123 results on '"Salvador, Amparo"'
Search Results
102. Determination of water-soluble UV-filters in sunscreen sprays by liquid chromatography
- Author
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Chisvert, Alberto, primary and Salvador, Amparo, additional
- Published
- 2002
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
103. Supercritical Fluid Extraction and Supercritical Fluid Chromatography of Vitamin E in Pharmaceutical Preparations
- Author
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Becerra, Gladys, primary, Menolasina, Sabino, additional, and Salvador, Amparo, additional
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- 1999
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
104. Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry analysis of wines
- Author
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Yolanda Pérez-Jordán, Mercedes, primary, Soldevila, Jose, additional, Salvador, Amparo, additional, Pastor, Agustín, additional, and de la Guardia, Miguel, additional
- Published
- 1999
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
105. Microwave-assisted saponification of animal greases for cholesterol determination
- Author
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Piñeiro-Avila, Gerardo, primary, Salvador, Amparo, additional, and de la Guardia, Miguel, additional
- Published
- 1998
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
106. Non-aqueous enzymatic flow injection determination of cholestanol in sediments
- Author
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Piñeiro-Avila, Gerardo, primary, Salvador, Amparo, additional, and de la Guardia, Miguel, additional
- Published
- 1998
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
107. Supercritical fluid chromatography in drug analysis: a literature survey
- Author
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Salvador, Amparo, primary, Jaime, M. Angeles, additional, Becerra, Gladys, additional, and Guardia, M. De La, additional
- Published
- 1996
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
108. Flow injection flame atomic spectrometric determination of aluminium, iron, calcium, magnesium, sodium and potassium in ceramic material by on-line dilution in a stirred chamber
- Author
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Carbonell, Vincente, primary, Sanz, Angel, additional, Salvador, Amparo, additional, and de la Guardia, Miguel, additional
- Published
- 1991
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
109. Direct determination of copper and iron in edible oils using flow injection flame atomic absorption spectrometry
- Author
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Carbonell, Vincente, primary, Maurí, A. R., additional, Salvador, Amparo, additional, and de la Guardia, Miguel, additional
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- 1991
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
110. Platform in furnace Zeeman-effect atomic absorption spectrometric determination of arsenic in beer by atomization of slurries of sample ash
- Author
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Cervera, Maria Luisa, primary, Navarro, Ascensio, additional, Montoro, Rosa, additional, de la Guardia, Miguel, additional, and Salvador, Amparo, additional
- Published
- 1991
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
111. A solid-phase extraction liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry method for the percutaneous absorption assessment of 3-(4′-methylbenzylidene)camphor viahuman urine analysisThis article is part of a themed issue on Cosmetic Ingredients, Guest Edited by Alberto Chisvert and Amparo Salvador.
- Author
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León-González, Zacarías, Chisvert, Alberto, Fernández, Isabel, and Salvador, Amparo
- Abstract
The UV filter 3-(4′-methylbenzylidene)camphor (MBC) is a common ingredient in sunscreen cosmetic products. However, different in vitroand in vivostudies suggest that MBC can cause endocrine disrupting effects. This report focuses on the development of an analytical method based on solid-phase extraction (SPE) prior to liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) for the determination of MBC and its main phase I metabolite, named 3-(4′-carboxybenzylidene)camphor (CBC), in urine from users of sunscreen cosmetic products containing MBC. The formation of phase II metabolites (i.e., glucuronide and sulphate conjugates) was also considered by carrying out an enzymatic hydrolysis of the urine samples. The standard addition calibration method was used to quantify the target analytes in order to correct the matrix effects observed. In this way, statistically accurate results were obtained when the developed SPE-LC-MS/MS method was applied to the analysis of fortified analytes-free urine samples. The limits of detection were 6 ± 2 ng mL−1for MBC and 6 ± 1 ng mL−1for CBC, and the intra- and inter-day variability of the method, expressed as relative standard deviation, were in the range of 1.3–2.0% and 4.5–7.7%, respectively, depending on the analyte. The analytical method was satisfactorily applied to the analysis of real urine samples from a volunteer that was subjected to repeated applications of a sunscreen cosmetic containing MBC, showing that the major contribution to the excretion of MBC corresponded to the glucuronide conjugated species of CBC. Furthermore, the second main phase I metabolite of MBC, named 3-(4′-carboxybenzylidene)hydroxycamphor (CBC-OH), which also predominates in its glucuronide conjugate species in urine samples, was identified and detected.
