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This simulation scenario is based on the events surrounding Naomi Osaka's decision to withdraw from the 2021 French Open tennis tournament, in which Osaka chose not to participate in media obligations due to mental health concerns. Tournament officials attempted to address her concerns, but Osaka did not find the response substantial enough and viewed the response as worsening the situation. Sport managers, athletes, and other stakeholders have responsibilities toward one another that may be best viewed through deontological ethics. Students will analyze the situation from the perspective of a sport manager using deontology as their guiding ethical framework. Learning objectives include developing a deeper understanding of Kant's categorical imperative and Ross's prima facie intuitionism, as well as providing opportunities for students to practice ethical leadership in a classroom setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the debate about the use of animals for human entertainment, such as pets, in zoos, circuses, and sports. Utilitarian, deontological, contractual, and virtue ethics are analyzed in relation to the use of animals for entertainment. The confinement and captivity of animals are questioned, and it is argued that entertainment is not a good moral justification for keeping animals in captivity. The suffering and deprivation of freedom experienced by animals in these places of entertainment are highlighted. Additionally, the relationship between humans and domestic animals is discussed from the perspective of contractual ethics, arguing that domestic animals have given up their physical freedom in exchange for food, care, and leadership in an implicit contract with humans. [Extracted from the article]

Having interviewed Germans who emigrated to Israel and, in most cases, converted to Judaism, I experienced a paralyzing sense of ethical conflict when I began analyzing the first order discourse my participants and I had co-constructed to transform it into the second-order discourse of research publications. So, I set out to rethink the ethics of life-history interview research. My quest into our ethical responsibilities began with rule-based deontological and consequentialist ethics and the guidelines in the social sciences they inform. It led me to reconsider such core notions as informed consent, privacy, and risk-benefit analysis. I came to realize that rule-based ethics are inherently inadequate for addressing the situation-specific and thus unpredictable ethical questions that arise in conducting and analyzing life-history interviews. Next, I turned to the notion of ethical conflict as arising from obligations to trust and truth and rethought it as responsibilities toward participants and audiences. I realized that our responsibilities extend beyond our interview partners, who entrusted us with their life stories, to the audiences, who engage with our analyses. I furthermore reevaluated using research to advocate for disenfranchised participants and argued for transparency and reflexivity regarding how our subject positions impact knowledge construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Is a Good God Logically Possible?, James Sterba uses the analogy of a just political state to develop evil-prevention principles he thinks a good God would follow. With the assumption that God is omnipotent, these principles entail that God would never permit free agents to bring about horrendous evil. But free agents routinely succeed in doing so: entailing a logical incompatibility between the world's evils and the existence of a good, omnipotent God. I challenge this conclusion by sketching two ways divine omnipotence arguably entails that God would face moral constraints on the prevention of moral evil that human agents and political states do not. If my account is sound, God would be morally precluded from functioning as a sovereign governing authority in the manner of just political states. If this is correct, Sterba's arguments might be taken to show, not that there is a contradiction between the world's evil and the existence of a good, almighty God, but that there is a contradiction between the world's evil and the common theistic belief that such a God is the sovereign ruler of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can anthropologists describe ethical values—that is, what emerges as important—in the social, material worlds of Christianity? This article considers the question by working along interfaces. The first part of the article discusses two diverging approaches to values in the anthropology of Christianity (realizing values and producing values) and situates these in relation to three groupings in the anthropology of ethics and morality (deontological ethics, first-person virtue ethics, and poststructuralist virtue ethics). The second part of the article follows one value—the value of movement—in a historical example: the writings of a group of Christian women in 1880s and 1890s Norway. I argue that ethical values move in multiple ways through this social world: people realize values, people produce values and people work on values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Palliative care represents the shared choice, between the health professional and the patient, to preserve the patient's dignity when drug therapy and surgical interventions are not beneficial to health care. This perspective of medical follow-up rescues the ethical care of attention and appreciation of the person's biography. The ethical aspect, based on the ethics of care and deontological ethics, reflects on the relationship between health professionals and patients with the aim of offering conditions for maintaining autonomy and dignity. Bioethics emphasizes care centered on patient choices. It avoids obstinacy in prolonging medical treatment unless there is an improvement in the patient's clinical condition. This conceptual dialectic between ethics and bioethics has the purpose of guaranteeing the well-being of patients in palliative care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many follow Kant in thinking that morally worthy actions must be carried out solely from the motive of duty. This outlook faces two challenges: (1) The One Feeling