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We study in this paper the effect of the type of information provided by an ecolabel. For this purpose, in the framework of a model of vertical differentiation, we compare the effects of a partial information label (Type I) and a complete information label (Type III) on firms' profits, industry profit, consumers' surplus, environmental damage and social welfare. A partial information label indicates that the environmental quality of a good exceeds some given threshold. The authority issuing a partial information label chooses its labeling criteria while maximizing the social welfare. A complete information label indicates the exact environmental quality chosen by firms. We prove that while a partial information label always improves the social welfare and deteriorates the green firm profit compared to a complete information label, the comparison between the two types of ecolabel in terms of the brown firm's profit, the industry's profit, the consumers surplus and the environment depend in a non-obvious way on the marginal cost of quality and on the environmental sensitivity to quality.

Manufacturers frequently resist heavy discounting of their products by retailers, especially when they are used as so-called loss leaders. Since low prices should increase demand and manufacturers could simply refuse to fund deep price promotions, such resistance is puzzling at first sight. We explain this phenomenon in a model in which price promotions cause shoppers to potentially reassess the relative importance of quality and price, as they evaluate these attributes relative to a market-wide reference point. With deep discounting, quality can become relatively less important, eroding brand value and the bargaining position of brand manufacturers. This reduces their profits and potentially even leads to a delisting of their products. Linking price promotions to increased one-stop shopping and more intense retail competition, our theory also contributes to the explanation of the rise of store brands.

This paper describes how process and product innovations respond to cost and demand changes. In the present model firms simultaneously choose process and product innovations within a model of vertical differentiation and uncovered market. We show that the outcome is unique both in monopoly and in the duopoly. In these outcomes, a demand increase (decrease) enhances (depresses) both process and product innovation, while an increase (decrease) in production costs stimulates (depresses) process innovation but lowers (increases) product one. The insight for these results relies on the scale effect of innovation. Our result can be placed in the ongoing debate on complementarity and substitutability of process and product innovation.

We study how quality uncertainty among consumers affects price competition in the presence of network effects. Our main result is that quality uncertainty has non-monotonic effects on firms’ price setting behavior. Prices and industry profit is first falling, then increasing, in quality uncertainty. In addition we show that quality uncertainty can force a high quality provider to be aggressive to the point where its price in the first period is below that of a low quality provider. We also analyse the incentives for compatibility under quality uncertainty, and find that when quality uncertainty is sufficiently high, compatibility may be used as a means of softening price competition.

The generation, formation, and development of debris flow are closely related to the vertical climate, vegetation, soil, lithology and topography of the mountain area. Taking in the upper reaches of Min River (the Upper Min River) as the study area, combined with GIS and RS technology, the Geo-detector (GEO) method was used to quantitatively analyze the respective influence of 9 factors on debris flow occurrence. We identify from a list of 5 variables that explain 53.92%% of the total variance. Maximum daily rainfall and slope are recognized as the primary driver (39.56%) of the spatiotemporal variability of debris flow activity. Interaction detector indicates that the interaction between the vertical differentiation factors of the mountainous areas in the study area is nonlinear enhancement. Risk detector shows that the debris flow accumulation area and propagation area in the Upper Min River are mainly distributed in the arid valleys of subtropical and warm temperate zones. The study results of this paper will enrich the scientific basis of prevention and reduction of debris flow hazards.

This paper addresses the mechanisms leading to income differences during the early career, both between individuals and between occupations. It compares the level of standardization, vocational specificity, and vertical differentiation of vocational education and training (VET) programmes and examines how these differences affect VET diploma holders’ incomes in their early careers. We go beyond previous research by developing refined theoretical concepts of vocational specificity, standardization, and differentiation and by measuring them with novel curriculum-based data. Theoretically, the paper assumes that training programmes’ institutional characteristics determine income by influencing diploma holders’ productivity as well as the signalling power of the degree. We test our hypotheses by combining institutional data from VET curricula with individual-level data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey and by applying multilevel regression analyses. The results show that the institutional dimensions, in particular vocational specificity, are multifaceted and consist of several subdimensions, which impact young workers’ incomes to different degrees at various time points during their early careers.

