentive-compatible despite being theoretically manipulable if the underlying preference environment is sufficiently diverse that voters have difficulty ascertaining others' preferences. Copyright 2008 , Oxford University Press.

Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place `in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of consensus. That is, a general agreement is sought, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement. In this context, the notion of a `neutral' voting rule, based on the compromise between equitableness and efficiency (or egalitarianism and utilitarianism) represented by the Nash bargaining solution, is founded, yielding a recommendation that differs from previous ones.

Despite their unmistakable advantages, the use of voting machines in elections is a topic of vivid debates. This article focuses on the experiences of voters using three types of voting equipment: (a) a paper ballot, (b) a voting machine, and (c) a voting machine with paper audit trail. An independent-groups experiment was conducted in which voters had to cast a vote for a donation to a charity organization and afterwards filled out a questionnaire about their voting experiences. The paper ballot was considered to be the most anonymous way of voting, especially by female voters. The voting machine (with or without paper trail), on the other hand, was considered to be more user-friendly than the paper ballot and gave the voters more confidence that their votes would actually be processed correctly. No differences were found between the voting machine with and without paper audit trail.

We define Endogenously Weighted Plurality Voting (EWPV) as the voting rule that, each individual being allowed to cast exactly one vote, selects the individual(s) who obtain(s) the greatest number of indirect votes. Endogenously Weighted Approval Voting (EWAV) selects the individual(s) who obtain(s) the greatest number of indirect votes when each individual can cast as many votes as he wants. In both cases, each individual can vote for any other individual, i.e., the set of candidates is the set of voters. In this study, we give necessary and sufficient axioms for EWPV and EWAV. We also propose a simple model where EWAV is more efficient than the traditional Approval Voting.

A person may vote for a candidate to please citizens who prefer the same candidate, and to anger citizens who dislike the candidate. Such behavior is consistent with high turnout (though any one vote is unlikely to be decisive), with strategic voting, and with candidates adopting divergent positions.

Pre-election and post-election interview data from the NES archive enables analysis of the relationship between statements of positive and negative preference for candidates and parties, and actual voting behaviour in the American presidential elections, 1980 to 2000. Having previously established that what American voters say they want (or say they like) is “almost always” different in content/meaning to what they say they don't want (or dislike), hence that the causes of any specific voting behaviour are complex, a fuzzy set approach to analysis was adopted. Analysing in excess of 10,000 individual cases, 5 out of 14 categories of preference are identified as “almost always” or “usually” necessary causes of voting in a particular way. Dealing with these necessary causes of voting is not an option; it is mandatory for the political marketer in America. Six out of 14 categories of preference are identified as “almost always” or “usually” sufficient causes of voting in a particular way. Having fir...

This paper studies a situation wherein a set of voters choose between two alternatives in the presence of a payoff externality. Specifically, regardless of her intrinsic preference, a voter’s payoff is maximized should she vote for the alternative that garners a majority of the votes cast. Are votes coordinated on a single alternative? Using laboratory experiments, we examine voting patterns in sequential voting and simultaneous voting elections. Across both election types, we also vary the amount of information that an individual voter has regarding the intrinsic preferences of the other voters. Our main findings are as follows. In the “low” information treatment, sequential voting elections facilitate coordinated voting. However, in the “high” information treatment, voting patterns are not dependent on how the election is structured.

We give an axiomatization for Qualified Majority Voting Rules where one of the alternative is socially chosen if it obtains the support of 100 · q % of the non-abstaining voters for some q ∈ ]0, 1[. These voting rules do not satisfy Neutrality in general. Instead, we introduce the axiom of Coalition Permanency.

This paper examines the welfare consequences of strategic voting under the Borda rule in a comparison of utilitarian efficiencies in simulated voting games under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility-maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Utilitarian efficiency is higher in the former than in the latter. Strategic voting increases utilitarian efficiency particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types. The Borda rule is shown to have two advantages: strategic voting is beneficial even if some but not all voter types engage in strategic behaviour, and even if the voters’ information is based on unreliable signals.

