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Traversing philosophy and the human sciences, literature, cinema, and the visual arts, this book maps out a history where all is chaos, maelstrom, and fog.If perception and language objectivate the world, if imagination structures it, if knowledge orders it, then how can we describe, name, or even apprehend that which comes to pass when language is absent, when perception vacillates, and when knowledge eludes us? How can we say, show, or make known that which undermines and refutes the order of things, the supposedly immutable real, and the administration of the sensible?This book takes us on a quest that traverses philosophy and the human sciences, but also literature, cinema, and the visual arts. Not content with analysing the ordering power of our representations, in The Infra-World François J. Bonnet also interrogates the works of artists who have experienced and experimented with those moments when they crack open, giving way to anguish and vertigo.If perception is a sieve, what can be said of that which slips through its net, how does one speak of what escapes? What remains of unqualified perceptions, of vanishing sensations? Where do the indescribable, nocturnal fears hide, the horrors lurking behind closed eyes? What of the world beneath language and objectivated sensation? What of the infra-world?

Nous vivons aujourd'hui dans une civilisation de l'image, on pourrait même dire de la dictature de l'image, fixe ou animée. Alors que ce qui a constitué l'humanité depuis presque ses origines ce sont les mots. Isabelle Guyon nous invite à partir à la redécouverte de notre relation à la langue, aux mots. Cherchant à comprendre cette puissance du Verbe et son influence sur nous, elle interroge d'une façon sensible, d'anecdotes en réflexions, notre rapport à ces mots que nous partageons.

Hartung works out both the linguistic and philosophy of language setting as well as socio-political and cultural implications of the radical critique of language developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by philosophers as diverse as Steinthal, Cohen, Simmel or Cassirer. He argues that the theories pleaded for a plurality of linguistic and cultural forms as well as for a new logic beyond the traditional nature/culture partition.

The works of Heidegger are perhaps the most influential in contemporary philosophy, yet they are not only least readily understood, but even what ‘understanding'means in this context is usually overlooked. This book addresses Heidegger's dense prose seeking an understanding of ‘language'which leads to a journey that allows the emergence of the terrain revealed when travelling with the philosopher. This book offers an experience of walking with Heidegger when considering ‘language', but refuses a conceptual analysis of the text. As such, it offers a profound experience, and yet refuses to reduce Heidegger's texts to simple formulae. The texts used include Heidegger's magnum opus, Being and Time, and many of his essays and lectures, as well as drawing on the writings of other thinkers.

A novel theoretical framework for an embodied, non-representational approach to language that extends and deepens enactive theory, bridging the gap between sensorimotor skills and language.Linguistic Bodies offers a fully embodied and fully social treatment of human language without positing mental representations. The authors present the first coherent, overarching theory that connects dynamical explanations of action and perception with language. Arguing from the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, they show that this continuity extends to language. Expanding and deepening enactive theory, they offer a constitutive account of language and the co-emergent phenomena of personhood, reflexivity, social normativity, and ideality. Language, they argue, is not something we add to a range of existing cognitive capacities but a new way of being embodied. Each of us is a linguistic body in a community of other linguistic bodies. The book describes three distinct yet entangled kinds of human embodiment, organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective; it traces the emergence of linguistic sensitivities and introduces the novel concept of linguistic bodies; and it explores the implications of living as linguistic bodies in perpetual becoming, applying the concept of linguistic bodies to questions of language acquisition, parenting, autism, grammar, symbol, narrative, and gesture, and to such ethical concerns as microaggression, institutional speech, and pedagogy.

Klug, ungeheuer kenntnisreich und voller Witz vermittelt Deutscher die neuesten Erkenntnisse der Linguistik. Er beschreibt, wie unsere alltäglichsten Gewohnheiten die eindrucksvollsten Sprachstrukturen hervor- und auch wieder zu Fall bringen. Und nebenbei beantwortet er in diesem Buch auch noch Fragen wie: Warum haben die meisten Sprachen kein Verb für «haben»? Warum sagte Luther «schlecht», wenn er doch das Gegenteil meinte? Und warum scheinen Türken rückwärts zu sprechen? Guy Deutschers Geschichte der Sprache beginnt mit einem Paradox: «Die Sprache ist die größte Erfindung der Menschheit – obwohl sie natürlich nie erfunden wurde.» Keine Sprachkommission, kein Ältestenrat des antiken Rom hat irgendwann die ausgeklügelte lateinische Grammatik entworfen, und auch von der Möglichkeit göttlicher Eingebung möchten wir einmal absehen. Aber wie kamen wir dann weg vom Niveau steinzeitlicher Äußerungen und zu den komplexen Sprachen der Antike und Gegenwart? Guy Deutscher zeigt anhand zahlreicher Beispiele, wie die differenzierten Grammatiken, enormen Vokabularien und komplexen Bedeutungszusammenhänge von heute entstehen konnten.

