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The Naval Tactical Game (NAVTAG) Training Systems are to become the standard war gaming computers in fleet use to train Surface Warfare Officers in tactical operations. As modern weapons platforms are developed, they need to be modeled into NAVTAG in order that they might be included in applicable at-sea engagements. In support of this objective, the SH-60B (SEAHAWK) Anti-Submarine Warfare Helicopter, which is currently not supported by NAVTAG, is incorporated into the NAVTAG System. The SH-60B is incorporated into the NAVTAG System with the full range of functions that are enjoyed by other aircraft modeled in NAVTAG. Using NAVTAG the SH-60B is tested in an Anti-Submarine Warfare {ASW) scenario developed to test its capabilities against a Soviet submarine. For comparison and testing purposes the SH-60B is also compared to the SH-2F helicopter previously modeled in NAVTAG.o Both helicopters have comparable mission objectives and tactics. This is a research project to determine if NAVTAG can be modified in a research environment and with what degree of difficulty this may be accomplished. This in no way is meant to modify the Standard NAVTAG Systems that have been distributed to fleet units without the consent of the Program Manager., http://archive.org/details/thenavtagsystemn1094519465, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In his chapter on boldness, Clausewitz asserts that audacity is one of the most essential qualities of military genius. Yet, it is a rare trait amongst senior military leaders since militaries often reward and select for intellect over temperament. Furthermore, the greater the complexity and uncertainty of the environment, the more crucial audacity becomes for commanders to avoid indecisiveness and timidity. Despite the emergence of the space and cyber domains, recent events in Ukraine have shown that information availability has not diminished the complexity of warfare. Therefore, training military professionals to make sound decisions in the face of complexity is essential to winning the next war. Yamashita's Gambit is a historical wargame that addresses this concern by modeling one of the most intriguing case studies on audacity in maneuver warfare: The Battle of Singapore in 1942. The wargame replicates the complex dilemmas and dynamics of the historical battle and can help military professionals at the field grade and above level develop audacious decision-making skills. This thesis explains the research methodology and design process for Yamashita's Gambit.

This monograph explores making divisions better through improved training techniques, specifically utilizing scenario training. Scenarios prove a viable option to aid in training divisions with their most common training deficiencies, staff integration, and staff processes as observed during the Warfighter Exercise series. Scenarios additionally offer a different approach to training the staff both individually and collectively by enabling different thinking styles. While scenarios have a wide range of benefits, they do not replace current training models, only augment, and should be implemented as such. However, given their limited resource requirements, divisions must implement scenarios soon to prepare for an unknown future that lies ahead.

Leaders of Consequence is a competitive wargame designed to demonstrate the impact of leader management on tactical execution. Two players lead respective combined arms battalions, managing and developing officers based upon leadership, behaviors, and propensity for war fighting functions. After players have managed their teams, each player deploys their organization in a tactical scenario. How well the player managed their team has complex effects on how the organization performs in the tactical phase. The tactical phase breaks down by war fighting function. Battalion staffs along with battalion to platoon leadership may use the wargame to better understand the impacts and value of managing leaders to improve tactical execution.

The United States is returning to a strategy of great power competition against rising and revisionist states. As the executive produces strategic guidance and initiatives movement across the whole of government, departments and agencies must determine how best to apply their means in an integrated fashion to achieve the directed ends. The joint force is still developing concepts and terms to address great power rivalry while competing through integrated campaigning. The existing doctrine and capabilities are suitable for employment in competition against adversaries, but there are no models that adequately depict actions below the threshold of armed conflict. This thesis identifies relevant aspects of great power rivalry and models them as a competitive wargame. Critical elements of U.S. and Chinese strategies are discussed at length to identify current methods of implementation and fundamental aspects of competition. Modeling techniques are detailed so they can be replicated and proofed by other wargame designers. Although this model has achieved a modicum of success in the current international security environment, it will need to be revisited and updated to remain relevant as actors modify the means and ways of competition.

This thesis examines the feasibility of creating a wargame intended to simulate logistical operations and decisions that logisticians must be able to make in a brigade-level decisive action fight. The wargame developed for thesis entitled A Crisis Exists, demonstrates that a model can reasonably accurately depict situations that stress the eight principles of sustainment according to ADP 4-0. A Crisis Exists demonstrates the ability to stress the demand for proper logistical planning on the battlefield that enables a brigade combat team to achieve tactical success. A Crisis Exists requires players to anticipate future logistical requirements, pre-plan logistics support, and responsively execute their logistics plan to achieve the maneuver end-state. Therefore, A Crisis Exists demonstrates the design of a wargame to stimulate education on the logistical environment associated with a decisive action fight.

Counter Fire! is a competitive wargame designed to train artillery leaders and staff in tactical fire direction and visualization of United States Army artillery battalion operations. The composite artillery battalion is a battalion of two M119A3 and one M777A2 batteries supported by a forward support company and a headquarters battery. Its mission is to provide fire support for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team. The game can be played by two players or more on two teams. The players fill the role of the artillery battalion commander and make decisions on what maneuver operations to support while balancing survival of the battalion and counterfire operations.