International audience; This note extends the results already obtained by Khaloul et al. (2017) on the majority vote between monopoly and duopoly by a heterogeneous population composed of individuals who are potentially consumers, workers, and shareholders to the general case where firms are owned by a given proportion of the population. Results show that duopoly is preferred when non-shareholders constitute a majority of the population. Otherwise, the majority vote depends on the relative dispersion of the individuals with respect to their intensity of preference for quality and their sensitivity to effort.

We consider a duopolistic market in which a green firm competes with a brown rival and both firms offer two vertically differentiated quality products. We study optimal non-linear contracts offered by the two firms when consumers: (i) are privately informed about their willingness to pay for intrinsic quality, and (ii) differ in their environmental consciousness. We characterize how consumers with different valuations for quality self-select into firms and show that the ranking of qualities, relative prices and profits all depend on the interplay between consumers’ valuations and firms’ cost heterogeneity. Interestingly, when consumers’ valuations for quality are relatively low, the brown firm does not offer the low quality variety. This contrasts with the situation of full information, in which all quality varieties are commercialized by both firms. Hence, the lack of information about consumers’ valuations may not only favor the green firm in terms of higher prices and profits, but also reduce the product range offered by the brown rival.

Research on collusion in vertically differentiated markets is conducted under one or two potentially restrictive assumptions. Either there is a single industry-wide cartel or costs are assumed to be independent of quality or quantity. We explore the extent to which these assumptions are indeed restrictive by relaxing both. For a wide range of coalition structures, profit-maximizing cartels of any size price most of their lower quality products out of the market as long as production costs do not increase too much with quality. If these costs rise sufficiently, however, then market share is maintained for all product variants. All cartel sizes may emerge in equilibrium when exclusively considering individual deviations, but the industry-wide cartel is the only one immune to deviations by coalitions of members. Overall, our findings suggest that firms have a strong incentive to coordinate prices when the products involved are vertically differentiated. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

In this chapter, we illustrate some classic spatial models. We provide a collection of the principal classic spatial models, by illustrating their characteristics and their main results. In particular, we discuss the Hotelling linear market and the Salop circular market, both under uniform pricing and under price discrimination. The location vertical differentiation model is also discussed.

In the last years, there has been a shift toward more private financing of higher education in many countries. At the same time, student mobility has substantially increased. This paper analyzes in a two-region model the impact of student mobility on region-specific higher education quality with private funding. Individuals decide whether and where to study based on their individual ability and the implemented quality. We show that mobility of students affects educational quality in very different ways depending on the probability of return migration. With full return migration, quality is optimally provided which is in stark contrast to the underprovision result in the case of tax financing. On the contrary, low return migration and thus more competition for students countervail the efficient provision of quality and result in too little differentiated levels or too high symmetric levels. This is in line with the overprovision result with tax financing.

This paper analyzes price collusion in a repeated game with two submarkets; a standard and a premium quality segment. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket only, (iii) two segment-wide cartels, and (iv) an industry-wide cartel. We present a complete characterization of the collusive pricing equilibrium and examine the corresponding effect on market shares and welfare. Partial cartels operating in a sufficiently large segment lose market share and the industry-wide cartel prefers to maintain market shares at pre-collusive levels. The impact on consumer and social welfare critically depends on the cost of producing quality. Moreover, given that there is a cartel, more collusion can be beneficial for society as a whole.

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogenous firms - characterized by vertical, respectively horizontal, differentiation - compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable payments. The degree of competition then determines the structure of these contracts. Three regions can be distinguished: For low competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too little effort. For high competition, high-ability agents are over-incentivized and bear too much risk. For a range of intermediate degrees of competition, however, agents' private information has no impact and contracts are second-best. An equilibrium where both firms are active exists only when the least-cost separating allocation (LCS) is interim efficient. If firms are only vertically differentiated, then the inferior firm is inactive in equilibrium, but its competitive threat still generates the three regions just described. Moreover, an equilibrium in which the inferior firm would not break even when attracting both agent types may exist even when the LCS is not interim efficient. We show that the degrees of vertical and horizontal differentiation have opposite impacts on the condition for interim efficiency of the LCS.

We investigate whether, in spite of the existence of cross‐market network externalities, platform competition can lead to segmentation of the two sides of the market served by the platforms. We address this question in the context of competition between two equity crowdfunding platforms that connect startups looking for capital with prospective investors. Given the heterogeneity in the populations of startups and investors in terms of the riskiness of the former population and the degree of risk aversion of the latter population, we investigate whether there exists an equilibrium where the two populations are segmented to ensure an improved match between them. We find that the segmenting equilibrium can arise only when compatibility in terms of their risk profiles is of high importance to both populations, and compatibility is significantly more important than the size of the network externality considered by startups. Segmentation is likely to improve the welfare of both populations when the basic benefit from any kind of match is relatively high.

An increasing number of firms are simultaneously offering consumers products for sale and for per-use rental services. Typically, the products offered in per-use rental services are different from those offered for sale. For example, automobiles offered in Daimler’s Car2Go program are “Smart” cars, which have a smaller size than the typical automobiles sold to consumers. Such a difference, which is objectively measurable and captured by quality, is called a vertical differentiation. This study investigates the optimal pricing problem for per-use rental services and sales, and reveals how per-use rental services interplay with sales when vertical differentiation exists. The optimal solution is unique and determined by a model that uses a marginal renter and a marginal buyer as decision variables rather than the prices of per-use rental services and sales. The vertical differentiation significantly influences a firm’s potential profitability. When the vertical differentiation falls into a certain interval, the potential profitability from per-use rental services is higher than that from sales, which explains why the per-use rental business model is increasing in popularity. Finally, the results show that offering products with a relatively high (low) quality in per-use rental services (sales) is highly profitable for product categories with a strong pooling effect or when there are high firm-side benefits from ownership. This finding enriches the existing literature by providing novel perspectives on ownership and the pooling effect, and these insights are illustrated through a numerical example.

This paper investigates the competitive effects of mergers involving producers of complementary goods, which are usually considered to be welfare increasing, in a setting where: (i) consumers need to purchase two components to make up a system; and (ii) there is competition between two vertically differentiated producers of one of the components whereas the second (must-have) component is monopolized. We find that the (privately profitable) merger involving the low quality producer of one component and the monopolist producer of the other component may decrease both consumers’ surplus and social welfare for parameter values such that this merger can endogenously occur. authorsversion published

We consider an open to trade two-country model with two vertically differentiated goods and relative preferences in consumption. These preferences are such that consumers obtain satisfaction from their own consumption in relation to the consumption of the others. Product differentiation is along an environmental quality dimension and countries are asymmetric in average income. Analysing the equilibrium configuration, we find that, when relative preferences are relegated to the poorer country producing the brown good, the process of trade liberalization can favor the polluting firm, while penalizing the green rival. In these circumstances, trade liberalization can be environmentally detrimental. At the opposite, trade liberalization always favors the green producer when relative preferences are observed in both countries, with possibly positive effects on global emissions.

In this paper, we study how the presence of coordination, competition and cost structures affect the product variety and pricing decisions in a two-stage supply chain. We consider vertically differentiated industries. Products reach the end customers via assembly companies positioned in the middle-tier between the producers and end customers. The assembly operations incur bill-of-materials (BOM) cost, which includes the cost of raw materials and components as well as the cost of producing, managing and synchronising supply, storage and distribution of these materials and components. We consider three coordination scenarios in the supply chain, and compare an uncoordinated supply chain with a horizontal and a vertical coordination scenario using the Nash equilibria of a multi-leader Stackelberg game between the producers and assembly companies. For exogenously given quality levels, we show that producers and assembly companies should either differentiate their product offering, or offer the high-end product only depending on the BOM cost. In addition, the uncoordinated scenario helps reduce the intensity of competition in the supply chain. For endogenous quality levels, partial product-differentiation equilibrium can emerge. Numerical experiments are performed to illustrate the impacts of BOM cost and quality levels on the equilibrium. INTEL Research Council

Over the past 10 years, many healthcare organizations have made significant investments in automating their clinical operations, mostly through the introduction of advanced information systems. Yet the impact of these investments on staffing is still not well understood. In this paper, we study the effect of information technology (IT)-enabled automation on staffing decisions in healthcare facilities. Using unique nursing home IT data from 2006 to 2012, we find that the licensed nurse staffing level decreases by 5.8% in high-end nursing homes but increases by 7.6% in low-end homes after the adoption of automation technology. Our research explains this by analyzing the interplay of two competing effects of automation: the substitution of technology for labor and the leveraging of complementarity between technology and labor. We also find that increased automation improves the ratings on clinical quality by 6.9% and decreases admissions of less profitable residents by 14.7% on average. These observations are consistent with the predictions of an analytical staffing model that incorporates technology adoption and vertical differentiation. Overall, these findings suggest that the impact of automation technology on staffing decisions depends crucially on a facility’s vertical position in the local marketplace. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2695 . This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.

This paper studies the bundling strategies of two firms that each sell a horizontally differentiated platform and a complementary good. When the complementary goods are vertically differentiated, the firm that sells the superior one can commit to a more aggressive pricing strategy through bundling. In the presence of asymmetry in externalities between the two sides in the platform market, bundling may be profitable without foreclosing the rival when platforms implement cross subsidies from the high-externality side (developers) to the low-externality side (consumers). Bundling has a positive effect on welfare because it allows for better internalization of the indirect network effects and reduces the developer cost of multi-homing, but it also has a negative effect because some consumers consume less-preferred components. Consequently, bundling is socially desirable when platforms are not too differentiated and the vertical differentiation between the complementary goods is high.

We study a pricing problem for a service firm facing delay-sensitive customers. Servers are quality-differentiated, where the quality can be improved based on the servers’ past experience. In such ...

The shift from a post-industrial to a knowledge economy has placed higher education at the center of attention among policy makers and the public at large. The increase in attention, along with the increasing diversity in the funding sources of higher education institutions (HEIs) has prompted calls for greater accountability. Efforts to assess the effectiveness of HEIs include a variety of accountability frameworks and review processes. These efforts produce competing pressures for both institutional differentiation and convergence: differentiation to efficiently accommodate broader participation and meet a wide array of societal needs; and convergence to compete for international prestige and recognition as demarcated by research university rankings. This paper examines the extent to which distinguishing between types of HEIs via taxonomies or classification systems has expanded or can contribute to expanding the basis upon which HEI performance is evaluated in order to meet the full range of societal expectations for higher education in the 21st Century.

The business model of low-cost carriers is now well established and accounts for a large share of Western civil aviation, particularly in Europe. To understand why it has proven so successful, we develop a theoretical model that exploits the two-sided nature of flights as connectors of supply and demand for goods and services other than traveling itself across physical space. Carriers offer flights of different quality and may sign agreements with suppliers of goods and services at the destination so as to subsidize and foster demand from the carriers’ travelers as in standard two-sided markets. Customers/travelers care about home and destination consumption and about the flight’s quality. Hence, beyond the thickness of the connected sides of the market, the quality of the airline platform has an intrinsic value to travelers. We show that only low-income travelers fly with low-cost airlines, while no-frills carriers are more likely to act as a platform than legacy airlines. We study how the degree of substitution between home and destination consumption affects the equilibrium market structure of the airline industry. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

Two firms compete to attract loss averse consumers that are uncertain about how well the goods on sale fit their needs. To resolve valuation uncertainty, firms can allow prospective customers to test (experiment) their products before purchase. We investigate firms’ dynamic incentives to allow experimentation and analyze the resulting effects on the profitability and the stability of tacit collusion. Depending on the regulatory regime in place – i.e., whether experimentation is forbidden, mandated or simply allowed but not imposed (laissez-faire) – the degree of loss aversion has ambiguous effects both on the profits that firms can achieve through tacit collusion and on the stability of these agreements. While in static environments consumer welfare is always maximized by a policy that forbids experimentation, the opposite happens in a dynamic environment.