Ce volume recueille une série de travaux de figures notoires de la pensée russe, comme Roman Jakobson, Petr Savickij et Nicolas Troubetzkoy, qui ont marqué un seuil épistémologique dans l'histoire du structuralisme en général et de la linguistique structurale en particulier. Publiés initialement au début des années 1920 et 1930, à Berlin, à Prague et enfin à Paris, ces travaux forment un véritable mouvement intellectuel dont nous voudrions mettre en évidence la portée philosophique, mais également les enjeux politiques. Nous espérons ainsi contribuer à rendre possible une autre histoire du structuralisme linguistique qui en ne se limitant pas à répertorier les idées de la langue conçues par les linguistes, puisse mettre en lumière les conditions épistémologiques permettant de construire la connaissance linguistique comme savoir structural des langues dans leur fonction sociale et historique.

In Natural Language and Possible Minds: How Language Uncovers the Cognitive Landscape of Nature Prakash Mondal attempts to demonstrate that language can reveal the hidden logical texture of diverse types of mentality in non-humans, contrary to popular belief. The widely held assumption in mainstream cognitive science is that language being humanly unique introduces an anthropomorphic bias in investigations into the nature of other possible minds. This book turns this around by formulating a lattice of mental structures distilled from linguistic structures constituting the cognitive building blocks of an ensemble of biological entities/beings. This turns out to have surprising consequences for machine cognition as well. Challenging mainstream views, this book will appeal to cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, linguists and also cognitive ethologists.

How is it that sounds from the mouth or marks on a page—which by themselves are nothing like things or events in the world—can be world-disclosive in an automatic manner? In this fascinating and important book, Lawrence J. Hatab presents a new vocabulary for Heidegger's early phenomenology of being-in-the-world and applies it to the question of language. He takes language to be a mode of dwelling, in which there is an immediate, direct disclosure of meanings, and sketches an extensive picture of proto-phenomenology, how it revises the posture of philosophy, and how this posture applies to the nature of language. Representational theories are not rejected but subordinated to a presentational account of immediate disclosure in concrete embodied life. The book critically addresses standard theories of language, such that typical questions in the philosophy of language are revised in a manner that avoids binary separations of language and world, speech and cognition, theory and practise, realism and idealism, internalism and externalism.

“Providing up-to-date, in-depth coverage of the central question, and written and edited by some of the foremost practitioners in the field, this timely new edition will no doubt be a go-to reference for anyone with a serious interest in the philosophy of language.” Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Stockholm University Now published in two volumes, the second edition of the best-selling Companion to the Philosophy of Language provides a complete survey of contemporary philosophy of language. The Companion has been greatly extended and now includes a monumental 17 new essays – with topics chosen by the editors, who curated suggestions from current contributors – and almost all of the 25 original chapters have been updated to take account of recent developments in the field. In addition to providing a synoptic view of the key issues, figures, concepts, and debates, each essay introduces new and original contributions to ongoing debates, as well as addressing a number of new areas of interest, including two-dimensional semantics, modality and epistemic modals, and semantic relationism. The extended “state-of-the-art” chapter format allows the authors, all of whom are internationally eminent scholars in the field, to incorporate original research to a far greater degree than competitor volumes. Unrivaled in scope, this volume represents the best contemporary critical thinking relating to the philosophy of language.

This volume offers recent developments in pragmatics and adjacent territories of investigation, including important new concepts such as the pragmatic act and the pragmeme, and combines developments in neighboring disciplines in an integrative holistic pragmatic approach. The young science of pragmatics has, from its inception, differentiated itself from neighboring fields in the humanities, especially the disciplines dealing with language and those focusing on the social and anthropological aspects of human behavior, by focusing on the language user in his or her societal environment.This collection of papers continues that emphasis on language use, and pragmatic acts in their context. The editors and contributors share a perspective that essentially considers language as a system for communication and wants to look at language from a societal perspective, and accept the view that acts of interpretation are essentially embedded in culture. In an interdisciplinary approach, some authors explore connections with social theory, in particular sociology or socio-linguistics, some offer a political stance (critical discourse analysis), others explore connections with philosophy and philosophy of language, and several papers address problems in theoretical pragmatics.

