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The Competition Commission of India's (CCI) journey with "control" has been the subject of much discussion in Indian competition law circles. As we witness an increase in reliance on technology as well as a consolidation in conventional industries, both catalyzed by the Covid-19 pandemic, there is a marked increase of activity in the Indian merger market. It is therefore crucial for businesses contemplating mergers and acquisitions, to have a clear sense of the hurdles they need to cross, particularly if the merger activity in question falls in the same or a related industry. The CCI would thus need to provide clarity on what constitutes control, and when transacting parties should approach the CCI. The CCI must also be transparent about control transactions resulting in anti-competitive effects. This paper proposes that the CCI provide guidance on what amounts to control, from the perspectives of both notifiability and competitive effects, to resolve the CCI's control quandary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have largely abdicated their role to scrutinize and challenge mergers in zero-priced industries. This abdication derives from a Chicago School assumption that concentration in these industries will not lead to consumer harm. Due to the agencies’ hands-off approach to merger review, the digital economy is rapidly concentrating as firms are permitted to acquire their competitors with no meaningful antitrust supervision. Increased consolidation of ownership is evident in the dating app industry. One firm has acquired twenty-five rival dating apps in the past decade and now operates over forty-five distinct dating sites, including Tinder, OkCupid, and Hinge. In this Note, I argue that increased concentration and decreased competition in the dating app sector can lead to three types of consumer harm: price discrimination, deterioration of quality, and reduced data privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author tells the tale of her journey to discover the synergy between equity and efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an overview of EU merger control in 2017. We begin by highlighting the main developments and then discuss these and other developments in greater detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the papers in the Antitrust Bulletin's Market Definition symposium. Four styles of market analysis, each represented by a different merger decision are presented, with two articles on each topic, one in general agreement with the court case and the other providing alternative perspectives for the decision. Simple models of competition suffice for the straightforward investigations; however, careful institutional analysis is necessary to determine if the standard models implicit in the Merger Guidelines can be directly applied in complicated cases. As different economists often interpret data in different ways, antitrust regulators must expect a range of perspectives to be presented in any given case. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the criminalization of cases involving personal conflicts of interest of non-governmental employees in public acquisition. Topics discussed include the development of public acquisition conflict of interest law and controls, case United States v. Strang addressing issues related to government-owned corporation and the case Rankin v. United State based on the payment of an implied contract claim from an agent by the government.

Corporate takeover legislation has evolved significantly since it was fi rst introduced in Australia. Starting with only a handful of provisions in the state based legislation enacted from 1961, the takeover provisions now in chs 6-6C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) form the basis of a complex regulatory regime. Since 1981, the legislation has been supplemented by a regulatory power to exempt persons from and modify the operation of the takeover provisions. There has also been a shift towards the resolution of takeover disputes by non-judicial bodies. From 1991, the regulator was given the power to apply to the Corporations and Securities Panel for orders where it considered circumstances to be unacceptable based on the principles underlying the legislation, even if the letter of the law had been complied with. This role was expanded in 2000 by allowing any interested party to apply to the Panel and limiting the ability to commence court proceedings during a takeover. This article analyses the forces driving each of these developments, with a particular focus on the resulting tensions and the evolution of the principles underlying the legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite high-profile divergences, competition officials in the European Union and United States frequently state a desire to reach convergent substantive decisions when regulating individual transatlantic merger cases. The extent of transatlantic convergence depends largely on the role of two domestic actors involved in the merger review process: regulators and firms. This article employs two competing approaches (principal–agent and regulatory capture) to assess the ways in which these actors and domestic institutions shape convergence in transatlantic merger review. Empirically, the article investigates the work of the EU–US Mergers Working Group and explores the extent to which it conforms more closely to the preferences of regulators or merging firms. By increasing procedural convergence over information exchanges, the competition regulators increase the likelihood of convergence in substantive decisions, which reduces the likelihood of intervention by political principals. The findings suggest that regulators have used their discretionary authority to overcome domestic political and legal institutions that obstruct information sharing and have reduced the information asymmetry traditionally enjoyed by merging firms. As a result, it is the regulatory agents who have shaped the convergent process via their discretionary authority and captured the merging firms to serve their regulatory interests. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the importance of regulating horizontal mergers for the benefit of consumer welfare in Europe. It highlights the effects of horizontal mergers on consumer welfare which include price increases, reduction in product variety and the rise of cost efficiencies. It outlines the arguments over the implementation of consumer welfare standards and the enactment of legislation for merger control.

