201. Modal Logics of Negotiation and Preference.
- Author
-
Fisher, Michael, Hoek, Wiebe, Konev, Boris, Lisitsa, Alexei, Endriss, Ulle, and Pacuit, Eric
- Abstract
We develop a dynamic modal logic that can be used to model scenarios where agents negotiate over the allocation of a finite number of indivisible resources. The logic includes operators to speak about both preferences of individual agents and deals regarding the reallocation of certain resources. We reconstruct a known result regarding the convergence of sequences of mutually beneficial deals to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, and discuss the relationship between reasoning tasks in our logic and problems in negotiation. For instance, checking whether a given restricted class of deals is sufficient to guarantee convergence to a Pareto optimal allocation for a specific negotiation scenario amounts to a model checking problem; and the problem of identifying conditions on preference relations that would guarantee convergence for a restricted class of deals under all circumstances can be cast as a question in modal logic correspondence theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2006
- Full Text
- View/download PDF