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Prior research has found that the higher one’s perceived status in society, the better one’s mental health and well-being. The present research used a longitudinal design to investigate whether social contact with friends mediated this relation between subjective social status and mental health and well-being among first-year undergraduate students at an Australian university (Wave 1 N = 749, Wave 2 N = 314). Participants completed an online survey that included measures of subjective social status, social contact with university friends during the past week, and mental health and well-being during the past week. Multiple regression analyses found that subjective social status positively predicted amount of social contact with university friends, and that both of these variables positively predicted subsequent mental health and well-being. Furthermore, bootstrapped mediation tests found that social contact with university friends acted as a significant mediator of the relations between social status and mental health and well-being. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for the mental health and well-being of lower class students at university.

The primary goal of the present research was to explore the relationship between adult attachment styles and four different types of identification with social groups. The results confirmed predictions and revealed that particular prototypic attachment styles are associated with an increase in only certain types of ingroup identification. People with secure attachment style had higher social identification than people with a dismissive-avoidant attachment style. Participants with secure attachment style showed higher communal identification than participants who had either a dismissive-avoidant or a fearful-avoidant attachment style. These findings supported the idea that relationship attachment style has an important effect on the way people identify with their social groups and can serve as a predictor of preferred type of ingroup identity

This is our response to Uri Simonsohn, Joe Simmons, and Leif Nelson's critique of Motyl et al. (in press, JPSP).

Description: Psychology contributes to criminal profiling process. Unfortunately, after intensive review on latest research findings, it is detected that most criminal profiling process is not based on strong scientific assumptions. This article explains the reasons why criminal profiling is quite a problem for psychology as a science. The author proposes several ideas to overcome this problem. The first idea is about the accurate understanding of criminal profiling scientific status. The science-pseudoscience-non science dichotomy and protoscience-science spectrum will support this understanding. The second idea is that there are some things to be considered for criminal profiling in order to be a prestigious discipline and be used scientifically appropriate by scientists and practitioners of forensic psychology and criminology.

Twenty-nine teams involving 61 analysts used the same data set to address the same research question: whether soccer referees are more likely to give red cards to dark-skin-toned players than to light-skin-toned players. Analytic approaches varied widely across the teams, and the estimated effect sizes ranged from 0.89 to 2.93 ( Mdn = 1.31) in odds-ratio units. Twenty teams (69%) found a statistically significant positive effect, and 9 teams (31%) did not observe a significant relationship. Overall, the 29 different analyses used 21 unique combinations of covariates. Neither analysts’ prior beliefs about the effect of interest nor their level of expertise readily explained the variation in the outcomes of the analyses. Peer ratings of the quality of the analyses also did not account for the variability. These findings suggest that significant variation in the results of analyses of complex data may be difficult to avoid, even by experts with honest intentions. Crowdsourcing data analysis, a strategy in which numerous research teams are recruited to simultaneously investigate the same research question, makes transparent how defensible, yet subjective, analytic choices influence research results.

Ideologically committed people are similarly motivated to avoid ideologically crosscutting information. Although some previous research has found that political conservatives may be more prone to selective exposure than liberals are, we find similar selective exposure motives on the political left and right across a variety of issues. The majority of people on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate willingly gave up a chance to win money to avoid hearing from the other side (Study 1). When thinking back to the 2012 U.S. Presidential election (Study 2), ahead to upcoming elections in the U.S. and Canada (Study 3), and about a range of other Culture War issues (Study 4), liberals and conservatives reported similar aversion toward learning about the views of their ideological opponents. Their lack of interest was not due to already being informed about the other side or attributable election fatigue. Rather, people on both sides indicated that they anticipated that hearing from the other side would induce cognitive dissonance (e.g., require effort, cause frustration) and undermine a sense of shared reality with the person expressing disparate views (e.g., damage the relationship; Study 5). A high-powered meta-analysis of our data sets (N = 2417) did not detect a difference in the intensity of liberals' (d = 0.63) and conservatives' (d = 0.58) desires to remain in their respective ideological bubbles.

Here we will focus on the problem of identifying good science from a psychological perspective, taking for granted that the people doing the science are human. The tendency to forget this is pointed out by Diener when he says, ‘I ask scholars to consider that the laws of psychology apply to them’ (p. 912, Diener, 2016).

Mature moral judgments rely on the consideration of the perpetrator’s mental state as well as the harmfulness of the outcomes produced. Prior work has focused primarily on the functional correlates of how intent information is neurally represented for moral judgments, but few studies have investigated whether individual differences in neuroanatomy can also explain variation in moral judgments. In the current study, we conducted voxel-based morphometry analyses combined with functional magnetic resonance imaging to address this question. We found that local grey matter volume in left anterior superior temporal sulcus, a region in the functionally defined theory of mind or mentalizing network, was associated with the degree to which participants relied on information about innocent intentions to forgive accidental harms. Our findings provide further support for the key role of mentalizing in the forgiveness of accidental harms and contribute preliminary evidence for the neuroanatomical basis of individual differences in moral judgments.