This article discusses the application of the European Commission (EC) for the nonhorizontal merger Guidelines in the European Union. It states that the Guidelines were adopted by the EC on November 28, 2007 which are part of the implementation of an effects-based analysis framework by the Directorate-General (DG) for Competition. It states that the guidelines were essential in the analysis of the issues concerning the assessment of the effects of nonhorizontal mergers on consumers.

The article discusses the enforcement problems encountered in European merger control in the context of the inaptness of modified economic approach to the institutional environment of the legal processes. It says that the decrease in anticompetitive merger projects was due to the desire of the industries to avoid rule-violating merger ventures and to the competitive business activity. It explores the decline of enforcement activity which is caused by the enforcement problems that lie on the inappropriate implementation of modern industrial economics. It tackles the aspects related to under-enforcement such as analysis of competitive effects and institutional incongruence. It mentions the need for a comprehensive competition economics approach to develop an appropriate policy framework.

Mergers and acquisitions are burgeoning in Korea after the involuntary restructuring of major conglomerates and financial institutions which occurred after the 1997 financial crisis. Many companies owned by government agencies are likely to be privatised in the coming years and the current administration aims to sell utilities and infrastructure projects to the private sector. Policies for certain government-owned financial institutions are currently being questioned as well. Despite the temporary crunch of capital markets in Korea, mergers and acquisitions will be at the core of Korean economic activities in the next decade. Amidst these developments, however, some have voiced concern about hostile takeover attempts, especially by foreign capital. The past and current regulation of hostile takeovers has been weighed down by securities regulations and corporate laws. Arguments for poison pills are being regurgitated in light of economic reality, which is that there is no separation between management and ownership. This paper argues that such concerns are not relevant to the Korean economy and there is no need for further changes intended to discourage hostile takeover attempts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses food contamination and the problems surrounding United States's food supply. The article presents several food safety problems and observes that increased statutory power and greater funding commitments would solve the crisis instead of agency consolidation.The article calls upon reformation in the food safety legislation.

Presents information on the court case of the Shareholders Litigation of IBP Inc. v. Tyson Foods Inc., which addresses the default interpretation of broadly written material adverse effect (MAE) clauses in the U.S. Information on the MAE provision of merger agreements; Details of the merger agreement between IBP Inc. and Tyson Foods Inc.; Ruling of the court for the MAE case of IBP Inc. and Tyson Foods Inc.

Discusses the issues on the merger application of railroads, Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Canadian National in 1999, which raised questions about the centralized federal regulations of the U.S. and Canada. Reaction of the U.S. Surface Transportation Board; Discussion on a review of the federal transportation policy in Canada; Survey of relevant legislation; Effects of the North American Free Trade Association on rail traffic; Conflicts between rail carriers and shippers.

Discusses the need for a more structured and transparent approach to the remedial phase of the merger review process in the United States. Promulgation of the 'Horizontal Merger Remedy Guidelines'; Market power risks associated with a merger's elimination of actual or potential competition between merging parties; Elements of an acceptable consent order or decree permitting a merger to proceed without further challenge.

Scrutinizes the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's approach to vertical mergers in the electric industry. Shortcoming of the FERC approach; Decision of the FERC on the merger of Dominion Resources and Consolidated Natural Gas; Economic analysis of vertical mergers.

Focuses on the challenges posed by financial industry mergers in the United States and other industrialized countries. Examination of policy options to address the challenges; Review on consolidation trends in financial services industry; Policy issues raised by mergers.