For the first time in English, this anthology offers a comprehensive selection of primary sources in the history of philosophy of language. Beginning with a detailed introduction contextualizing the subject, the editors draw out recurring themes, including the origin of language, the role of nature and convention in fixing form and meaning, language acquisition, ideal languages, varieties of meanings, language as a tool, and the nexus of language and thought, linking them to representative texts. The handbook moves on to offer seminal contributions from philosophers ranging from the pre-Socratics up to John Stuart Mill, preceding each major historical section with its own introductory assessment. With all of the most relevant primary texts on the philosophy of language included, covering well over two millennia, this judicious, and generous, selection of source material will be an indispensable research tool for historians of philosophy, as well as for philosophers of language,in the twenty-first century. A vital tool for researchers and contemporary philosophers, it will be a touchstone for much further research, with coverage of a long and varied tradition that will benefit today's scholars and enhance their awareness of earlier contributions to the field. ​

'Language and Human Nature'exposes a century's worth of flawed thinking about language, to exhibit some of the dangers it presents, and to suggest a path to recovery. It begins by examining the causes of changes in the English vocabulary. These sometimes take the form of new words, but more often that of new senses for old words. In the course of this examination, Halpern discusses a wide variety of verbal solecisms, vulgarisms, and infelicities generally. His objective is not to deplore such things, but to expose the reasons for their existence, the human traits that generate them.A large part of this book is devoted to contesting the claims of academic linguists to be the only experts in the study of language change. Language is too central to civilized life to be so deeply misunderstood without causing a multitude of troubles throughout our culture. We are currently experiencing such troubles, a number of which are examined here. The exposure of linguists'misunderstandings is not an end in itself, but a necessary first step in recovery from the confusion we are now enmeshed in.The picture of the relationship between words and thoughts that is part of the attempt to deal with language'scientifically'is partly responsible for dangerous cultural developments. The attempt by linguists to treat their subject scientifically makes them view meaning as an irritating complication to be ignored if possible. It turns them into formalists who try to understand language by studying its physical representations, with a resort to semantics only when unavoidable. With words practically stripped of their role as bearers of meaning, it becomes easy to see them as unimportant. Halpern's book is a serious critique of such oversimplified theorizing.

By highlighting relations between experimental and theoretical work, this volume explores new ways of addressing one of the central challenges in the study of language and cognition. The articles bring together work by leading scholars and younger researchers in psychology, linguistics and philosophy. An introductory chapter lays out the background on concept composition, a problem that is stimulating much new research in cognitive science. Researchers in this interdisciplinary domain aim to explain how meanings of complex expressions are derived from simple lexical concepts and to show how these meanings connect to concept representations. Traditionally, much of the work on concept composition has been carried out within separate disciplines, where cognitive psychologists have concentrated on concept representations, and linguists and philosophers have focused on the meaning and use of logical operators. This volume demonstrates an important change in this situation, where convergence points between these three disciplines in cognitive science are emerging and are leading to new findings and theoretical insights. This book is open access under a CC BY license.

Due to the increasing lingua-cultural heterogeneity of today's users of English, it has become necessary to examine politeness, translation and transcultural communication from a different perspective. This book proposes a concept for a transdisciplinary methodology to shed some light onto the opaque relationship between the lingua-cultural biographies of users of English and their patterns of perceiving and realizing politeness in speech acts. The methodology incorporates aspects of CAT tools and business intelligence systems, and is designed for long-term research that can serve as a foundation for theoretical studies or practical contexts, such as customer relationship management and marketing.

The present book is a collection of scholarly reflections on the theme of humanism from an integrational linguistic perspective. It studies humanist thought in relation to the philosophy of language and communication underpinning it and considers the question whether being a ‘humanist'binds one to a particular view of language. The contributions to this volume explore whether integrational linguistics, being informed by a non-mainstream semiology and adopting a lay linguistic perspective, can provide better answers to contentious ontological and epistemological questions concerning the humanist project – questions having to do with the self, reason, authenticity, creativity, free agency, knowledge and human communication. The humanist perspectives adopted by the contributors to this volume are critical insofar as they start from semiological assumptions that challenge received notions within mainstream linguistics, such as the belief that languages are fixed-codes of some kind, that communication serves the purpose of thought transfer, and that languages are prerequisites for communication.

