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A significant number of persons engage in paradoxical behaviors, such as extreme food restriction (up to starvation) and non-suicidal self-injuries, especially during periods of rapid changes, such as adolescence. Here, we contextualize these and related paradoxical behavior within an active inference view of brain functions, which assumes that the brain forms predictive models of bodily variables, emotional experiences, and the embodied self and continuously strives to reduce the uncertainty of such models. We propose that not only in conditions of excessive or prolonged uncertainty, such as in clinical conditions, but also during pivotal periods of developmental transition, paradoxical behaviors might emerge as maladaptive strategies to reduce uncertainty—by "acting on the body"— soliciting salient perceptual and interoceptive sensations, such as pain or excessive levels of hunger. Although such strategies are maladaptive and run against our basic homeostatic imperatives, they might be functional not only to provide some short-term reward (e.g. relief from emotional distress)—as previously proposed—but also to reduce uncertainty and possibly to restore a coherent model of one's bodily experience and the self, affording greater confidence in who we are and what course of actions we should pursue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the "attention economy," a user's lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time plays a significant role in science and everyday life. Despite being experienced as a continuous flow, computational models of consciousness are typically restricted to a sequential temporal structure. This difference poses a serious challenge for computational phenomenology—a novel field combining phenomenology and computational modelling. By analysing the temporal structure of the active inference framework, we show that an integrated continuity of time can be achieved by merging Husserlian temporality with a sequential order of time. We also show that a Markov blanket of the present moment integrates past and future moments of both subjective temporality and objective time in an asynchronous manner. By applying the integrated continuity, it is clear that active inference makes use of both subjective temporality and objective time in an integrated fashion. We conclude that active inference, on a temporal note, qualifies as a computational model for phenomenological investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we aim to conceptualize and formalize the construct of resilience using the tools of active inference, a new physics-based modeling approach apt for the description and analysis of complex adaptive systems. We intend this as a first step toward a computational model of resilient systems. We begin by offering a conceptual analysis of resilience, to clarify its meaning, as established in the literature. We examine an orthogonal, threefold distinction between meanings of the word "resilience": (i) inertia, or the ability to resist change (ii) elasticity, or the ability to bounce back from a perturbation, and (iii) plasticity, or the ability to flexibly expand the repertoire of adaptive states. We then situate all three senses of resilience within active inference. We map resilience as inertia onto high precision beliefs, resilience as elasticity onto relaxation back to characteristic (i.e., attracting) states, and resilience as plasticity onto functional redundancy and structural degeneracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This narrative review presents key concepts from neurophysiology, phenomenology, psychology, and narrative medicine which underpin a developing enactive-ecological framework for osteopathic practice. This framework aims to provide a coherent theoretical basis for understanding healthcare processes and outcomes, based on the neuroscience principles of active inference and enactivism. It offers insights into factors that influence patients' pain perception and behaviour and foster or inhibit the development of effective therapeutic relationships. Although this approach offers promising opportunities to increase the scope of care by harnessing potential in the unique embodied ecological niches created between patients and osteopaths, it raises challenges to traditional treatment agendas. Healthcare which frames the patient-as-a person, and acknowledges the multidimensional nature of the self, requires practitioners to be collaborative and self-aware, and be able to elicit patients' lived experiences and body stories. Phenomenological and psychological studies into enactivism emphasise the complex, dynamic nature of therapeutic relationships and the need to understand each person's unique lifeworld context. The new framework represents an important step forward, but further research is now needed to explore ways of integrating active and enactive inference into practice, of developing psychological or mindful self- and body-awareness, and narrative communication skills for shared sense-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

