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In 1993, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) concluded that the United States could fight and win in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). Nearly simultaneous required that the two MRCs be spaced at least 42 days apart to allow adequate time to shift forces and resources between theaters. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 1995 Report To The President And The Congress specified that US forces be sized and structured to preserve the flexibility and capability to achieve their objectives without the assistance of allied forces. Based on a Win-Hold-Win formula, the 2 MRC strategy suggests the capability of the United States military to effectively wage decisive battle in one or both of the MRCs. This notion runs contrary to historical and theoretical observations regarding the evolution of warfare. In fact, it implies that the United States has adopted a national security strategy that is unattainable. This monograph is the result of a historical and theoretical examination of decisive battles and indecisive military contests. An analysis of warfighthing concepts, theories and doctrine from the fifteenth century through the twentieth century provides an intellectual foundation for establishing constructs regarding the conduct of contemporary decisive battle. This includes an examination of the nature of decisive battle, the required conditions for its employment, and its viability as an effective operational warfighting method in modern military contests. The author concludes that decisive battle is still a viable operational warfighting method, but only under specific operational conditions. Recognizing the distributed nature of contemporary warfare, the author offers the concept of distributed concentration to achieve the necessary leverage against an operational decisive point in the initial operational action. A historical analysis of Operation JUST CAUSE demonstrates the utility of employing distributed concentration as a viable operational warfighting me

"Toward a Universal Society and the United States Army" is a research thesis examining social and political theories relevant to defining the post-Cold War era operationally. Two prevailing schools of thought are examined; the school of pacific union and the school of international pessimism. This research has found a relevance for these theories in discussion of the post-Cold War era forecasting the development of a universal society of liberal democratic states. In opposition there still exist non-democratic states that impede upon the expansion of the pacific union of the liberal democratic states much in the way anticipated by international pessimism. Through analysis of these respective schools of thought this research has examined how this universal society is believed to occur. Also, the research has examined how the existence of non-democratic states affects the pacific union. The research concludes that this confrontation of liberal democratic and non-democratic states has played a key role in explaining the goals of U.S. National Security Strategy in the post-Cold War era. Also, it can assist in explaining a refocusing of military strategic objectives, roles and missions in the post-Cold War era to providing stabilization and support in pursuit of an emerging universal society.