401. Stochastically stable equilibria in -person binary coordination games
- Author
-
Toshimasa Maruta and Akira Okada
- Subjects
education.field_of_study ,Stochastic stability ,Sociology and Political Science ,Population ,General Social Sciences ,Binary number ,Random matching ,Strategy ,Equilibrium selection ,Best response ,Coordination game ,Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty ,education ,Mathematical economics ,General Psychology ,Mathematics - Abstract
Best response structure of n -person binary coordination games suggests that equilibrium selection outcome is determined by the balance of the ordinal aspects and the cardinal aspects of the game. This intuition inspires new equilibrium selection results for that class of games under the adaptive play with mistakes. Detailed comparison of the adaptive play and the single population random matching is made possible by these results. It turns out that stochastic stability in the adaptive play depends sharply on details of the ordinal, pure strategy best response structure that are indiscernible to the single population random matching.
- Published
- 2012
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