This preregistered replication attempt focuses on the finding from Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh (2010; ANB) that holding a heavy object triggers concepts related to importance. ANB reported that participants who were holding a heavy clipboard rated a job candidate as better overall and more seriously interested in the job than participants holding a light clipboard. We failed to replicate ANB’s results; instead, Bayes factor hypothesis tests indicated evidence for the absence of a difference between the heavy and the light condition in the overall evaluation andperceived seriousness of the candidate, and in participants’ perceived task importance. Our findings highlight the importance of conducting preregistered replication research and illustrate the theoretical and practical advantages of Bayesian inference in psychological research.

Bayesian vs. frequentist paradigms are here extended to the issue of racial stereotypes. It has been widely argued that human beings do not embody an innate probability of calculus and are not Bayesian thinkers. Bayesian probabilists argue that probability refers to subjective degrees of confidence, while the frequentists believe probability refers to frequencies of events in the real world. A growing body of research has shown that frequentist versions of Bayesian problems elicit Bayesian reasoning. This study (N = 118) replicated Fiedler's finding that a frequency version of the Linda problem elicits Bayesian reasoning in about 75% of participants, compared to 17% for the probability version in Tversky and Kahneman's studies. It also found, however, that the inductive reasoning mechanism that operates on frequency input is not activated when there is a racial stereotype generated.

A major obstacle for the design of rigorous, reproducible studies in moral psychology is the lack of suitable stimulus sets. Here, we present the Socio-Moral Image Database (SMID), the largest standardized moral stimulus set assembled to date, containing 2,941 freely available photographic images, representing a wide range of morally (and affectively) positive, negative and neutral content. The SMID was validated with over 820,525 individual judgments from 2,716 participants, with normative ratings currently available for all images on affective valence and arousal, moral wrongness, and relevance to each of the five moral values posited by Moral Foundations Theory. We present a thorough analysis of the SMID regarding (1) inter-rater consensus, (2) rating precision, and (3) breadth and variability of moral content. Additionally, we provide recommendations for use aimed at efficient study design and reproducibility, and outline planned extensions to the database. We anticipate that the SMID will serve as a useful resource for psychological, neuroscientific and computational (e.g., natural language processing or computer vision) investigations of social, moral and affective processes. The SMID images, along with associated normative data and additional resources are available at https://osf.io/2rqad/.

Abstract. In the current research, we investigated whether belief in conspiracy theories satisfies people’s need for uniqueness. We found that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories was associated with the feeling of possessing scarce information about the situations explained by the conspiracy theories (Study 1) and higher need for uniqueness (Study 2). Further two studies using two different manipulations of need for uniqueness (Studies 3 and 4) showed that people in a high need for uniqueness condition displayed higher conspiracy belief than people in a low need for uniqueness condition. This conclusion is strengthened by a small-scale meta-analysis. These studies suggest that conspiracy theories may serve people’s desire to be unique, highlighting a motivational underpinning of conspiracy belief.

Normative theories of judgment either focus on rationality – decontextualized preference maximization, or reasonableness – the pragmatic balance of preferences and socially-conscious norms. Despite centuries of work on such concepts, a critical question appears overlooked: How do people’s intuitions and behavior align with the concepts of rationality from game theory and reasonableness from legal scholarship? We show that laypeople view rationality as abstract and preference-maximizing, simultaneously viewing reasonableness as social-context-sensitive and socially-conscious, as evidenced in spontaneous descriptions, social perceptions, and linguistic analyses of the terms in cultural products (news, soap operas, legal opinions, and Google books). Further, experiments among North Americans and Pakistani bankers, street merchants, and samples engaging in exchange (vs. market-) economy show that rationality and reasonableness lead people to different conclusions about what constitutes good judgment in Dictator Games, Commons Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma: Lay rationality is reductionist and instrumental, whereas reasonableness integrates preferences with particulars and moral concerns.

Empathy, or the ability to understand and resonate with the experiences of others, has long been considered by philosophers and scientists to be an important part of human morality. We present a new framework that explains empathy as resulting from motivated decisions. Drawing on models of cybernetic control, value-based choice, and constructionism, we suggest that empathy shifts depending on how people value and prioritize conflicting goals. We generate novel predictions about the nature of empathy from the science of goal pursuit, and address its apparent limitations. Empathy appears less sensitive to suffering of large numbers and out-groups, leading some to suggest that empathy is an unreliable ethical guide. Whereas these arguments assume that empathy is a limited-capacity resource, we suggest that apparent limits of empathy reflect byproducts of domain-general goal pursuit. Arguments against empathy reflect a misguided essentialism: they mistake our own choices to avoid empathy for intrinsic features of empathy, treating empathy as a capricious emotion in conflict with reason. We suggest that empathy results from a rational decision, even if its rationality is bounded, as in many decisions in everyday life. Empathy may only be limited if we choose to avoid pursuing empathic goals.