Models the reaction of business firms to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decisions which seek to block proposed horizontal mergers. Issues in merger enforcement; Background on the FTC; Overview of the merger review process; Modelling of the fight vs. fold vs. settle process.

The Justice Department's 1982/1984 merger guidelines identify various factors--concentration, entry barriers, ease of collusion, efficiency--that would thereafter determine whether the government will challenge a merger. Analysts have criticized enforcement agencies, however, for not following the guidelines, and criticize the guidelines themselves for not identifying the weights attached to the factors. Using a 1982-86 sample of seventy horizontal mergers, we examine which factors influenced Federal Trade Commission decisions to challenge mergers. The relative importance of the guidelines and other factors in merger challenges is measured, and related empirical issues are also explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Features guidelines for business enterprises regarding federal vertical merger enforcement policy in the United States. History of vertical merger enforcement theory; Examination of five consent decrees on vertical mergers; Views of the so-called classic school on the consent decrees; Recommendations to federal antitrust authorities.

Suggests some merger policies for the United States government to adopt to ensure competitively structured markets. Role of American antitrust policy in the enhancement of market competition; Issues articulated against antitrust policy; Evidence that support the desirability of structural antitrust policy.

Points out the shortcomings and loopholes in the 1992 Merger Guidelines from an advocate's point of view. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI); `In re Echlin Mfg. Co.' case; `U.S. vs. Baker Hughes' case; Likelihood of entry factor; Anticompetitive injury; `U.S. vs. Gillette' case; Power buyer defense; National Association of Attorneys' General (NAAG) Guidelines; `In re Coca Cola' case; Failing company defense.

Discusses changes relating to the implementation of merger policy in Great Britain. 1973 Fair Trade Act; 1984 Tebbit Statement; Guidelines: competition, efficiency, employment and regional consideration, international competitiveness, foreign ownership, failing firms; State regulation; Statistical analysis of mergers; Pros and cons; Competition as dominant factor; Perceived absence of economic effects of mergers.

Discusses 31 questions about the 1993 Merger guidelines. Section 7 of the Clayton Act; Market definition; Market participation and measurement; Potential adverse competitive effects; Ease of entry; Efficiencies; Failing firms; Dynamic state of economic theory; Opinion of various authorities; Subtleties of the law.

Analyzes the 1992 Merger Guidelines on market definition. `Brown Shoe vs. United States' case; Reasonable Interchangeability or cross elasticity standard; Structural demand elasticity; `United States vs. Philadelphia National Bank', `United States vs. Alcoa', `Continental Can' cases; Mergers which encourage collusion; Competitive effects; Cournot and differentiated Bertrand model; Critical Loss; Price correlation.

Summarizes the state of the empirical economics literature regarding merger and acquisition issues. Direct and indirect implications for competition policy; Innovations in the market for corporate assets or general merger trends; Brief examination of the merger-related results obtained in markets conducted in a laboratory setting.

Raises some issues on how the antitrust community looks at mergers. Strategy as rationale for merging; Merger implementation; Merger investigation; Merger `efficiencies' not reliable; Heterogeneity of firms in a given industry; Real world factors; Strategic costs; `Revenues'; Profits; Competitive strategies; Anticompetitive theories; Antitrust pricing theories; Cournot model; Differentiated Bertrand model; Barriers.

Assesses the 1982 Merger Guidelines clarifying market delineation. Paradigm; Market delineation-Market share approach in antitrust; Demand substitutability, Supply substitutability, and entry; Antitrust market; Candidate market sequence; Relevant market; Standard for market delineation; Smallest market principle; `U.S. vs. Dupont' case (1956); Horizontal merger.

Discuss the U.S. Department of Justice's 1982 guidelines on corporate mergers. Indication of the federal government's commitment to a strong antitrust policy that will safeguard competition in the free enterprise economy of the U.S.; Statutory base of the merger guidelines; Key stipulations of the guidelines on corporate merger activity.