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This book uses the 21st Century Foundations series format to re-introduce to the military community the writings of General Thomas S. Power, the third Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). His unappreciated works contain many insights into military topics such as technology and the arms race, the nature of deterrence, and the military utility of space. Unifying all of these writings was Power's quest to maintain nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Although Power is considered a quintessential Cold Warrior, his ideas are timely considering today's challenges of re-energizing the morale and technology of U.S. strategic forces in the wake of foreign advances, discerning what deterrence means in the “Second Nuclear Age,” and planning the future of space and cyber power.

From the rising significance of non-state actors to the increasing influence of regional powers, the nature and conduct of international politics has arguably changed dramatically since the height of the Cold War. Yet much of the literature on deterrence and compellence continues to draw (whether implicitly or explicitly) upon assumptions and precepts formulated in-and predicated upon-politics in a state-centric, bipolar world. Coercion moves beyond these somewhat hidebound premises and examines the critical issue of coercion in the 21st century, with a particular focus on new actors, strategies and objectives in this very old bargaining game. The chapters in this volume examine intra-state, inter-state, and transnational coercion and deterrence as well as both military and non-military instruments of persuasion, thus expanding our understanding of coercion for conflict in the 21st century. Scholars have analyzed the causes, dynamics, and effects of coercion for decades, but previous works have principally focused on a single state employing conventional military means to pressure another state to alter its behavior. In contrast, this volume captures fresh developments, both theoretical and policy relevant. This chapters in this volume focus on tools (terrorism, sanctions, drones, cyber warfare, intelligence, and forced migration), actors (insurgents, social movements, and NGOs) and mechanisms (trilateral coercion, diplomatic and economic isolation, foreign-imposed regime change, coercion of nuclear proliferators, and two-level games) that have become more prominent in recent years, but which have yet to be extensively or systematically addressed in either academic or policy literatures.

The challenge of deterring territorial aggression is taking on renewed importance, yet discussion of it has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles. The authors aim to provide a fresh look, with two primary purposes: to review established concepts about deterrence, and to provide a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships. They focus on a specific type of deterrence: extended deterrence of interstate aggression.

This book contains papers presented at a conference held at the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in 1991. The papers reflect the spectrum of thought in the expert community that is likely to frame the policy debate over the future of nuclear deterrence..

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today's international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.

Can we avoid nuclear war? Why are we more at risk today than at the end of the Cold War? Can the world powers work together to ensure international stability? Stephen Cimbala provides a comprehensive assessment of these complex issues, ranging from the prospects for nuclear abolition, to the management of nuclear crises, to the imperative need for nuclear arms control worldwide.

This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor.Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state's counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor's grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers'Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization's strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.

Current NATO military strategy is based on the policy of flexible response that U.S. and European politicians endorsed in 1967; for over 15 years, no fundamental changes in NATO's defense strategy have occurred. If NATO cannot stop a Warsaw Pact aggression conventionally, it continues to threaten a gradual and controlled nuclear escalation of both theater and strategic nuclear weapons. Many analysts now question the fundamental principles underlying NATO's policy and strategy, given the enormous changes that have occurred in the strategic environment between 1967 and 1984. The contributors to this book examine the recent proposal by Samuel Huntington, who advocates that NATO adopt a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy based on offensive military actions deep into Eastern Europe. In evaluating this new proposal, the authors analyze the potential impact that it would have on U.S. and NATO military doctrine, assess probable European and Soviet reactions to NATO adopting a conventional counter-retaliatory strategy, and address the linkages existing between conventional and nuclear strategy. In the final chapter, the editors consider the policy, strategy, and force structure questions raised in the book and recommend policy options for the United States.

Despite a U.S. focus on securing an international deal to curb Iran's nuclear development for the last several years, the United States lacks a strategy to combat the full range of Iranian activities that threaten the interests of the United States and its allies but fall short of conventional warfare. In this report, CSIS's International Security Program sets forth analysis of Iran's strategy, motivations, military, and paramilitary capabilities and evaluates the effects of Iranian behavior on key U.S. partners. The study leverages the expertise of contributing authors at CSIS, the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Naval Analyses, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Harvard University and the University of Hawaii to inform its analysis. The study proposes a framework for deterring Iran, including practical recommendations for the U.S. administration and Congress that would enhance the security of the United States and its allies and partners.

In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China's assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China's maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.

China's approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first test in 1964, but it has recently accelerated nuclear force modernization. China's strategic environment is likely to grow more complex, and nuclear constituencies are gaining a larger bureaucratic voice. Beijing is unlikely to change official nuclear policies but will probably increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence and may adjust the definition of key concepts.