Too Few problem (actions that issue from, say, compassion also seem to have moral worth), and (2) The One Thought Too Many problem (some actions have moral worth precisely because they're not motivated by duty). These challenges haven't led Kantians to dispense with the motive of duty. Instead, they have proposed to push it into the background. We should not (the thought goes) construe duty as a primary motive, a consideration that motivates the agent to act. Duty is best thought of as a secondary motive, a background concern that constrains her choice. Since it is consistent with acting from duty at the secondary level that one is motivated at the primary level by compassion, this move is thought to overcome both challenges. In this paper, I argue that secondary motive views don't live up to their stated ambitions. Such proposals either fail to make progress on issues with which primary motive views continue to grapple, or they render the motive of duty ill‐suited to underwrite a plausible account of moral worth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tejuelo: Didáctica de Lengua y Literatura is the property of Tejuelo. Didactica de la Lengua y la Literatura. Educacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The relationship between ethics and performance has previously been addressed in the literature, although there are still some gaps, for example, the relationship of ethical ideologies to student performance. This work aims to contribute to the literature with a statistical evaluation using partial least squares path modelling (PLS-PM) regarding whether university students' ethical ideologies and moral meaningfulness influence their level of student performance and academic achievement. Results indicate that the ideologies of justice and deontology increase moral meaningfulness, moral meaningfulness in turn increase student's citizenship behaviours and student's in-role performance, and finally, student's in-role performance positively influences academic achievement. This research provides resources applicable to the fields of pedagogy and ethics to encourage performance during the study and highlight the value of the ideologies of justice and deontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that applied ethics can itself be morally problematic. As illustrated by the case of Peter Singer's criticism of social practice, morally loaded communication by applied ethicists can lead to protests, backlashes, and aggression. By reviewing the psychological literature on self-image, collective identity, and motivated reasoning three categories of morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism by applied ethicists are identified: serious psychological discomfort, moral backfiring, and hostile conflict. The most worrisome is moral backfiring: psychological research suggests that ethical criticism of people's central moral convictions can reinforce exactly those attitudes. Therefore, applied ethicists unintentionally can contribute to a consolidation of precisely those social circumstances that they condemn to be unethical. Furthermore, I argue that the normative concerns raised in this paper are not dependent on the commitment to one specific paradigm in moral philosophy. Utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Rawlsian contractarianism all provide sound reasons to take morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism seriously. Only the case of deontological ethics is less clear-cut. Finally, I point out that the issues raised in this paper provide an excellent opportunity for further interdisciplinary collaboration between applied ethics and social sciences. I also propose strategies for communicating ethics effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral dilemmas often involve a conflict between action-options that maximize outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) and inaction-options that conform to moral norms (deontology). Previous research suggests that, compared to individuals, groups show stronger support for outcome-maximizing actions that violate moral norms. The current study used a computational modeling approach to investigate whether this difference is driven by (1) stronger sensitivity to consequences, (2) weaker sensitivity to moral norms, or (3) weaker action aversion in moral-dilemma judgments made by groups. The results suggest that groups show a stronger sensitivity to consequences than individuals. Groups and individuals did not differ in terms of their sensitivity to moral norms and their general action aversion. The findings challenge the idea that groups are less action averse and less concerned about violating moral norms than individuals and instead suggest that group decisions are more strongly guided by outcomes for the greater good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author opts for the "dialogue model" as the best way to approach the science-faith relationship. The aim of the book is to provide readers with a tool to approach the complexity of the interaction of science and faith, an area of knowledge in which, unfortunately, easy solutions often form part of the common perception of the argument. [Extracted from the article]

This paper is focusing on the concept of “freedom of expression”, a philosophical notion that could be framed either as a norm or as a value. After clarifying the contexts of its utilization, I am interested in analyzing the ways in which an ethical framework for freedom of expression is proposed. I do this by investigating a prominent example from the contemporary political life of Canada, namely Justin Trudeau’s response to Emmanuel Macron’s position concerning the publication of Muhammad’s caricatures. I will argue that differences in conceiving freedom of expression go hand in hand with an antinomy between a consequentialist ethic and a deontological ethic. As such, disputes between norm and value and between consequentialism and deontology constitute sub-debates of the central debate on the limitation or ethical regulation of freedom of expression. This investigation reveals, yet again, the presence of the motif of dissymmetry at the core of public debates: more often than not, discussions are not dominated by the intrinsic logic of the arguments, but by discursive force.