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
112. Application of the slurry technique to biological materials: a survey of literature.
- Author
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Benzo, Zully, Velosa, Manuelita, Ceccarelli, Claudio, Guardia, Miguel, and Salvador, Amparo
- Published
- 1991
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
113. Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry analysis of wines
- Author
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Pérez-Jordán, Mercedes Yolanda, Soldevila, Jose, Salvador, Amparo, Pastor, Agustín, and Guardia, Miguel de la
- Abstract
An inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) procedure has been developed for the determination of major elements, such as Mg, Na, K, Ca and Fe, minor elements, such as Al, Cr, Mn, Cu, Zn, Se, Sr, Br and Rb, and trace elements, such as Li, Ti, Ni, As, I, Ba, Pb, Sc, V, Co, Y, Zr, Mo, Sn, Cs, Ga, Nb, Pd, Cd, Sb, Hf, W, Hg, Tl, Th and U, in wines. The results obtained for Na, Mg, Al, Mn, Fe, Co, Zn, Rb and Cs were compared with those found by neutron activation analysis (NAA). Two ICP-MS calibration methodologies were used and results evaluated from spike recovery studies from which an average recovery of 102±20% was found for quantitative mode measurements. Multi-determination, using Be, Ge, In and Bi for the calibration of the ICP-MS sensitivity in the whole mass range and Rh as the internal standard, provided fast and accurate results, whereas the quantitative mode, using a series of external standard solutions, needs more time and consumes more reagent.
- Published
- 1999
114. Decisiones de consumo: un ejemplo usando una solución dinámica 'Cournot- Nash'
- Author
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Urbano Salvador, Amparo
- Subjects
Economía - Published
- 1985
115. Rapid atomic spectrometric determination of sodium, potassium, calcium and magnesium in powdered milk by direct dispersion.
- Author
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de la Guardia, Miguel, Salvador, Amparo, Bayarri, Pilar, and Farre, Rosaura
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- 1986
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
116. Cosmetic ingredients: from the cosmetic to the human body and the environment
- Author
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Chisvert, Alberto and Salvador, Amparo
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
117. Internet two sided market regulation: A zero-ratong analysis from a theoretical and experimental approach
- Author
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Pinar García, Lucía D., Urbano Salvador, Amparo, Comeig Ramírez, Irene, Arribas Fernández, Iván, and Departament d'Anàlisi Econòmica
- Subjects
net neutrality ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS ,two-sided market ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS [UNESCO] ,internet regulation ,zero-rating ,vertical integration - Abstract
El objetivo de esta tesis es estudiar las prácticas discriminatorias empleadas en el Mercado de Internet. Dichas prácticas han sido reguladas por la neutralidad de red en medio de un amplio y polémico debate político, económico y técnico. Con esta investigación, hemos querido analizar los efectos de los servicios de zero-rating desde una perspectiva teórica y experimental. Así mismo, proponemos un replanteamiento de la neutralidad de red a través de un estudio experimental que replica las interacciones entre agentes en el actual ecosistema digital. Capítulo 2: El objetivo de este capítulo es estudiar el efecto de los contratos de zero-rating en un mercado bilateral de duopolio de Internet. Proponemos un mercado bilateral con dos proveedores de servicios de Internet (PSI) que ofrecen servicios de Internet a una masa de usuarios diferenciados verticalmente para acceder a dos plataformas de contenidos (CP) asimétricas. Nuestro modelo es un juego de tres periodos en el que estudiamos el equilibrio eficiente en subjuegos en un mercado con competencia entre plataformas. Comparamos nuestros equilibrios de tarificación cero con los de la integración vertical. Capítulo 3: Debido a la complejidad algebraica de dar respuestas teóricas muy precisas a los retos de la regulación de la neutralidad de la red, este capítulo trata de hacerlo mediante un enfoque experimental. En nuestro mercado experimental de Internet, dos plataformas simétricas de ISP, Prontophone y Cellcom, pueden ofrecer servicios de zero-rating a dos plataformas de CPs, Movistream y Sportstream en el tratamiento 1, Movistream y Seriestream en el tratamiento 