Replication attempts of empirical psychological phenomena lack guidance by a larger effort to evaluate thepsychological theory that predicted the phenomena. In this paper we present a template for theory evaluationsuited for the class of theories produced by psychological science: Theories of construction. As a case study,we perform a rigorous post-publication peer-review of the theoretical core of Unconscious Thought Theory(UTT). We present several uncomplicated indices that quantify the quality of evaluation of the results andconclusions by experts who reviewed the article and the amount of interpretation bias on behalf of theauthors. The results reveal a failure of expert peer-review to detect empirical reports of sub-standard quality.The analyses reveal there is in fact hardly any empirical evidence for the predictions of UTT in importantpapers that claim its support. Our advice is to evaluate before you replicate.NOTE: This manuscript is presented here for reference only see e.g.Nieuwenstein, M. R., Wierenga, T., Morey, R. D., Wicherts, J. M., Blom, T. N., Wagenmakers, E. J., & van Rijn, H. (2015). On making the right choice: a meta-analysis and large-scale replication attempt of the unconscious thought advantage. Judgment and Decision Making, 10(1), 1. http://journal.sjdm.org/14/14321/jdm14321.html. It will not be submitted for publication in its present form.

Personality traits are most often assessed using global self-reports of one's general patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behavior. However, recent theories have challenged the idea that global self-reports are the best way to assess traits. Whole Trait Theory postulates that repeated measures of a person's self-reported personality states (i.e., the average of many state self-reports) can be an alternative and potentially superior way of measuring a person's trait level (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015). Our goal is to examine the validity of average state self-reports of personality for measuring between-person differences in what people are typically like. In order to validate average states as a measure of personality, we examine whether they are incrementally valid in predicting informant reports above and beyond global self-reports. In 2 samples, we find that average state self-reports tend to correlate with informant reports, although this relationship is weaker than the relationship between global self-reports and informant reports. Further, using structural equation modeling, we find that average state self-reports do not significantly predict informant reports independently of global self-reports. Our results suggest that average state self-reports may not contain information about between-person differences in personality traits beyond what is captured by global self-reports, and that average state self-reports may contain more self-bias than is commonly believed. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on daily manifestations of personality and the accuracy of self-reports. (PsycINFO Database Record

Despite differences in beliefs about the self across cultures and relevant individual differences, recent evidence suggests that people universally believe in a ‘true self’ that is morally good. We propose that this belief arises from a general tendency: psychological essentialism.

In this comment we articulate one central weakness in Lilienfeld’s (2017) perspective on microaggression research in psychological science: Namely, that any analysis of modern forms of expressed prejudice, be they subtle or overt, that does not acknowledge the historical context in which these forms of prejudice are expressed is likely to be fraught with challenges and potential for misunderstanding. Here we articulate how this ahistorical context of prejudice has a prominent history in psychological science, and has frequently led otherwise well-meaning and rigorous research studies to incomplete conclusions about the prejudice experienced by historically marginalized groups. We then discuss how this ahistorical perspective on expressed prejudice leads to misconceptions about microaggression research. Ultimately, the Lilienfeld (2017) piece is a compelling case for considering, whenever possible, the perspectives of those for whom the surrounding historical context of prejudice is most salient. This need is particularly great with respect to research questions that examine the experience of prejudice and thereby directly rely on the wisdom of individuals who come from traditionally marginalized groups and thus are personally steeped in the history, traditions, and thought perspectives that arise from those conditions.

One crucible for theories of religion is their ability to predict and explain the patterns of belief and disbelief. Yet, religious nonbelief is often heavily stigmatized, potentially leading many atheists to refrain from outing themselves even in anonymous polls. We used the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation to indirectly estimate atheist prevalence in two nationally representative samples of 2,000 U.S. adults apiece. Widely cited telephone polls (e.g., Gallup, Pew) suggest U.S. atheist prevalence of only 3–11%. In contrast, our most credible indirect estimate is 26% (albeit with considerable estimate and method uncertainty). Our data and model predict that atheist prevalence exceeds 11% with greater than .99 probability and exceeds 20% with roughly .8 probability. Prevalence estimates of 11% were even less credible than estimates of 40%, and all intermediate estimates were more credible. Some popular theoretical approaches to religious cognition may require heavy revision to accommodate actual levels of religious disbelief.

There is currently extensive debate in psychological science about how to improve the field’s replicability (e.g. Lindsay, 2015). In this paper I explore the meta-scientific question of who is pushing for changes to the way research is done, and why. I aim to contribute to the debate in 2 ways: First, I use system justification theory (SJT; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) to derive (pre-registered) hypotheses about differences between junior and senior researchers, and as a framework for reflecting on the current debate. Results show that tenured social psychologists are more likely to defend the status quo, and to perceive more costs (relative to benefits) to proposed initiatives such as direct replications and pre-registration, than are those who are untenured. Second, all materials and the data from 406 research psychologists are available on the OSF, and I invite other researchers to make full use of them.

