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The article explores the concept of jus cogens in light of the past and present impact of Russia's veto power. It mentions permanent member of the Security Council violating the core norm against the aggressive use of force and violating international law, and causing the Security Council to be unable to carry out its core mandate. It also mentions limitations to veto use in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

An introduction is presented in which editor discusses various articles within the issue on topics including implications of a new tribunal to prosecute crimes of aggression in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine; traditional notions of jus ad bellum and concept of jus cogens in Russia.

The article discusses a book "Existing Legal Limits to the Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes" argues that , when considered within the context and veto use by the permanent members of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council. It mentions face of ongoing, or the serious risk of, genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes is of questionable legality. It also mentions veto power when considering jus cogens.

The article discusses the judicialization of mega-political issues to international law by examining the issue of jus cogens in international courts. Other topics include the transposition of themes in constitutional law to international law, the study on the original historical promise of jus cogens based on a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), and the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT).

The Caribbean Court of Justice was established in 2005 to have a determinative role in the further development of Caribbean jurisprudence, and, during its sixteen years of existence, the CCJ has made many important pronouncements on the rule of law. A recent study of these pronouncements suggests that the Court appears to be headed towards the acceptance of a substantive conception of the rule of law which is hierarchically superior to the Constitution and which limits the legislative power to amend the Constitution. But any such court-determined rule of law may be difficult to reconcile with orthodox principles of Caribbean constitutionalism and the orderly development of Caribbean Constitutional democracies. This paper identifies an alternative method of disciplining legislative action in the norms of jus cogens and explores the conceptual methodologies and precedents for making these norms applicable in domestic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As COVID-19 has spread around the world, many states have suspended their compliance with a core requirement of international refugee law: the duty to refrain from returning refugees to territories where they face a serious risk of persecution (the duty of nonrefoulement). These measures have prompted some observers to question whether non-refoulement will survive the pandemic as a nonderogable legal duty. This Article explains why the international community should embrace non-refoulement as a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) that applies even during public emergencies, such as the coronavirus pandemic. Viewed from a global justice perspective, the authority that international law entrusts to states--including the sovereign power to regulate migration across national borders--can be legitimate only if states refrain from refoulement. For the international legal order to claim to possess legitimate authority over exiled outsiders, it must treat non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm. A failure to regard nonrefoulement as a peremptory norm would thus strip the international legal system of its claim to legality vis-à-vis asylum seekers, supplanting the rule of international law in this context with mere coercive force. To test this account of the authority of international refugee law, the Article surveys closed-border policies that states have adopted in response to COVID-19 and explains why the associated restrictions on non-refoulement are unjustifiable and incompatible with the rule of law. Even during a genuine national emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving states cannot return refugees to persecution without subverting their own claims to legal authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than a decade, U.S. courts have struggled to develop a common law immunity regime to govern suits brought against foreign government officials, and they are now divided on a number of issues, including the extent to which they should defer to the executive branch and whether to recognize a jus cogens exception. This Editorial Comment considers a more conceptual division in the courts, between an "effect-of-judgment" approach that would confer immunity only when the judgment that the plaintiff is seeking would be directly enforceable against the foreign state, and a broader "nature-of-act" approach that would confer immunity whenever the plaintiff's case is challenging conduct carried out on behalf of the state. The Comment argues in favor of the nature-of-act approach and explains why analogies in this context to domestic civil rights litigation are misplaced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with an important question of legal justification: What reasons serve to justify a claim that a norm has the status of jus cogens. This question can be approached from two fundamentally different perspectives – in this article referred to as legal positivism and legal idealism. As earlier research has demonstrated, legal positivists have great difficulty justifying their jus cogens claims. What this article argues is that legal idealists face a no less difficult task, and that this prompts an entirely new understanding of the jus cogens discourse. If there is no way for a lawyer to justify a jus cogens claim, then neither is there any way for him or her to refute propositions put forth by others. Jus cogens discourse becomes a safe haven for all kinds of arguments, of which, legally speaking, no one can ever be regarded as any more acceptable than any other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International legal responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors have been many but often inconsistent, inadequate, and legally unsound. This Article argues in favor of resorting to successfully-implemented methods of dealing with similar crimes. International law has already expanded from its original statist conceptions and scope to include individuals, such as in international human rights norms and international humanitarian laws. In the latter, in particular, the law has expanded in the context of both international and non-international armed conflict. This Article argues that the advancement of law in these areas can lend much to efforts to bring nuclear terrorism within the scope of International Criminal Court, from whose jurisdiction this crime is currently excluded. This Article also recommends purposefully elevating the prohibition against possession and use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors to jus cogens, making such acts international crimes of the type that do not necessarily require state consent for prosecution by an international tribunal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International environmental law (IEL) seems unable to comprehensively and effectively respond to the Anthropocene's deepening socio‐ecological crisis. While there are several reasons for this state of affairs, one in particular relates to the argument that IEL lacks higher‐order global constitutional‐type norms that could constrain State sovereignty and the free will of States in their relations with the environment. As a contribution to the debate on the effectiveness of IEL in the Anthropocene, we seek here for such higher‐order constitutional norms in the areas of customary international law and jus cogens. We conduct the ensuing analysis through the lens of the 'normative hierarchy' and 'global constitutionalism' theories of international law and critically reflect on the extent to which these norms could play a meaningful role to mediate the human–environment interface in the Anthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines claims filed by Ukrainian investors against Russia under the Ukraine–Russia BIT alleging violations committed in Crimea after its annexation by Russia in 2014. Six tribunals have recently rendered awards concluding that they have jurisdiction over these disputes. I will argue that the only logical way for them to come to this conclusion is to consider that Crimea is now part of Russia for the application of the BIT. Yet, Crimea is still part of Ukraine under international because the annexation was in violation of the jus cogens prohibition of the use of force. Tribunals should therefore have declined their jurisdiction over these claims. Their decisions have certainly been influenced by the unprecedented context of these proceedings, including Ukraine’s intervention recognizing the effectiveness of the occupation. Yet, such decisions are giving legal effect to Crimea’s change of status contrary to the non-recognition obligation under international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state on 16th August in 1960 after being declared formally as a Crown Colony on 10th March in 1925 by the United Kingdom. The Constitution of the Republic, which came into effect on the day of independence, had its roots in agreements reached between the heads of government of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on 11th February in 1959. These were incorporated in agreements reached between those governments and the United Kingdom in London on 19th February. On the same day, the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities accepted the documents concerned, and accompanying declarations by the three governments, as "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus". The agreements were embodied in treaties - the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and the Treaty of Alliance, signed by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey - and in the constitution, signed in Nicosia on 16th August in 1960. Republic of Cyprus was founded as a bi-communal state based on partnership between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots proposed amendments to the Constitution, known as the Thirteen Points that entailed usurping the rights of Turkish Cypriots and degrading their equal co-founder status to that of a minority on the Island. Turkish Cypriots refused the Thirteen Points as an obligation to protect their treaty rights and do not recognize the situation created by the abuse of rights as legal. International community has an obligation not to recognize as lawful within the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur based on the peremptory norm of self-determination of peoples under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, the situation created by the Greek Cypriots with the amendments to the Constitutional Treaty of 16 August 1960. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers the apparent disjunction between the Court's effective limitation of liability for the U.S. corporation and expansive liability for the natural person for similar crimes. Topics include Jus Cogens claims against corporations; court cases Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. on the same; and Alien Tort Statute on the same.

