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Invoking Laozi and Mencius, Jullien offers an oblique take on efficacy, one of China's most intriguing yet most influential notions formulated in Daoism, the practice of art, and military strategies. It circumvents the heavy philosophical apparatus of means versus ends and theory versus practice that jam the Western conception of efficacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper frames Morocco as a settler state in order to map how the structural logic of settler colonialism persists through the transformation of the built environment in contemporary Casablanca. Rather than focus on commonly-referenced settler states, such as Israel or America, this paper analyzes Morocco, where formal decolonization occurred through the end of the French Protectorate 1956, but there has been an ongoing settler colonial project in Western Sahara since 1975. The logic of elimination of Indigenous populations and territorial expansion of the settler polity endure through urban planning, documentation of the built environment, and architectural preservation. I argue that the structural logic of settler colonialism was produced by the convergence of French military strategy of domination during the Protectorate era was adapted through forms of knowledge and institutions shaping urban space through architectural preservation in contemporary Casablanca. I map the production of knowledge by French academics, then show how this knowledge shaped the preservation agenda that reproduced the structural logic of settler colonialism. The entanglement of institutions, forms of knowledge, and the applications of that knowledge by preservationists highlights how the structural logic of settler colonialism adapts to the changing conditions for settler colonial theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of modern technologies, especially in the space or cyber fields, brought a new interpretation of conflicts, based on modern systems and decisions adapted to these novelties. It is through these considerations that the changing nature of conflicts has presented challenges to traditional military doctrines and strategies. The multi-domain operations approach is used by NATO to identify the unique strengths and capabilities of each force category. By identifying these capabilities, the Alliance is able to create plans that maximize the effectiveness of each force category and enable a more effective response to potential threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article designs and evaluates the psychometric properties of a measurement instrument that could be used to manage the culture of a military institution. A type of instrumental study was performed, both quantitative and exploratory. Once a conceptual model of the dimensions and determinants had been constructed, internal and external experts were approached to validate its design. This allowed an appreciation of the quality of the measurement test, and assured its content validity. Subsequently, a sample of 1644 members of the institution was selected in order to carry out a pilot test and determine the analysis of the psychometric properties of the measurement instrument. This was performed through confirmatory factor analysis and reliability analysis of the factors. As a result of the investigation, it was possible to use the model to propose a theoretical instrument to measure institutional culture (IC) is based on 5 dimensions, 21 determinants and 53 items that contribute directly to the fulfillment of the strategy of the military institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia 396 is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso, Instituto de Historia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Bulletin of the 'Carol I' National Defence University / Buletinul Universitatii Nationale de Aparare 'Carol I' is the property of Carol I National Defence University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Deception has long been an essential component of military operations. It can be considered a tactic as old as warfare, having been used since immemorial times. From Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” to the present days, military strategists have recognized its power to turn the tide of conflict. Although, over the years, the methods, means and techniques specific to it have continuously evolved, along with technological developments, its basic principle remains the same: portraying a false reality to the adversary that leads to the materialization of operational opportunities, by causing the adversary to adopt courses of action disadvantageous to him. As the battlefield has become increasingly complex, the ability to deceive the adversary has also become an increasingly important asset to the success of military operations. Today, in an era of instant and abundant information, deception has paradoxically become more difficult to achieve and more critical to operational success. The deceptive action of the Ukrainians at Kherson last September against the Russians once again demonstrated its importance on the modern battlefield. However, many military planners tend to overlook this key aspect of military strategy despite its importance. This oversight can lead to grave consequences in the modern battlefield, where the enemy’s ability to gather intelligence can hinder operational success. For this reason, the present paper is an analysis of how deception actions can be integrated into the operational planning process at the operational level in order to maximize the chances of their success and, consequently, the military operation success. The need for such a scientific approach arises from the complexity of the deception process, which places a special emphasis not only on the thoroughness in planning these actions but also on the need to integrate and synchronize them with other military actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego is the property of University of Lower Silesia / Dolnoslaska Szkola Wyzsza and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A proxy war between a coalition of countries, BLUE, and a country, RED, is considered. RED wants to increase the size of the RED territory. BLUE wants to involve more regions in trade and other types of cooperation. GREEN is a small and independent nation that wants to become a member of BLUE. RED attacks GREEN and tries to invade. BLUE decides to give optimal arms support to GREEN. This support can help GREEN in the war against RED and simultaneously can reduce the military power of RED, which is valuable to BLUE also outside this proxy war, since RED may confront BLUE also in other regions. The optimal control problem of dynamic arms support, from the BLUE perspective, is defined in general form. From the BLUE perspective, there is an optimal position of the front. This position is a function of the weights in the objective function and all other parameters. Optimal control theory is used to determine the optimal dynamic BLUE strategy, conditional on a RED strategy, which is observed by BLUE military intelligence. The optimal arms support strategy for BLUE is to initially send a large volume of arms support to GREEN, to rapidly move the front to the optimal position. Then, the support should be almost constant during most of the war, keeping the war front location stationary. In the final part of the conflict, when RED will have almost no military resources left and tries to retire from the GREEN territory, BLUE should strongly increase the arms support and make sure that GREEN rapidly can regain the complete territory and end the war.