How strongly do higher investment premiums tempt people to invest in unethical assets, such as harmful 'sin stocks'? We present two experimental studies (N total = 1260) examining baseline willingness to invest in 'sin stocks' (without a premium), changes in investments as premiums increase, and how individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations and dark personality traits impact baseline and changes to investments. We compare results to hypothetical models of sensitivity to higher returns: a) full resilience (to moral decay), where people increase investment in regular but not sin stocks with increasing premiums, b) partial resilience, where increasing premiums increases investment more slowly for sin than regular stocks, c) sin deduction: a flat baseline penalty for sin versus regular stocks resulting in similar sensitivity to increasing premiums, and d) decay, where investment differences in sin versus regular stocks reduce as premiums increase. On average, responses aligned best with the partial resilience model. Individual differences in morally-relevant traits moderated effects: most notably, people with higher deontological inclinations and lower dark traits showed greater resilience. However, 21–33% of participants exhibited full resilience, refusing to invest more in sin stocks even as premiums increased, which was more common in people with higher deontological inclinations and lower dark traits. These findings suggest that decisions to invest in sin stocks reflect the sensitivity to the sinfulness of the stock, which remains strong even after unethical investments are made more attractive. We conclude that increasing the economic reward of unethical investments does not crowd out moral concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is considerable evidence linking cognitive reflection with utilitarian judgments in dilemmas that involve sacrificing someone else for the greater good. However, the evidence is mixed on the question of whether cognitive reflection is associated with utilitarian judgments in self-sacrificial dilemmas. We employed process dissociation to extract a self-sacrificial utilitarian (SU) parameter, an altruism (A) parameter, an other-sacrificial (OU) utilitarian parameter, and a deontology (D) parameter. In Study 1, the cognitive reflection test (CRT) positively correlated with both SU and OU (replicated in Studies 2 and 4, pre-registered). In Study 2, we found that instructing participants to rely on reason increased SU and OU (replicated in Study 4, pre-registered). In Study 3, we found that SU and OU positively correlated with giving in the single-game version of the public goods game (replicated in Study 4, pre-registered), which provides behavioral validation that they are genuine moral tendencies. Together, these studies constitute strong cumulative evidence that SU and OU are both valid measures that are associated with reliance on cognitive reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main normative moral theories in Western thought, from deontology to virtue and consequentialist ethics, revolve around conceptions of the moral right, good, and worth. However, a few elementary psychological motives lie at a deeper level. In the present article, I outline the key tenets of regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and the hedonic principle (approach/avoidance), which I define as "motivational primitives," and provide a conceptual analysis of their links with specific ethical systems. I unveil how moral judgment in each of them is psychologically construed on the basis of the motivational primitives and their underlying self-regulatory processes. The credibility of the proposed framework will be fully brought to life when researchers, having agreed on satisfactory operationalizations and manipulations of the primitives, will be able to reconcile the speculative and the empirical planes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship between pleasure and the Good in Levinas's ethics. Firstly, the paper points out that, for Levinas, pleasure and the Good are both essentially related to sensibility, except that pleasure is concerned with the self-affection of sensibility, and the Good is concerned with the hetero-affection of sensibility. The self-affection of pleasure and enjoyment enables the subject to locate and contract itself, and thus to establish an inner and separated self. Meanwhile, the Good is originated from the hetero-affection of the call of the transcendent Other, and is embodied in an involuntary suffering for the other's suffering, weakness, and needs. Secondly, the paper argues that the relationship between pleasure and the Good is highly tensional. On the one hand, the Good does interrupt the egoism of life and its pleasure. On the other hand, pleasure actually constitutes a necessary condition for the Good, rather than something that must be rejected. The intersection of pleasure and the Good constitutes an insurmountable and irreducible tension within subjectivity. Finally, the paper places Levinas's ethics in a dialogue with hedonism, virtue ethics, asceticism, and deontology, and regards Levinas's ethics as a new paradigm for understanding the relationship between pleasure and the Good in the history of Western ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Max Weber, modernity is characterized by a tragic conflict among value spheres, each claiming to possess the 'true