This article examines the legal and political implications of the anti-Zionism provisions in the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) and 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights (Arab Charter), considering the International Law Commission’s current work on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). The Banjul Charter and Arab Charter present what appear to be rare test cases of treaties that conflict with a jus cogens norm, which self-determination—in the case of the Banjul Charter and Arab Charter, this would be Zionism, which this article understands as Jewish self-determination—at least arguably is. This article has three parts. First, it sets forth the nature and parameters of jus cogens under international law, paying attention to the operation of these norms under international treaty law. It then examines the anti-Zionism provisions in the Banjul Charter and Arab Charter and explores their drafting history. Finally, on the assumption that self-determination qualifies as a jus cogens norm, this article applies the black letter law of jus cogens to the Banjul Charter and Arab Charter and looks at the political implications of the two treaties’ anti-Zionism provisions, whether or not self-determination qualifies as a jus cogens norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of jus cogens or "peremptory norms" is not new to students and practitioners of international law, but the practical identification and application of jus cogens norms is not without its own set of disagreements and debate. The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the details of the development of the common understanding of jus cogens within international law, with particular emphasis on the Asian-African perspective, and to outline the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the topic since its inclusion on the ILC's work programme in 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prohibition on torture has attained status as a peremptory norm of general international law. This gives rise to the obligation erga omnes to take action against those who torture. Despite this, most world states routinely conduct torture. Is there really a worldwide prohibition of torture? Argument is framed to demonstrate that the concept of a jus cogens peremptory norm, flowing erga omnes to all nations, is in practice unattainable, preventing any absolute and universal international law prohibition against torture. States cannot declare someone an enemy of all mankind, or bind all other states to that view. Jus cogens is a text writers' municipal communis opinio, but held administratively to be based in customary international law. Any prohibition against torture appears to remain in municipal customary law form, breaches of which are proved as arguments based on fact, eliminating operation of any absolute peremptory governing norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the persistent gap in receptivity to feminist approaches to public international law within international institutions, using the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as an example. The article argues that the ICJ, as the main judicial organ of the United Nations, remains non-receptive to feminist analyses of public international law. Mainstream public international law, therefore, still has a long way to go before we can affirm that feminist critiques of public international law are fully acknowledged and being addressed. In order to defend this argument, the article analyses the ICJ's position on the notion of jus cogens, including the dissenting and separate opinions of individual judges, through the lens of feminist legal methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the plea of necessity remedy for responding to cyberspace attacks which is addressed in the "Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations" treatise, and it mentions an international legal right to self-defense and the law of countermeasures. State responsibility and malicious cyber operations are assessed, as well as a jus cogens international legal doctrine and the "Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare."