2. Nuestros equilibrios teóricos surgen cuando ningún ISP ofrece zero-rating en el mercado - tratamiento 1- y cuando un ISP lo ofrece al contenido menos Los dos equilibrios teóricos que queremos probar empíricamente con este experimento dependen del grado de sustituibilidad. de sustituibilidad: no ofrecer servicios de zero-rating a ningún CP , o, si los contenidos son suficientemente sustituibles, ofrecerlo sólo al menos valorado de los contenidos. Capítulo 4: Aquí estudiamos el efecto de estos servicios de zero-rating en un mercado en el que existe un ISP monopolista que ofrece servicios de Internet a dos tipos de consumidores, Tortuga (T) y Velocidad (S), uno con mayor preferencia por la velocidad de la red que el otro (diferenciación horizontal), y dos tipos de proveedores de contenidos. El monopolista dispone de dos herramientas de discriminación, que puede combinar: por un lado, el zero-rating como herramienta de revalorización de los contenidos por otra, el menú de tarifas como mecanismo de selección entre consumidores heterogéneos que le permite extraer al menos la totalidad del excedente de uno de ellos. Capítulo 5: En este último capítulo se analiza una posible herramienta para ajustar y reforzar el principio de neutralidad de la red, a través de un experimento económico económico basado en una versión ampliada del juego del dictador. En concreto, estudiamos el efecto de un mecanismo de control y sanción ex-ante sobre el comportamiento colusorio de las grandes empresas. El mecanismo de regulación se muestra eficaz, reduciendo significativamente el comportamiento abusivo de las grandes compañias de Internet. The aim of this thesis is to study the discriminatory practices employed in the Internet market. These practices have been regulated by net neutrality in the midst of a wide and controversial political, economic and technical debate. With this research, we wanted to analyse the effects of zero-rating services from a theoretical and experimental perspective. We also propose a rethinking of net neutrality through an experimental study that replicates the interactions between agents in the current digital ecosystem. Chapter 2: The aim of this Chapter is to study the effect of zero-rating contracts in an Internet duopoly two-sided market. We propose a twosided market with two Internet Service Providers (ISPs) offering Internet services to a mass of vertically differentiated users to get access to two asymmetric content platforms (CPs). Our model is a three-period game where we study the efficient subgame perfect equilibrium of zerorating services in a market with inter-platform competition. We compare our zero-rating equilibria with those under vertical integration. Chapter 3: Due to the algebraic complexity of providing very precise theoretical answers to the challenges of net neutrality regulation, this Chapter tries to do so by means of an experimental approach. In our experimental Internet market, two symmetric ISP platforms, Prontophone and Cellcom, can offer zero-rating services to two CPs platforms, Movistream and Sportstream in treatment 1, or Movistream and Seriestream in treatment 2. Our theoretical equilibria arise when no ISP offers zero-rating in the market -treatment 1- and when an ISP offers it to the less valued content, Seriestream -treatment 2-.The two theoretical equilibria we want to empirically test with this experiment depend on the degree of substitutability: not offering zero-rating services to any CP , or, if the contents are sufficiently substitutable, to offer it only to the less valued one. Chapter 4: Here, we study the effect of such zero-rating services in a market where there is a monopolistic ISP offering Internet services to two types of consumers, Turtle (T) and Speed (S), one with a higher preference for the network speed than the other (horizontal differentiation), and two types of content providers. The monopolist has two discrimination tools, which can combine: on the one hand, zero-rating as a content revaluation tool, on the other hand, the tariff menu as a screening mechanism between heterogeneous consumers that allows him to extract at least the full surplus from one of them. Chapter 5: In this last Chapter we analyse a possible tool to adjust and reinforce the principle of net neutrality, through an economic experiment based on an extended version of the dictator game. In particular, we study the effect of an ex-ante control and sanction mechanism on the collusive behaviour of large firms. The regulatory mechanism proves to be effective, significantly reducing the abusive behaviour of large Internet.
- Published
- 2022
118. Consumers' privacy, selling of information, and security in digital markets
- Author
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Sánchez Romero, María Dolores, Urbano Salvador, Amparo, and Departament d'Anàlisi Econòmica
- Subjects
price dispersion ,industrial organization ,MATEMÁTICAS::Investigación operativa::Teoría de juegos [UNESCO] ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Organización industrial y política pública::Monopolio y competencia [UNESCO] ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Organización industrial y política pública::Monopolio y competencia ,digital markets ,selling of information ,privacy ,UNESCO::MATEMÁTICAS::Investigación operativa::Teoría de juegos ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Teoría económica::Teoría microeconómica ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Teoría económica::Teoría microeconómica [UNESCO] ,microeconomics - Abstract
La era digital se caracteriza por la gran producción de datos (algunos de ellos de naturaleza privada) a gran escala. La vulnerabilidad y la exposición está ocurriendo a un ritmo sin precedentes, produciendo grandes incentivos económicos para los propietarios de estos datos. Sin embargo, los proveedores de dichos datos, que a menudo son consumidores de contenido gratuito en plataformas digitales, están comenzando a desarrollar problemas de privacidad y, por lo tanto, conducen a la consiguiente reducción de la confianza en los mercados digitales. El objetivo principal de esta tesis es analizar la privacidad desde una perspectiva informativa y fuente de ineficiencias en el mercado. Además, la tesis ofrece un análisis de las decisiones óptimas de los agentes económicos teniendo en cuenta la necesidad actual imperante de una demanda de privacidad. Después de la introducción del tema, el Capítulo 2 analiza el papel de la privacidad en la discriminación de precios basada en canales y la dispersión de precios. El Capítulo 3 investiga la decisión del monopolista de invertir en seguridad en los mercados digitales para influir en los consumidores aumentando su confianza en cuestiones de seguridad y privacidad. El Capítulo 4 estudia el comportamiento estratégico de los consumidores en un mercado compuesto por un mercado ascendente y un mercado descendente, donde la información sobre ellos se puede vender a otra empresa que venda otro bien que también podrían comprar. Además, examinamos el escenario en el que se ofrece a los consumidores una opción de exclusión para evitar que su información sea vendida. Como conclusiones generales, descubrimos que el monopolista obtiene mayores ganancias esperadas bajo la discriminación de precios basada en el canal. Además, existe una dispersión de precios por canales, muy en línea con la literatura. De hecho, la dispersión de precios depende de las preocupaciones de privacidad media de la población en el mercado. Obtenemos que el monopolista considera rentable invertir en seguridad. Sin embargo, tales inversiones en seguridad pueden resultar en una transferencia del coste directamente a los consumidores a través del precio, y puede resultar en abuso de posición. Finalmente, la venta de información al consumidor genera un mayor excedente del consumidor que no permitir la venta de información en el mercado. Sin embargo, cambiar las reglas para permitir la exclusión voluntaria nunca mejora el excedente agregado del consumidor. The digital era is characterized by the large production of data (some of them of private nature) on a large scale. The vulnerability and exposure is occurring at an unprecedented rate, producing great economic incentives for the owners of these data. However, the providers of such data, who are often consumers of free content on digital platforms, are starting to develop privacy concerns and thus, lead to the subsequent reduction of confidence in digital markets. The main objective of this thesis is to analyze privacy from an informational perspective and source of inefficiencies in the market. Furthermore, the thesis offers an analysis of optimal decisions of economic agents considering the current prevailing need for a demand for privacy. After the introduction of the topic, Chapter 2 analyzes the role of privacy in channel-based price discrimination and price dispersion. Chapter 3 investigates the monopolist's decision to invest in security in digital markets in order to influence consumers increasing their confidence in matters of security and privacy. Chapter 4 studies the strategic behavior of consumers in a market composed by an upstream market and a downstream market, where information about them can be sold to another firm selling another good they might also buy. Furthermore, we examine the scenario when consumers are offered an opt-out option to avoid having their information sold. As general conclusions, we find out that the monopolist gets higher expected profits under channel-based price discrimination. Moreover, it does exist price dispersion over channels, much in line with the literature. Indeed, price dispersion depends on the average population privacy concerns in the market. We get that the monopolist finds it profitable to invest in security. However, such investments in security may result in a transfer of the cost directly to consumers through the price, and it might result in abuse of position. Finally, selling consumer information renders higher consumer surplus than no letting the sale of information in the market. However, changing the rules to permit free opt-out never improves aggregate consumer surplus.