World models is a construct that is used to represent internal models of the world. It is an important construct for human-artificial intelligence systems, because both natural and artificial agents can have world models. The term, natural agents, encompasses individual people and human organizations. Many human organizations apply artificial agents that include machine learning. In this paper, it is explained how human survival first principles of interactions between energy and entropy influence organization's world models, and hence their implementations of machine learning. First, the world models construct is related to human organizations. This is done in terms of the construct's origins in psychology theory-building during the 1930s through its applications in systems science during the 1970s to its recent applications in computational neuroscience. Second, it is explained how human survival first principles of interactions between energy and entropy influence organizational world models. Third, a practical example is provided of how survival first principles lead to opposing organizational world models. Fourth, it is explained how opposing organizational world models can constrain applications of machine learning. Overall, the paper highlights the influence of interactions between energy and entropy on organizations' applications of machine learning. In doing so, profound challenges are revealed for human-artificial intelligence systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the subjective character of pain experience in terms of what we will call 'embodied predictive processing'. The predictive processing (PP) theory is a family of views that take perception, action, emotion and cognition to all work together in the service of prediction error minimisation. In this paper we propose an embodied perspective on the PP theory we call the 'embodied predictive processing (EPP) theory. The EPP theory proposes to explain pain in terms of processes distributed across the whole body. The prediction error minimising system that generates pain experience comprises the immune system, the endocrine system, and the autonomic system in continuous causal interaction with pathways spread across the whole neural axis. We will argue that these systems function in a coordinated and coherent manner as a single complex adaptive system to maintain homeostasis. This system, which we refer to as the neural-endocrine-immune (NEI) system, maintains homeostasis through the process of prediction error minimisation. We go on to propose a view of the NEI ensemble as a multiscale nesting of Markov blankets that integrates the smallest scale of the cell to the largest scale of the embodied person in pain. We set out to show how the EPP theory can make sense of how pain experience could be neurobiologically constituted. We take it to be a constraint on the adequacy of a scientific explanation of subjectivity of pain experience that it makes it intelligible how pain can simultaneously be a local sensing of the body, and, at the same time, a more global, all-encompassing attitude towards the environment. Our aim in what follows is to show how the EPP theory can meet this constraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the mechanistic framework of active inference has been put forward as a principled foundation to develop an overarching theory of consciousness which would help address conceptual disparities in the field (Wiese 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020). For that promise to bear out, we argue that current proposals resting on the active inference scheme need refinement to become a process theory of consciousness. One way of improving a theory in mechanistic terms is to use formalisms such as computational models that implement, attune and validate the conceptual notions put forward. Here, we examine how computational modelling approaches have been used to refine the theoretical proposals linking active inference and consciousness, with a focus on the extent and success to which they have been developed to accommodate different facets of consciousness and experimental paradigms, as well as how simulations and empirical data have been used to test and improve these computational models. While current attempts using this approach have shown promising results, we argue they remain preliminary in nature. To refine their predictive and structural validity, testing those models against empirical data is needed i.e., new and unobserved neural data. A remaining challenge for active inference to become a theory of consciousness is to generalize the model to accommodate the broad range of consciousness explananda; and in particular to account for the phenomenological aspects of experience. Notwithstanding these gaps, this approach has proven to be a valuable avenue for theory advancement and holds great potential for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, whether conscious or not. Self-evidencing in itself is therefore not sufficient for consciousness. Different systems may however be capable of self-evidencing in different, specific and distinct ways. Some of these ways of self-evidencing can be matched up with, and explain, several properties of consciousness. This carves out a distinction in nature between those systems that are conscious, as described by these properties, and those that are not. This approach throws new light on phenomenology, and suggests that some self-evidencing may be characteristic of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between intuition and flow from a neurodynamics perspective. Flow and intuition represent two cognitive phenomena rooted in nonconscious information processing; however, there are clear differences in both their phenomenal characteristics and, more broadly, their contribution to action and cognition. We propose, extrapolating from dual processing theory, that intuition serves as a rapid, nonconscious decision-making process, while flow facilitates this process in action, achieving optimal cognitive control and performance without [conscious] deliberation. By exploring these points of convergence between flow and intuition, we also attempt to reconcile the apparent paradox of the presence of enhanced intuition in flow, which is also a state of heightened cognitive control. To do so, we utilize a revised dual-processing framework, which allows us to productively align and differentiate flow and intuition (including intuition in flow). Furthermore, we draw on recent work examining flow from an active inference perspective. Our account not only heightens understanding of human cognition and consciousness, but also raises new questions for future research, aiming to deepen our comprehension of how flow and intuition can be harnessed to elevate human performance and wellbeing., Competing Interests: None declared., (© The Author(s) 2025. Published by Oxford University Press.)

Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference . Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.

Most of our movement consists of sequences of discrete actions at regular intervals-including speech, walking, playing music, or even chewing. Despite this, few models of the motor system address how the brain determines the interval at which to trigger actions. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the problem of timing movements. We consider a scenario in which we must align an alternating movement with a regular external (auditory) stimulus. We assume that our brains employ generative world models that include internal clocks of various speeds. These allow us to associate a temporally regular sensory input with an internal clock, and actions with parts of that clock cycle. We treat this as process of inferring which clock best explains sensory input. This offers a way in which temporally discrete choices might emerge from a continuous process. This is not straightforward, particularly if each of those choices unfolds during a time that has a (possibly unknown) duration. We develop a route for translation to neurology, in the context of Parkinson's disease-a disorder that characteristically slows down movements. The effects are often elicited in clinic by alternating movements. We find that it is possible to reproduce behavioural and electrophysiological features associated with parkinsonism by disrupting specific parameters-that determine the priors for inferences made by the brain. We observe three core features of Parkinson's disease: amplitude decrement, festination, and breakdown of repetitive movements. Our simulations provide a mechanistic interpretation of how pathology and therapeutics might influence behaviour and neural activity., (Copyright © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