People like positive objects (e.g., fun activities) and dislike negative objects (e.g., boring activities). However, objects usually do not appear in isolation; They are often objects of an action (the boring activities were removed from a class). Using a wide array of stimuli and procedures, 11 experiments (N = 5,574) found that evaluation of objects is biased by the outcome of an action performed on the objects. For example, when participants read that a gene increases the likelihood of possessing the trait kindness (an action with a positive outcome) they evaluated kindness more positively than after reading the gene inhibits the trait (an action with a negative outcome). Conversely, they disliked dishonesty more after reading about genes that increased dishonesty than after reading about genes that decreased dishonesty. The effect was incompatible with logical inference from the information provided. We found evidence that misattribution of the valence of the action’s outcome to the action’s object contributes to this effect. These findings extend knowledge about the factors that lead to evaluative change. Importantly, the results demonstrate a recursive evaluation process: the valence of the outcome of an action on the object determines the evaluation of the object, but the valence of the outcome is already based on a previous evaluation of the object itself.

NOTE: This paper has been revised and renamed. The most current version can be found at: https://psyarxiv.com/gb5am/

Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims. Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can (a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and (b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the theory of mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record

We explored the possibility of a general brightness bias: brighter pictures are evaluated more positively, while darker pictures are evaluated more negatively. In Study 1 we found that positive pictures are brighter than negative pictures in two affective picture databases (the IAPS and the GAPED). Study 2 revealed that because researchers select affective pictures on the extremity of their affective rating without controlling for brightness differences, pictures used in positive conditions of experiments were on average brighter than those used in negative conditions. Going beyond correlational support for our hypothesis, Studies 3 and 4 showed that brighter versions of neutral pictures were evaluated more positively than darker versions of the same picture. Study 5 revealed that people categorized positive words more quickly than negative words after a bright prime picture, and vice versa for negative pictures. Together, these studies provide strong support for the hypotheses that picture brightness influences evaluations.

Finkel, Eastwick, and Reis (2016; FER2016) argued the post-2011 methodological reform movement has focused narrowly on replicability, neglecting other essential goals of research. We agree multiple scientific goals are essential, but argue, however, a more fine-grained language, conceptualization, and approach to replication is needed to accomplish these goals. Replication is the general empirical mechanism for testing and falsifying theory. Sufficiently methodologically similar replications, also known as direct replications, test the basic existence of phenomena and ensure cumulative progress is possible a priori. In contrast, increasingly methodologically dissimilar replications, also known as conceptual replications, test the relevance of auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., manipulation and measurement issues, contextual factors) required to productively investigate validity and generalizability. Without prioritizing replicability, a field is not empirically falsifiable. We also disagree with FER2016's position that "bigger samples are generally better, but . . . that very large samples could have the downside of commandeering resources that would have been better invested in other studies" (abstract). We identify problematic assumptions involved in FER2016's modifications of our original research-economic model, and present an improved model that quantifies when (and whether) it is reasonable to worry that increasing statistical power will engender potential trade-offs. Sufficiently powering studies (i.e., >80%) maximizes both research efficiency and confidence in the literature (research quality). Given that we are in agreement with FER2016 on all key open science points, we are eager to start seeing the accelerated rate of cumulative knowledge development of social psychological phenomena such a sufficiently transparent, powered, and falsifiable approach will generate. (PsycINFO Database Record

Long-established rituals in pre-existing cultural groups have been linked to the cultural evolution of group cooperation. Here we test the prediction that novel rituals – arbitrary hand and body gestures enacted in a stereotypical and repeated fashion – can impact intergroup bias in newly formed groups. In four studies, participants practiced novel rituals at home for one week (Experiments 1, 2, 4) or once in the lab (pre-registered Experiment 3), and were divided into minimal ingroups and outgroups. Our results offer mixed support for the hypothesis that novel rituals promote intergroup bias. A modest effect for daily repeated rituals but a null effect for rituals enacted only once suggests that novel rituals can inculcate bias, but only when certain features are present: rituals must be sufficiently elaborate and repeated to impact bias. Taken together, our results offer modest support for the influence of novel rituals on intergroup bias.

Research on reducing or controlling implicit bias has been characterized by a tension between the two goals of reducing lingering intergroup disparities and gaining insight into human cognition. The tension between these two goals has created two distinct research traditions, each of which is characterized by different research questions, methods, and ultimate goals. We argue that the divisions between these research traditions are more apparent than real and that the two research traditions could be synergistic. We attempt to integrate the two traditions by arguing that implicit bias, and the disparities it is presumed to cause, is a public health problem. Based on this perspective, we identify shortcomings in our current knowledge of controlling implicit bias and provide a set of recommendations for future research.