Syntax and semantics are traditional areas of the study of language recognised in linguistics and philosophy of language. This overlap of research areas seems to justify publication of a volume containing both linguistic and philosophical papers on selected issues pertaining to syntax and semantics. While linguistics and philosophy of language remain distinct disciplines in a number of ways, this collection of papers attempts to demonstrate that exchange of ideas by the representatives of the two fields is not only possible: it can actually be fruitful. The major goal of this volume is to bring together the efforts of linguists and philosophers (representing different schools of thought within respective disciplines) trying to explore selected topics in syntax and semantics. The most obvious contrast between linguistics and philosophy of language – the preoccupation with the morphosyntactic distribution of specific linguistic elements in the former and striving for precise semantic analyses that abstract from language-particular morphosyntactic detail in the latter – is still visible throughout the book. Yet, one can observe some degree of openness to insights from philosophical investigation on the part of linguists and from linguistic research on the part of philosophers. This openness involves, among other things, ingesting the results of investigation in the other field, employment of terminology or even ‘borrowing'some methods of research.

This title was first published in 2000: What was Wittgenstein's relation to'theory of meaning'in his post-1937 writings and what was his characterization of'philosophy'? How does'philosophy'in Wittgenstein's later writings differ from what is usually accepted in modern academic'analytic'philosophy? This book discusses problems encountered in looking at Wittgenstein's texts after-1937, focusing particularly on whether the problem of philosophy amounts to a systematic or a theoretical activity. Arguing that philosophy can be characterized as a form of conceptual investigation, Gefwert aims to demonstrate that a theoretical view does not correspond to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. For example, philosophy is not transcendental as he thought it was before 1929. Neither is philosophical language universal as Wittgenstein 1929-1936 thought it was. Proposing that a philosophical conceptual investigation is analogous to a psychotherapeutical session of Freud, with the common aim to dissolve the conceptual problems in language that haunt us in our everyday life, Gefwert's examination of the post-1937 writings of Wittgenstein concludes that'philosophical investigation'is a very different activity than that assumed by the Logical Positives and others adhering to a theoretical view.

This volume consists of twelve studies thematically grouped into three parts: (1) Linguistics and Philosophy of Language, (2) Hermeneutics and Text Linguistics, and (3) Lexicology and Phraseology. The phrase «tradition and innovation» characterizes almost all the texts included here, since tradition and innovation are present both at the level of the object (language) and at the level of its research (linguistics). The dominant theoretical perspective is the «Coserian» one, since the author borrowed from Eugenio Coseriu's linguistic theory a series of essential concepts and distinctions regarding language and culture.

Wittgenstein and Davidson are two of the most influential and controversial figures of twentieth-century philosophy. However, whereas Wittgenstein is often regarded as a deflationary philosopher, Davidson is considered to be a theory builder and systematic philosopher par excellence. Consequently, little work has been devoted to comparing their philosophies with each other. In this volume of new essays, leading scholars show that in fact there is much that the two share. By focusing on the similarities between Wittgenstein and Davidson, the essays present compelling defences of their views and develop more coherent and convincing approaches than either philosopher was able to propose on his own. They show how philosophically fruitful and constructive reflection on Wittgenstein and Davidson continues to be, and how relevant the writings of both philosophers are to current debates in philosophy of mind, language, and action.

This book is the first part of a comprehensive study of Wittgenstein's conception of language description. Describing language was no pastime occupation for the philosopher. It was hard work and it meant struggle. It made for a philosophy that required Wittgenstein's full attention and half his life. His approach had always been working on himself, on how he saw things. The central claim of this book is that nothing will come of our exegetical efforts to see what Wittgenstein's later philosophy amounts to if his work on describing language is not given the place and concern it deserves. The book shows what his philosophy might begin to look like in the light of critical questions around his interest to see the end of the day with descriptions, and these things only.

The Philosophy of Umberto Eco stands out in the Library of Living Philosophers series as the volume on the most interdisciplinary scholar hitherto and probably the most widely translated. The Italian philosopher's name and works are well known in the humanities, both his philosophical and literary works being translated into fifteen or more languages. Eco is a founder of modern semiotics and widely known for his work in the philosophy of language and aesthetics. He is also a leading figure in the emergence of postmodern literature, and is associated with cultural and mass communication studies. His writings cover topics such as advertising, television, and children's literature as well as philosophical questions bearing on truth, reality, cognition, language, and literature. The critical essays in this volume cover the full range of this output. This book has wide appeal not only because of its interdisciplinary nature but also because of Eco's famous “high and low” approach, which is deeply scholarly in conception and very accessible in outcome. The short essay “Why Philosophy?” included in the volume is exemplary in this regard: it will appeal to scholars for its wit and to high school students for its intelligibility.