There is a renewed interest in taking phenomenology seriously in consciousness research, contemporary psychiatry, and neurocomputation. The neurophenomenology research program, pioneered by Varela (1996), rigorously examines subjective experience using first-person methodologies, inspired by phenomenology and contemplative practices. This review explores recent advancements in neurophenomenological approaches, particularly their application to meditation practices and potential clinical research translations. We first examine innovative multi-dimensional phenomenological assessment tools designed to capture subtle, dynamic shifts in experiential contents and structures of consciousness during meditation. These experience sampling approaches allow shedding new light on the mechanisms and dynamic trajectories of meditation practice and retreat. Secondly, we highlight how empirical studies in neurophenomenology leverage the expertise of experienced meditators to deconstruct aversive and self-related processes, providing detailed first-person reports that guide researchers in identifying novel behavioral and neurodynamic markers associated with pain regulation, self-dissolution and acceptance of mortality. Finally, we discuss a recent framework, deep computational neurophenomenology, which updates the theoretical ambitions of neurophenomenology to "naturalize phenomenology" (Varela, 1997). This framework uses the formalism of deep parametric active inference, where parametric depth refers to a property of generative models that can form beliefs about the parameters of their own modeling process. Collectively, these methodological innovations, centered around rigorous first-person investigation, highlight the potential of epistemologically beneficial mutual constraints among phenomenological, computational, and neurophysiological domains. This could contribute to an integrated understanding of the biological basis of mental illness, its treatment and its tight connections to the lived experience of the patient., (Copyright © 2024. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

Classical imitation learning methods suffer substantially from the learning hierarchical policies when the imitative agent faces an unobserved state by the expert agent. To address these drawbacks, we propose an online active learning through active inference approach that encodes the expert’s demonstrations based on observation-action to improve the learner’s future motion prediction. For this purpose, we provide a switching Dynamic Bayesian Network based on the dynamic interaction between the expert agent and another object in its surrounding as a reference model, which we exploit to initialize an incremental probabilistic learning model. This learning model grows and matures based on the free-energy formulation and message passing of active inference dynamically at discrete and continuous levels in an online active learning phase. In this scheme, generalized states of the learning world are represented as distance-vector, where it is the learner’s observation concerning its interaction with a moving object. Considering the distance vector entail intentions, it enables action prediction evaluation in a prospective sense. We illustrate these points using simulations of driving intelligent agents. The learning agent is trained by using long-term predictions from the generative learning model to reproduce the expert’s motion while learning how to select a suitable action through new experiences. Our results affirm that a Dynamic Bayesian optimal approach provides a principled framework and outperforms conventional reinforcement learning methods. Furthermore, it endorses the general formulation of action prediction as active inference.

Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche.

In this article, we aim to conceptualize and formalize the construct of resilience using the tools of active inference, a new physics-based modeling approach apt for the description and analysis of complex adaptive systems. We intend this as a first step toward a computational model of resilient systems. We begin by offering a conceptual analysis of resilience, to clarify its meaning, as established in the literature. We examine an orthogonal, threefold distinction between meanings of the word “resilience”: (i) inertia, or the ability to resist change (ii) elasticity, or the ability to bounce back from a perturbation, and (iii) plasticity, or the ability to flexibly expand the repertoire of adaptive states. We then situate all three senses of resilience within active inference. We map resilience as inertia onto high precision beliefs, resilience as elasticity onto relaxation back to characteristic (i.e., attracting) states, and resilience as plasticity onto functional redundancy and structural degeneracy.

Active inference is a leading theory in neuroscience that provides a simple and neuro-biologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behavior; and has been recently used to explain a variety of psychopathological conditions. In parallel, morphogenesis has been described as the behavior of a (non-neural) cellular collective intelligence solving problems in anatomical morphospace. In this article, we establish a link between the domains of cell biology and neuroscience, by analyzing disorders of morphogenesis as disorders of (active) inference. The aim of this article is three-fold. We want to: (i) reveal a connection between disorders of morphogenesis and disorders of active inference as apparent in psychopathological conditions; (ii) show how disorders of morphogenesis can be simulated using active inference; (iii) suggest that active inference can shed light on developmental defects or aberrant morphogenetic processes, seen as disorders of information processing, and perhaps suggesting novel intervention and repair strategies. We present four simulations illustrating application of these ideas to cellular behavior during morphogenesis. Three of the simulations show that the same forms of aberrant active inference (e.g., deficits of sensory attenuation and low sensory precision) that have been used to explain psychopathological conditions (e.g., schizophrenia and autism) also produce familiar disorders of development and morphogenesis when implemented at the level of the collective behavior of a group of cells. The fourth simulation involves two cells with too high precision, in which we show that the reduction of concentration signaling and sensitivity to the signals of other cells treats the development defect. Finally, we present the results of an experimental test of one of the model's predictions in early Xenopus laevis embryos: thioridazine (a dopamine antagonist that may reduce sensory precision in biological systems) induced developmental (anatomical) defects as predicted. The use of conceptual and empirical tools from neuroscience to understand the morphogenetic behavior of pre-neural agents offers the possibility of new approaches in regenerative medicine and evolutionary developmental biology.