Previous research has demonstrated that, when negative metastereotypes are made salient, members of low status groups help members of high status groups in order to improve the reputation of their low status group and its associated social identity. The present research investigated three potential moderators of low status groups’ outgroup helping: ingroup identification, audience group membership, and perceived reputational benefit. In Study 1 (N = 112) we found that members of a low status group (Keele University students) were most likely to offer to help raise funds for a high status group (University of Birmingham students) when they were high identifiers who had considered a negative metastereotype and believed that their responses would be viewed by an outgroup member. In Study 2 (N = 100) we found a similar effect in an intergroup context that referred to psychology students (low status ingroup) and junior doctors (high status outgroup), showing that the effect was limited to people who perceived reputational benefit in helping the outgroup. The practical and social implications of these findings are discussed in relation to intergroup contact and international relations.

This meta-analysis examines the effects of transcranial direct current brain stimulation (tDCS) applied to the prefrontal cortex on a variety of social behaviors including aggression, overeating, impulsivity, bias, honesty, and risk-taking. 48 studies were included in this meta-analysis, N=2,196. tDCS was found to have an overall effect size of d=-0.2, which means tDCS reduced the undesirable behavior by a small but significant amount. tDCS was most effective at reducing risk-taking behavior, bias, and overeating. tDCS was not significantly effective at reducing aggression, impulsivity, or dishonesty. Moderators such as brain region of interest, online versus offline stimulation, within versus between subjects designs, dose, and duration were examined. Publication bias was also examined with three different tools, and significant publication bias was found in the literature in this meta-analysis. These findings indicate high likelihood that many tDCS studies with null findings exist and have not been added to our published literature. Taken together, these results suggest that tDCS works better on some social behaviors than others, but overall, can reduce antisocial behavior by a small but significant amount.Keywords: transcranial direct current stimulation, meta-analysis, social psychology, prefrontal cortex, prosocial behavior

In June 2016, British voters took part in a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. By a margin of 52%:48%, they voted to leave. Until now, polling data has consistently demonstrated that fixed demographic factors were the best predictors of voting intentions in either direction, but we investigated the role of moral intuitions. Before adding psychological variables, older age, being male, and lower educational attainment predicted the Brexit vote. After adding psychological variables, though, these were non-significant predictors of the vote. Instead, Brexit voting was predicted by political conservatism, ontological insecurities, and an adherence to the liberty foundation of morality. In contrast, only an adherence to the care foundation of morality was significantly predictive of a vote to remain in the EU. These findings were also reflected in linguistic analyses of campaign materials and news items. Our data question some common-sense commentaries of the EU referendum campaign.

Research on ego depletion often employs a dual-task setting with short tasks to study limits of consecutive self-control. However, this time frame is smaller than the time frame of the behaviours such as smoking which ego depletion research was initially set out to explain. In two studies, 83 (54 female, M = 24.0 years, SD = 3.2) and 92 (78 female, M = 22.6 years, SD = 6.1) completed four (Study 1) or twelve dual-task blocks (Study 2). Findings did not show consistent ego depletion effects. Instead, performance was stable or increased over the course of the experiments, depending on the task measure. These results demonstrate that self-control is not as volatile as suggested by the large body of research using one short dual-task setting. Instead, participants are able to adapt to re-occurring self-control demands in the presence of various other self-control demands, painting a brighter picture of human self-control.

I discuss the function of social identity signaling in facilitating cooperative group formation, and how the nature of that function changes with the structure of social organization. I propose that signals of social identity facilitate assortment for successful coordination in large-scale societies, and that the multidimensional, context-dependent nature of social identity is crucial for successful coordination when individuals have to cooperate in different contexts. Furthermore, the structure of social identity is tied to the structure of society, so that as societies grow larger and more interconnected, the landscape of social identities grows more heterogeneous. This discussion bears directly on the need to articulate the dynamics of emergent, ephemeral groups as a major factor in human cultural evolution.

Previous research has shown that the people in low status, negatively-valued groups are perceived to be more homogeneous than the people in high status, positively-valued groups. The present research investigated the possibility of an opposite effect in which people perceive positive groups to be more homogeneous than negative groups. The researchers hypothesized that winning groups would be perceived to be more homogenous than losing groups because group homogeneity is associated with group cohesiveness, and group cohesiveness has a positive value in the context of an intergroup competition. In a first experiment (N = 175), target groups varied according to their objective group variability and whether they won or lost a competition. As predicted, winning groups were perceived to be significantly more homogenous than losing groups regardless of their objective variability. In a second experiment (N = 186), these effects were replicated using different social groups, and the effect of group performance on homogeneity judgements was mediated by perceptions of group cohesiveness.