This radically original book argues for the power of ordinary language philosophy—a tradition inaugurated by Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, and extended by Stanley Cavell—to transform literary studies. In engaging and lucid prose, Toril Moi demonstrates this philosophy's unique ability to lay bare the connections between words and the world, dispel the notion of literature as a monolithic concept, and teach readers how to learn from a literary text. Moi first introduces Wittgenstein's vision of language and theory, which refuses to reduce language to a matter of naming or representation, considers theory's desire for generality doomed to failure, and brings out the philosophical power of the particular case. Contrasting ordinary language philosophy with dominant strands of Saussurean and post-Saussurean thought, she highlights the former's originality, critical power, and potential for creative use. Finally, she challenges the belief that good critics always read below the surface, proposing instead an innovative view of texts as expression and action, and of reading as an act of acknowledgment. Intervening in cutting-edge debates while bringing Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell to new readers, Revolution of the Ordinary will appeal beyond literary studies to anyone looking for a philosophically serious account of why words matter.

This volume is the second part of a project which hosts an interdisciplinary discussion about the relationship among law and language, legal practice and ordinary conversation, legal philosophy and the linguistics sciences. An international group of authors, from cognitive science, philosophy of language and philosophy of law question about how legal theory and pragmatics can enrich each other.In particular, the first part is devoted to the analysis of how pragmatics can solve problems related to legal theory: What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and its relationship with moral, and, in particular, about the eternal dispute between legal positivism and legal naturalism? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of law and/or legal disagreements?The second part is focused on legal adjudication: it aims to construct a pragmatic apparatus appropriate to legal trial and/or to test the tenure of the traditional pragmatics tools in the field. The authors face questions such as: Which interesting pragmatic features emerge from legal adjudication? What pragmatic theories are better suited to account for the practice of judgment or its particular aspects (such as the testimony or the binding force of legal precedents)? Which pragmatic and socio-linguistic problems are highlighted by this practice?

Qu'est-ce qui est mis en oeuvre dans l'acte de parler? Dans la parole adressée à autrui se joue en fait une relation spécifique, au travers de laquelle tout individu se structure. Celle-ci devient alors l'instrument essentiel d'une intersubjectivité possible, c'est-à-dire d'une relation créatrice qui nous constitue comme sujet dans notre relation à l'autre. Parler aurait donc une fonction véritablement politique : s'y joue en définitive le rapport de chacun d'entre nous au monde.

We live in a time of moral confusion: many believe there are no overarching moral norms, and we have lost an accepted body of moral knowledge. Alasdair MacIntyre addresses this problem in his much-heralded restatement of Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics; Stanley Hauerwas does so through his highly influential work in Christian ethics. Both recast virtue ethics in light of their interpretations of the later Wittgenstein's views of language. This book systematically assesses the underlying presuppositions of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, finding that their attempts to secure moral knowledge and restate virtue ethics, both philosophical and theological, fail. Scott Smith proposes alternative indications as to how we can secure moral knowledge, and how we should proceed in virtue ethics.

In attempting to answer the question posed by this book's title, Giorgio Agamben does not address the idea of philosophy itself. Rather, he turns to the apparently most insignificant of its components: the phonemes, letters, syllables, and words that come together to make up the phrases and ideas of philosophical discourse. A summa, of sorts, of Agamben's thought, the book consists of five essays on five emblematic topics: the Voice, the Sayable, the Demand, the Proem, and the Muse. In keeping with the author's trademark methodology, each essay weaves together archaeological and theoretical investigations: to a patient reconstruction of how the concept of language was invented there corresponds an attempt to restore thought to its place within the voice; to an unusual interpretation of the Platonic Idea corresponds a lucid analysis of the relationship between philosophy and science, and of the crisis that both are undergoing today. In the end, there is no universal answer to what is an impossible or inexhaustible question, and philosophical writing—a problem Agamben has never ceased to grapple with—assumes the form of a prelude to a work that must remain unwritten.

This book discusses developments in the study of implicatures and presuppositions, drawing on recent linguistic and psycholinguistic literature. It provides original discussions of specific formal aspects of the theoretical reconstruction of these phenomena. The authors offer innovative experimental analyses in which crucial processing questions are addressed, and new experimental methodologies are introduced. The result is an advanced debate featuring broad empirical coverage of the issues, as well as an informed discussion of the connections between a Compositional Semantics and a Pragmatic Theory of Implicit Communication, in light of the empirical data coming from Experimental Semantics and Pragmatics. This book will be a worthwhile read for those with interests in both the formal and methodological aspects of these arguments.