meaning' of human life. In particular, Weber argues that while the political sphere is dominated by the unifying, exclusionary, power-driven, and war-prone nation state, the ethical sphere is characterized by the universalization of individually based, deontological norms. For Weber, I argue, the modern separation between the ethical and political spheres originates in ancient Judaism. His work on Judaism, mostly neglected by political theorists, describes the emergence of politics as an autonomous, naturalistic sphere with the establishment of kingship. Biblical prophets, simultaneously, were the inventors of an idealistic, mulish, universal ethics Weber termed the 'ethics of ultimate ends'. Thus, against the Greek model harmonizing ethics and politics, Judaism invented an antagonistic model of the two. This Jewish imagination lay dormant for almost two millennia but returned to the stage in secularized modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mediterranean Journal of Communication / Revista Mediterránea de Comunicación is the property of Revista Mediterranea de Comunicacion / Mediterranean Journal of Communication and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Social Psychology / Psihologie Socială is the property of Alexandru Ioan Cuza University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Copyright of Revista Bioetica is the property of Conselho Federal de Medicina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Documentación de las Ciencias de la Información is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Quaestio Iuris (QI) is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Rights and obligations—sometimes referred to as deontology or deontic powers—are key to most contemporary conceptions of social ontology. Both Cambridge Social Ontology and the dominant analytic conception associated, most prominently, with John Searle, place rights and obligations at the centre of their accounts. Such a common emphasis has led some to consider deontology to be a point of similarity between these different theories. This is a mistake. In this paper, I show that a distinctive conception of rights and obligations underpins Cambridge Social Ontology and its social positioning theory. Moreover, I argue that a fuller understanding of the account of rights and obligations defended in Cambridge in fact reveals that it can be differentiated from other conceptions and, most importantly, Searle's, by its recognition that a practical dimension is always involved in social constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Online risks and harms, including cyber-bullying, trolling, revenge porn and digital harassment, are an everyday reality in many young people's lives. Educators are increasingly being called upon to address these concerns but are not adequately equipped to do so. In this article the case is made for a new educational model for cyber-flourishing. The model is constructed through a pragmatic approach to moral theory, adopting the central tenets of deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics, and showing how these can be integrated and put to work by teachers to tackle online harms. The model is comprised of three core components, cyber-rules, cyber-wisdom and cyber-flourishing, and each is explained in detail in the article. Cyber-rules must be put in place by schools to provide the foundations for the cultivation of character and cyber-wisdom. Cyber-wisdom is the individual quality of doing the right thing, at the right time, especially when no one is looking. Cyber-flourishing is defined as authentic happiness that comes from living morally in the online world, and is the utility value that we should all strive for. The article concludes by outlining nine educational practices that demonstrate how teachers can adopt and implement the model in their schools. The model is the first attempt in the world to integrate moral theory into an educational model that provides an overarching and whole-school approach to tackling pressing everyday online concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mandatory reporting of child abuse is a part of the civil legal system that can activate a policy cascade disproportionately criminalizing racialized and marginalized communities. While social work scholarship has explored ways to increase provider compliance with mandatory reporting laws, there is a dearth of research focused on how social work education guides future providers towards the praxis of mandatory reporting discourses. This article presents findings from a content analysis of social work textbook excerpts focused on mandatory reporting of child abuse in the U.S. We found that textbooks affirm social work's loyalty to the State by approaching mandatory reporting through a deontological lens and systematically reinforcing risk management practices. Although some texts offer a nod to mandatory reporting as facilitating ethical dilemmas, none offer guidance for how to navigate competing social work commitments, and none actually treat mandatory reporting as an ethical dilemma. We argue that social work education should equip future practitioners to: a) have a nuanced understanding of mandatory reporting laws and requirements; b) contextualize mandatory reporting within broader discourses of criminalization, professionalization, and neoliberalism; and c) ground future practices in macro social work ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Douglas Husak contends that both criminalization and punishment can serve preventive goals, so long as they respect retributive culpability constraints. This Essay draws on Husak's work to argue that, while Husak is right to defend the legitimacy of criminal law as a (partly) preventive endeavor, preventive coercion is also permissible on consequentialist grounds alone, outside the culpability constraints of the criminal law. The Essay presents a unified consequentialist theory of preventive coercion, addresses deontological objections to 'pure' preventive detention, and argues that a consequentialist approach to prevention might ultimately be more protective of liberty and equality interests than the deontological 'mad or bad' approach that currently dominates Anglo-American jurisprudence and legal theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of the present work concerns the nature ofdeontological decisions. We test the hypothesis that it ispossible to specify deontological moral choices based on anunemotional rule, norm or principle and that such moralchoices can be distinguished from emotion-driven ones.Using a novel paradigm for moral choice that we call TheRefugees’ Dilemma, we provide evidence for such a rule-based route to moral choice. We show that participants withhigh scores in a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) were morelikely to adopt utilitarian or rule-based responses, as opposedto emotional ones. We also found that rule-based respondentsreported the highest average psychological distance, more sothat even utilitarian respondents. These findings show howemotional and rule-based influences can be separated with theappropriate scenario and challenges the approach of assumingboth influences can be combined into a single deontologicalroute in dual-process models.

The new Brazilian Civil Code brought forth important issues on procedures to be used in civil demands. Appeals were made extinct and procedural issues were added, coupled to modifications with regard to items in civil procedure. Besides procedure changes, the new CC presented a new feature for the judge, transforming him in a particular way in an administrator of the process in collaboration with the other partners. Several tools were produced never yet seen in the Brazilian CC. This made possible a greater flexibility of procedure and the personal intervention of the judge so that the procedure becomes more efficacious and more just in the issue. Several tools have been analyzed too. It is a great challenge for judges in their high mission through the effectiveness of the process and the constant insistence of the legal status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two articles recently published in the international journal Libri summarized and rekindled the debate on fake news, post-truth and intellectual neutrality of librarians hosted a few years ago by AIB studi, focusing on the issues of the relevance of the concept of truth for libraries and of the possible introduction among librarians' ethical principles of the 'alethic rights' theorized by the Italian philosopher Franca D'Agostini. These rights can be understood in a 'strong' or a 'weak' sense: in the first case, adopting them would be problematic for libraries both from a technical and from a deontological point of view, while in the second case the adoption would be dangerous and redundant. Dangerous due to the risk that aletic rights, even if 'weak', are still interpreted as 'strong'. And redundant because, on the one hand, they would not modify the practices currently in force in libraries and, on the other, any temporary (and risky) limitations of the intellectual freedom of users motivated by emergencies such as the current pandemic could in some way be justified by the principle of social responsibility, already present in many ethical codes. As regards the relevance of truth for libraries, the theory of 'alethic pluralism' is - among those that try to define this elusive, but indispensable, concept - the most suitable to be applied in the library field, because it allows to 'translate' it with other characteristics more easily requirable from documents collected by libraries and from information provided by their reference services, such as reliability and accuracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amartya Sen defends the capability approach (CA) and the "discipline of consequential evaluation" which suggests that his CA is consistent with some form of "consequentialism". Yet prominent commentators suggest or imply that Sen's CA is not "consequentialist". The resulting confusion is defused by showing that whether Sen's CA, as a general normative perspective, is consistent with "consequentialism" depends on how "consequentialism" is understood. If "consequentialism" is understood as a moral doctrine, then the CA is not committed to either "consequentialism" or "non-consequentialism". On a social choice theoretic (SCT) definition a normative framework or view is "consequentialist" if it restricts relevant information to "outcomes". On this definition, whether the CA is compatible with "consequentialism" depends on whether "outcomes" are understood as "comprehensive" or "culmination" outcomes. Two varieties of "non-welfarist consequentialist" moral theory which restrict information respectively to capability and freedom are compared. Martha Nussbaum's version of the CA is not a "non-welfarist consequentialist" theory of this sort because it is not a moral doctrine with a maximizing structure. It may, nonetheless, classify as "consequentialist" on the SCT definition if all valued objects in her approach can be included in the description of "outcomes". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of ConTexto is the property of ConTexto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article draws on moral theory to advance digital citizenship education and explore how adolescents aged 13–16 make decisions when confronted with incivility, such as cyberbullying, on social media. Given the extent to which digital citizenship education may be approached in line with deontological (rules), utilitarian (consequences) and/or virtue ethical (character) theories, we argue that it is important to know which of these underpin adolescents' moral decision making online. To address this question, this article reports findings from a survey completed by 1947 13–16 year olds in England. Chi-square tests, binary logistic regressions and other exploratory analysis showed that most 13–16 year-olds use virtue ethical reasons to justify moral actions. We conclude that if online incivility is to be reduced, policymakers, educators and parents should focus more on virtue- and character-based approaches to digital citizenship education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On some current approaches, deontology is the foundation of social reality. But we do not yet have an account of the kinds of deontic structures in play. One way to approach a taxonomy of deontic kinds is to understand the ways in which they bind to an agent. There are three ways of binding deontic powers to any agent. The first two emerge from a distinction between those rights and duties forced upon an agent versus those that the agent voluntarily accepts. Within the category of voluntarily accepted deontics, however, there is an interesting subtype which, rather than being a composite of deontics assembled by sources external to the agent, is instead assembled and bound by the agent to herself. There are, then, three categories of deontic binding: imposed, voluntary, and self-bound (autogenic). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study attempts to adopt more comprehensive and rigorous methods to deconstruct and confirm the association between guilt and moral dilemma judgements, with the expectation of providing new insights for related research. A total of 170 college participants were employed in separate batches for the experiment, including 53 males and 117 females, ranging from 17 to 28 years old (M = 20.88, SD = 2.29). We first induced guilt in the subjects using recalling and writing tasks and then asked the participants to complete the moral dilemma judgement tasks. Results of the analysis using traditional methods showed no association between induced guilt and moral dilemma judgements. However, the results of the process dissociation analysis indicated that induced guilt is related to higher deontological inclination. Moreover, the CNI model analysis revealed that induced guilt has a stronger sensitivity to moral norms. Induced guilt was associated with a stronger sensitivity to moral norms, which is reflected in less violation and more compliance with moral norms. There was no direct relation between induced guilt and the sensitivity to consequences and a general preference for action in moral decision-making. What is already known about this topic: Previous findings on the relation of guilt in moral decision-making were not consistent. The traditional approach treats utilitarianism and deontology as bipolar opposites, which may further confound the relation between guilt and moral decision-making. Numerous studies imply that guilt increases other-oriented empathy and emotional concern for the victims. What this topic adds: Induced Guilt is associated with higher sensitivity to moral norms and will discipline one's behaviour to be more in line with ethical standards. Induced Guilt is unrelated to utilitarian decisions about the well-being of the majority and is not involved in the inhibition and activation of action. The current study used more comprehensive and rigorous methods to clarify the potential confounding factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power affects how people think about moral issues, and has been found to elicit deontological moral judgments. We hypothesized that powerholders' propensity to rely on intuitive thinking would trigger deontological moral choices. In two studies, power was induced by role simulation tasks and participants then made a judgment on a moral dilemma that did not involve bodily harm. In Study 1 memory cognitive load was manipulated to induce an intuitive processing style, and in Study 2 deliberation was induced by asking participants to deliver strong arguments. Results of Study 1 show that high power led to deontological judgments regardless of cognitive load, and cognitive load enhanced deontological preferences among powerless individuals. In Study 2 we found that deliberation shifted the judgments of powerholders toward utilitarianism. These results extend prior findings and reinforce the links between power and deontology. The findings suggest that powerholders' preference for deontological moral judgments is driven by their reliance on intuitive thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]