Social identity theory proposes that the need for self-esteem motivates group members to protect and enhance the positivity of their group. In this chapter, we explain this self-esteem hypothesis in detail and discuss its caveats and limitations. We also discuss recent work that proposes a dynamic relation between collective self-esteem and group-related outcomes. Based on this discussion, we present a reformulated version of the self-esteem hypothesis that makes more specific predictions than the original. We also broaden the scope of the self-esteem hypothesis by taking into account identity management strategies other than intergroup discrimination. Hence, this chapter moves beyond the blunt question of whether self-esteem motivates intergroup discrimination and instead provides a more nuanced explanation of the various issues that need to be considered when investigating the relation between the need for self-esteem and group behaviour.

Income inequality gained increasing attention in public discourse. Promoting upward mobility is a potential solution to income inequality. The current study tested whether upward mobility predicts greater well-being, whether upward mobility attenuates the negative effects of income inequality, and whether gender differences in upward mobility differentially predict well-being for men and women. Upward mobility was operationalized as changes in income rank across generations for families in the lowest income quartile. In a pre-registered study on 917,331 US workers, results supported neither the main effect of upward mobility nor the moderating role of upward mobility on the association between income inequality and life satisfaction. Gender differences in upward mobility did not consistently predict well-being of men or women. The null results were robust across measures of well-being, measures of upward mobility, and different analytical strategies. The results consistently indicated that regional upward mobility may have little to no association with well-being.

One feature attributed to moral disgust is the sensation that immorality is physically contaminating, as shown by experiments in which participants are unwilling to contact immoral objects like a Nazi officer’s hat. We propose that a different concern drives the apparent contagiousness of immorality: associating visibly with immoral stimuli risks reputation damage because observers will infer immorality by association. Hypothetical (Study 1) and behavioral (Study 2) evidence supported this account. Forced to choose, participants preferred to wear a Nazi armband under rather than over their clothing, even though this meant direct skin contact. The “under” preference was stronger with an audience. Despite reporting strong disgust towards the armband, participant reported little contamination concern but strong reputation concern. Changing perspective, targets who touched but concealed the armband were not seen as contaminated or immoral (Study 3). Contrary to previous conceptions, moral disgust may not involve intuitions of physical contamination.

Socially relevant tasks reliably elicit activity in the theory of mind network (ToMN), but the computations implemented within these regions have remained unclear. Following recent suggestions that ToMN activity tracks prediction error in social contexts, we examined the by-stimuli relationship between ToMN activity and dispositional, prescriptive, and descriptive prediction error, all of which have been identified as critical sources of information in classic social psychological research. Participants read moral narratives in which agents made moral (or immoral) decisions. Additional information reframed these narratives, reversing participants’ initial moral judgments. Study 1 normed these stimuli in an online sample (N = 554), identifying underlying dimensions of dispositional, prescriptive, and descriptive prediction error using principal components analysis. Study 2 compared by-stimuli prediction error with ToMN activity as participants (N=20) read the same scenarios inside the scanner. Multilevel models provided estimates of by-stimuli estimates of behavioral ratings in Study 1, and ToMN activity in Study 2, allowing the samples to be compared. ToMN activity was related to dispositional and prescriptive prediction error, but not to descriptive prediction error. Critically, significant relationships were observed only when morally relevant information was presented (as opposed to morally irrelevant, control information). Thus, the present work provides evidence that the ToMN encodes prediction error in social contexts.

Humans commonly punish exploitative group members but punishment is also frequently targeted at cooperative individuals. The proclivity for ‘antisocial punishment’ varies widely across societies, although the reasons for this variation remain unclear. Here, we identify personality factors associated with antisocial punishment, using a joy-of-destruction game with participants from India and the USA. This game allows players to harm one another, by destroying the partner’s earnings, without any strategic incentive for doing so. High Dark Triad scores, implying the presence of personality traits underlying selfish and aggressive behavior, predicted destruction in this game. Participants from India scored higher on the Dark Triad scale than players from the USA, and were more likely than US-based participants to destroy the partner’s endowment. These data suggest that Dark Triad personality traits could be a proximate explanation for antisocial behavior.

This manual focuses on the use of imagery particularly mental simulations as a specific form of imagery and a means to change health behaviour. Imagery refers to a set of techniques that have been used in interventions to change behaviour in multiple contexts, including health. This manual will provide detail on the background and theory behind the use of imagery to change behaviour, introduce mental simulations as one form of imagery, outline how mental simulation interventions work, and provide a step-by-step guide on how to develop, implement, and evaluate an imagery behaviour-change intervention.

This chapter provides an overview of research on positive emotions and autonomic reactivity.The chapter is published in Oxford University Press' "Positive Emotion: Integrating the Light Sides and Dark Sides" edited by J. Gruber and J.T. Moskowitz.