Currently, the military-political strategy of J. Biden’s administration is in the process of formation. The American ruling circles have to take into account unfavorable changes for the United States in the military- and political situation in the world. The American policy of “regime change” has suffered a complete collapse in Afghanistan; the United States is facing the strengthening of the military- and technical potential of the Russian Federation and China. Under these conditions, official Washington is betting on strengthening relations with partners and allies and is trying to abandon some of its international obligations (as, for example, it happened in Afghanistan). When developing its nuclear and space strategy, as well as military strategy in various regions of the world, the American military and political leadership is forced to proceed from the fact that Washington has lost its once indisputable military superiority in a number of areas. President Biden's actual rejection of the policy of promoting democracy in the world calls into question Washington's claims to leadership in the community of democratic states. At the same time, the priorities of the American ruling circles are clearly shifting in the direction of the Indo-Pacific region – while the Middle East is losing its former priority in their eyes.

This article tells the extraordinary story of Fiorenzo Capriotti, the man behind the sinking of the Egyptian flagship the Emir Farouk in October 1948 and the birth of the Israeli navy commando unit. Using the same unconventional technique that the Italian navy special assault unit Decima Flottiglia MAS had pioneered against the British in World War II, the embryonic Israeli navy was able to defeat Egypt's superior numbers and weaponry. Not only did Capriotti play a key role in the founding of the Israeli navy commando unit, but he also made a significant contribution in shaping the doctrine that the Israeli navy should overcome the unfavourable balance of power through the superiority of its naval commando units. The sinking of Emir Farouk in fact consolidated the notion that the Israeli navy should compensate for its small size relative to most of its enemies through greater agility and firepower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – Russia dynamics in Eastern Europe, focusing on the competition for influence in Georgia and Montenegro with comparisons to Moldova and Ukraine. Whereas all four countries have expressed a desire to join NATO – and Russia has consistently communicated its disapproval – Moscow has pursued divergent means to curb NATO expansion and escalated with tit-for-tat strategies. We argue that whether Russia deployed military strategies, economic levers, political tactics or covert actions has varied according to its relative power projection capacity along with the responses of NATO and the target countries. Where power projection capacity is greater due to its contiguous geography (Georgia, Ukraine), Russia staged military interventions, and where it was weaker, in non-contiguous countries (Montenegro, Moldova), it resorted to non-military means. Russia may be uniformly opposed to NATO expansion, but its strategies to keep its neighbours out of NATO and in Russia's orbit are contingent upon its relative power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Israeli's lightning quick victory of June 1967, in the Six Day War, obscured serious deficiencies in Israel's military strategy. The Israeli Air Force's (IAF) dependence on a preemptive strike had cost Israel an essential ally and military arms supplier in France. The false assumption that political support would again be forthcoming for a pre-emptive strike was exposed six years later, in the Yom Kippur War. The U.S. military would take lessons from the Yom Kippur War on the lethality of modern battle but observations of the changing character of modern warfare were available in the Six-Day War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is compulsory for Indonesian Armed Forces at Army Aviation Center (AAC) to demonstrate military discipline and uphold military ethics pursuant to Sapta Marga and Sumpah Prajurit (Oath of Enlistment). The law of military discipline is governed by several laws in Indonesia to maintain and enforce the professionalism of privates. However, in the armed forces at AAC, there had been at least 28 violations of military disciplines from 2017-2022. This research aims to analyze the causes of these violations and formulate the proper strategies to help improve law enforcement in military discipline for the armed forces at AAC. The research results reveal that nine factors have triggered the violations of military discipline among privates in AAC, including poor understanding of the law, poor organizational culture, socio-cultural factors, personality, motivation, psychological conditions, a shortage of natural resources, inadequate sanction, leadership, family problems, and economic burdens. To tackle all those factors causing violations of military disciplines, this research formulates 7 strategies to enhance law enforcement in military discipline for armed forces, consisting of strict law enforcement, training and education, administrative sanctions, enforcement of rules and regulations, strong organizational cultures, reinforced focus on career building, openness, and transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the field of international relations, we tend to apply the premises of political realism to our understanding of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in the USA and Latin America. In this perspective, TCOs are regarded as autonomous state-like actors or insurgent groups seeking political and ideological domination over the nation-state. This view is reinforced by notions of the "weak" or "failed state" in which TCOs are seen to be mounting a successful challenge to nation-states for control over governance. I contend that this view reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of TCOs, which are disinclined toward political and ideological domination and inherently dependent upon the state for their functioning and survival. The state in turn receives certain benefits through what becomes a kind of partnership with TCOs, one which actually strengthens both at the expense