- Published
- 2019
119. The economics of platform competition: compatibility, standardization and piracy
- Author
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Nadal Moriana, Ignacio, Moner Colonques, Rafael, Urbano Salvador, Amparo, and Departament d'Anàlisi Econòmica
- Subjects
standardization ,software ,piracy ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS ,two-sided market ,compatibility ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS [UNESCO] ,network effects - Abstract
This thesis studies the platform competition with compatibility, standardization and piracy. In the first chapter we study the role played by expectations, the strength of the network externality and product differentiation in the strategic decisions of the platforms regarding compatibility and price competition. The decision problem is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage platforms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose the degree of compatibility and in the second stage platforms compete in prices. More specifically, we solve a two-stage game in which duopolists decide simultaneously and non cooperatively the degree of compatibility between their products and they compete in prices. We obtain the following results: When the expectations about the network size are symmetrical, the high quality platform always choose compatibility and fix a higher price. The result change when consumers have different expectations about the networks size: If the difference between qualities is minimal, only the company whose expectations of network size are larger serves the market. If the products are minimally vertically differentiated, quality becomes irrelevant and externalities become decisive. When the difference between qualities increases, perhaps the degree of compatibility chosen by the high quality platfrom is not necessarily higher than the degree of compatibility choosen by the low quality platform and vice versa. The second chapter examines the role played by consumers¿ expectations, the strength of the direct network externality, the indirect network externalities associated with the number of complements and product differentiation in the strategic decisions of competing platforms i) regarding the adoption of a common standard, ii) the decisions on innovation and iii) market competition. In the first part of the paper we consider fulfilled expectations (when the consumers expect that both platforms takes part in the market). In the second part of the chaper we analyze the extreme case of expectations on a single platform (when the consumers expect that only one platform take part in the market). A total welfare analysis is undertaken under the fulfilled expectations setting. We observe two effects, the variety and the price effect; as a consequence, consumer surplus is always higher without the standard. Finally, we study the software piracy problem in a two-sided market framework. Platforms compete to attract software developers and consumers in four types of markets, they simultaneously choose the price charged to consumers and the license fee charged to software developers. We consider first with when consumers can be multi-homing and the developers are single-homing , then we analyze when whole the market is single-homing, thirdly when developers can be multi-homing and consumers are single-homing and finally when whole the market is multi-homing. Piracy appears in the developers market, therefore consumers in this market can buy the original software or get a copy. The software developers have the possibility to invest in an anti-piracy mechanism. The second part of the chapter provides a total welfare appraisal under the threat of piracy and calculates the social optimum when a social planner regulates the consumers and the developers market.