Tacit coordination between individuals has received considerable research attention (Mehta, Starmer & Sugden, 1994; Abele, & Stasser, 2008). However, groups often must coordinate tacitly with other groups, and such intergroup coordination has been rarely studied. In three experiments, we found that interacting groups are more successful at coordinating tacitly than are individuals. This advantage is driven by two types of coordination salience that are uniquely derived from groups deliberating and making collective responses. Consensual salience occurs when groups select a response because a majority of members support it. Majorities efficiently identify popular response tendencies (i.e., focal points) and thereby increase the chances of matching other groups’ responses. Disjunctive salience occurs when at least one member of a group suggests a focal point. We propose that focal points are often demonstratively evident when mentioned, and if proposed by any group member, are likely to be adopted as the group response.

The need for closure predicts an evaluative bias against people whose opinions or behaviors deviate from other members of their social groups (Doherty, K. T., 1998; Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M., 1991; Schimel, J., et al., 1999). In the present study, we investigated whether the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias generalized to nonsocial stimuli, and we examined the process underlying this relationship. Sixty-one undergraduate students completed measures of the need for closure, the need for structure, intolerance for ambiguity, and the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure. They then rated their liking for letters of the Latin alphabet (“A” & “B”) whose locations were consistent and inconsistent with relevant categories (“A circle” & “B circle”). Participants liked category-inconsistent letters less than category-consistent letters. Measures related to the need for structure and closed-mindedness correlated positively with this deviant bias, whereas measures related to the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure did not. These results imply that the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias is a relatively basic and pervasive effect that is not unique to social deviance and that is driven by the need for structure and closed-mindedness. Implications for social and nonsocial stimuli are discussed.

Terror management theory (TMT) proposes that thoughts of death trigger a concern about self-annihilation that motivates the defense of cultural worldviews. In contrast, uncertainty theorists propose that thoughts of death trigger feelings of uncertainty that motivate worldview defense. University students (N = 414) completed measures of the chronic fear of self-annihilation and existential uncertainty as well as the need for closure. They then evaluated either a meaning threat stimulus or a control stimulus. Consistent with TMT, participants with a high fear of self-annihilation and a high need for closure showed the greatest dislike of the meaning threat stimulus, even after controlling for their existential uncertainty. Contrary to the uncertainty perspective, fear of existential uncertainty showed no significant effects.

Despite envy’s importance as a driver of social behavior, scholars disagree on its conceptualization. We review the literature and distinguish three incongruent theories: (a) Malicious Envy Theory (i.e., envy as uniform and malicious), (b) Dual Envy Theory (i.e., envy as taking on two forms, benign and malicious), and (c) Pain Theory of Envy (i.e., envy as uniform and driven by pain). Moreover, within and across theories, operationalizations of envy have included various different components. We integrate these conceptualizations using a data-driven approach, deriving a comprehensive theory of envy in five studies (total N = 1,237)—the Pain-driven Dual Envy (PaDE) Theory. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of an exhaustive set of envy components (Studies 1-4) suggest that envy consists of three factors: Pain (i.e., preoccupation with the envy-eliciting situation, inferiority), predicts both benign envy (i.e., desire for the envy object, improvement motivation, emulation of the other), and malicious envy (i.e., communication about the other, directed aggression, nondirected aggression). An experience-sampling study (Study 5) suggests that pain constitutes a quickly fading reaction, whereas benign and malicious envy are enduring attitudinal constructs. We apply this theory in a meta-analysis on the controversial relation of envy and schadenfreude (N = 4,366), finding that envy and schadenfreude are more strongly and positively correlated to the extent that the respective research operationalizes envy as malicious, compared to as pain or benign envy. We discuss how the PaDE Theory can illuminate research on envy in diverse settings, and envy’s relation to other distinct emotions.

According to the common-sense model of self-regulation, individuals form lay representations of illnesses that guide coping procedures to manage illness threat. We meta-analyzed studies adopting the model to (a) examine the intercorrelations among illness representation dimensions, coping strategies, and illness outcomes; (b) test the sufficiency of a process model in which relations between illness representations and outcomes were mediated by coping strategies; and (c) test effects of moderators on model relations. Studies adopting the common-sense model in chronic illness (k = 254) were subjected to random-effects meta-analysis. The pattern of zero-order corrected correlations among illness representation dimensions (identity, consequences, timeline, perceived control, illness coherence, emotional representations), coping strategies (avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, emotion venting, problem-focused generic, problem-focused specific, seeking social support), and illness outcomes (disease state, distress, well-being, physical, role, and social functioning) was consistent with previous analyses. Meta-analytic path analyses supported a process model that included direct effects of illness representations on outcomes and indirect effects mediated by coping. Emotional representations and perceived control were consistently related to illness-related and functional outcomes via, respectively, lower and greater employment of coping strategies to deal with symptoms or manage treatment. Representations signaling threat (consequences, identity) had specific positive and negative indirect effects on outcomes through problem- and emotion-focused coping strategies. There was little evidence of moderation of model effects by study design, illness type and context, and study quality. A revised process model is proposed to guide future research which includes effects of moderators, individual differences, and beliefs about coping and treatment. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP) is a frequently-used laboratory measure of aggressive behavior. However, the flexibility inherent in its implementation and analysis can undermine its validity. To test whether the TAP was a valid aggression measure irrespective of this flexibility, I conducted a preregistered study of a 25-trial version of the TAP using a single scoring approach with 160 diverse undergraduate participants. TAP scores showed agreement with other laboratory aggression measures and were magnified by an experimental provocation manipulation. Mixed evidence was found for associations with aggressive dispositions and real-world violence. These results provide preliminary support for this approach to the TAP to measure state-level aggressive behavior. However, more evidence is needed to assess the TAP’s external validity and ability to measure dispositional forms of aggression. Using preregistered designs, researchers should validate specific variants of their behavioral tasks in order to optimize the veridicality and reproducibility of psychological science.