Evolutionary science has long viewed language as, basically, a fortunate accident—a crossing of wires that happened to be extraordinarily useful, setting humans apart from other animals and onto a trajectory that would see their brains (and the products of those brains) become increasingly complex. But as Michael C. Corballis shows in The Truth about Language, it's time to reconsider those assumptions. Language, he argues, is not the product of some “big bang” 60,000 years ago, but rather the result of a typically slow process of evolution with roots in elements of grammatical language found much farther back in our evolutionary history. Language, Corballis explains, evolved as a way to share thoughts—and, crucially for human development, to connect our own “mental time travel,” our imagining of events and people that are not right in front of us, to that of other people. We share that ability with other animals, but it was the development of language that made it powerful: it led to our ability to imagine other perspectives, to imagine ourselves in the minds of others, a development that, by easing social interaction, proved to be an extraordinary evolutionary advantage. Even as his thesis challenges such giants as Chomsky and Stephen Jay Gould, Corballis writes accessibly and wittily, filling his account with unforgettable anecdotes and fascinating historical examples. The result is a book that's perfect both for deep engagement and as brilliant fodder for that lightest of all forms of language, cocktail party chatter.

Homer recounts how, trapped inside a monster's cave, with nothing but his wits, Ulysses once saved himself by twisting his name. He called himself Outis: “No One” or “Non-One,” “No Man” or “Non-Man.” The ploy was a success. He blinded his barbaric host and eluded him, becoming anonymous, for a while, even as he bore a name.Philosophers never forgot the lesson that the ancient hero taught. From Aristotle and his commentators in Greek, Arabic, Latin, and more modern languages, from the masters of the medieval schools to Kant and his many successors, thinkers have exploited the possibilities of adding “non-” to the names of man.Aristotle is the first to write of “indefinite” or “infinite” names, his example being “non-man.” Kant turns to such terms in his theory of the infinite judgment, illustrated by the sentence, “The soul is non-_mortal.” Such statements play unexpected and often major roles in the systems of Salomon Maimon, Hegel and Hermann Cohen, before being variously and profoundly reinterpreted in the twentieth century.Reconstructing the adventures of a particle in philosophy, Heller-Roazen's book shows how a grammatical possibility can be an incitement for thought. Yet it also draws a lesson from persistent examples. The philosophers'infinite names all point to one subject: us. “Non-man” or “soul,” “Spirit” or “the unconditioned,” we are beings who name and name ourselves, bearing witness to the fact that we are, in every sense, unnamable.

For someone whose influence has been so profound on Western thinking remarkably little is known of the Greek philosopher and thinker Plato. Due to the means and social status of his family Plato was most probably educated by some of Athens'finest teachers. The curriculum would have been rich and varied and include the doctrines of Cratylus and Pythagoras as well as Parmenides. Two major events shaped Plato's life whilst he was a young man. The first was a meeting with the great philosopher Socrates. Socrates's methods of debate impressed Plato and he soon became a devoted follower. From here would flow Plato's career as one of the finest minds civilization has produced. Major event number two was the on-going rivalry between Athens and Sparta which erupted into the Peloponnesian War. This was, in fact, several ‘stop-start'wars fought during the period 431–404 BCE. Plato served in the cause of Athens and its Allies between 409 and 404 B.C.E. The comprehensive defeat of Athens by Sparta ended the Athenian democracy, although after a brief oligarchy it was restored. Plato traveled for a dozen years throughout the Mediterranean, studying mathematics with the Pythagoreans in Italy, as well as geometry, geology, astronomy and religion in Egypt. It was during this time that Plato began his writings, a remarkable number of which survive to this day. The writings themselves are usually classified into three distinct periods although there is some uncertainty as to the exact order in which they were written. Having now returned to Athens Plato embarked upon an extraordinary undertaking. In around 385 B.C.E., he established a school of learning, known as the Academy. The extensive curriculum included astronomy, biology, mathematics, political theory and philosophy. Plato hoped that those who studied there would be future leaders who would be better equipped thorough its teachings to understand how to build a better government. Plato would preside over its teachings until his death in Athens around 348 B.C.E.

Benedetto Croce is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His work in aesthetics and historiography has been controversial, but enduring. When the first edition of ^Esthetic appeared in 1902, Croce was seen as foremost in reasserting an idealistic philosophy, which despite its source in continental idealists from Descartes to Hegel, offers a system that attempts to account for the emergence of scientific systems. Croce thus combines scientific and metaphysical thought into a dynamic aesthetic.Croce regards aesthetics not merely as a branch of philosophy, but as a fundamental human activity. It is inseparable from historical, psychological, political, economic, and moral considerations, no less than a unique frame of artistic reference. Aesthetic is composed of two parts: Part One concentrates on aesthetic theory and practice. Among the topics it covers are: intuition and expression, art and philosophy, historicism and intellectualism, and beauty in nature and in art. Part Two is devoted to the history of aesthetics. Croce analyzes such subjects as: aesthetic ideas in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Giambattista Vico as the inventor of aesthetic science, the philosophy of language, and aesthetic psychologism.In his new introduction to a classic translation, John McCormick assesses Croce's influence in aesthetic theory and historiography. He notes that the republication of this work is an overdue appreciation of a singular effort to resolve the classic questions of the philosophy of art, art for its own sake and art as a social enterprise; both find a place in Croce's system.