People actively adjust how they acquire sensory information, such as tactile cues, based on how their bodily functions alter their senses.

Consciousness has been described as acting as a global workspace that integrates perception, imagination, emotion and action programming for adaptive decision making. The mechanisms of this workspace and their relationships to the phenomenology of consciousness need to be further specified. Much research in this area has focused on the neural correlates of consciousness, but, arguably, computational modeling can better be used toward this aim. According to the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), consciousness is structured as a viewpoint-organized, internal space, relying on 3D projective geometry and governed by the action of the Projective Group as part of a process of active inference. The geometry induces a group-structured subjective perspective on an encoded world model, enabling adaptive perspective taking in agents. Here, we review and discuss the PCM. We emphasize the role of projective mechanisms in perception and the appraisal of affective and epistemic values as tied to the motivation of action, under an optimization process of Free Energy minimization, or more generally stochastic optimal control. We discuss how these mechanisms enable us to model and simulate group-structured drives in the context of social cognition and to understand the mechanisms underpinning empathy, emotion expression and regulation, and approach–avoidance behaviors. We review previous results, drawing on applications in robotics and virtual humans. We briefly discuss future axes of research relating to applications of the model to simulation- and model-based behavioral science, geometrically structured artificial neural networks, the relevance of the approach for explainable AI and human–machine interactions, and the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.

This study investigated how a physical robot can adapt goal-directed actions in dynamically changing environments, in real-time, using an active inference-based approach with incremental learning from human tutoring examples. Using our active inference-based model, while good generalization can be achieved with appropriate parameters, when faced with sudden, large changes in the environment, a human may have to intervene to correct actions of the robot in order to reach the goal, as a caregiver might guide the hands of a child performing an unfamiliar task. In order for the robot to learn from the human tutor, we propose a new scheme to accomplish incremental learning from these proprioceptive–exteroceptive experiences combined with mental rehearsal of past experiences. Our experimental results demonstrate that using only a few tutoring examples, the robot using our model was able to significantly improve its performance on new tasks without catastrophic forgetting of previously learned tasks.

Depth estimation is an ill-posed problem; objects of different shapes or dimensions, even if at different distances, may project to the same image on the retina. Our brain uses several cues for depth estimation, including monocular cues such as motion parallax and binocular cues such as diplopia. However, it remains unclear how the computations required for depth estimation are implemented in biologically plausible ways. State-of-the-art approaches to depth estimation based on deep neural networks implicitly describe the brain as a hierarchical feature detector. Instead, in this paper we propose an alternative approach that casts depth estimation as a problem of active inference. We show that depth can be inferred by inverting a hierarchical generative model that simultaneously predicts the eyes’ projections from a 2D belief over an object. Model inversion consists of a series of biologically plausible homogeneous transformations based on Predictive Coding principles. Under the plausible assumption of a nonuniform fovea resolution, depth estimation favors an active vision strategy that fixates the object with the eyes, rendering the depth belief more accurate. This strategy is not realized by first fixating on a target and then estimating the depth; instead, it combines the two processes through action–perception cycles, with a similar mechanism of the saccades during object recognition. The proposed approach requires only local (top-down and bottom-up) message passing, which can be implemented in biologically plausible neural circuits.

Deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as aerial base stations is an exceptional approach to reinforce terrestrial infrastructure owing to their remarkable flexibility and superior agility. However, it is essential to design their flight trajectory effectively to make the most of UAV-assisted wireless communications. This paper presents a novel method for improving wireless connectivity between UAVs and terrestrial users through effective path planning. This is achieved by developing a goal-directed trajectory planning method using active inference. First, we create a global dictionary using traveling salesman problem with profits (TSPWP) instances executed on various training examples. This dictionary represents the world model and contains letters representing available hotspots, tokens representing local paths, and words depicting complete trajectories and hotspot order. By using this world model, the UAV can understand the TSPWP’s decision-making grammar and how to use the available letters to form tokens and words at various levels of abstraction and time scales. With this knowledge, the UAV can assess encountered situations and deduce optimal routes based on the belief encoded in the world model. Our proposed method outperforms traditional Q-learning by providing fast, stable, and reliable solutions with good generalization ability.

Resilience is often characterized as the outcome of well-being maintenance despite threats to that well-being. We suggest that resilience can also be characterized as an emotional-intelligence-related ability to obtain this outcome. We formulate an allostatic active inference model that outlines the primary tools of this resilience ability as monitoring well-being, maintaining stable well-being beliefs while updating situational beliefs and flexibly prioritizing actions that are expected to lead to well-being maintenance or gathering the information needed to discern what those actions could be. This model helps to explain the role of positive emotions in resilience as well as how people high in resilience ability use regulatory flexibility in the service of maintaining well-being and provides a starting point for assessing resilience as an ability.

Precisely timed behavior and accurate time perception plays a critical role in our everyday lives, as our wellbeing and even survival can depend on well-timed decisions. Although the temporal structure of the world around us is essential for human decision making, we know surprisingly little about how representation of temporal structure of our everyday environment impacts decision making. How does the representation of temporal structure affect our ability to generate well-timed decisions? Here we address this question by using a well-established dynamic probabilistic learning task. Using computational modeling, we found that human subjects’ beliefs about temporal structure are reflected in their choices to either exploit their current knowledge or to explore novel options. The model-based analysis illustrates a large within-group and within-subject heterogeneity. To explain these results, we propose a normative model for how temporal structure is used in decision making, based on the semi-Markov formalism in the active inference framework. We discuss potential key applications of the presented approach to the fields of cognitive phenotyping and computational psychiatry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental disorder, comprised of heterogeneous psychological and neurobiological pathologies. Here, we propose a predictive processing (PP) account of BPD to integrate these seemingly unrelated pathologies. In particular, we argue that the experience of childhood maltreatment, which is highly prevalent in BPD, leaves a developmental legacy with two facets: first, a coarse-grained, alexithymic model of self and others – leading to a rigidity and inflexibility concerning beliefs about self and others. Second, this developmental legacy leads to a loss of confidence or precision afforded beliefs about the consequences of social behavior. This results in an over reliance on sensory evidence and social feedback, with concomitant lability, impulsivity and hypersensitivity. In terms of PP, people with BPD show a distorted belief updating in response to new information with two opposing manifestations: rapid changes in beliefs and a lack of belief updating despite disconfirmatory evidence. This account of distorted information processing has the potential to explain both the instability (of affect, self-image, and interpersonal relationships) and the rigidity (of beliefs about self and others) which is typical of BPD. At the neurobiological level, we propose that enhanced levels of dopamine are associated with the increased integration of negative social feedback, and we also discuss the hypothesis of an impaired inhibitory control of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of negative social information. Our account may provide a new understanding not only of the clinical aspects of BPD, but also a unifying theory of the corresponding neurobiological pathologies. We conclude by outlining some directions for future research on the behavioral, neurobiological, and computational underpinnings of this model, and point to some clinical implications of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Automated vehicle (AV) technologies promise to improve traffic safety and reduce driver workload in the near future. However, most current implementations have limited capabilities and require transition of control between the vehicle and the human driver during automation failures. For this reason, models of driver behavior have been widely studied to assist the design and development of AV technologies. Recent works have shown that driver behavior models grounded in human cognitive information processing achieve better generalization than prior methods. In this work, we applied active inference, a framework of human perception, cognition, and behavior based on the predictive processing theory, to model driver emergency braking responses to automation failures. We estimated the model parameters from experimental data and examined the model parameters using a factor analysis. We verified the model’s braking response prediction capability in counterfactual scenarios. Our results show that the model effectively captured braking reaction times and provided insight on the correspondence between the variations in driver parameters and behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work proposes a novel resource allocation strategy for anti-jamming in Cognitive Radio using Active Inference (AIn), and a cognitive-UAV is employed as a case study. An Active Generalized Dynamic Bayesian Network (Active-GDBN) is proposed to represent the external environment that jointly encodes the physical signal dynamics and the dynamic interaction between UAV and jammer in the spectrum. We cast the action and planning as a Bayesian inference problem that can be solved by avoiding surprising states (minimizing abnormality) during online learning. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed AIn approach in minimizing abnormalities (maximizing rewards) and has a high convergence speed by comparing it with the conventional Frequency Hopping and Q-learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generalized anxiety disorder is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders and often manifests as persistent and difficult to control apprehension. Despite its prevalence, there is no integrative, formal model of how anxiety and anxiety disorders arise. Here, we offer a perspective derived from the free energy principle; one that shares similarities with established constructs such as learned helplessness. Our account is simple: anxiety can be formalized as learned uncertainty. A biological system, having had persistent uncertainty in its past, will expect uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether uncertainty truly persists. Despite our account’s intuitive simplicity— which can be illustrated with the mere flip of a coin—it is grounded within the free energy principle and hence situates the formation of anxiety within a broader explanatory framework of biological self-organization and self-evidencing. We conclude that, through conceptualizing anxiety within a framework of working generative models, our perspective might afford novel approaches in the clinical treatment of anxiety and its key symptoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) represents a fundamental problem for autonomous embodied systems, for which the hippocampal/entorhinal system (H/E-S) has been optimized over the course of evolution. We have developed a biologically-inspired SLAM architecture based on latent variable generative modeling within the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference (FEP-AI) framework, which affords flexible navigation and planning in mobile robots. We have primarily focused on attempting to reverse engineer H/E-S "design" properties, but here we consider ways in which SLAM principles from robotics may help us better understand nervous systems and emergent minds. After reviewing LatentSLAM and notable features of this control architecture, we consider how the H/E-S may realize these functional properties not only for physical navigation, but also with respect to high-level cognition understood as generalized simultaneous localization and mapping (G-SLAM). We focus on loop-closure, graph-relaxation, and node duplication as particularly impactful architectural features, suggesting these computational phenomena may contribute to understanding cognitive insight (as proto-causal-inference), accommodation (as integration into existing schemas), and assimilation (as category formation). All these operations can similarly be describable in terms of structure/category learning on multiple levels of abstraction. However, here we adopt an ecological rationality perspective, framing H/E-S functions as orchestrating SLAM processes within both concrete and abstract hypothesis spaces. In this navigation/search process, adaptive cognitive equilibration between assimilation and accommodation involves balancing tradeoffs between exploration and exploitation; this dynamic equilibrium may be near optimally realized in FEP-AI, wherein control systems governed by expected free energy objective functions naturally balance model simplicity and accuracy. With respect to structure learning, such a balance would involve constructing models and categories that are neither too inclusive nor exclusive. We propose these (generalized) SLAM phenomena may represent some of the most impactful sources of variation in cognition both within and between individuals, suggesting that modulators of H/E-S functioning may potentially illuminate their adaptive significances as fundamental cybernetic control parameters. Finally, we discuss how understanding H/ES contributions to G-SLAM may provide a unifying framework for high-level cognition and its potential realization in artificial intelligences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recurrent, unvarying, and seemingly purposeless patterns of action and cognition are part of normal development, but also feature prominently in several neuropsychiatric conditions. Repetitive stereotyped behaviors (RSBs) can be viewed as exaggerated forms of learned habits and frequently correlate with alterations in motor, limbic, and associative basal ganglia circuits. However, it is still unclear how altered basal ganglia feedback signals actually relate to the phenomenological variability of RSBs. Why do behaviorally overlapping phenomena sometimes require different treatment approaches-for example, sensory shielding strategies versus exposure therapy for autism and obsessive-compulsive disorder, respectively? Certain clues may be found in recent models of basal ganglia function that extend well beyond action selection and motivational control, and have implications for sensorimotor integration, prediction, learning under uncertainty, as well as aesthetic learning. In this paper, we systematically compare three exemplary conditions with basal ganglia involvement, obsessive-compulsive disorder, Parkinson's disease, and autism spectrum conditions, to gain a new understanding of RSBs. We integrate clinical observations and neuroanatomical and neurophysiological alterations with accounts employing the predictive processing framework. Based on this review, we suggest that basal ganglia feedback plays a central role in preconditioning cortical networks to anticipate self-generated, movement-related perception. In this way, basal ganglia feedback appears ideally situated to adjust the salience of sensory signals through precision weighting of (external) new sensory information, relative to the precision of (internal) predictions based on prior generated models. Accordingly, behavioral policies may preferentially rely on new data versus existing knowledge, in a spectrum spanning between novelty and stability. RSBs may then represent compensatory or reactive responses, respectively, at the opposite ends of this spectrum. This view places an important role of aesthetic learning on basal ganglia feedback, may account for observed changes in creativity and aesthetic experience in basal ganglia disorders, is empirically testable, and may inform creative art therapies in conditions characterized by stereotyped behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We comment on a technical critique of the free energy principle in linear systems by Aguilera, Millidge, Tschantz, and Buckley, entitled "How Particular is the Physics of the Free Energy Principle?" Aguilera and colleagues identify an ambiguity in the flow of the mode of a system, and we discuss the context for this ambiguity in earlier papers, and their proposal of a more adequate interpretation of these equations. Following that, we discuss a misinterpretation in their treatment of surprisal and variational free energy, especially with respect to their gradients and their minima. In sum, we argue that the results in the target paper are accurate and stand up to rigorous scrutiny; we also highlight that they, nonetheless, do not undermine the FEP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Flexible, goal-directed behavior is a fundamental aspect of human life. Based on the free energy minimization principle, the theory of active inference formalizes the generation of such behavior from a computational neuroscience perspective. Based on the theory, we introduce an output-probabilistic, temporally predictive, modular artificial neural network architecture, which processes sensorimotor information, infers behavior-relevant aspects of its world, and invokes highly flexible, goal-directed behavior. We show that our architecture, which is trained end-to-end to minimize an approximation of free energy, develops latent states that can be interpreted as affordance maps. That is, the emerging latent states signal which actions lead to which effects dependent on the local context. In combination with active inference, we show that flexible, goal-directed behavior can be invoked, incorporating the emerging affordance maps. As a result, our simulated agent flexibly steers through continuous spaces, avoids collisions with obstacles, and prefers pathways that lead to the goal with high certainty. Additionally, we show that the learned agent is highly suitable for zero-shot generalization across environments: After training the agent in a handful of fixed environments with obstacles and other terrains affecting its behavior, it performs similarly well in procedurally generated environments containing different amounts of obstacles and terrains of various sizes at different locations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Active inference is a state-of-the-art framework for modelling the brain that explains a wide range of mechanisms such as habit formation, dopaminergic discharge and curiosity. However, recent implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time horizon. Fountas et al. (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to very good results in two different tasks. Additionally, Champion et al. (2021a) proposed a tree search approach based on (temporal) structure learning. This was enabled by the development of a variational message passing approach to active inference (Champion, Bowman, Grześ, 2021), which enables compositional construction of Bayesian networks for active inference. However, this message passing tree search approach, which we call branching-time active inference (BTAI), has never been tested empirically. In this paper, we present an experimental study of the approach (Champion, Grześ, Bowman, 2021) in the context of a maze solving agent. In this context, we show that both improved prior preferences and deeper search help mitigate the vulnerability to local minima. Then, we compare BTAI to standard active inference (AcI) on a graph navigation task. We show that for small graphs, both BTAI and AcI successfully solve the task. For larger graphs, AcI exhibits an exponential (space) complexity class, making the approach intractable. However, BTAI explores the space of policies more efficiently, successfully scaling to larger graphs. Then, BTAI was compared to the POMCP algorithm (Silver and Veness, 2010) on the frozen lake environment. The experiments suggest that BTAI and the POMCP algorithm accumulate a similar amount of reward. Also, we describe when BTAI receives more rewards than the POMCP agent, and when the opposite is true. Finally, we compared BTAI to the approach of Fountas et al. (2020) on the dSprites dataset, and we discussed the pros and cons of each approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The free energy principle is notoriously difficult to understand. In this paper, we relate the principle to a framework that philosophers of biology are familiar with: Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantics. We argue that: (i) systems that minimise free energy are systems with a proper function; and (ii) Karl Friston’s notion of implicit modelling can be understood in terms of Millikan’s notion of mapping relations. Our analysis reveals some surprising formal similarities between the two frameworks, and suggests interesting lines of future research. We hope this will aid further philosophical evaluation of the free energy principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last fifteen years, an ambitious explanatory framework has been proposed to unify explanations across biology and cognitive science. Active inference, whose most famous tenet is the free energy principle, has inspired excitement and confusion in equal measure. Here, we lay the ground for proper critical analysis of active inference, in three ways. First, we give simplified versions of its core mathematical models. Second, we outline the historical development of active inference and its relationship to other theoretical approaches. Third, we describe three different kinds of claim—labelled mathematical, empirical and general—routinely made by proponents of the framework, and suggest dialectical links between them. Overall, we aim to increase philosophical understanding of active inference so that it may be more readily evaluated. This paper is the Introduction to the Topical Collection “The Free Energy Principle: From Biology to Cognition”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a longstanding debate between those who think that cognition extends into the external environment (extend cognition) and those who think it is located squarely within the individual (internalism). Recently, a new actor has emerged on the scene, one that looks to play kingmaker. Predictive processing (PP) says that the mind/brain is fundamentally engaged in a process of minimising the difference between what is predicted about the world and how the world actually is, what is known as ‘prediction error minimisation’ (PEM). The goal of this paper is to articulate a novel approach to extended cognition using the resources of PP. After outlining two recent proposals from Constant et al. (2020) and Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019), I argue that the case for extended cognition can be further developed by interpreting certain elements of the PP story (namely, PEM) as a “mark of the cognitive”. The suggestion is that when construed at an ‘algorithmic level’ PEM offers a direct route to thinking about extended systems as genuine cognitive systems. On route to articulating the proposal, I lay out the core argument, defend the proposal’s novelty, and point to several of the advantages of the formulation. Finally, I conclude by taking up two challenges raised by Hohwy (2016, 2018) about the prospects of using PEM to argue for extended cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by the close relation of predictive coding and activeinference to cognition, we introduce a dynamic artificial neu-ral network-based (ANN) adaptation process, which we termREPRISE: REtrospective and PRospective Inference SchEme.REPRISE first executes a retrospective inference process, in-ferring the unobservable contextual state that best explains itsrecently encountered sensorimotor experiences. It then exe-cutes a prospective inference process, inferring upcoming mo-tor activities in the light of the inferred contextual state anda given goal state. First, the ANN – a recurrent neural net-work – is trained to learn one sensorimotor temporal forwardmodel, that is, the sensorimotor contingencies generated by thebehavior of three moving or flying vehicles. During training,additional three bits are provided as input, indicating whichmode currently applies. After training, goal-directed controland system state inference are activated: Given a goal state,the system imagines a motor command sequence optimizing itwith the prospective objective to minimize the distance to thegoal. Meanwhile, the system evaluates the encountered sen-sorimotor contingencies retrospectively, adapting its vehicleestimation activities and, in order to maintain coherence, theneural hidden states accordingly. This ANN’s ’mind’ is thuscontinuously imagining the future and reflecting on the past –showing superior performance on the posed control problems.The architecture effectively demonstrates that neural error sig-nals and neural activities can be projected into the past and intothe future, respectively, optimizing both neural context codesthat approximately generate the recent past and upcoming be-havior in the light of desired goal states.

Distributed cognition and decision making has been a topic ofintense research in the recent years. In this paper, a computa-tional model of distributed decision making using a commu-nity of predictive coding agents is developed. The agents areembodied multimodal entities and situated in a shared envi-ronment. They have different visibility of the environment dueto unique sensory and generative models. We show that com-munication between agents helps each of them reach a shareddecision in a way that cannot be reached by brain processes ina single agent. Using a simulated environment, we show thatsensory limitations may lead to incorrect or delayed causal in-ferences giving rise to conflicts in the mind of a predictive cod-ing agent, and communication helps to resolve such conflictsand overcome the limitations.

Methodological problems often arise when a special case is confused with the general principle. So you will find affordances only for ‚artifacts’ if you restrict the analysis to ‚artifacts’. The general principle, however, is an ‚invitation character’, which triggers an action. Consequently, an action-theoretical approach known as ‚pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science is recommended. According to this approach, the human being is not a passive-receptive being but actively produces those action effects that open up the world to us (through ‚active inferences’). This ‚ideomotor approach’ focuses on the so-called ‚epistemic actions’, which guide our perception as conscious and unconscious cognitions. Due to ‚embodied cognition’ the own body is assigned an indispensable role. The action theoretical approach of ‚enactive cognition’ enables that every form can be consistently processualized. Thus, each ‚Gestalt’ is understood as the process result of interlocking cognitions of ‚forward modelling’ (which produces anticipations and enables prognoses) and ‚inverse modelling’ (which makes hypotheses about genesis and causality). As can be shown, these cognitions are fed by previous experiences of real interaction, which later changes into a mental trial treatment, which is highly automated and can therefore take place unconsciously. It is now central that every object may have such affordances that call for instrumental or epistemic action. In the simplest case, it is the body and the facial expressions of our counterpart that can be understood as a question and provoke an answer/reaction. Thus, emotion is not only to be understood as expression/output according to the scheme ‚input-processing-output’, but acts itself as a provocative act/input. Consequently, artifacts are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for affordances. Rather, they exist in all areas of cognition—from Enactive Cognition to Social Cognition.

Precisely timed behavior and accurate time perception plays a critical role in our everyday lives, as our wellbeing and even survival can depend on well-timed decisions. Although the temporal structure of the world around us is essential for human decision making, we know surprisingly little about how representation of temporal structure of our everyday environment impacts decision making. How does the representation of temporal structure affect our ability to generate well-timed decisions? Here we address this question by using a well-established dynamic probabilistic learning task. Using computational modeling, we found that human subjects' beliefs about temporal structure are reflected in their choices to either exploit their current knowledge or to explore novel options. The model-based analysis illustrates a large within-group and within-subject heterogeneity. To explain these results, we propose a normative model for how temporal structure is used in decision making, based on the semi-Markov formalism in the active inference framework. We discuss potential key applications of the presented approach to the fields of cognitive phenotyping and computational psychiatry.