It has now been four years of contested elections for the Council of the Associ ation. In this note we ask: What can we learn about these elections from a politi cal science perspective?' In each election, there was a slate of eight candidates nominated by the APSA Nominating Committee to fill eight va cancies. There were also one or two can didates nominated by a petition of APSA members. These candidates nominated by petition emerged from the "Perestroika" movement, which has advocated opening up the APSA Council by filling its va cancies through competitive elections. Eligible members of the APSA were pro vided access to a web site where they could cast up to eight votes, with no more than one vote per candidate. Each candidate's vote totals were then tallied and the top eight finishers declared elected to the Council. The descriptive evidence displayed in Table 1 makes the point that there is considerable variation in vote totals, which implies that a siz able number of members are making their own, individual choices for whom to vote, rather than just following the recommended slate put forth by the Nominating Committee or another enti ty.2 In this note we explore some of the candidate-specific factors that ex plain the variation in the vote shares of the candidates running for a Council seat. This variability in vote totals across candidates suggests that more members pick and choose from the list of candi dates than one might expect a priori. Some of this picking and choosing might take the form of "bullet voting" or "plumping." The aggregate evidence

This research creates a theoretical framework for understanding the effect of Internet voting on the electorate. Based on standard Downsian rational choice voting theory, we claim that Internet voting lowers the cost of voting for certain voting demographics based upon race, age, and income. We further contend that this electoral advantage may crystallize the growing turnout disparity between demographic groups. The theory is tested using Bayesian inferential methods with data from the Internet turnout in the 2000 Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary merged with demographic data obtained from the 2000 Census. Our findings lend support for the theory that the Internet provides an electoral bias towards white voters, younger voters, and to the more affluent.

We consider 3-candidate elections under a general scoring rule and derive precise conditions for a given voting situation to be strategically manipulable by a given coalition of voters. We present an algorithm that makes use of these conditions to compute the minimum size M of a manipulating coalition for a given voting situation. The algorithm works for any voter preference model — here we present numerical results for IC and for IAC, for a selection of scoring rules, and for numbers of voters up to 150. A full description of the distribution of M is obtained, generalizing all previous work on the topic. The results obtained show interesting phenomena and suggest several conjectures. In particular we see that rules “between plurality and Borda” behave very differently from those “between Borda and antiplurality”.

Problems of multicandidate races in U.S. presidential elections motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not previously been recognized that the first four presidential elections (1788–1800) were conducted using a variant of approval voting. That experiment ended disastrously in 1800 with the infamous Electoral College tie between Jefferson and Burr. The tie, this paper shows, resulted less from miscalculation than from a strategic tension built into approval voting, which forces two leaders appealing to the same voters to play a game of Chicken. Because the Burr Dilemma poses a significant difficulty for approval voting, this paper urges that researchers give more attention to “instant runoff” reform options, especially the alternative vote and the Coombs rule.

This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the rational voter model so as to reflect the potential impact of the results of polls of likely voters’ Presidential candidate preferences on the expected benefits of voting and hence on the voter participation rate. This study introduces the poll results hypothesis: in any given state, given the existence of the Electoral College, the greater the lead of a principal Presidential candidate over his/her closest rival as revealed in polls of likely voters, the lower, for at least some portion of prospective voters, the expected gross benefits of voting in that state and hence the lower the aggregate voter participation rate in that state. In a cross-section study of the 50 states during the 2004 general election, it is found, after allowing for a variety of other factors, that the greater the lead (as revealed in polls of likely voters) of either of the principal Presidential candidates over the other in any given state, the lower the voter turnout rate in that state.

This project reconciles historically distinct paradigms at the interface between individual and social choice theory, as well as between rational and behavioral decision theory. The authors combine a utility-maximizing prescriptive rule for sophisticated approval voting with the ignorance prior heuristic from behavioral decision research and two types of plurality heuristics to model approval voting behavior. When using a sincere plurality heuristic, voters simplify their decision process by voting for their single favorite candidate. When using a strategic plurality heuristic, voters strategically focus their attention on the 2 front-runners and vote for their preferred candidate among these 2. Using a hierarchy of Thurstonian random utility models, the authors implemented these different decision rules and tested them statistically on 7 real world approval voting elections. They cross-validated their key findings via a psychological Internet experiment. Although a substantial number of voters used the plurality heuristic in the real elections, they did so sincerely, not strategically. Moreover, even though Thurstonian models do not force such agreement, the results show, in contrast to common wisdom about social choice rules, that the sincere social orders by Condorcet, Borda, plurality, and approval voting are identical in all 7 elections and in the Internet experiment.

We give new characterizations for Mk0, decision rules based on the difference of votes. We also give a characterization for MkK, decision rules based on the difference of votes with a quorum. This characterizations consider weak versions of Monotonicity since MkK is not generally monotonic.

Many analyses of plurality-rule elections predict the complete coor- dination of strategic voting, and hence support for only two candidates. Here I suggest that stable multi-candidate support will arise in equilibrium. A group of voters must partially coordinate behind one of two challenging candidates in order to dislodge a disliked incumbent. In a departure from existing models, the popular support for each challenger is uncertain. This support must be inferred from the private observation of informative signals, such as the social communication of pref- erences throughout the electorate, or the imperfect observation of opinion polls. The uniquely stable voting equilibrium entails only limited strategic voting and hence incomplete coordination. This is due to the surprising presence of negative feed- back: an increase in the degree of strategic voting by others reduces the incentives for an individual to vote strategically. The incentive to vote strategically is lower in relatively marginal elections, after controlling for the distance from contention of a trailing preferred challenger. A calibration of the model applied to the UK General Election of 1997 is consistent with the impact of strategic voting and the reported accuracy of voters' understanding of the electoral situation. It suggests that nearly 50 seats may have been lost by the Conservative party due to strategic voting. 1. Plurality-Rule Elections and Strategic Voting 1.1. Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law. Plurality-rule elections, where the winner is the candidate who receives the largest number of votes, are vulnerable to strategic voting: a voter might well switch away from her preferred candidate and toward a perceived leader, in the hope of exerting a greater influence over the outcome of the election. This phenomenon has long been the focus of both economic and political scientific study. In an influential essay, Riker (1982b) cited Droop's (1871) eloquent exposition of the strategic-voting problem: 1 I oer my grateful thanks to the many friends, colleagues, seminar participants, referees, and editors who have oered insightful comments during the long gestation of this paper, its antecedents, and companion work. Special thanks go to Steve Fisher, whose empirical analysis of strategic voting raised many of the questions that I seek to answer in this paper, and to Chris Wallace. This particular paper brings together much of the analysis previously circulated in the papers A New Theory of Strategic Voting, Strategic Voting Under the Qualified Majority Rule, and Idiosyncrasy, Information, and the Impact of Strategic Voting.

The spatial voting theory literature has generally focused on either parties or candidates as the unit of analysis and ignored strategic interactions between them. I study a game theoretic spatial model of elections with many heterogeneous constituencies in which both party and candidate behavior are modeled. Parties choose a platform and a ‘whip rate,’ representing the proportion of final policy that will be made by the party, as opposed to by the successful candidates. Candidates are office-motivated and can choose both a platform and a level of advertising in order to defeat their opponent. It is shown that the introduction of whipping as a choice variable can cause party platforms to diverge and that parties will whip on some but not all issues, reflecting the empirical reality of parties influencing rather than determining policy outcomes exclusively. Further, parties respond to sharper voter polarization by reducing the power of the whip as well as distinguishing their platforms from one another, while more voter uncertainty has the opposite effect. Other real-world phenomena, including ‘safe seats’ and legislators voting with their party even when unwhipped, are also shown to be predicted by the model.

Does social-isolation deflate observed preferences for public goods? Using a voting referendum elicitation mechanism, List et al. (2004) document a 30% reduction in affirmative voting when votes are privately, rather than publicly, cast for a public good. We replicate this work and then add to the exercise by examining the role that group size plays in generating social-pressure bias – an extension we motivate with a structural model. Having replicated to the extent possible the List et al.’s consequential private and public treatments, we find that when group size is large (N = 60), social isolation reduces affirmative votes by roughly 30%, a result that does not carry over to the small-group (N = 30) session.

International audience; This paper studies the determinants of citizens’ preferences for different electoral systems. We use data collected through a large internet-based quasi-experiment carried out during the 2012 French presidential election where we invited subjects to cast a vote for real candidates according to four voting rules: two-round (the official system), one-round, the alternative vote, and approval voting. After voting with each of the four voting rules, subjects were also asked to report which system they liked the most. We find that voters prefer systems that are beneficial to the candidate they prefer, that their preference for the official two-round system (weakly) depends on how they actually vote under this system, and that right-wing voters are more supportive of voting rules under which one can vote for only one candidate (one-round and two-round).

This paper proposed a reliable cost effective secure electronic voting system that can be used in cost effectively way in many development countries like Egypt. The important obstacle in any e-voting system across the world is the security issue. Election's results may be modified when delivered to the Higher Elections Committee, unauthorized voter may vote instead of the eligible voter, a vote may not be calculated; also the voter has to ensure that nobody has the possibility to know his ballot data. The proposed Voting Model System overcomes these obstacles. Security evaluation experiments are performed successfully to the proposed system proving that it satisfies privacy, accuracy, reusability, eligibility and integrity.