Throughout his philosophical development, Wittgenstein was more concerned with language than with any other topic. No other philosopher has been as influential on our understanding of the deep problems surrounding language, and yet the true significance of his writing on the subject is difficult to assess, since most of the current debates regarding language tend to overlook his work. In this book, Thomas McNally shows that philosophers of language still have much to learn from Wittgenstein's later writings. The book examines the finer details of his arguments while also clarifying their importance for debates outside the field of Wittgenstein studies. Presenting the issues thematically (as they relate to questions of reference, scepticism about meaning, and the social dimension of language, among others), the book explores how the arguments in the Philosophical Investigations remain relevant, compelling us to reflect in novel and challenging ways on the nature of language.

Many still consider Ludwig Wittgenstein's 1953 Philosophical Investigations to be one of the breakthrough works of twentieth-century philosophy. The book sets out a radically new conception of philosophy itself, and demonstrates all the attributes of a fine analytical mind. Taking an argument from Plato and subjecting it to detailed (and very clear) analysis, Wittgenstein shows his understanding of how the sequence and function of differing parts of a highly-complex argument can be broken down and assessed. In so doing, he reaches a logical position of simultaneous agreement and disagreement with Plato's philosophical position. Philosophical Investigations is also a powerful example of the skill of interpretation. Philosophical problems often arise from confusions in the use of language – and the way to solve these problems, Wittgenstein posits, is by clarifying language use. He argues that philosophers must study ordinary uses of language and examine how people use it as a tool in their everyday lives. In this highly-interpretative way, the meaning of a word or sentence becomes relative to the context (people, culture, community) in which it is used. Rather than debate abstract problems, Wittgenstein urges philosophers to concern themselves with ordinary life and the concrete situations in which humans find themselves.

This volume offers novel views on the precise relation between reference to an object by means of a linguistic expression and our mental representation of that object, long a source of debate in the philosophy of language, linguistics, and cognitive science. Chapters in this volume deal with our devices for singular reference and singular representation, with most focusing on linguistic expressions that are used to refer to particular objects, persons, or places. These expressions include proper names such as Mary and John; indexicals such as I and tomorrow; demonstrative pronouns such as this and that; and some definite and indefinite descriptions such as The Queen of England or a medical doctor. Other chapters examine the ways we represent objects in thought, particularly the first-person perspective and the self, and one explores a notion common to reference and representation: salience. The volume includes the latest views on these complex topics from some of the most prominent authors in the field and will be of interest to anyone working on issues of reference and representation in thought and language.

P.F. Strawson has been a major and influential spokesman for ordinary language philosophy throughout the late twentieth century, studying the relationship between common language and the language of formal logic. This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor corrections to the text, these classic essays remain original and intact. Logico-Linguistic Papers contains Strawson's major essay,'On Referring', in which he disputed Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions, distinguishing between referring to an entity and asserting its existence. The book contains twelve essays in all, grouped by subject matter. The first five are concerned with the topic of singular reference and predication and the last three are all responses to J.L. Austin's treatment of the topic of truth. Strawson disputes the correspondence theory of truth, maintaining that facts are what statements (when true) state. The remaining papers deal with meaning, speech acts, logical truth and Chomsky's views on syntax.

Jacques Derrida's extensive early writings devoted considerable attention to “being as presence,” the reality underlying the history of metaphysics. In Derrida on Being as Presence: Questions and Quests, David A. White develops the intricate conceptual structure of this notion by close exegetical readings drawn from these writings. White discusses cardinal concepts in Derrida's revamping of theoretical considerations pertaining to language–signification, context, negation, iterability–as these considerations depend on the structure of being as presence and also as they ground “deconstructive” reading. White's appraisal raises questions invoking a range of problems. He deploys these questions in conjunction with thematically related quests that arise given Derrida's conviction that the history of metaphysics, as variations on being as presence, has concealed and skewed vital elements of reality. White inflects this critical apparatus concerning being as presence with texts drawn from that history–e.g., by Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Hume, Kant, Whitehead. The essay concludes with a speculative ensemble of provisional categories, or zones of specificity. Implementing these categories will ground the possibility that philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular can be pursued in ways which acknowledge the relevance of Derrida's thought when integrated with the philosophical enterprise as traditionally understood.