Mounting evidence supports longstanding claims that religions can extend cooperative networks. However, religious prosociality may have a strongly parochial component. Moreover, aspects of religion may promote or exacerbate conflict with those outside a given religious group, promoting regional violence, intergroup conflict, as well as tacit prejudice against nonbelievers. Anti-atheist prejudice—a growing concern in increasingly secular societies—affects employment, elections, family life, and broader social inclusion. Preliminary work in the USA suggests that anti-atheist prejudice stems, in part, from deeply rooted intuitions about religion’s putatively necessary role in morality. However, the cross-cultural prevalence and magnitude—as well as intracultural demographic stability—of such intuitions, as manifested in intuitive associations of immorality with atheists, remain unclear. Here, we quantify moral distrust of atheists by applying well-tested measures in a large global sample (N=3256, 13 diverse countries). Consistent with cultural evolutionary theories of religion and morality, people in most—but not all—countries viewed extreme moral violations as representative of atheists. Notably, anti-atheist prejudice was even evident among atheist participants around the world. Results contrast with recent polls that do not find self-reported moral prejudice against atheists in highly secular countries15, and imply that the recent rise in secularism in Western countries has not overwritten intuitive anti-atheist prejudice. Entrenched moral suspicion of atheists suggests that religion’s powerful influence on moral judgements persists, even among nonbelievers in secular societies.

Consuming coffee without (or with less) sugar may help people lower their daily calorie intake without restrictive dieting. We tested two theory-based interventions to help people do so. One involved gradually reducing sugar over time, and the other was based on mindfulness theory. These interventions were compared to a repeated exposure (to sugar-free coffee) group. Participants in all conditions had significant increases in consumption of sugar-free coffee that lasted 6 months. The mindfulness group had a larger increase than the others. Unexpectedly, the gradual reduction intervention led to a decrease in liking for sugar-free coffee and was the least effective.

In the wake of the Great Recession, rising inequality has increased social class disparities between people in society. In this research, we examine how differences in social class shape unique patterns of cultural expression, and how these cultural expressions affirm ingroup beliefs. In Study 1 (N=113), we provide evidence that cultural expressions of social class on an online social network can signal the social class of targets: by simply viewing the cultural practices of individuals captured in uploaded Facebook photographs, individuals express their social class in ways that allow it to be perceived by strangers at levels that are above chance accuracy. In Study 2 (N=78), we provide evidence that individuals express their own ingroup space differently based on social class: Class-specific cultural practices (including interests in education, arts, newspapers, TV, and shopping) have implications for ingroup-related beliefs and political organizing. Individuals who reported being lower in subjective social class, relative to those reporting higher subjective social class, show cultural practices that relate to recognizing the ingroup’s relative lack of control (lower group efficacy) and, in turn, a tendency to remain politically inactive when faced with an ingroup-related social disadvantage. In sum, our research provides evidence suggesting that expressions of culture derived from one’s social class have the capacity to create and maintain social class boundaries between individuals. Practical and political implications are discussed.

Seeing someone in need may evoke a particular kind of closeness that has been conceptualized as sympathy or empathic concern (which is distinct from other empathy constructs). In other contexts, when people suddenly feel close to others, or observe others suddenly feeling closer to each other, this sudden closeness tends to evoke an emotion often labeled in vernacular English as being moved, touched, or heart-warming feelings. Recent theory and empirical work indicates that this is a distinct emotion; the construct is named kama muta. Is empathic concern for people in need simply an expression of the much broader tendency to respond with kama muta to all kinds of situations that afford closeness, such as reunions, kindness, and expressions of love? Across 16 studies sampling 2918 participants, we explored whether empathic concern is associated with kama muta. Meta-analyzing the association between ratings of state being moved and trait empathic concern revealed an effect size of, r(3631) = 0.35 [95% CI: 0.29, 0.41]. In addition, trait empathic concern was also associated with self-reports of the three sensations that have been shown to be reliably indicative of kama muta: weeping, chills, and bodily feelings of warmth. We conclude that empathic concern might actually be a part of the kama muta construct. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion