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Where sporting games may be said to epitomize our species' unique agential capacity for playful movement, sports played in nature differ from their equivalent played indoors in that they envelop the human agent within the living physical environment from which our agency originates. In this paper, we draw attention to how sporting sites differ according to origin by pursuing a biosemiotic line of reasoning. Here, the story of a meaningful human life begins with the eukaryotic cell, even though the human subject itself arises much later. As such, the story of nature in relation to our agency, here, in sports, changes too. We present key concepts from biosemiotics, including its continuum life-as-semiotic-agency view, Umwelt, metasemiosis, and semiotic scaffolding to advance our argument that naturogenic sporting sites provide continuity to the macro processes that have generated our semiotic ability to play. Meanwhile, secluded anthropogenic environments constitute yet another discontinuity for the modern sportsperson where the moving body steps into an anthroposemiotic loop and its restricted signscapes from centralized agency. We conclude on the primacy of naturogenic sporting sites as they preserve the quality and complexity of animal ludens' constitutive relations and therefrom semiotic freedom, on which current and future gameplaying depends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the question of whether nature sports are to be counted among the (traditional) sports and Kevin Krein's recent argument, based on sporting excellence, as to why they should. Krein argues that sports as such are ultimately about sporting excellence and because both so-called traditional sports and nature sports fulfil that criterion, nature sports belong in the sport domain. Here, I show that Krein's argument rests on an equivocation between two concepts of sporting excellence. Sporting excellence in traditional sports is connected to sporting success. Here agon (contest or competition) dictates or frames areté (striving for excellence). This is not the case for sporting excellence in nature sports, as these are not competitions. We are dealing with two different concepts of sporting excellence and Krein's argument, based on sporting excellence, must be rejected. It gives no basis for including nature sports in the sport domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this article is to reconstruct and comment on Bernard Suits' argument concerning the paradoxicality of the perfectly played game and explain how the argument might contribute to the game vs. performance distinction. The argument was mentioned by Suits in 'Tricky Triad: Games, Play and Sport' in the course of argumentation for the distinction between games and performances but it has not been presented in any of Suits' works published during his lifetime. However, Suits' fonds deposited in the Special Collections and Archive of the University of Waterloo contains two texts that were nevertheless meant for publication: 'A Perfectly Played Game' (recently published as Appendix III to Suits' Return of the Grasshopper) and unpublished 'The Search for a Perfectly Fair Game'. The latter is a modified version of the former; there is an overlapping core in both texts, but there are also some essential differences between them. To provide a formula capable of embracing Suits' ideas from both texts and remove the tension between the ideas of a perfectly played and perfectly fair game, I introduce the concept of a perfect game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its beginnings, modern bodybuilding has been accompanied by the background issue of whether it should be considered a sport. The problem, culminating in its provisional acceptance as a sport by the International Olympic Committee, was later retracted. The uncertainty of whether bodybuilding is a sport or not seems to linger. Addressing this issue, Aranyosi (2018) provided an account to determine the status of bodybuilding as a sport that arrives at the negative answer: bodybuilding is not a sport but rather a form of artistic presentation. In this paper, we disagree with Aranyosi. We argue that by the standards he presents in his first argument, bodybuilding should be considered a sport. Further, we argue that his alternative approach on how to evaluate a discipline as more sport- or art-like on a spectrum, is not a valid basis to make such a judgment regarding bodybuilding. Further, even if his spectrum was modified to enable such a judgment, again it would result in bodybuilding being evaluated as a sport. Therefore, we conclude that everyone who accepts Aranyosi´s (or any less restrictive) requirements to decide whether bodybuilding is a sport, has to consider bodybuilding as a sport or refrain from making claims about its status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most interesting open problems of a digraph is Seymour's Second Neighborhood Conjecture (SSNC), which asserts that every digraph D has a vertex v satisfying d + + (v) ≥ d + (v) , we called such vertex v a Seymour vertex. Sullivan stated two compromise conjectures on SSNC. Let v ∈ V (D) if d + + (v) ≥ d − (v) , then v is called a Sullivan-1 vertex. If d + + (v) + d + (v) ≥ 2 d − (v) , then v is called a Sullivan-2 vertex. In this paper, we give a condition that the digraph has n Seymour vertices. And we also prove that every random tournament T n has n Sullivan-1 vertices and at least n 2 − n log n Sullivan-2 vertices with high probability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we consider the quantum Zakharov system { i u t + μ Δ u − Δ 2 u = n u , α − 2 n t t − μ Δ n + Δ 2 n = Δ | u | 2 , (t , x) ∈ [ 0 , T) × R d , where μ ≥ 0 and α > 0 is a wave speed. We show blow-up or grow-up for the quantum Zakharov system with 0 < α < + ∞ and with α = + ∞ under the radial assumption when 6 ≤ d ≤ 9. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to generalize a statement by Drinfeld, asserting that Yangians can be constructed as limit forms of the quantum loop algebras, to the super case. We establish a connection between quantum loop superalgebra and super Yangian of the general linear Lie superalgebra gl M | N in RTT type presentation. In particular, we derive the Poincaré-Birkhoff-Witt(PBW) theorem for the quantum loop superalgebra U q (Lgl M | N). Additionally, we investigate the application of the same argument to twisted super Yangian of the ortho-symplectic Lie superalgebra. For this purpose, we introduce the twisted quantum loop superalgebra as a one-sided coideal of U q (Lgl M | 2 n) with respect to the comultiplication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objection to pragmatism about knowledge is that it entails that truth-irrelevant factors can make a difference to knowledge. Blake Roeber [2018. "Anti-Intellectualism." Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 127: 437–466] has recently argued that this objection fails. I agree with Roeber. But in this paper, I present another way of thinking about the dispute between purists and pragmatists about knowledge. I do so by formulating a new objection to pragmatism about knowledge. This is that pragmatism about knowledge entails that factors irrelevant to both truth and 'cognitive agency' can make a difference to knowledge. An interesting additional upshot of my argument is the connection revealed between the debate between pragmatists and purists about knowledge, and the debate between 'alethists' and pragmatists about reasons for belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Axiarchism holds that fundamental concrete reality is necessarily ordered toward goodness. I argue that it is not fully rational to reject axiarchism while also rejecting radical skepticism. A key premise in the argument is that among conceivable worlds that contain one's internal duplicate, 'epistemically inhospitable' worlds (i.e. worlds where all or most of one's internal duplicates are radically deceived) are predominant. This predominance of inhospitable worlds provides a prima facie reason for thinking that the actual world is probably inhospitable. To avoid skepticism, this prima facie support for inhospitableness must be countered by a good reason to think that the actual world is probably epistemically hospitable. I argue that opponents of axiarchism lack any such reason. I consider various non-axiarchic ways of dismissing the inhospitable world hypothesis, including appeals to simplicity considerations and to a certain 'representationalist' theory of phenomenal consciousness, and find them wanting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political realists have devoted much effort to clarifying the methodological specificity of realist theorising and defending its consistency as an approach to political reasoning. Yet the question of how to justify the realist approach has not received the same attention. In this article, I offer a prudential justification of political realism. To do so, I first characterise realism as anti-moralism. I then outline three possible arguments for the realist approach by availing myself of recent inquiries into the metatheoretical basis of realism: The metaethical, the ethical and the prudential arguments. I explain that the prudential argument offers the most solid basis for political realism because it relies on the least controversial premises. Still, I delve into the metaethical and ethical arguments for two reasons: The prudential argument takes advantage of the theses defended by the rival arguments and elaborating the other arguments shows the comparative strengths of the prudential argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes content questions in Sm'algyax (or Coast Tsimshian, Maritime Tsimshianic) based on novel fieldwork. I outline the complex morphosyntactic reflexes of movement, or "extraction," including wh -movement, relativization, and focus. Despite behaving rigidly ergative in terms of number and person agreement, Sm'algyax exhibits a three-way distinction when extracting core arguments of the predicate: the extraction of an intransitive subject, a transitive subject, and a direct object are all marked uniquely. Extraction therefore reveals an underlying structural distinction between intransitive subjects and transitive objects that is not otherwise apparent in their in situ positions. We observe similar phenomena in the extraction of oblique arguments: a number of extraction configurations mark different types of adjunct and non-core argument extraction that are often marked identically in situ. Moving beyond local movement, I show that long-distance movement is possible and exhibits the same morphosyntactic marking found in local movement in each intermediate clause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The beta (type 1) and inverted beta distributions are of vital importance in science, engineering and economics. In this article, we introduce a matrix variate generalization of the inverted beta distribution. By using linear and quadratic transformations, we obtain several matrix variate distributions including matrix variate generalized beta type 1 distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are philosophical arguments as effective as narratives in influencing charitable giving and attitudes toward it? In four experiments, we exposed online research participants to either philosophical arguments in favor of charitable giving, a narrative about a child whose life was improved by charitable donations, both the narrative and the argument, or a control text (a passage from a middle school physics text or a description of charitable organizations). Participants then expressed their attitudes toward charitable giving and were either asked how much they would hypothetically donate if given $10 (Experiment 1) or told they had a 10% chance of winning $10 and given the opportunity to donate from their potential winnings (Experiments 2–4). Across the four experiments, participants in all of the narrative conditions and in some of the argument conditions tended to express more positive attitudes toward charitable giving and donated about $1 more on average than did participants in the control conditions. These effects appear to have been mediated by the "narrative transportation" scale, which suggests that appeals to donate can be effective if they engage participants' emotions, imagery, and interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the critical p$$ p $$‐Laplacian equation of Kirchhoff type −M∫ℝN|∇u|pdxΔpu+V(x)|u|p−2u=λK(x)f(u)+|u|p∗−2u,x∈ℝN,$$ -M\left({\int}_{{\mathrm{\mathbb{R}}}&#x0005E;N}{\left&#x0007C;\nabla u\right&#x0007C;}&#x0005E;p dx\right){\Delta}_pu&#x0002B;V(x){\left&#x0007C;u\right&#x0007C;}&#x0005E;{p-2}u&#x0003D;\lambda K(x)f(u)&#x0002B;{\left&#x0007C;u\right&#x0007C;}&#x0005E;{p&#x0005E;{\ast }-2}u,x\in {\mathrm{\mathbb{R}}}&#x0005E;N, $$ where M$$ M $$ is the Kirchhoff function, Δpu=div(|∇u|p−2∇u)$$ {\Delta}_pu&#x0003D;\operatorname{div}\left({\left&#x0007C;\nabla u\right&#x0007C;}&#x0005E;{p-2}\nabla u\right) $$ with N20$$ N\ge 2,\lambda >0 $$ is a parameter, p∗=Np/(N−p)$$ {p}&#x0005E;{\ast }&#x0003D; Np/\left(N-p\right) $$, and the potentials V$$ V $$ and K$$ K $$ vanish at infinity. Under some suitable assumptions on f$$ f $$, by using the constraint minimization approach, we obtain a least energy sign‐changing solution uλ$$ {u}_{\lambda } $$ to this problem if λ$$ \lambda $$ is large enough and show the energy of uλ$$ {u}_{\lambda } $$ is strictly larger than twice that of the ground state solutions. Moreover, by considering a wider class of M$$ M $$ and f$$ f $$, we exploit the truncation argument to find a nontrivial solution if λ$$ \lambda $$ is sufficiently large via some analytic skills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his remarkable new book, Emotion and Virtue, Sreenivasan defends the view that, in the case of many virtues, in order for an exemplar of each of these virtues to be a reliable judge of what that virtue requires in specific circumstances, she must possess a particular, morally rectified, emotional trait. In this article, I raise two challenges to “the argument from salience” that Sreenivasan offers in favor of this view. First, I argue that, although Sreenivasan wishes to remain neutral about different philosophical theories of emotions, the success of his argument depends, in fact, on the outcome of the debate about the nature of emotions. Second, I challenge the central claim of Sreenivasan's argument from salience, namely, that the possession of a morally rectified emotional trait, cleverness, and supplementary moral knowledge is sufficient to explain an agent's ability to reliably judge what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that life is a strongly emergent phenomenon. For the project of drawing a real distinction between living and non‐living beings cannot but appeal to strongly emergent powers. First, I introduce some features whose possession is typically taken to be sufficient for possessing life, i.e., Life‐Sufficient Features (or LS‐Features). I also clarify what I mean by “strongly emergent powers”. And I fully develop and illustrate my argument. Subsequently, I examine no less than 17 possible reactions to my argument. I show why all of such reactions turn out to be troublesome or inadequate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document presents an elementary approach using ε -Poincaré inequality to prove generation of L p -bounds, p ∈ (1 , ∞) , for the homogeneous Landau equation with moderate soft potentials γ ∈ [ − 2 , 0). The critical case γ = − 2 uses an interpolation approach in the realm of Lorentz spaces and entropy. Alternatively, a direct approach using the Hardy-Littlewood-Sobolev (HLS) inequality and entropy is also presented. On this basis, the generation of pointwise bounds p = ∞ is deduced from a De Giorgi argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using two decades worth of experimental philosophy (aka x-phi), Edouard Machery argues in Philosophy within its Proper Bounds (2017) that philosophers’ use of the “method of cases” is unreliable because it has a strong tendency to elicit different intuitive responses from non-philosophers. And because, as Machery argues, appealing to such cases is usually the only way for philosophers to acquire the kind of knowledge they seek, an extensive philosophical skepticism follows. I argue that Machery’s “Unreliability” argument fails because, once its premises are percisified, they are either self-defeating or without justification. This is a significant result because Machery’s arguments are the most widely cited and discussed x-phi arguments for philosophical skepticism and many hold that Machery provides the most empirically informed, convincing, and thus best case for this kind of skepticism. So, if my arguments are sound, then the best x-phi argument for philosophical skepticism fails. I further argue that this result provides strong reason to believe the more general conclusion that “negative” x-phi is likely doomed: x-phi likely can never support a substantive philosophical skepticism. Ultimately, I argue for the broad conclusion that all empirically minded arguments for philosophical skepticism are likely to fail for the same reasons that Machery’s does, i.e. they are (likely) self-defeating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractHow people distinguish well-justified from poorly justified arguments is not well known. To study the involvement of intuitive and analytic cognitive processes, we contrasted participants’ personal beliefs with argument strength that was determined in relation to established criteria of sound argumentation. In line with previous findings indicating that people have a myside bias, participants (N = 249) made more errors on conflict than on no-conflict trials. On conflict trials, errors and correct responses were practically equal in terms of response times and mouse-tracking indices of hesitation. Similarly to recent findings on formal reasoning, these findings indicate that correct reasoning about informal arguments may not necessitate corrective analytic processing. We compared findings across four argument schemes but found few differences. The findings are discussed in light of intuitive logic theories and the notion that evaluating informal arguments could be based on implicit knowledge of argument criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper investigates participial root configurations, i.e. participial clauses that are grammatically independent of a host clause. Unlike previous work, which has focussed on either directive or (non-directive) performative uses of so-called past participles (i.e. participles that have passive and/or perfect(ive) interpretations), the present paper establishes a typology of 'root participles' in Germanic and contrasts the properties of four main types: (1) directive (RPdir), (2) expressive (RPexp), (3) commissive (RPcom), (4) representative root participles (RPrep). The main claim with respect to the properties of these distinct types is that they differ in terms of whether they include a verbal or an adjectival (passive) participle. In fact, arguments based on argument structure, orientation, aspect, and adverbial modification are presented to substantiate the claim that types (1) and (2) are formed with verbal and types (3) and (4) with adjectival participles. Additionally, the distinct types will be shown to differ in their status of either being non-sentential (i.e. structurally different from potential clausal counterparts) or merely elliptical (just phonologically reduced): types (1) and (3) can be shown to be non-sentential and hence receive a dedicated syntactic analysis, where special attention is paid to the contribution of the (imperative vs. declarative) left periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argument visual states are helpful for detecting structured components of events in videos, and existing methods tend to use object detectors to generate their candidates. However, directly leveraging object features captured by bounding boxes overlooks a deep understanding of object relations and differences between them and real arguments. In this work, we propose a novel framework to generate selective contextual representations of videos, thereby reducing the interference of useless or incorrect object features. Firstly, we construct grid-based object features as graphs based on the internal grid connection and then use graph convolutional network to execute feature aggregation. Secondly, a weighted geometric attention module is designed to obtain the contextual representation of objects, which explicitly combines visual similarity and geometric correlation with different importance proportions. Then, we propose a dual relation-aware selection module for further feature selection. Finally, we utilize labels as the ladder to bridge the gap between object features and semantic roles, while considering the proximity in the semantic space. Experimental results and extensive ablation studies on the VidSitu indicate that our method effectively obtains a deep understanding of events in videos and outperforms state-of-the-art models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The executive veto is one of the most important instruments of presidential power within the legislative arena. Because of constitutional requirements, every regular veto and many pocket vetoes are accompanied by a short letter to Congress from the president describing—often in detail—the reasoning behind the decision to veto. As such, these messages form a unique window into interbranch and partisan conflict over time. While analyses have been conducted on the broad patterns of veto use, questions remain concerning presidential motivations for vetoing as well as how these motivations have evolved over time along with changing political institutions. Using a data set of approximately 2000 unique veto messages from the first in 1792 to the last of President Trump's vetoes in 2021, we examine the content of veto messages to uncover the number and kind of arguments used by presidents when addressing Congress over vetoed legislation. Our analysis uncovers significant variation, with the evolution of arguments within veto messages mirroring broader political trends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has frequently been argued recently that Jeffrey Conditionalization (JC) does not permit undermining. For JC to be inapplicable in cases where the evidence could be undermined would severely compromise JC's range. However, this paper contends that the argument fails to show that JC cannot accommodate undermining. This response turns on using the proper partition to capture the direct impact of our evidence in redistributing our credences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critique of the current version of Derk Pereboom's "disappearing agent argument" against event-causal libertarianism. Special attention is paid to a notion that does a lot of work in his argument—that of settling which decision occurs (of the various decisions it is open to the agent to make at the time). It is argued that Pereboom's disappearing agent argument fails to show that event-causal libertarians lack the resources to accommodate agents' having freedom-level control over what they decide. The connection between the disappearing agent argument and the problem of present luck is explored, as is the connection between settling which decision one makes and luck. Pereboom's disappearing agent argument also is distinguished from another argument with the same name that targets intentional action itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I aim to counter Jason Brennan's principled objection to the Representativeness Argument for compulsory voting, and to criticize the case in favour of voting lotteries, on which this challenge is predicated. In brief, Brennan claims that compulsory voting should be rejected because there is an alternative system, i.e. a voting lottery, which is able to ensure demographic proportionality in electoral turnouts without diminishing the freedom of citizens. But even on the most favourable conception of freedom which the argument can employ, voting lotteries raise a number of serious concerns in respect to this value. Furthermore, while comparing voting lotteries and compulsory voting on the basis of freedom cannot provide any generalizable support for the former, a plausible case can instead be offered in support of the opposite idea, namely that compulsory voting outperforms voting lotteries with respect to freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche's perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of 'perspectives' to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore's treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche's pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1984, Bressoud and Subbarao obtained an interesting weighted partition identity for a generalized divisor function, by means of combinatorial arguments. Recently, the last three named authors found an analytic proof of the aforementioned identity of Bressoud and Subbarao starting from a q-series identity of Ramanujan. In the present paper, we revisit the combinatorial arguments of Bressoud and Subbarao, and derive a more general weighted partition identity. Furthermore, with the help of a fractional differential operator, we establish a few more Bressoud–Subbarao type weighted partition identities beginning from an identity of Andrews, Garvan and Liang. We also found a one-variable generalization of an identity of Uchimura related to Bell polynomials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present numerical algorithms for efficient and highly accurate computations of Fresnel's sine and cosine integrals S(z) and C(z) for real (z = x) and complex (z = x + iy) arguments. The algorithms are based on series expansion for small values of |z|, expansion in Chebyshev subinterval polynomial approximations for intermediate real values (y = 0), toggled with sum of half-integer order Bessel functions for complex arguments, together with asymptotic series expansion for large values of |z|. The present algorithms, implemented in a Fortran elemental module, can be run using any of the single, double, or quadruple precision arithmetic. Results from the present code have been benchmarked versus comprehensive data tables, generated using Maple, Mathematica, and Matlab symbolic toolbox. Compared to a maximum of 16 significant digits in the literature, the present algorithms can calculate S(x) and C(x) up to 28 significant digits in the range xϵ[0, 106] and S(z) and C(z) to the same accuracy in the domain where |S(z)| and |C(z)| each is less than the largest finite floating point number in the precision under consideration with ∣ arg z ∣ < π 2 or more specifically 3 × 10 - 4 < y x < 2 × 10 3 for S(z) and 4 × 10 - 4 < y x < 2.2 × 10 3 for C(z). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I propose two practical advances to the argument‐based approach to validity: developing a living document and incorporating preregistration. First, I present a potential structure for the living document that includes an up‐to‐date summary of the validity argument. As the validation process may span across multiple studies, the living document allows future users of the instrument to access the entire validity argument in one place. Second, I describe how preregistration can be incorporated in the argument‐based approach. Specifically, I distinguish between two types of preregistration: preregistration of the argument and preregistration of validation studies. Preregistration of the argument is a single preregistration that is specified for the entire validation process. Here, the developer specifies interpretations, uses, and claims before collecting validity evidence. Preregistration of a validation study refers to preregistering a single validation study that aims to evaluate a set of claims. Here, the developer describes study components (e.g., research design, data collection, data analysis, etc.), before collecting data. Both preregistration types have the potential to reduce the risk of bias (e.g., hindsight and confirmation biases), as well as to allow others to evaluate the risk of bias and, hence, calibrate confidence, in the developer's evaluation of the validity argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research shows that the rise of political and discursive opportunities enabled by the diffusion of progressive global norms has empowered many aggrieved local actors. Drawing on colonial victims' transnational redress movements, I add to this literature in two ways. First, rejecting the common association between global opportunities and local movement facilitation and success, I make a counterintuitive argument that the early availability of opportunities can inadvertently hamper a movement's efficacy in achieving its goals in the long run. Second, contrary to the implicit assumption that large-scale, high-profile transnational movements should fare better than smaller, little-known ones, I demonstrate that the latter can sometimes achieve their goals more easily than the former. In making these arguments, I show that an increasing focus in the norm literature on backlash in target states against norm promotion risks neglecting the flip side of the same coin: Global normative support inadvertently undermining the efficacy of local causes it otherwise helps publicize. Empirically, I look at three Korean colonial victim groups and their divergent paths to transnational redress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller's argument is not sound. I argue that a coherent non-factualist way of formulating the conditions of correct use of meaning ascriptions may be performed by rejecting the closure principle of assertibility of meaning ascriptions. On this basis, I demonstrate that argument formulated against non-factualist interpretation by Miller may be refuted. What is more, I argue that rejection of the closure principle should be regarded as the central aspect of Kripke's skeptical solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its essential assumptions. This was made possible by an upgraded property exemplification account of events. I also argue against a view which, if true, gives substantial support to the epistemic argument: that a belief justified by other beliefs is knowledge only if it is caused by those beliefs in virtue of their contents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are two kinds of defences for the Phenomenal Principle in the literature, namely, the epistemological one (e.g. H.H. Price) and the semantic one (e.g. Frank Jackson). I argue that neither consolidates the Phenomenal Principle. I particularly demonstrate that the appearance verb in premise 1 of the argument from illusion is not used in the phenomenal sense as it is used in the Phenomenal Principle, which renders the argument essentially invalid. To avoid invalidity, the proponents either give up the phenomenal use, which makes the argument unable to serve its original purpose, i.e. inferring an unusual existence, or they insist on the phenomenal use in all premises of the argument, which will trivialise the argument. I also demonstrate that a similar objection applies to the argument from appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that beliefs about the identity or distinctness of objects are necessary to explain some normal inferential transitions between thoughts in humans. Worries about vicious regress are not powerful enough to dismantle such an argument. As an upshot, the idea that thinkers "trade on" identity without any corresponding belief remains somewhat mysterious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Talking about, Unnsteinsson defends an intentionalist theory of reference by arguing that confused referential intentions degrade reference. Central to this project is a "belief model" of both identity confusion and unconfused thought. By appealing to a well‐known argument from Campbell, I argue that this belief model falls short, because it fails to explain the inferential behavior it promises to explain. Campbell's argument has been central in the contemporary literature on Frege's puzzle, but Unnsteinsson's account of confusion provides an opportunity for more clarity about how the argument is best interpreted, and what it shows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of conceptual improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the dissipative structure for the system of Moore–Gibson–Thompson (MGT) thermoelasticity in the whole space. To analyze the dissipative structure, it is very useful to rewrite the equations into a symmetric hyperbolic system and apply the so‐called stability condition. When we rewrite our system into the symmetric hyperbolic form in the multidimensional case, it is important to take the constraint conditions into account. Indeed, the stability condition with the constraint conditions guarantees the dissipative property for our system in some cases. In this paper, we introduce the stability condition with constraints for the general problem and apply this argument to the system of MGT thermoelasticity. Furthermore, we discuss the optimality of the decay estimates we obtain, together with the no regularity‐loss phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

M. Goresky and R. MacPherson intersection homology is also defined from the singular chain complex of a filtered space by H. King, with a key formula to make selections among singular simplexes. This formula needs a notion of dimension for subspaces S of an Euclidean simplex, which is usually taken as the smallest dimension of the skeleta containing S. Later, P. Gajer employed another dimension based on the dimension of polyhedra containing S. This last one allows traces of pullbacks of singular strata in the interior of the domain of a singular simplex. In this work, we prove that the two corresponding intersection homologies are isomorphic for Siebenmann's CS sets. In terms of King's paper, this means that polyhedral dimension is a "reasonable" dimension. The proof uses a Mayer-Vietoris argument which needs an adapted subdivision. With the polyhedral dimension, that is a subtle issue. General position arguments are not sufficient and we introduce strong general position. With it, a stability is added to the generic character and we can do an inductive cutting of each singular simplex. This decomposition is realised with pseudo-barycentric subdivisions where the new vertices are not barycentres but close points of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In terminally ill individuals who would otherwise end their own lives, active voluntary euthanasia (AVE) can be seen as life-extending rather than life-shortening. Accordingly, AVE supports key pro-euthanasia arguments (appeals to autonomy and beneficence) and meets certain sanctity of life objections. This paper examines the extent to which a terminally ill individual's wish to donate organs after death contributes to those life-extension arguments. It finds that, in a terminally ill individual who wishes to avoid experiencing life he considers to be not worth living, and who also wishes to donate organs after death, AVE maximizes the likelihood that such donations will occur. The paper finds that the wish to donate organs strengthens the appeals to autonomy and beneficence, and fortifies the meeting of certain sanctity of life objections, achieved by life-extension arguments, and also generates appeals to justice that form novel life-extension arguments in favour of AVE in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roche and Sober (2013; 2014; 2017; 2019) have offered an important new argument that explanatoriness lacks confirmatory significance. My aim in this paper is not only to contend that their argument fails to show that in confirmation 'there is nothing special about explanatoriness' (Roche & Sober, 2017: 589), but also to reveal what is special confirmationwise about explanatoriness. I will argue that much of the heavy work in Roche and Sober's argument is done by the dichotomy into which they carve up the philosophical options: either explanatory considerations per se are confirmatorily relevant or they acquire whatever confirmatory significance they may possess only by way of background beliefs and so no differently from non‐explanatory considerations. I will argue that this is a false dichotomy: Explanatoriness per se can have confirmatory relevance even while explanatory considerations acquire their confirmatory relevance only through background opinions. Furthermore, there is 'something special' about the background opinions concerning explanations that allow explanatoriness in itself to have confirmatory impact. Unlike other sorts of background, having some background opinions expressly about explanations is indispensable to being an observer at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We apply new results on free boundary regularity to obtain a quantitative convergence rate for the shape optimizers of the first Dirichlet eigenvalue in periodic homogenization. We obtain a linear (with logarithmic factors) convergence rate for the optimizing eigenvalue. Large scale Lipschitz free boundary regularity of almost minimizers is used to apply the optimal L2$L^2$ homogenization theory in Lipschitz domains of Kenig et al. A key idea, to deal with the hard constraint on the volume, is a combination of a large scale almost dilation invariance with a selection principle argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether ordinary quantification over objects is an extensional phenomenon, or rather creates non-extensional contexts; each claim having been propounded by prominent philosophers. It turns out that the question only makes sense relative to a background theory of syntax and semantics (here called a grammar) that goes well beyond the inductive definition of formulas and the recursive definition of satisfaction. Two schemas for building quantificational grammars are developed, one that invariably constructs extensional grammars (in which quantification, in particular, thus behaves extensionally) and another that only generates non-extensional grammars (and in which quantification is responsible for the failure of extensionality). We then ask whether there are reasons to favor one of these grammar schemas over the other, and examine an argument according to which the proper formalization of deictic utterances requires adoption of non-extensional grammars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Kirzner's contribution to the study of the equilibrating tendency in economics. By analyzing his interpretation of Jevons' law of indifference, we participate in the debate on Kirzner association with neoclassicals when discussing the equilibrating tendency. A reconstruction of Kirzner's use of Jevons' law is conducted, considering his argumentative strategy when presenting the Austrian economics ideas to other professionals in the field. We conclude that Kirzner drew close to neoclassical economics to emphasize the relevance and uniqueness of Austrian economics. By doing so, we highlight the main differences between the two currents of economic thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Almeida has recently tried to show that if S5 correctly represents metaphysical necessity, there can be no non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. Evidence would thus be irrelevant to the reasonability of traditional theistic belief. Almeida's argument has implications beyond its announced target: it amounts to a new argument for sweeping scepticism. Almeida's argument for the irrelevance of evidence to the existence of God would apply to any state of affairs that entails some metaphysical necessity. In S5, every state of affairs entails some metaphysical necessity, so Almeida should conclude that non-trivial evidence for or against any state of affairs is impossible. I argue that the problem is not with S5 but with inadequately motivated assumptions about evidential support. Avoiding those assumptions disables the argument for sweeping scepticism and without foreclosing the possibility of non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious expressivism is the view that religious sentences, like 'God is all-loving' and 'God offers us the gift of salvation', are devoid of cognitive meaning. Such sentences are not truth-evaluable: they cannot be judged as true or false. In Religious Language , Michael Scott asked what explains the seeming logical behaviour of religious sentences if they are not truth-evaluable, as religious expressivists claim. In particular, religious expressivists need to explain (i) how a given religious sentence and its negation seem inconsistent and (ii) how religious sentences could figure in logically valid arguments. In this article, I develop a version of Weak Kleene semantics that could address these two 'logic' challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Ward explicates and defends a version of divine exemplarism called Containment Exemplarism to make good on the claim that God is a 'totally original artist'. According to Containment Exemplarism, (i) God ex nihilo creates according to divine ideas, (ii) divine ideas are about an aspect or part of God, and (iii) God has the ideas he has by knowing himself. Containment Exemplarism, we are told, secures the rationality and creativity of the divine creative act. I argue, first, that Ward's God is not a totally original artist since, on Containment Exemplarism, God does not act creatively in creating. Theistic Activism, the view that God makes up the ideas he has, can secure the creativity of the divine creative act. I argue, second, that Ward's argument against the rationality of God making stuff up fails. Thus, there is one version of divine exemplarism that satisfies key desiderata for divine creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit the following fractional Schrödinger equation 0.1 ε 2 s (- Δ) s u + V u = u p - 1 , u > 0 , in R N , where ε > 0 is a small parameter, (- Δ) s denotes the fractional Laplacian, s ∈ (0 , 1) , p ∈ (2 , 2 s ∗) , 2 s ∗ = 2 N N - 2 s , N > 2 s , V ∈ C ( R N , [ 0 , + ∞)) is a general potential. Under various assumptions on V(x) at infinity, including V(x) decaying with various rate at infinity, we introduce a unified penalization argument and give a complete result on the existence and nonexistence of positive solutions. More precisely, we combine a comparison principle with iteration process to detect an explicit threshold value p ∗ , such that the above problem admits positive concentration solutions if p ∈ (p ∗ , 2 s ∗) , while it has no positive weak solutions for p ∈ (2 , p ∗) if p ∗ > 2 , where the threshold p ∗ ∈ [ 2 , 2 s ∗) can be characterized explicitly by p ∗ = 2 + 2 s N - 2 s if lim | x | → ∞ (1 + | x | 2 s ) V (x) = 0 , 2 + ω N + 2 s - ω if 0 < inf (1 + | x | ω ) V (x) ≤ sup (1 + | x | ω) V (x) < ∞ for some ω ∈ [ 0 , 2 s ] , 2 if inf V (x) log (e + | x | 2) > 0. Moreover, corresponding to the various decay assumptions of V(x), we obtain the decay properties of the solutions at infinity. Our results reveal some new phenomena on the existence and decays of the solutions to this type of problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]