Decisive Operations is a wargame for military professionals and wargame hobbyists alike. Designed to be played by two players and under two hours but still forces players to make difficult meaningful decisions at the U.S. Army Division level. To plan future operations while managing current operations. This paper provides the basis and rationale for the modeling decisions made by the researcher in the development of this wargame. Players will take on the roles of the U.S. and PLA Army Commanders, immersing players in the commanders' decision-making process.

Today’s Internet of Things (IoT) is often employed to connect material artefacts to digital identifiers and a digital record of their history and existence. This has been heralded as a coming together of our material existences and our increasingly-digital lives. Bringing each object that we create, use and cherish into the IoT, is an outwardly appealing prospect. Using material objects is an accepted part of connecting with narratives and our history, and such a technological boon already enables the storytelling opportunities that are supported by rich digital records. However, in everyday life and in the practices that occupy them, people consider and share stories about the things that they feel to be meaningful to them in complex ways which do not necessarily conform to the expectations of the designers and developers who attempt to intervene and support such practices by focusing on the material objects at hand. This thesis draws upon observations from a thorough engagement with the community of practice of the Tabletop Miniature Wargaming pastime, which involves the acknowledged craft and use of objects deemed as meaningful, to reveal that the practitioners, in reality, construct their shared records and narratives around intangible Identities, both singular and collective, which they find to be the actual ‘meaningful things’ of their activities. These findings contravene the conventional emphasis on the material objects, and pose technological and conceptual challenges. Considering these findings through a lens informed by philosophical grounding, the thesis examines the distinctions between ordinary objects and extraordinary things; how things become meaningful; and the interplay between material and abstract things. The culmination of these efforts is the Meaningful Things Framework, which aims to help disambiguate the complex ways by which practitioners create, perceive and treat the meaningful things involved in their activities, and aid designers, devel

All Domain Operations (ADO) is the evolution of the joint concept of the United States military that addresses strategic adversaries who look to leverage the emerging character of warfare to disrupt and overcome American efforts upon an increasingly complex and global battlefield. ADO as a concept is important because it at once recognizes the complexity of the operational environment and how adversaries intend to achieve strategic advantage within it. The concept describes how the US Army can enable the Joint Force and prevent, deny, and exploit adversaries while consolidating gains. Continued development of the ADO concept is crucial as the operational environment emerges and the US Army seeks to gain and maintain enduring advantages into the future. Wargaming continues to serve as an essential function and tool for military organizations. Wargames simulate processes and consequences based off players' decisions with varying degrees of reality and abstraction. Wargame theory is critical to leader development and the US Army because it supplies a process from which critical decision-making is reduced through abstract mechanics into an iterative process that enables the exploration of failure and rewards learning to make more appropriate decisions. Wargaming is a crucial element towards testing the concepts of ADO as well as training and educating leaders into the future. Key to ADO is developing the capacity to understanding the concept and the operational environment. Wargaming ADO allows leaders and military theorists to learn and explore the operational environment including adversary versus US and allied capabilities across operational context. Designing a wargame regarding the operational concept of ADO creates a framework within which leaders can practice planning, execution, and reflect upon the key elements. This monograph proposes a proof of concept Theatrum Belli for future leader development through education and training that focuses on the Army's opera

The destruction and social upheaval of the U.S. Civil War did not end with the laying down of arms at Appomattox, but instead continued for the next 11 years, a period known as Reconstruction, as Americans of different classes, backgrounds, and origins struggled to achieve competing visions of what a more perfect union would look like. For many Northerners, this meant the increased economic integration of the South into the North. For the Planter-class of the former Confederacy, this took the form a return to slavery by other means. Between these two forces stood the Freedmen; men and women who had retaken their freedom through force, and sought to establish for themselves a future in the only home most of them had ever known. Of these three visions, the Jim Crow future engineered by Southern elites would come to dominate not only the rebel states of the Confederacy, but would affect the culture of the United States as a whole, laying the groundwork for both the Civil Rights protests of the 1960s and the racial inequalities that continue to afflict our nation today. This simulation, and the paper that accompanies it, seeks not to explain why one man would choose to subjugate another, but to show how, by raising the cost of Reconstruction and occupation beyond what the North was willing to pay, the strategic goals the Confederacy was unable to achieve by force of arms, their decedents were able to take through patience, economics, culture, and terror. This thesis tells the story of counterinsurgencies and asymmetric wars: a disenfranchised elite, a newly empowered ethnic group, an occupying military power, and the violence and chaos of economic upheaval. By modeling the chaos and asymmetry of the Reconstruction era as a four-player wargame, this game will allow players to understand the decisions, resources, and constraints of major factions following the end of the Civil War, and encourage them to both understand the context of America's historical execution of asym