- Published
- 2013
120. Theoretical Models of Industrial Espionage
- Author
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Barrachina Monfort, Alejandro, Tauman, Yair, Urbano Salvador, Amparo, and Departament d'Anàlisi Econòmica
- Subjects
non-cooperative games ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Organización industrial y política pública::Monopolio y competencia [UNESCO] ,Espionage ,signaling games ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Organización industrial y política pública::Monopolio y competencia ,entry ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Teoría económica::Teoría microeconómica [UNESCO] ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Teoría económica::Teoría microeconómica - Abstract
Dada la importancia del espionaje industrial en la realidad económica, el objetivo de la presente tesis es analizar teóricamente el comportamiento de las empresas a la hora de obtener información de sus competidores, para poder comprenderlo mejor y ver cuáles pueden ser sus consecuencias, ya que, aunque el espionaje industrial es una práctica muy extendida, pocos trabajos teóricos han tratado de analizarlo. Más concretamente, nuestro objetivo es analizar teóricamente el impacto del espionaje industrial sobre el comportamiento estratégico de las empresas en un contexto de disuasión de la entrada usando las herramientas propias de la Teoría de Juegos. En los modelos de la presente tesis se considera la existencia de un monopolio (M) en un mercado y un entrante potencial (E) al mismo. Para tratar de impedir que E entre al mercado, M considera invertir en la expansión de su capacidad (Capítulos 2 y 3) o invertir en I+D para reducir su coste de producción (Capítulo 4). En el primer caso, E no observa las decisiones de inversión de M, y en el segundo E no sabe si la inversión para reducir costes fue exitosa. Por ello E utiliza un Sistema de Inteligencia (SI), que puede tener un coste o ser de libre acceso, para tratar de detectar la acción de M en el primer caso, y el resultado de la inversión en el segundo, y tiene en cuenta esta información que le proporciona el SI para decidir si entra o no al mercado.El SI puede enviar dos señales con ruido sobre la decisión de M en el primer caso, y sobre el resultado de la inversión en el segundo. En esta tesis se supone que la precisión del SI puede ser tanto exógena (Capítulos 2 y 4) como endógena (Capítulo 3). El primer caso sería aquel en que la empresa que espía dispone de un SI antes de encontrar a un nuevo rival (por ejemplo, una empresa que puede implantar un Caballo de Troya en el sistema informático de sus rivales). El segundo sería el de una empresa que contrata a directivos y trabajadores de otra para que le proporcionen información de la misma. Por último comentar que este tipo de SI no es un jugador que actúa estratégicamente.
- Published
- 2012
121. Ensayos sobre la teoría del arrepentimiento y la teoría de la decepción
- Author
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Soria Bonet, Delfina, Urbano Salvador, Amparo, and Universitat de València. Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials
- Subjects
Economics, General ,UNESCO::CIENCIES ECONÓMICAS ,CIENCIES ECONÓMICAS [UNESCO] - Published
- 1998
122. Salarios de eficiencia y desempleo : evidencia empírica para el sector industrial
- Author
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Sánchez Pérez, Rosario, Urbano Salvador, Amparo, and Universitat de València. Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials
- Subjects
Economics, Labor ,UNESCO::CIENCIES ECONÓMICAS ,CIENCIES ECONÓMICAS [UNESCO] - Published
- 1994
123. 'Rational herding in crowdfunding, social preferences under uncertainty, and overplacement in known and unknown tasks: a behavioral approach'
- Author
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Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez, Urbano Salvador, Amparo, Comeig Ramírez, Irene, and Departament d'Anàlisi Econòmica
- Subjects
known task ,crowdfunding ,herding ,behavior ,unknown tasks ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Economía general::Comportamiento del consumidor ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Economía general::Metodología económica ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Economía general::Metodología económica [UNESCO] ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS ,UNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Teoría económica::Teoría microeconómica ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS [UNESCO] ,overplacement ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Economía general::Comportamiento del consumidor [UNESCO] ,overconfidence ,CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Teoría económica::Teoría microeconómica [UNESCO] ,social preferences - Abstract
It has been proved in this dissertation how experimental economics continues to be a tool that, as it nourishes theoretical economics (and viceversa), it keeps producing results that are necessary to understand how to articulate social relations which, ultimately, have consequences oneconomic relations. Specifically, Chapter 1 has studied how the dissemination of new information affects crowdfunding markets and the generation of herding behaviour. Specifically, we provide evidence in that such behaviour is rational and could be well moulded through optimal choice under uncertainty with Bayesian review of beliefs. In this sense, the effect of the first sponsors on the agents# behaviour has been highlighted, through the change in the probabilities of success of the financing campaigns. Finally, another result shows how potential funders are more guided by the opinions of other individuals rather than those of experts. Chapter 2 of the dissertation has focused on analyzing how social preferences are affected in contexts of uncertainty. Taking an experimental (more conventional) laboratory design, a Dictator's Game was proposed in which it was verified to what extent the probability of being dictated (recipient) affected the distribution made by the agents according to the given initial endowment. The three conclusions obtained are: the level of generosity decreases as the probability of being dictator increases; being in the role of dictator reduces generosity; and starting making decisions with absolute certainty affects only those who are in the role of recipient. We did not find that variables such as sex, degree of risk aversion or cognitive abilities would affect the level of generosity of individuals. Finally, chapter 3 has focused on studying the existence -or not- of possible gender differences in the performance of tasks in which individuals must evaluate their performance. This evaluation was not only in reference to themselves (absolute), but also in relation to other reference groups (total, same sex, opposite sex). For this study, and as a control measurement, two tasks have been assigned that are different in the degree of the subjects# exposure to the performance of similar tasks (level of experience). Namely, the Raven test and the recording of a short video. The latter task adds the lack of previous experience in other similar tasks and the difficulty of self-assessment, since the evaluation was done by people who did not take part of the experiment. The results obtained do not support the hypothesis saying that men are more optimistic than women when performing the tasks with respect to others. In the Raven test no gender differences were found. No differences in both the terms of predictions and how it has been carried out with respect to others (overplacement), and in relation to the total or those of the same sex. However, we did find that women are more precise in adjusting their results compared to men. It has been proved in this dissertation how experimental economics continues to be a tool that, as it nourishes theoretical economics (and viceversa), it keeps producing results that are necessary to understand how to articulate social relations which, ultimately, have consequences oneconomic relations. Specifically, Chapter 1 has studied how the dissemination of new information affects crowdfunding markets and the generation of herding behaviour. Specifically, we provide evidence in that such behaviour is rational and could be well moulded through optimal choice under uncertainty with Bayesian review of beliefs. In this sense, the effect of the first sponsors on the agents# behaviour has been highlighted, through the change in the probabilities of success of the financing campaigns. Finally, another result shows how potential funders are more guided by the opinions of other individuals rather than those of experts. Chapter 2 of the dissertation has focused on analyzing how social preferences are affected in contexts of uncertainty. Taking an experimental (more conventional) laboratory design, a Dictator's Game was proposed in which it was verified to what extent the probability of being dictated (recipient) affected the distribution made by the agents according to the given initial endowment. The three conclusions obtained are: the level of generosity decreases as the probability of being dictator increases; being in the role of dictator reduces generosity; and starting making decisions with absolute certainty affects only those who are in the role of recipient. We did not find that variables such as sex, degree of risk aversion or cognitive abilities would affect the level of generosity of individuals. Finally, chapter 3 has focused on studying the existence -or not- of possible gender differences in the performance of tasks in which individuals must evaluate their performance. This evaluation was not only in reference to themselves (absolute), but also in relation to other reference groups (total, same sex, opposite sex). For this study, and as a control measurement, two tasks have been assigned that are different in the degree of the subjects# exposure to the performance of similar tasks (level of experience). Namely, the Raven test and the recording of a short video. The latter task adds the lack of previous experience in other similar tasks and the difficulty of self-assessment, since the evaluation was done by people who did not take part of the experiment. The results obtained do not support the hypothesis saying that men are more optimistic than women when performing the tasks with respect to others. In the Raven test no gender differences were found. No differences in both the terms of predictions and how it has been carried out with respect to others (overplacement), and in relation to the total or those of the same sex. However, we did find that women are more precise in adjusting their results compared to men.
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