Search

While support for redistribution remains high across Europe, voting for left-wing parties, traditionally identified with this agenda, has been under par. Past research explains this puzzle by class-based disagreements about redistributive priorities and by second-dimension attitudes. These explanations, however, assume coherent voter preferences reacting to structural changes. By contrast, I argue that part of the puzzle also lies in attitudinal ambivalence—simultaneous negative and positive evaluations—regarding redistributive policy. Using cross-sectional public opinion and party position data, I find that such ambivalence increases with lower political sophistication, greater value conflict, and weaker economic need. Electorally, it deepens detachment between support for redistribution and left-wing self-identification and increases voting for more economically and culturally right-wing parties. These patterns hold independently of class differences and second-dimension attitudes and replicate stably in earlier data. The findings contribute to ongoing debates about attitude structures and voting patterns and illuminate an additional challenge for economically progressive parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Micro-expressions reveal underlying emotions and are widely applied in political psychology, lie detection, law enforcement and medical care. Micro-expression spotting aims to detect the temporal locations of facial expressions from video sequences and is a crucial task in micro-expression recognition. In this study, the problem of micro-expression spotting is formulated as micro-expression classification per frame. We propose an effective spotting model with sliding windows called the spatio-temporal spotting network. The method involves a sliding window detection mechanism, combines the spatial features from the local key frames and the global temporal features and performs micro-expression spotting. The experiments are conducted on the CAS(ME) 2 database and the SAMM Long Videos database, and the results demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms the state-of-the-art method by 30.58 % for the CAS(ME) 2 and 23.98 % for the SAMM Long Videos according to overall F-scores. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideological research links liberal and conservative orientations to variations in genetic, psychological, and physiological factors. Yet, while a knowledge of the mechanistic causes of ideologies are advancing quickly, we know less about their potential functional causality. Here, we ask what the social functions of ideologies are and investigate whether the behaviors associated with different ideological orientations are consistent with different strategies for social interactions. We recruit an American sample of (N = 454) liberals and conservatives to complete two rounds of an iterated prisoner's dilemma. Using a three-wave design, we obtain a sample of each ideological group that is comparable on multiple demographic factors. We hypothesize that a liberal orientation is underpinned by an approach-oriented social strategy that is directed towards pursuing cooperative opportunities, while a conservative orientation is underpinned by a social strategy directed towards avoiding loss. On multiple measures of ideology, we find evidence that liberals and conservatives differ in their: (1) initial cooperativeness; (2) overall cooperation; and, (3) forgiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research demonstrates that acculturated co-ethnics of immigrant groups adopt restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to that of host country dominant groups. However, acculturated U.S. Latinxs still maintain relatively open immigration policy preferences despite their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype (e.g., Spanish-speaking, immigrant). To answer the puzzle, I draw on sociological perspectives and theorize that the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants in tandem with an expanding interior immigration enforcement apparatus generates rebuff against Anglo political norms among acculturated Latinxs. Using 6 national Latinx surveys, I corroborate my theory and find perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts forestall the adoption of restrictive immigration policy preferences via acculturation. Absent deportation threat, acculturated Latinxs adopt immigration preferences similar to white Anglos. I also replicate these findings for attitudinal dimensions outside immigration policy preferences. This paper suggests political assimilation is not preordained among acculturated immigrant co-ethnics in light of an unreceptive host society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English slavocrats' colonial power is further challenged in I Oroonoko i when Behn reintroduces Imoinda to the plot: Trefry tells Oroonoko that he has become sexually captivated by a "she-slave." "Several English gentlemen" are with Oroonoko during this display, observing the popular appeal of Oroonoko to enslaved Africans, despite that Oroonoko "was that Prince who had ... sold most of 'em to these Parts" (70). In 1654, Henry Whistler noted on Barbados the condition of the "miserabell Negors borne to perpetual slauery thay and thayer seed", indicating the English adoption of color-based ("Negors") hereditary ("thay and thayer seed") slavery in that other colony.[48] The replacement of Oroonoko and Imoinda's noble lines with hereditary chattel status will make them and their child racially identical to other enslaved Africans in the colony, who are defined only as being Negro and unfree, despite the fact that they are of "several Nations" (70). Press 17 Karen E. Fields; Barbara J. Fields; Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life; 2012; Verso 18 Hunt; Inventing Human Rights: A History; 35; 2007; Norton 19 Richard Kroll; "Tales of Love and Gallantry": The Politics of Oroonoko; Huntington Library Quarterly; 67; 573; 2004 20 Janet Todd; Oroonoko; Or, The Royal Slave; 2003; Penguin 21 Vincent Brown; Tacky's Revolt: The Story of an Atlantic Slave War; 2020; Harvard Univ. [Extracted from the article]

Why did Putin decide to invade Ukraine in 2022? Structural realists regard it as a preventive war with a strategic rationale in response to NATO's eastward expansion. However, as many scholars suggest, Putin's decision-making is riddled with various irrationalities, which can be better framed as overbalancing and the classical realist concept of 'hubris'. Lawrence Freedman and others argue that a key to explaining Putin's overbalancing is applying the concept of self-deception in evolutionary psychology, which can be the scientific foundation of hubris in classical realism. Thus, Freedman's argument of Putin's self-deception and others' general theses of self-deception as a cause of overconfidence led to the introduction of self-deception into classical realism to solve the puzzle of overbalancing in international affairs. Thereby, the novel balancing concept of 'hubris balancing' was developed: irrationally aggressive balancing that exceeds what is achievable in practice. There are three causal pathways (cognitive, emotional and social) to hubris balancing as ideal types: overconfidence, anger and nationalism. As a plausibility probe, hubris balancing is illustrated by analysing Putin's decision to wage war against Ukraine. The result shows that, as the logic of hubris balancing suggests, driven by overconfidence and anger towards western liberalism, Putin decided to invade Ukraine by driving exclusive nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Propaganda has been an age-old part of warmongering. It is thus no surprise that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was preceded by, and continues to be fuelled by, propaganda transmitted by state-controlled Russian media. What is more unusual about the Russian (dis)information campaigns is the sheer volume of distorted narratives or complete fictional accounts about the conflict. This article explores the content and technologies of Russian information manipulation of domestic audiences in the context of the invasion of Ukraine. We also examine the bases for the sustained robust public support for the war within Russia during the first 12 months of the conflict, despite being based on mostly fabricated (dis)information. Relying on political psychology and communication theory we explain how emotions and associative memories have played an important role in the Russian public's sustained approval to the war. Our findings point to that in the absence of contrasted and independently-verified information, the volume, frequency, emotional intensity of slick, plug-and-play media packages on Ukraine have acted to displace and distort the average Russian's associative social monitoring processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

DEMOCRACY AND THE DIGITAL PUBLIC SPHERE The public sphere performs three important functions in democracy.[3] The first function - opinion formation - is to facilitate the circulation of information used by citizens to form their political opinions and take positions on public matters. By new authoritarian forces we mean groups, leaders, or parties that seek to promote authoritarian, autocratic, or patrimonial regimes "within" the framework of constitutional democracy (Hanson & Kopstein, [30]). But this has also been a deliberate strategy of Trump and other populist authoritarians within electoral democracies. The dangers of false information for democracy are doubled when the substance of that information are false claims about democratic procedures themselves, for example, the belief voter fraud is rampant or the claim that Trump really won the election. [Extracted from the article]

How do people respond to different decision-making processes in high courts? One long-standing view suggests that citizens expect courts to be neutral arbiters of legal controversies. Although the relevance of such "myth of legality" has been challenged, we know very little about the relationship between the portrayals of the motives of courts and justices and public attitudes in civil law countries. We explore this question in a pair of experiments in Norway and Portugal where we isolate the effects of different institutional frames from outcome favorability. We find that while partisan frames are detrimental to fairness perceptions and acceptance of decisions, depictions of judicial decision-making that emphasize policy goals do not adversely affect citizens' responses in comparison with legalistic frames. The results suggest that, even in civil law systems, preserving the myth of legality may not be a necessary condition to elicit public support for judicial decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narratives within mainstream psy disciplines around 'medically unexplained symptoms' (MUS), as constructed through (bio)psychosocial theorising, have been charged with promoting victim blaming. Psychosocial discourse and practice within this field are also critiqued on grounds of inadequate empirical support and associated with patient harms, yet (bio)psychosocial hegemony persists. Understanding what drives current practice and attendant victim blaming in the field of MUS is therefore important in challenging dominant discourse and changing psychotherapy practice, thus precluding patient harm. In this article, practitioner psychology is explored through a critical lens, locating this within a context of organisational and biopolitical influences which likely reinforce mainstream theory and practice. It is argued that victim blaming tendencies within dominant discourse around MUS may serve relational, existential and epistemic needs for practitioners and social actors more broadly, alongside fulfilling a need to assert moral value in the face of social injustices that threaten the neoliberal 'just world' view. In other words, (bio)psychosocial constructions of MUS satisfy society's need to create and ascribe to a shared reality, dominated by a belief in a just, meaningful and relatively predictable world that justifies the status quo. Critical reflexivity is emphasised as a starting point for transforming practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While electoral reforms clearly affect how seats are (re)distributed among parties immediately after their adoption, they do not significantly change the (re)distribution of votes among parties. As political knowledge is positively related to turnout, we argue that the effect of majoritarian electoral reforms on the number of parties is contingent upon the turnout in the last election prior to the reform. Specifically, the lower the turnout level in the previous election, the more effective the majoritarian reform will be. However, the psychological effect of proportional reforms relies on the interplay between elites and voters and is highly uncertain. The argument is tested using aggregated data from 43 major electoral reforms worldwide from 1945 to 2020 and individual data from the first election held in New Zealand after the 1993 electoral reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconstructs and analyzes the memories of women who were in the city of Valparaíso on September 11, 1973, the day of the coup d'état in Chile. Research participants were six women from the Valparaíso region, militants of leftist parties, and survivors of political imprisonment and torture during the Chilean civil-military dictatorship. We conducted a focus group and two semi-structured individual interviews. Data analysis was carried out in two stages: the first one phenomenological-hermeneutic and the second one based on Grounded Theory. The research results show that the day of the coup d'état in Valparaíso is remembered by women as a mighty and irrevocable milestone, functioning as a biographical event. The coup d'état means a before and after in civic experiences in social, political, and historical aspects and in the dwelling manners of the city. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos de Psicología del Deporte is the property of Cuadernos de Psicologia del Deporte and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, the author responds to critiques of their book, "American Immanence," which explores the theopolitics of resilient democracy. They address concerns about the book's abstractness and lack of practical specification, explaining their rationale for taking a conceptual and imaginative approach. The author acknowledges the value of a more spiritually and practically oriented articulation of their project and affirms the importance of cultivating spiritual characteristics in progressive politics. They also discuss the reflections and criticisms of another author, Smid, regarding the concept of resilient democracy and the role of education in credentialing expertise. The author agrees with Smid's suggestions for strengthening the arguments and acknowledges the need for further investigation into the psychological and cognitive aspects of resilient democracy. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Gumushane Universty Electronic Journal of the Faculty of Communication / Gümüshane Üniversitesi Iletisim Fakültesi Elektronik Dergisi is the property of Gumushane Universitesi Iletisim Fakultesi Elektronik Dergisi (e-GIFDER) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As part of the Good Friday Agreement, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is obliged to call a referendum 'if at any time it appears likely to him (or her) that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland'. Indeed, the main story of that election was Sinn Féin overtaking the Democratic Unionist Party as the largest party - marking the first time that a nationalist party had won more seats than a unionist party. Currently, for example, Michelle O'Neill is the First Minister-designate since Sinn Féin is the largest party overall, and it is up to the DUP to nominate a deputy First Minister, as the largest party in the unionist bloc. [Extracted from the article]

Researchers, political parties and groups, and states have always been interested to understand the behavior and mental processes influencing the political choice, the reasons underlying participation or non-participation, and the behavior and motivation of voters. In addition to the contextual factors (e.g., mass media, groups, political parties, states, ideologies, ethnicity, religions, regions, social classes, and the like), the behavioral processes of feeling, perception, motivation, or emotion can also play a determining role in the political attitude, understanding, and choice—alongside the prevailing conditions, culture, and atmosphere of a given society. This is a legitimate research topic in the field of political psychology worthy of further investigation. In this respect, the present research intends to examine emotion as one of the internal, behavioral states and processes influencing the political choice and the participation level.The motivation behind voters’ participation in elections depends on various factors. The first and perhaps the most important one is the acceptance of sovereignty and state by people, so the legitimacy of the governance system, trust in the health and fairness of elections, and confidence about the candidacy of real representatives of people are the determining factors influencing people’s participation. The second important factor is the general atmosphere prevailing in society, that is, the extent to which the most important issues of the day can motivate and encourage people’s participation in elections. Economic, social, and political crises or the events such as the possibility of war and internal disputes, together with healing and savior-like promises, can be considered as effective issues in the election process. Definitely influencing the participation level, the third significant factor is the candidacy of prominent, popular, charismatic, and influential figures. Moreover, a competitive and partisan atmosphere can increase the participation level to its high. Finally, by helping individuals, parties, and candidates in different ways, advertising and media performs a significant role in their victory or defeat. Besides these important reasons, the findings of political psychology show that in many cases the election result usually depends on emotion as a factor influencing the type and level of people’s participation in elections.Offering a brief overview of the Iranian presidential elections, the present research employs the theory of rational choice as a theoretical framework and the descriptive–analytical method in order to analyze the collected historical documents. The research tries to answer the key question of whether people’s tendency in elections is more influenced by rational choice or by emotion. In other words, which variable has a more influential role in the election process? and what spectrum of society, why, and under what conditions is affected by the emotional atmosphere? Assuming the rational choice as a logical goal, regardless of the positive and negative effects of emotion on the choice, an overview of the Iranian presidential elections confirms the hypothesis that influential events along with the presence of certain figures and competitors at different times can arouse emotion and create a passionate political and competitive atmosphere, leading to a high participation level.The study briefly reviews the results of the Iranian presidential elections from the beginning until now, but it especially focuses on the phases that witnessed the highest and lowest participation rates. The highest rate was seen in the third election (the election of Ayatollah Khamenei), the seventh election (the election of Mohammad Khatami) and the tenth election (the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) while the sixth election (the election of Hashemi-Rafsanjani) and the thirteenth election (the election of Ebrahim Raisi) had the lowest level of people’s participation.There are various reasons behind the decrease and increase in the participation rate. The focus on motivational factors makes manifest the undeniable effect of changes in political emotion on the participation level. As an answer to the research questions, the findings generally confirm the theory of rational choice subscribing to the view that people naturally rely on rational calculations and consider personal interests in each choice, including the political one. However, the study of the presidential elections in Iran made clear that, in addition to motivational factors, other factors such as certain events and the presence of certain political figures at different times could arouse emotion and create a passionate political and competitive atmosphere, leading to an increase in the participation level.

This paper argues that organizations tend to be more "open" or "closed" as a function of their members' political ideologies and that this variation can help explain firms' responses to social activism. Integrating research on social activism with political psychology, we propose that when firms experience activists' protests, a liberal-leaning firm will be more likely to concede to activists' demands than its conservative-leaning counterpart, because its decision makers will more readily accept the interconnectedness of the firm's activities with the activists' claims. Building on this core concept, we examine how factors that increase the salience of an organization's ideology also amplify its effect on responses to protests. Based on a longitudinal sample of 558 protest events directed against Fortune 500 firms from 2001 to 2015, our results support the notion that liberal-leaning firms concede more to activism, an effect that exists after accounting for the ideological valence of the protest issues. When an organization's members are more proximate to the corporate headquarters, this effect of its ideology is heightened. The same is true when the firm's ideology is incongruent with that of its local community or its industry. These findings inform research on the organizational implications of political ideologies, as well as on social movements, institutional complexity, and non-market strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"No Blank Check: The Origins and Consequences of Public Antipathy Towards Presidential Power" by Andrew Reeves and Jon Rogowski explores the American public's skepticism towards presidential power. The authors argue that Americans have a deep-seated skepticism about executive authority, which persists regardless of the political alignment of the president in office. They propose a model of the public based on "constitutional veneration" and a belief in checks and balances. The book presents empirical evidence, including polling, survey experiments, and longitudinal panel data, to support their argument. While partisanship does play a role, the authors emphasize that other factors also influence public attitudes towards executive power. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on introducing key members of the Psychotherapy Section committee for the year 2024, which include Ho Chung Law, Angela Shengxi Miao, and Isabel Clarke, highlighting their diverse backgrounds and contributions to mental health and psychotherapy.

This article is a book review of "Hayek: A Life, 1899–1950" by Bruce Caldwell and Hansjoerg Klausinger. The book provides a comprehensive account of Friedrich Hayek's life, from his early rise in the field of economics to his later work in psychology and political philosophy. It explores his theories on the Great Depression, socialism, and the free market, as well as his influential role in establishing the Mont Pelerin Society. The biography also delves into Hayek's personal life, including his relationships and his move to the United States. Overall, the book offers an accurate and well-written portrayal of Hayek's life and contributions to economics. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses the importance of empathy in both societies and organizations. It highlights how empathy can improve communication, collaboration, and overall organizational performance. The article also emphasizes the role of empathy in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts, stating that it can foster understanding, dialogue, and sustainable peace. Additionally, the article suggests that empathy should be prioritized in organizational policies and training programs, and leaders should demonstrate empathy to set an example for others. Overall, the article promotes empathy as a powerful tool for promoting kindness, peace, and human rights. [Extracted from the article]

The present study examines the Big Five traits and socio-demographic factors as predictors of both traditional left-right and liberal-conservative positions of Slovak voters (N = 704). As shown in previous research, Open-Mindedness and Conscientiousness are significant but weak predictors of both political axes, while Agreeableness plays a surprising role in predicting left-right orientation. To overcome the limitations of traditional political axes, three latent variables of the Slovak political space were discovered by exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of political preferences: sympathy towards old/new government, socially conservative parties, and a non-populist coalition. The former is significantly predicted by Open-Mindedness, while the latter is predicted by Conscientiousness. Overall, the Big Five traits predict a small but significant variance in political variables.

The highly influential theory of "Motivated System 2 Reasoning" argues that analytical, deliberative ("System 2") reasoning is hijacked by identity when considering ideologically charged issues--leading people who are more likely to engage in such reasoning to be more polarized, rather than more accurate. Here, we fail to replicate the key empirical support for this theory across five contentious issues, using a large gold-standard nationally representative probability sample of Americans. While participants were more accurate in evaluating a contingency table when the outcome aligned with their politics (even when controlling for prior beliefs), we find that participants with higher numeracy were more accurate in evaluating the contingency table, regardless of whether or not the table's outcome aligned with their politics. These findings call for a reconsideration of the effect of identity on analytical reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various research have been directed towards investigating the behaviour of political parties engaging in attacks. However, this topic has predominantly been studied in campaigning venues while focusing only on the attacker (parties that are attacking). This study contributes to the existing literature by (i) studying attack behaviour in the parliamentary venue, and (ii) analysing the interactions between both the attacker and the target. To this end, this paper uses longitudinal data on attacks during question time sessions in the parliaments (2010 to 2020) of Belgium, Croatia and the United Kingdom. More specifically, I investigate the conditions that make parties engage in mutual attacks. These conditions can be characterised along three dimensions: time (proximity to elections), status (government vs. opposition), and ideology (close vs. distant). The results confirm the overarching argument that: (i) more attacks in parliaments happen closer to election day; (ii) opposing parties are more likely to attack the government rather than vice‐versa; (iii) governing parties equally attack the opposition and themselves; and finally, (iv) the larger the ideological distance between parties, the more likely attacks happen (with mainstream parties engaging equally in attack behaviour compared to radical parties). As such, these findings contribute to our understanding of attack strategies between parties in regular day‐to‐day politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political accountability requires that voters understand the distribution of policy outcome responsibility among their vote choice options. Research on partisan‐motivated reasoning suggests that voters do not meet this requirement. The problem is that voters condition their attributions of responsibility to the government on their party identification. Government identifiers credit the government for desirable outcomes and blame external forces such as the global economy for undesirable outcomes. This paper draws a more optimistic conclusion. It argues that focusing on the perceived responsibility of the government and external forces is not sufficient for understanding whether voters meet the responsibility attribution requirement. It is also necessary to compare the perceived responsibility of government parties to the perceived responsibility of opposition parties because those are the options that voters get to choose from. This party distribution of perceived responsibility is analyzed with original survey data from Denmark and the United Kingdom. The results demonstrate that while party identification does indeed condition voters' responsibility attributions, both government identifiers and independents attribute systematically more responsibility to the government than to the opposition regardless of the desirability of the outcome. This suggests that voters tend to meet the responsibility attribution requirement of accountability despite the presence of partisan‐motivated reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As multiracial children of foreign-born parents, Kamala Harris and Barack Obama embody diversity in politics for many perceivers. Yet some have also questioned their loyalty to their respective groups. We explored perceptions of dual group members' (DGM; dual nationals, multiracial people, and dual state residents) loyalty among first-party (those who share a group membership with a DGM target) and third-party perceivers (those who do not). Studies 1a–2b showed that first- and third-party perceivers rated DGMs as less loyal than their single group member (SGM) counterparts. However, only first- (Studies 2a–2b) but not third-party (Studies 1a–1b) perceivers preferred SGMs to DGMs for loyalty-dependent roles. Study 3 revealed that perceivers who were higher in patriotism supported DGMs for loyalty-dependent roles less when they were first- (vs. third) party observers. These studies suggest that perceivers readily intuit that DGMs are less loyal than SGMs and, under some conditions, this may lead to discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perhaps one of the most demanding challenges of the arrival of the COVID-19 crisis in early 2020 was the extent to which it arrived on top of a series of existing global crises. The [4] ([4]) published its Global State of Democracy Report, stating that, simply put, the previous two years "had not been good for democracy". Capelos and her colleagues refer to the continuation of patterns of anti-globalization, misogyny, and neoliberal ideology that predate the COVID-19 pandemic. Already in April 2020, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace issued a report in which they identified areas of pandemic-related activism (https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/21/civil-society-and-coronavirus-dynamism-despite-disruption-pub-81592, accessed on 1 January 2020), which included the categories of mutual aid initiatives, repurposing initiatives (filling gaps left by the state), and campaigns fighting disinformation. [Extracted from the article]

This article introduces an analytical framework to trace and compare leaders' different types of behaviours to the health crisis posed by COVID-19, following the analytical benefits of Leadership Trait Analysis. It examines Boris Johnson's and Nicola Sturgeon's diverging initial responses to the pandemic's onset. We employ the Leadership Trait Analysis to shed light on three main differences in their respective leadership styles: risk-proneness versus risk-aversion; flexibility versus rigidity and rule advocacy versus rule ambivalence. Crises are one of the more fruitful situations in which to study leaders as their personal characteristics become central to the decision-making process. Thus, we employ an agent-centred and political psychology approach to analyse leaders' behaviour and make sense of their divergent management styles. The results show that the differences between these leaders' approaches to handling this global health crisis can be partly explained by their level of openness to information and their task versus relationship focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of "purity" transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity—unlike other moral constructs—is not understood by what it is but what it isn't : obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm—the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality. People are fascinated by morality—how do people make moral judgments and why do liberals and conservatives seem to frequently disagree? "Purity" is one moral concept often discussed when talking about morality—it has been suggested to capture moral differences across politics and to demonstrate the evolutionary roots of morality, especially the role of disgust in moral judgment. However, despite the many books and articles that mention purity, there is no systematic analysis of purity. Here, we review all existing academic articles focused on purity in morality. We find that purity is an especially messy concept that lacks scientific validity. Because it is so poorly defined and inconsistently measured, it should not be invoked to explain our moral minds or political differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article devised an effective Student Psychology-based Dragonfly Political Optimizer (SPDPOA) for predicting heat level and soil moisture to monitor plant health in the Internet of Things (IoT). The developed SPDPOA is modeled by integrating the Student Psychology-based Optimization (SPBO) algorithm, Dragonfly Algorithm (DA) and Political optimizer (PO), respectively. The prediction process is done in the base station (BS), which gathers the IoT nodes' information through optimal Cluster Head (CH) using Deep Recurrent Neural Network (Deep RNN). Moreover, the CH selection and routing process are established using a developed SPDPOA scheme. The data transformation and feature selection processes are done based on Box-Cox transformation and wrapper model, correspondingly, which helps in the selection of best features. Moreover, the developed SPDPOA scheme attained better performance in Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), energy and testing accuracy of 0.7232, 0.6342 J and 0.9372, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Progressivism has increasingly challenged traditional liberalism as the dominant influence within left-wing ideology. Across four studies, we developed a measure—the Progressive Values Scale (PVS)—that characterizes distinctly progressive values within the left-wing. In Study 1, left-wing participants evaluated divisive issues, with four scale factors emerging. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure and included a battery of personality and values measures to explore individual differences among those who maintain a progressive worldview. In Study 3, we achieved final confirmation of the factor structure and validated the ability of the PVS to assess a distinctly progressive perspective, insofar as progressives generated prototypical faces for Liberals and Conservatives that were markedly distinct from those generated by traditional liberals. In Study 4, we distinguished the PVS from measures of left-wing authoritarianism and demonstrated that it is a better predictor of progressive political preferences and social judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A social and political psychology of citizenship can be furthered by the analysis of the values and representations through which citizenship is constructed in the text of laws and reconstructed during implementation and how these (re)constructions best serve some groups. This article views laws as facts from the reified/institutional universe whose texts operate a simplification process by prioritizing certain values from the plurality existent in the consensual universe and sees institutions in charge of law implementation as mediating systems operating re-complexification processes. Using this perspective, it (1) explores how the values and social representations prioritized in Portuguese foreign residency laws exclude/include certain groups and define rights and duties of "the good foreign resident/citizen"; (2) illustrates with interviews with experts from a mediating system (n = 6) the re-complexification of the laws in implementation. It highlights how the "worthiness" of foreign residents in Portugal depends upon three central values (work, study, and investment) keeping, however, some ambiguity of these values in the legal texts. Interviews illustrate how mediating systems re-signify the laws, amplifying the ambiguities by resorting to other values and representations. We discuss how the analysis of the dynamic relation between the reified and the consensual universes contributes to a better understanding of how macro-level factors interact with everyday citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]