This thesis and wargame addresses the question "Can the use of air capabilities in Romanian mountainous terrain be effectively represented in a competitive wargame to train the Romanian mountain brigade officers and battle staff on airmobile mountain operations?" The Romanian Land Forces lacks an understanding for the planning and conduct of helicopter-supported operations within its borders because of the absence of military publications and manuals regarding airmobile operations. The desired outcome of this wargame is to provide the brigade officers and battle staff a better understanding of the military environment. Through the use of this wargame, the brigade planners will understand how to use the air capabilities in mountain operations, what the limitations are, and what factors should be taken into consideration while planning airmobile operations in mountainous terrain. By playing and analyzing many serious wargames, appropriate mechanics were identified and used to create the Carpathians' Eagles wargame, using the traditional wargaming formula of space, time, assets, and resolution.

Ides of War: War Machines of World War II is a competitive wargame designed to foster training and develop scenarios for force management professionals to enhance technology adaption to the changing battlefield environment. This wargame models strategic-level resource gathering and transformation to components of a national economy, and an operational-level view of the program management and theater commander perspectives on technology applications to the battlefield. After gathering resources, the player utilizes elements of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policies (DOTMLPF-P) force management process to develop and test simulated warfighting technologies in combat simulations on WW II's Axis-Soviet front. Hence, this wargame seeks to demonstrate a series of program management decisions that build and test implications of new technologies on simulated units and the battlespace in order to demonstrate the quality versus quantity of forces.

Motorcade Showdown is a wargame modeling motorcade operations in order to teach the fundamentals of the protection and disruption of motorcade movements. In this game, players can experience motorcade operations from the perspective of both the protection cell and also the disruption cell. It exercises the players' ability to make accurate decisions to facilitate delivering the principal safely to the venue, and aids in learning the cause and effect relationship of planning routes incorrectly, failing to anticipate potential threats, and reacting inappropriately to obstacles or dangers. It enhances an individual's critical decision-making abilities concerning basic motorcade skills, and understanding of adversary operations, in order to prevent incorrect choices during the conduct of motorcade operations.

This competitive wargame will examine the fundamentals necessary for a planner to provide critical information to the commander and demonstrate the complexity of gaining understanding of an unknown environment. This wargame will focus on tactics relevant for army aviation reconnaissance and security missions. The use of this simulation will allow the user to develop a strategy to conduct reconnaissance on specific intelligence requirements and follow the chain to decision points made by the commander. Through the use of this wargame, aviation officers assigned to an aviation reconnaissance squadron may gain greater appreciation of tactics in ATP 3-04.1.

This wargame thesis seeks to answer the question: "Can the employment of chemical weapons be effectively represented to illustrate its impact on maneuver in large-scale combat operations in a competitive wargame set in a scenario from World War One?" The United States has not effectively experienced chemical warfare since World War One, but the threat heightens in the context of large-scale combat. The 2nd Battle of the Marne on the western front from around 14 July 1918 to 6 August 1918 is an optimal scenario for a wargame because it features peer level adversaries employing chemical warfare on a large scale to support maneuver operations. Research and experimentation with various existing wargames and models inspired the development of mechanics and key aspects of the wargame that create a functional, playable, and adaptable simulation. The wargame's foundation is based on historical research on the 2nd Battle of the Marne and data on German and American capabilities in 1918 during World War One. The author selected key aspects of the historical data based on warfighting functions, applied gaming mechanics, and adjusted balancing in order to create a competitive wargame.

The British campaign to capture the French fortress city of Quebec in 1759 led to the decisive battle of the French and Indian War, and paved the way for British domination of North America for the next twenty years. While the ultimate battle on the Plains of Abraham is known to most scholars, the campaign along the St. Lawrence River that led up to the battle provides many lessons of operational level leadership that are still relevant today: maneuvering forces and securing lines of operation, integrating land and naval forces in joint operations, massing forces at the decisive point, simultaneity in operations, and the strategic use of key terrain. This paper provides the historical basis and rationale for the modeling decisions made by the researcher in the development of this wargame. Players will take on the roles of the Army Commanders, both learning the historical details of the campaign, and immersing players in the commanders' decision making process. The wargame enables players to make decisions consistent with the information and capabilities available to the commanders during the campaign, and thereby allows them to gain an understanding as to why the campaign unfolded the way it did.

This wargame thesis seeks to answer the question: "Can Air and Missile Defense (AMD) concepts be effectively modeled to educate junior Air Defense Artillery (ADA) officers and senior non-air defense officers on the basic employment of AMD and its cost trade-offs in a competitive wargame?" Many wargames focus heavily on air to air combat or air support of ground units, but few focus on air and missile defense beyond the most abstract level. Joint and Army design and mission planning concepts informed game structure and goals while AMD doctrine provided guidelines for tactical decisions. Research into a variety of different games provided mechanics and elements that enabled these concepts to be woven together to support 14A individual critical tasks using the Time-Space-Assets-Resolution (TSAR) model. Research using open source intelligence, such as Jane's Defense, informed threat data and modeling. This wargame enhances understanding though a God's eye view of the air environment to demonstrate AMD concepts at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

This thesis and wargame addresses the strategic and operational aspects, and importance concerning logistics during the American Civil War by focusing on the Western Theater of 1862. Through the use of a qualitative discussion format, logistics and resources are highlighted through several characteristics such as the significance of railroads, rivers, and roads to transport troops and supplies, supply production, troop recruitment, value of proper planning and execution of supplies, and contracting services. Although the thesis and subsequent wargame are modeled from events that took place over a hundred years ago, the value of understanding the significance of logistics during war transcends to our current operating environment. The Time, Space, Assets, and Resolution (TSAR) model was used to capture the essential elements that make up a wargame. Furthermore, extensive research using numerous publications and playing classic and modern wargames was conducted to ensure historical elements and suitable mechanics were developed to ensure the intent of the educational outcome of the wargame was at the forefront of the project.

As the Army transitions from a seventeen-year focus on stability operations, the majority of leaders at the tactical level lack experience operating in a high intensity conflict environment. Realistically, no U.S. service member has experienced peer-level conflict lasting more than a few days since the Korean War in 1950-1951. When analyzing Combat Training Center (CTC) observations over the past decades, a common trend arises: tactical leaders and staffs struggle to make rapid tactical decisions and maximizing the effects of warfighting function integration, directly impacting success or failure at the CTCs. Through the use of a tabletop wargame simulation, this thesis develops an easily-distributed, adaptable, and rapid method to develop leaders' abilities in tactical decision making and warfighting function integration. Titled The Box, this simulation is a turn-based, hex-mapped, brigade-level, peer-capable, force-on-force tactical wargame where players assume the role of a brigade commander and staff at the National Training Center. Players must use their knowledge of tactical maneuver, planning factors, and warfighting function enablers to achieve victory. The Box seeks to be a method through which a leader can develop organizations in preparation for future training events or combat deployments.

In 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work committed the Department of Defense (DOD) to overhaul its approach to wargaming in order to reinvigorate innovation across the DOD, including a five-year target to use wargames to improve operational planning. This monograph explores the causes of wargaming failures and proposes recommendations for successful wargames. Does doctrine provide sufficient guidance, striking the appropriate balance between prescriptive and descriptive guidance? This monograph postulates that wargaming theory—including game element analysis and wargame pathologies—provides an excellent rubric for creating and evaluating wargames and wargaming doctrine, that doctrine and practice diverge from wargame theory, and that current doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance. The theory—history—doctrine approach of this monograph is intended for military planners, doctrine authors, and wargaming professionals. Wargames are a useful tool to assess plans as directed in operational planning processes; however, commanders and staffs should neither equate wargame victory with wargame success, nor consider either as "validation" of a given plan. There are ten elements of wargame design: objectives, scenario, database, models, rules and procedures, infrastructure, participants, analysis, culture and environment, and audiences. These elements provide a framework for creating wargames, and analyzing wargames and their failure modes (known as pathologies). By evaluating Japan's Midway campaign plan through the theories of game element analysis and wargame pathologies, this monograph creates greater understanding of those theories and provides recommendations for doctrine. Pathologies exhibited by Japanese planners include those related to wargame objectives, scenario, database, model, participants, and culture; genuine testing of the Operation MI plan appears to have been impossible. Wargame officials twice rejected inconvenient outcomes, undermining the c

In 1996 the United States Army established the Army After Next (AAN) project. This project is tasked with the development of a military force capable of decisively nullifying any major military competitor. The cornerstone the AAN's strategic deployment and tactical maneuver capability is the air-mechanized formation. The air-mechanized formation will be able to strategically deploy from the United States to the theater of operations in less time than current modern military airlift, and immediately establishing a dominant military force. Essential to the development of the AAN concept is the analysis of its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. As the Army proceeds with the analysis of the air-mechanized formation concept, the identification of viable threat weapons is essential to the development of realistic and challenging wargaming models. In wargaming models, teams working as the enemy force have effectively used various weapons to defeat the air-mechanized formation. Among the weapons used, the man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) has proven to be an integral part of the enemy force defense while every air defense system offers substantial advantages and capabilities to ground commander, MANPADS are the distinctive weapon for use against the AAFs of the air-mechanized formation. Nations will spend a great deal of resources to develop ways of defeating the United States future military force. As part of our efforts to make the concept viable and effective, the determination of weapon systems that can be effective against the force must be used in every modeling and wargaming for proper analysis.