of civil society. Whereas political realism features the use of the military as a chief strategy for dealing with TCOs, an alternative view, which acknowledges interdependence between the state and TCOs, highlights the importance of strengthening civil society and the democratic norm as a more effective strategy for weakening the power and influence of TCOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, historians believed that taking captives was a major goal in Mexica warfare, and this tendency has even been given as a reason why the Spanish conquistadors defeated the Mexica. Although historians have largely revised these conclusions, the perception that captives were important to Aztec strategy and warfare persists. In this article I argue that the need for captives was not great enough to affect Aztec military strategy or battlefield conduct. First, rituals only needed a small number of victims, which could easily be acquired through the normal course of battle, and thus did not constitute a specific objective. Second, Mexica strategy focused on economic objectives, rather than captive taking. Finally, individual warriors were not well equipped to take prisoners. Although captives played a vital role in Mexica society, the practice should be thought of as opportunistic, rather than strategic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study highlights the changing dimensions of power in the Indo-Pacific region. A paradigm shift in India's maritime strategy is shaping the balance of power in the region. The regional balance has shifted in favor of India due to the new Indo-Pacific policy of the United States. A major shift in US policy has strengthened India's maritime security and blue economy in the region. However, India's maritime strategy has far-reaching implications for Pakistan's security and economy. This article examines India's maritime strategy in the 21st century and the development of partnerships with Western powers to contain China in the region. The article analyzes the change in India's maritime strategy and the expansion of its role in the Indo-Pacific region due to the availability of new technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have "the right to be wrong" about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans' trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans' views of civil-military relations. We report and analyze the results of a June 2019 survey that yields two important, and troubling, findings. First, Americans do not accept the basic premises of democratic civil-military relations. They are extraordinarily deferential to the military's judgment regarding when to use military force, and they are comfortable with high-ranking officers intervening in public debates over policy. Second, in this polarized age, Americans' views of civil-military relations are not immune to partisanship. Consequently, with their man in the Oval Office in June 2019, Republicans—who, as political conservatives, might be expected to be more deferential to the military—were actually less so. And Democrats, similarly putting ideology aside, wanted the military to act as a check on a president they abhorred. The stakes are high: democracy is weakened when civilians relinquish their "right to be wrong." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economy impacts and influences a state's military strategy. This article focuses on how the integration of the US political economy in the Indo-Pacific drives US Navy officers and the broader national security state to establish the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Investigating the strategic thought of senior Naval officers shows that they think far beyond military threats and engage with the United States and the Indo-Pacific political economy. Even as the US Navy competes with China's military, its FOIP strategy benefits corporate elites in both China and the US, whose cooperation creates a mutually supportive economic relationship. This argument leads to the finding that the US hegemony in the region is a strategy that avoids a bipolar 'New Cold War' of an entirely de-coupled US and China. The FOIP supported by the US Navy continues to integrate China into regional and global economies, even as it attempts to push back against China by gathering allies and partners. The emphasis on international political economy highlights how the region is a network of 'patchwork' relations, where states rely on one another for economic prosperity. Through investigating speeches and strategic papers from US Naval officials, this paper demonstrates how the US competes and cooperates with China in the context of relations in the region that are in constant flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Disaster of Annual in 1921 was the greatest military catastrophe suffered by the Spanish Army in the 20th century. It took place in the Protectorate of Morocco and originated in a military camp in the village of Annual. Spain accepted the Protectorate to maintain its position in Europe, but faced armed resistance from tribes in northern Morocco. The Spanish military strategy was insufficient and resulted in a defeat against the army led by Abd-el-Krim. The withdrawal of Spanish troops was chaotic and disorganized, resulting in a great loss of lives. The disaster caused outrage in Spain and led to the formation of a new government and a more effective army. The repercussions of Annual contributed to the resurgence of militarism in Spain. [Extracted from the article]

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the fact that India's orthodox offensive doctrine has made its army a more inefficient tool even in the face of radical changes in India's strategic geographical position, and in this context, why the innovation movements of the Indian army in the recent period will be more inefficient with this doctrine. The primary assumption in this article, in which it is discussed that India can use its regional and global interests and power more efficiently with a new doctrine, is the central assumption of India's current military doctrine in the recent period when India has implemented a new dimension of its non-alignment policy on a more global scale in its foreign policy. Strategic cooperation, indigenization movements, and foreign policy programs aiming to reduce foreign dependency will not make the Indian military productive. The risks and opportunities that will arise from developing a new military doctrine and vision should be discussed within the framework of a new doctrine. Considering all these limitations and inferences, this article consists of three parts. The first chapter examines the history of India's military strategy in the context of India's orthodox doctrine of aggression to secure its ground forces. In the second part, the developments that overturned the security paradigms of India in the 21st century and the failure of the military policies followed in the static environment afterwards, and the causes and consequences of this failure are analyzed. In the last part, some analyzes and implications are made for why India's military power will fail if it insists on the current doctrine and for a new modern military doctrine that should be created so that breakthroughs can result in efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the gap caused by civil-military activity and its effects on strategy is essential to the practice of strategy. Based on the analysis of cases of intrinsic value, the practice of strategy is assessed to show that the discrepancy between politics and military strategy results from the fact that war, as a policy-dependent variable, assumes unpredictable variations, meaning that strategy, as an intervening variable and as an activity resulting from civil-military relations, must be defined as a theory of success. The argument is based on three explanations for the existence of that gap: (1) the nature of war influences the nature and effectiveness of military strategy, because the actors involved in the process act in an environment of great unpredictability; (2) the stability and coherence of the relationship between politics and war, embodied in the practice of military strategy, makes it necessary to consider the purpose of strategy is success; (3) the effectiveness of civil-military relations is crucial to reducing the natural tensions between politics and military action. It is concluded that military strategy because of civil-military relations follows the dynamics of the complex relationship between politics and war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Universal war is a conflict that involves many components of the state in defending the territory of the state. In order to face universal war, good preparation and training for soldiers is very important. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the role of drills and simulations in preparing soldiers for universal warfare. This research uses a qualitative approach with a case study method in the Indonesian Air Force. The results showed that drills and simulations have an important role in preparing soldiers for universal warfare. Drills and simulations help improve soldiers' technical and tactical skills, improve situational awareness, and improve soldiers' ability to work in difficult and complex conditions. In addition, exercises and simulations also help identify weaknesses and strengths in the operation plan, so that necessary improvements can be made before the actual operation is carried out. However, the study also shows that exercises and simulations are not fully capable of mimicking the conditions of actual universal warfare. Therefore, exercises and simulations need to be made part of a broader training strategy, which includes training in more complex and realistic situations, as well as improvements in non-technical skills such as leadership, interpersonal skills, and ethics. The study concluded that training and simulation are one of the most important factors in preparing soldiers for universal warfare. Well-planned drills and simulations can help improve soldiers' ability to deal with difficult and complex situations in universal warfare, enabling them to act effectively in dangerous situations and defend national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs about the ongoing civil war in Sudan, particularly the conflict between two principal leaders who took power in a military coup in 2021. Topic include It highlights how the military and militia leaders are deeply involved in the Sudanese economy, with their business interests interconnected with international partners, including in the US and Europe.

With the Taiwan Strait war crisis of global concern, this research proposed a conceptual model of RFID adoption based on the TOE framework to explore related factors of intention to use RFID by conducting a quantitative analysis of the ROC's military administration and logistic officers. Based on the results of this study, policymakers must understand the factors of Performance Expectancy (PE), Effort Expectancy (EE) and Information Security (IS) should be given priority, followed by Government Support (GS) and Top Management Support (TMS). These can affect the opinions of the chief executive, rallying their support, thereby effectively promoting new technology policies for ROC's military strategy, thus enhancing combat capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the second article in a study examining the influence of naval geostrategy as a driver influencing Russian policy and military strategy in the Black Sea region. By the mid-2010s, Russia featured a much-improved geostrategic situation in the Black Sea theater as compared to the beginning of the century. Nevertheless, substantial weaknesses remained, some of which Russia has been able to neutralize during the conduct of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following an examination of Russian military actions during the Russo-Ukrainian War, the author concludes that the application of military force by Russia in parts of Ukraine and the wider Black Sea region follows a long-term rationale and that Odesa and Mykolaiv, located at the western Black Sea littoral, remain core concerns for Russian military planners, despite the Russian military's current defensive posture at most sections of the front in southern Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The power competition between the major powers of the world has always been dependent on the strategic security landscape. Over the years, military operations and warfare have evolved with the development of new