Durante siglos, los filósofos han estado divididos acerca de la naturaleza del lenguaje. Los de tradición empirista afirman que el lenguaje es una herramienta desarrollada por los seres humanos para codificar y comunicar información. Pero esta visión, afirma Taylor, descuida el papel crucial que desempeña el lenguaje en la formación del mismo pensamiento: este no se limita a describir; constituye un significado y conforma la experiencia humana de manera definitiva. La capacidad lingüística humana no es algo que poseemos de modo innato. Primero aprendemos el lenguaje de los demás, y luego, inducidos a conversar, emerge nuestro ser individual. El lenguaje es intelectual, pero también queda representado en retratos, gestos, tonos de voz, metáforas… No reconoce fronteras entre mente y cuerpo. Al mostrar la plena capacidad de ese'animal de lenguaje', Taylor arroja luz sobre qué es, en definitiva, el ser humano.

In a unique cooperation between philosophy, linguistics, art history, and ancient studies, this volume focuses on ways in which the entangled and embodied nature of image and language enables us to symbolically articulate the world and our experience in a great variety of forms. It lays the foundation for a new cultural anthropology of symbolic processes.

The philosophy of language of Robert Brandom is based on a theoretical structure composed of three main elements: the normative analysis of linguistic practices, the inferential characterization of conceptual contents and the expressive articulation of the relations between the former two. Normative pragmatics aims to explain how linguistic practices are sufficient to confer contentful states in those who engage in them. Inferential semantics provides a theory of such pragmatic significances in terms of the inferential relations that articulate conceptual contents. Rational expressivism is the thesis that concept application is essentially a process of turning something that can only be done into something that can also be said. Such a threefold structure is the core of normative inferentialism. This book is a concise, self-contained and comprehensive presentation of this philosophical enterprise. It guides the reader through the analysis of Brandom's imposing theoretical apparatus, the discovery of the roots of his approach in American pragmatism and German idealism, till the exploration of some of its most interesting and recent outcomes in pragmatics and semantics. It is a valuable resource for both those who approach Brandom's work for the first time and those who are interested in the potential of normative inferentialism.

Die vielfach anzutreffenden Vorurteile und Missverständnisse über Sinn und Zweck der Philosophie lassen sich vermutlich auf dem kürzesten Weg durch Fragen entkräften, die sich wissenschaftlichen Forschungen entziehen und sich dennoch nicht vermeiden lassen. Der Braunschweiger Philosoph Steen O. Welding behandelt in diesem Band exemplarisch und in prägnanter Weise einige solcher zentralen Probleme der Philosophie des Geistes, der Erkenntnis, der Sprache und der Logik. Für die Frage etwa »Wo denn bin ich im Hinblick auf das Bewusstsein der eigenen Existenz?« sind die großen Fortschritte der Hirnforschung insofern provozierend, als den zerebralen Ereignissen mentale Zustände zugeschrieben werden, deren Existenz sich nicht epistemisch feststellen lässt. Wie verbinde ich aber phänomenale Erfahrungen von Ereignissen in meinem Körper – etwa Sinnesempfindungen und Emotionen – mit dem Bewusstsein vom eigenen Selbst? Eine andere Frage betrifft eines der Hauptprobleme der gegenwärtigen Erkenntnistheorie, das sog. Gettier-Problem: Edmund Gettier hatte 1963 die Standarddefinition von Wissen – Wissen ist gerechtfertigte wahre Meinung – durch eine Reihe von Gegenbeispielen in Frage gestellt. Welding kann zeigen, dass zwischen der gerechtfertigten wahren Meinung und der Behauptung eines Wissens eine epistemische Differenz besteht, die in den bisherigen Debatten um das Gettier-Problem nicht berücksichtigt worden ist. Darüber hinaus behandelt der Band u.a. die Struktur wissenschaftstheoretischer Erklärungen, Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über Spiele, Sprachspiele und Familienähnlichkeiten sowie ein destruktives Dilemma in der formalen Logik.

The study of language has always been closely allied to the study of philosophy. This book starts from a criticism of the neglect by linguists of the study of “macrolinguistics” – the nature and rules of sequence in dialogue of the larger linguistic units, such as statements, questions, retractions, various kinds of imperative, and expressions of attitudes and of emotion – and develops consequences of interest both to philosophers and to linguists. Its central thesis concerns the influence of macrolinguistic grammatical categories on theories of the mind.This book will be of interest to philosophers generally and philosophers of language and philosophers of mind in particular, as well as to linguists, especially those working in pragmatics and speech act theory. It will also appeal to computer and cognitive scientists, particularly those with an interest in natural language processing. It makes important contributions to both philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, abounding with new arguments and perspectives 46 years on from its completion.