This monograph investigates the suitability of the Wass de Czege Combat Power Model as a framework for thought in which the military decision-making process--specifically the critical steps of wargaming--can occur at the tactical level of war. The model can assist the decision-maker in understanding how to apply combat power, and it can further function as an analytical tool, especially in time-constrained situations. The monograph first discusses the historical development of the estimate process, leading to what is currently used in the US Army today. Included in this is a discussion of when the concept of wargaming first appeared in doctrine and how the wargaming methodology evolved to its present format. A description of the military decision-making process in use today follows, with emphasis on its inadequacies in time-critical situations at the lower tactical levels of warfighting. Next is a description of the recognition-primed decision-making theory developed by Gary A. Klein and associates and how this theory accurately delineates the process by which decision-makers, especially military leaders, make and assess decisions. Following this is an explanation of the Wass de Czege combat power model and its suitability as a framework for thought in which recognition-primed decision-making can occur. To demonstrate the utility of this method of thought and analysis, the combat power model is then applied to a tactical situation involving a battalion task force. The monograph concludes that the US Army decision-making process is ideal for long-range planning and situations where time is not a critical factor. Recommended methods of wargaming described in our doctrine and instructional manuals require too much detail and are generally unable to accommodate rapid changes on the battlefield. Furthermore, they do not account for the largely intuitive nature of the process, particularly at the tactical level of warfighting. Training in the US Army, therefore, needs to

"The value of the War Game is well known and appreciated, yet each day we see attempts at its practice abandoned when just begun. This is surprising in view of the many fine works by means of which the exercise has been in many places made a great success. The question naturally suggests itself as to why this partial failure exists…" Subjects in this document include titles such as "manner of conducting an exercise", "general and special situations", "beginning of the exercise", "contact of the opposing artillery", and actions and attacks at Warsaw, etc.

This monograph analyzes the manual wargaming portion of the U.S. Army's decision-making cycle in order to determine if the process deduces the optimum course of action. The monograph begins by examining game theory, which is the theoretical basis for wargaming. This examination establishes that game theory provides two theoretical models for decision-making, one based upon enemy capabilities and the other on enemy intentions. The analysis continues by examining the historical development of wargaming and its incorporation as a decision-making tool. Using theory-based criteria, the monograph reviews current American, German, British, and Soviet war gaming methods at the division level. The three criteria analyze how well a methodology provides a rational opponent, considers friendly and enemy intentions, and uses rational control or rules. The monograph concludes that the current U.S. wargaming method does not give us the optimum solution, largely because it is difficult to discover enemy intentions before a decision is made by the friendly commander. If a friendly commander knew what the enemy's intentions were, he would choose the appropriate course of action to counter it. However, since the commander can only base his decision on enemy capabilities--or what his enemy can (vice will) do--his course of action choice becomes merely a 'best guess.' The monograph then suggests remedies to bring us closer to an optimum course of action.

The US Army's training for staff officers has consistently been identified as one of the major factors for US military success over the last century. As technology has improved the Army has sought to replicate many facets of this training with computer simulations. While the use of automation yields benefits as the force utilizes technology in real world operations, developing technological based systems has potential drawbacks that other training methods may alleviate. Traditional manual simulations, utilizing analog technology as simple as paper and maps, offer training benefits that have been neglected in the push towards automation. As budgets in the near future continue to shrink these alternative methods offer the potential to achieve the Army's stated goals of producing adaptable and flexible leaders and units at a fraction of the cost, particularly at the Brigade level.

As a result of the growing capabilities of computers, the Army has used wargaming increasingly for training and education activities, force planning, doctrine development, acquisition and cost analysis, operational test and evaluation, and campaign development. The intent of this monograph was to determine if commercial wargame simulations could be used to develop the organizational leadership abilities of Army officers. The initial step in this process selected commercial wargame simulations to evaluate for their ability to develop organizational leaders. Chapter two of this monograph discusses the history of simulations, the simulation selection process, and provides an overview of the simulations selected. This monograph then evaluated each simulation’s ability to develop the four organizational leadership skills (interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical) and to perform the three organizational leadership actions (influencing, operating, and improving) described and required by Army doctrine. The final chapter of this monograph concluded with a recommendation to use commercial simulations for developing organizational leadership skills, and suggested some commercial wargame simulations for future evaluation and possible integration into leadership training plans. This study suggests, from the ability of the small sample analyzed to meet the criteria, that it may be possible to the Army to use commercial simulations to help develop organizational leader skills and actions at a reduced cost.

After the 11 September 2001 surprise attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by al Qaida terrorists, planners from all over the US Army were tasked to join an Army planning team to develop the Army’s Strategic Campaign Plan (ASCP) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) formed the team around officers from the office entitled DAMO-SS and other officers displaced from the Pentagon due to the damage caused by the terrorist attack. Three School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Fellows based out of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas were part of this team. The purpose of the ASCP was to permit the Army to quickly begin planning and to provide direction for the Army to meet its obligations under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The Army needed to quickly transition from a peace time to a war time status and be prepared to rapidly respond to directions from the highest levels of the nation, the Joint Staff, and the warfighting CINCs. The ASCP in its final form established the basis for the rapid transition from peace to war. This monograph discusses the challenges of planning at the strategic level of war, the techniques used to address those challenges, and the lessons learned experienced by the SAMS Fellows. This study covers the challenges the Army planning team faced and addresses: assembling the planning team; determining the campaign plan design; using assumption based planning and the Wedemeyer method; developing the plan using the elements of operational design; wargaming; and writing the actual ASCP. The paper also covers the lessons learned during the process of writing the ASCP from a planner’s perspective. These lessons learned include insights on assumption based planning, the roles of a planner, and some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The monograph addresses conclusions on the development and writing of the ASCP. The final product was presented to the Chief of Staff of the Army 6 weeks a

This monograph analyzes the military decision making process in terms of time management in order to determine if a timeline will expedite the process. The monograph begins by establishing the importance of time and time management in planning. This section provides a general discussion of time, an explanation of the Army's 1/3 - 2/3 rule, and a synopsis of the deficiencies and recommendations for improvement of units' execution of the military decision making process during rotations to the National Training Centers. Next an analysis is made of how the US Army's current publications address time. The documents reviewed include FM 100-5, FM 101-5, FC 71-6, FC 101-55, FC 71-100, FM 71-100, and ST 100-9. The purpose of the next section is to examine how the British, Germans, and Russians manage time as part of their military decision making process. Finally a timeline for the brigade military decision making process is proposed as a technique to manage time. This timeline has been undergoing field testing since 1988 and has been reviewed by numerous agencies and individuals. The monograph concludes with the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing a timeline. The end result is that the advantages of a timeline far outweigh the disadvantages. Over 70% of the rotations to the National Training Centers in Fort Irwin, California and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas fail to manage time. A technique must be developed to assist the units in accomplishing their missions in a timely manner. Perhaps using some of the techniques that other armies use will facilitate time management. The timeline presented for the combat arms brigade military decision making process is a technique that worked for one brigade, but as a minimum it can be used a base to design unit specific timelines, and possible applications at battalion and division.

This monograph explains the ability of the military decision-making process to inform the decision-maker in the current operational environment. A comparison of the operational environment, as envisioned through the U.S. Army’s doctrine, before and after the end of the Cold War establishes the framework by which commanders makes decisions. Moreover this comparison highlights the critical changes in that environment that the MDMP has yet to account for. Next, an analysis of naturalistic decision-making theory provides insight into how commanders inform the decisions they make. Subsequently, the military decision-making process (MDMP) is analyzed to determine the advantages and disadvantages of the process as compared to the current operational environment and the way experienced commanders naturally make decisions. This analysis establishes the logical evolutionary steps the MDMP must make in order to be a viable decision-making process in the current operational environment The fundamental dilemmas of decision-making within the U.S. Army are five fold. First, there currently is little experience within the U.S. Army at the operational level. Yet, since the end of the cold war the U.S. Army is increasingly becoming involved at the operational level of war, as the shift in focus of the Army’s doctrine indicates. Second, Joint Doctrine does not prescribe a methodology for decision-making that is fundamentally different from the tactical MDMP contained in U.S. Army doctrine. Because of the deficiency in Joint Doctrine it is logical that a U.S. Army planner, for example, operating in a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters will utilize the only decision-making process that the planner is familiar with—the MDMP. Yet the MDMP is a tactical process. Third, the MDMP was a tactical decision-making process designed for the pre-cold war, tactical U.S. Army. However, the post-Cold War environment is more focused on the operational level. Fourth the MDMP was potentially time-consum

This monograph discusses the importance of the commander and staff wargaming together. Wargaming is a critical visualization event where the participants develop detailed images of the operation. Wargaming allows the commander and staff to build a common vision and understanding of battle. The monograph first describes the historical development of wargaming. Included is a brief background of the estimate process and the roots of Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Wargaming is traced from the early uses by the Prussian Army to its late introduction in United States Army doctrine. Following this description is an explanation of battle command and its critical dynamic of visualization. Visualization tasks required during the MDMP are discussed. FM 101-5 (1984) and the subsequent drafts are examined to determine the current and proposed doctrine for wargaming. Each document is reviewed for relevant changes to the Military Decision-making Process (MDMP), and wargaming procedures. The role of the commander is investigated in detail. This examination is followed with an analysis of the adequacy of wargaming doctrine to facilitate the development of a common vision between the commander and staff. The monograph concludes that the wargaming doctrine delineated in FM 101-5 does not support the development of common vision. The current FM 101-5 (1984) is outdated and does not incorporate the integrated operations of the staff. Draft manuals (1993 and 1996) have shifted the primary responsibility of wargaming to the staff. Responsibilities and roles are not described for the commander. Consequently, commanders rarely wargame with the staff. Common vision can not be produced without the commander and staff wargaming together.

This monograph presents a methodology to help tactical battle staffs estimate ground force combat power, and consists of three major products. First, pre-calculated “combat potential scores” (CPS) for different friendly and threat units are provided, so that staff officers can determine force ratios based upon the friendly task organization and the enemy order of battle. Second, the “weapon values” (WV) and “category weights” (CW) which were used to develop the CPS values are included. With these, staff officers can modify CPS values as desired and develop values for unique units. Finally, the study addresses ways to use the CPS values during planning (war gaming) and while monitoring tactical operations. The methodology is a variation of the “Weapons Effectiveness Indices/Weighted Unit Value (WEI/WUV) approach. It is a relatively simple static measurement of combat power, yet has sufficient detail to permit differentiation among units at the tactical level. It avoids the complexity of other, more dynamic approaches discussed in the monograph; conversely, it is more detailed than the overly-broad method currently taught at the US Army Command and General Staff College. It does not give a comprehensive measurement of combat power, but merely intends to provide a quantitative starting point to estimate relative force ratios. The text provides an overview of the model and its applications, together with discussion of other models and the field in general. The two appendices are stand-alone sections with the requisite instructions and data for their usage; these are the only portions of the monograph necessary for its practical application.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the capabilities of commercial computer wargames and determine if the Army can use them to train its leaders. The study is intended for all Army leaders, from team leader through joint task force commander, interested in training tools to supplement the existing training methods in the Army. There are several problems inhibiting the training of the Army’s leadership. The first problem is finite resources such as personnel, training dollars, land, and ammunition. Second is a high operational deployment tempo that reduces the available training time. Third is an increased rotation of leaders within units lowering the level of experience of leaders. Finally, restrictions on training with certain weapon systems and ammunition at their operational ranges causes soldiers to ignore the realities of combat. The results are less experienced leaders incapable of dealing with the complexities particular to the Army. This monograph examines the question: can commercial computer wargames increase the experience level and decision making abilities of Army leaders? Additionally, the monograph looks at three secondary questions. How can the Army use computer wargames to increase experience and decision making? Why should the Army use computer wargames? Finally, what are the benefits of computer wargames for the Army? This monograph shows the computer wargame used consistently by army leaders can increase experience and decision making skills. Like any training, computer wargames must be used repetitively to achieve results. Commercial computer wargames are available now. The software industry produces a wide variety of wargames enabling leaders to focus on the level of war that suits rank and position. The costs of computer wargames are negligible. The army could purchase site license from the software industry for wide distribution or units could locally purchase the games. The bottom line is, using commercial computer wargames to develo

This monograph examines the relationship between battlefield synchronization and decision-making. Beginning with a review of rational analytical decision theory and Gary Klein’s recognition primed decision theory, the monograph reviews the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to determine if the MDMP and its resultant products are sufficient to achieve and maintain synchronization of the effects of distributed operations. In addition to the detailed review of the MDMP, this monograph considers the relationship between complexity, uncertainty, and synchronization. Klein’s recognition primed decision-making (RPD) theory, based on extensive study of fire fighters, emergency medical service workers, and military commanders describes the intuitive manner which experienced people most frequently use to solve problems. RPD is a rapid process that foregoes extensive analysis to generate feasible solutions. When employing RPD techniques, decision-makers filter environmental cues and create a solution hypothesis using an analogy or a metaphor. This hypothesis is then tested using mental simulation to ensure it is acceptable. RPD is very effective when the decision-maker has substantial expertise in solving the type of problem at hand, however it is adversely affected by uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. RPD seeks satisfactory, rather than optimal, solutions. Rational analysis is a common alternative to RPD, seeking optimal solutions through deliberate, detailed analysis. Rational analysis provides the theoretical underpinnings of the MDMP. Rational analysis is a linear procedures used to solve complex, interdisciplinary problems that exceed the expertise of any single decisionmaker. Rational analysis is a time consuming process because of the sequential nature of analysis and decision. Because it is a group process it is vulnerable to errors of miscommunication and misperception. However, rational analysis and RPD are complementary approaches to problem solving becaus

This monograph examines whether or not a Division Operations Order (OPORD) Training Program would improve task force synchronization in a resource constrained environment. Using doctrinal analysis, historical examples, and current data collected from the National Training Center (NTC) take-home packages, the study focuses on the failure of task forces to synchronize operations. Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, the NTC has identified numerous shortcomings in Mission Analysis, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), wargaming, and rehearsals. Combining these activities, synchronization was deficient in over 75% of the missions observed. The monograph begins with the importance of synchronized combat operations. This section highlights significant NTC synchronization deficiencies and reviews observer-controller (OC) recommendations for task force improvement. Secondly, the monograph reviews the purpose and importance of synchronization as expressed in current US Army publications. The next section examines selected US Army division’s training guidance to determine if the divisions assist in training task force synchronization. The monograph then proposes a Division OPORD Training Program (DOTP) designed to evaluate and train task force synchronization. The DOTP is a monthly program for selected units to train the OPORD process from division to company level. The DOTP's function is to assess subordinate level synchronization in terms of troop leading procedures, flow of commander's intent, staff integration, quality of OPORDs, and time management. Moreover, company execution is assessed to evaluate the results of a synchronized plan. The monograph concludes with the advantages of such a program outweighing the disadvantages. With current resource cutbacks and poor NTC results, the Army needs a cost effective means of training task force synchronization. The Division OPORD Training Program serves this need by using the division staff as competent OCs w

This study establishes a base analysis for the determination of a method for wargaming both tactical and operational level courses of action. It orients on situations involving a compression of available time in which to decide on and execute the course of action. The study establishes the US Army estimate process as a base method for review and comparison. A review of the historical development of decision making is included, as well as a look at the process used within other armies. The author studies the Airland Battle doctrine, and the Corps' role as part of the doctrine. This includes a review of the three levels of war--Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. After describing the estimate process itself, and analyzing the "wargaming paragraphs" of the process, the author then presents other methods of wargaming. Studied and analyzed are models available to the decision maker that reflect varying degrees of comprehensiveness and force orientation. To provide a "picture" of wargaming a corps fight on tomorrow's battlefield, a notional corps in a fictitious battle scenario is presented, with a discussion from the corps commander's perspective. The METT-T method is used as a descriptive vehicle. By comparing all of the discussed models against six criteria for wargaming, an analysis is made of each method. Criteria used are: staff integration; mental visualization; timeliness; use of significant combat factors; constant and continuous process; and continuing application. The analysis reveals that although no set method of wargaming can be prescribed, a corps level decision maker has certain factors of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available, and Time (METT-T) that will be considered.

This study investigates the necessity of an abbreviated military decision-making process for battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs. It examines the problem that during time critical situations commanders and staffs abbreviate the decision-making process and frequently deviate from the doctrinal method. The result is often incomplete and ineffective plans that do not accomplish the mission. The study researches doctrinal and nondoctrinal publications to determine if an abbreviated process exists and compares the doctrinal process to unit performance at the National Training Center. It identifies that doctrine for decision-making is not standardized, with different methods described depending on the field manual. However, even with different methods, some portions of the decision making process are not addressed in sufficient detail to enable commanders and staffs to make rapid decisions. The study identifies the steps of the military decision-making process that are omitted or poorly conducted and provides techniques to solve the problem. It then promotes the use of the military decision-making process, even during time critical situation by abbreviating the process with techniques to speed the process.

This analysis examines the validity of using miniature wargaming to study the American Civil War. The analysis specifically examines the miniature wargame rules, STARS*N*BARS III. The goal is to determine whether Civil War combat can be accurately simulated with miniature wargaming. The study first examines the simulation's rule mechanics to determine their historical soundness. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery combat are each examined in three sections: unit organization, maneuver, and firepower. Each section is subdivided into three areas for analysis: First, an overview of how the section is simulated; Second, an historical overview of the section; and, finally, a determination of historical accuracy. The rules are then applied in simulating two historical Civil War battles. The battle of New Market is gamed as a controlled reenactment the results of which are compared against the actual battle. The battle of Cedar Mountain is executed as a free-flowing wargame to evaluate historicity. The overall conclusion of the study is that, although not exact, acceptable accuracy can be achieved in simulating Civil War combat. Wargaming can be used to study history. In historical simulations, gaming and history complement each other in building a more complete understanding of the period's warfare.

As the military scrutinizes and downsizes training budgets, the number of simulations for training, modeling, research, and education in the U.S. military continues to expand. The military endeavors to integrate these simulations into the military training life cycle, seeing them as essential for meeting military missions and goals in this era of reduced budgets, new military equipment, and strategies. There is little research on capitalizing on the commercial market’s research and development for simulations. This study looks at one commercial simulation with a comparative analysis for the study of military history. Although this study just scratches the surface of the potential to tap into this great resource, it recognizes the limitations of current commercial simulations and the balance required in their use for historical analysis. This military history review focus is on the operational command level decisions of Operation Crusader. Operation Crusader was the desert clash between the German task force led by General Rommel and the Allied task force led by British General Auchinleck in November of 1941, using The Operational Art of War, a war game published by Talonsoft (1998). This study looks at the commercial game’s use to educate military leaders to a critical analysis of examining possible command-level decisions. This study addresses this by using seven officers from different branches (infantry, armor, intelligence, engineer, aviation, quartermaster, and field artillery) who have never played The Operational Art of War, and an analysis of their experience playing the game.

This Basic Plan contains the statement of the problem presented for solution in the Army and Navy Joint Exercises of 1925, the first estimate of the situation by the Commanding General of the Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, an outline of the Staff organiztion, actual and constructive, a general statement of the actual personnel taking part and the method of representation of the Constructive Force, and outline of the operations contemplated, and sections on supply, evacuation and hospitalization, and on intelligence and reconnaissance.