weapons, equipment, and technologies. During the 20th century, the world witnessed a transformation from conventional strategic competition to unconventional strategic competition with the advent of nuclear weapons. The genesis of the 21st century marked another revolution in military affairs when electronic warfare was modernized and cyber warfare came into the spotlight. In the current century, new poles of powers have emerged whereby Beijing and Washington started competing at all levels and in all domains. Shortly after the incorporation of digital, electronic, and cyber equipment and techniques by militaries around the world, cyberspace became militarized and emerged as the fifth battlefield. The U.S. armed forces and the Chinese PLA both rely heavily on cyberspace when it comes to their communication, operations, and planning. Cyber campaigns launched by Washington and Beijing on various targets accounted for a cyber arms race and continuous cyberspace strategic competition between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past two decades, there has been a growing tendency among Middle Eastern states to use armed non-state actors (ANSAs) as proxies, making them a constant feature of regional conflicts. Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades are two recent examples of state-sponsored ANSAs, which have played a significant role as Iran's proxies in the course of the Syrian conflict. This article seeks to answer the question as to what role the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades have played in Iran's military strategy in Syria and how effective they have been in securing Tehran's strategic interests in the war-torn country. The article argues that following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis—as the most critical challenge to Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East over the past decade—and due to Iran's restraints in sustaining a large-scale direct military presence in Syria, the two Afghan and Pakistani brigades acted as Iran's ground forces, reducing human and financial costs of a direct military engagement for Tehran. The effective role played by the two brigades was mainly reflected in the four strategic battles of Aleppo, Southern Syria, Palmyra, and Eastern Syria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the significant change that has occurred in the balance between offense and defence in Israel's 'hybrid' military strategy in recent decades. Relying on fresh materials concerning the organizational, doctrinal, and procurement processes of Israel's military, we identify a shift from offense towards defence as the preferred way to protect Israel in the face of new security threats. We also show that due to rapidly changing security challenges, limited resources, and the military's organizational culture, this change has been gradual, incremental, improvised, and largely informal. We propose that similar changes may characterize other states facing new security challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Rouya Turkiyyah is the property of Insight Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Im Rahmen ihres 2008 gestarteten Modernisierungsprogramms haben die russischen Heeresverbände starkes Gewicht auf bataillonstaktische Gruppen (BTG) gelegt. Diese erschienen besonders geeignet für den Einsatz in lokalen und kleinen Kriegen und fanden erstmals Einsatz im Ukraine-Konflikt 2014. Nach den Erfahrungen aus diesem sowie dem Syrien-Konflikt wurden Organisation und Einsatz der BTGs erheblich verbessert. Im Zuge des russischen Angriffskriegs vom Februar 2022 maß Russland der Rolle von BTGs hohe Bedeutung zu, was sich offensichtlich als Irrtum erwies. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die verschiedenen Kriegsphasen und zeigt auf, wie wenig der BTG-Ansatz Russland geholfen hat, seine Kriegsziele zu erreichen, und welche Faktoren für den Ausgang dieses Kriegs bestimmend sein werden. As part of its modernization program, which began in 2008, Russian Army units placed strong emphasis on battalion tactical groups (BTG). These were particularly suited for use in local and small wars. The first deployment took place in the Ukraine conflict in 2014, and the organization and deployment of BTGs were significantly improved after the experience of that conflict as well as Syria conflict. In the context of the Russian war of aggression of February 2022, strong emphasis was placed on the role of BTGs. This obviously proved to be a mistake. The paper analyzes the different phases of the war and shows how little the BTG approach helped the Russians achieve their war aims and what factors will be determinants of how this war will turn out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the many reasons for the failure of the Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) in the Second Lebanon War was the concept of Systemic Operational Design (SOD), translated into de facto military doctrine. The story of the rise and fall of the SOD idea is a warning sign for all militaries faced with "modern" and "fashionable" ideas. The purpose of this paper is therefore to describe and evaluate the Systemic Operational Design created and introduced into the IDF by Brigadier General Shimon Naveh and the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI). The study is based on the literature created by the State of Israel, the IDF, and its main proponent Shimon Naveh, as well as other militaries (mainly the US Army). This theoretical background is confronted with the IDF's operations during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and their effects on the war's outcome. The over intellectualised, ambiguous, and not properly structured concept of the SOD, introduced as the IDF's doctrine and approach to operations, led to military failure (which also had more root causes) in Lebanon. A study of the SOD failure should lead to a careful approach being taken to all new military concepts and ideas. Both change and continuation need to be properly balanced and evaluated, while enhanced military effectiveness could be of great value. At the same time, the impact of concepts which are not well anchored in military science/history and untested, like the SOD, could be devastating for militaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]