Cet ouvrage tente de comparer la dissuasion nucléaire et le terrorisme à travers le prisme de la terreur. Même si ces deux notions peuvent, de prime abord, paraître diamétralement opposées, elles revêtent néanmoins bon nombre de similitudes. La terreur est un véritable concept psycho-stratégique, à la fois légitimée lorsqu'elle émane de l'Etat et paradoxalement réprimée lorsqu'elle procède d'entités sub-étatiques. Par cette approche comparative, tentons aujourd'hui de mieux comprendre la terreur qui s'est emparée de nos sociétés afin de mieux pouvoir la combattre demain.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a bipartisan think tank in Washington, D.C., looks ahead in this annual volume at the critical international policy issues facing the United States and the world in 2017. This collection of essays by CSIS experts seeks to flesh out the specific policy areas that the new U.S. administration will face in an uncertain and dynamic global context. Global Flashpoints is a valuable resource for understanding the foreign and defense policy questions that will be critical to the United States and its allies in the years ahead.

This book offers a broader theory of nuclear deterrence and examines the way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in a series of historical case studies.The existing body of literature largely leans toward the analytical primacy of nuclear deterrence and it is often implicitly assumed that nuclear weapons are so important that, when they are present, other factors need not be studied. This book addresses this omission. It develops a research framework that incorporates the military aspects of deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, together with various perceptual factors, international circumstances, domestic politics, and norms. This framework is then used to re-examine five historical crises that brought two nuclear countries to the brink of war: the hostile asymmetric nuclear relations between the United States and China in the early 1960s; between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1960s; between Israel and Iraq in 1977–1981; between the United States and North Korea in 1992–1994; and, finally, between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The main empirical findings challenge the common expectation that the threat of nuclear retaliation represents the ultimate deterrent. In fact, it can be said, with a high degree of confidence, that it was rather the threat of conventional retaliation that acted as a major stabilizer.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, cold war studies, deterrence theory, security studies and IR in general.

Relations between the United States and Russia have recently escalated from strained to outright aggressive. From imperial expansion in Ukraine to intervention in Syria to Russian hacking during the US election in 2016, it is clear that the United States must be prepared to defend itself and its NATO allies against Russian aggression. Resurgent Russia, researched and written by six residents and internationally experienced officers at the US Army War College, analyzes the current threat of Russian acts of war—both conventional military attacks and unconventional cyber warfare or political attacks—against the United Stated and NATO. The officers detail how the America can use its international military resources and political influence to both prepare for and deter aggression ordered by Vladimir Putin, making it clear that such an attack would be unsuccessful and therefore keeping the peace. This study provides a clear assessment of how the United States and its allies must utilize their political and military power to deter Russian aggression and maintain the hierarchy of power in today's world.

One important area of interest within military and policy circles focuses on an effort to revitalize the nuclear triad amidst a number of competing strategic interests. The difficulties arising from US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading many scholars and policy makers to question whether a reinvigorated nuclear triad has any role in deterring modern adversaries. This volume takes an unashamed pro-nuclear modernization position and argues for designing and fielding new nuclear warheads and delivery systems (submarine, ICBM, and bomber) while also arguing against signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or agreeing to further reductions in the nuclear arsenal. It also argues that nuclear deterrence remains as relevant today, perhaps more, than it was during the Cold War. With so many authors advocating for'Global Zero'and highlighting perceived dangers from a nuclear arsenal, this work stands in stark contrast to the chorus of anti-arsenal works. Because of the work's structure and effort to answer questions of current relevance, it should appeal to a broad audience including: service staffs, PME students, COCOM staffs, Pentagon personnel, Capitol Hill staffers, policy makers, academics, graduate students, and interested readers.

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the first human-made object to orbit the Earth. Six decades later, space-faring nations face a much different space environment, one that's more diverse, disruptive, disordered, and dangerous. Today's space domain presents a number of asymmetries that differ from other domains, creating a deterrence environment with unique policy implications. Escalation and Deterrence in the Second Space Age, a report from the CSIS Aerospace Security Project, discusses the evolution of space as a contested domain, the changing threats to U.S. space systems, deterrence theory and its applications to the space domain, and findings from a space crisis exercise administered by CSIS in late 2016.

For close to sixty years, the United States has maintained alliances with Japan and South Korea that have included a nuclear umbrella, guaranteeing their security as part of a strategy of extended deterrence. Yet questions about the credibility of deterrence commitments have always been an issue, especially when nuclear weapons are concerned. Would the United States truly be willing to use these weapons to defend an ally?In this book, Terence Roehrig provides a detailed and comprehensive look at the nuclear umbrella in northeast Asia in the broader context of deterrence theory and U.S. strategy. He examines the role of the nuclear umbrella in Japanese and South Korean defense planning and security calculations, including the likelihood that either will develop its own nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is most important as a political signal demonstrating commitment to the defense of allies and as a tool to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region. While the role of the nuclear umbrella is often discussed in military terms, this book provides an important glimpse into the political dimensions of the nuclear security guarantee. As the security environment in East Asia changes with the growth of North Korea's capabilities and China's military modernization, as well as Donald Trump's early pronouncements that cast doubt on traditional commitments to allies, the credibility and resolve of U.S. alliances will take on renewed importance for the region and the world.