Jus cogens is receiving renewed interest both in legal practice and academia. A number of recent books approach the subject from different angles, attributable to different strands of the debate. Some approaches are predominantly technical and cannot adequately address the symbolic value of jus cogens. Others argue that considerable legal effects derive from the value dimension of jus cogens but risk skipping over technical niceties. Reading several works that represent these tendencies together points to an insurmountable tension between value orientation and formalism that is indicative of the current state of jus cogens in international law. In this review essay, I discuss a legal technique approach, a value approach relying on social contract theory and a practice-oriented approach to the study of jus cogens, represented by the three books under review. On the basis of the current state of case law and research, I also identify the most pressing challenges for our understanding of jus cogens and reflect on the relation of scholarship and the parallel work of the International Law Commission and, more generally, on the performative force of theories. I conclude that jus cogens as a manifestation of 'value formalism' in international law is an even greater conceptual conundrum than it was 20 years ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present Article inquires whether a right to unilateral non-colonial (UNC) secession is grounded in the United Nations (UN) law of self-determination. The Article argues that peoples subjected to deliberate, sustained, and systematic human rights abuses in extremis (e.g., ethnic cleansing, mass killings, or genocide) by the existing state have an international customary law right to UNC secessionist self-determination. This right is coextensive with the "remedial-rights-only" philosophical approach to UNC secession. The Article further argues that in the post-millennial era two developments are likely for the law of UNC secessionist self-determination: first, the right will become available in response to human rights abuses in moderato (political, cultural, or racial discrimination); and second, in the much longer term, the right will become justified not only on remedial grounds but also on liberal philosophical bases. The latter development is predicted to parallel the increase in the number of liberal democratic governments throughout the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the Warfaa v. Ali court case and the decision of the U.S. district court in contrast with that of Supreme Court in a case involving similar issues of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Topics discussed include approach of district court in redressing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for torture in abroad by dismissing of the ATS claims; role of Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in examining judicial immunity, and reifying of jus cogens in the light of ATS.

‘Act of State’ doctrine absolves state action from judicial review by a foreign court. Indeed, it is settled law that there is no cause of action that will make a foreign state liable in domestic courts. The doctrine has developed in a manner which focuses on the sovereign nature of an act rather than the status of the person who committed it. In the UK, recent judgments have evaluated the honesty and fairness of dealings in the public policy context. The courts have moved beyond competence and restraint, and state officials who have breached a fundamental principle of international law have faced judicial scrutiny. Courts have developed the concept of a qualified state immunity for the actions of officials that are contingent on human rights. This paper argues that courts should develop a doctrine that allows judicial activism when wrongs are committed by states that infringe customary international law. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Samantar v. Yousuf regarding the adjudication of individual foreign official immunity and the implications of circuit split on the on jus cogens exceptions.

An essay is presented which explores the rejection of a jus cogens exception by the China's government for sovereign immunity on U.S. judicial practice after the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case Yousuf v. Samantar and its impact on international law.

This Note addresses the implications of jus cogens for sovereign immunity, in particular regarding the act of supporting terrorism. Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms of international law ? fundamental principles which cannot be abrogated by international agreement, judicial opinion or custom. Terrorism might be considered the type of violation of international law that falls outside existing immunity protections, under a fiduciary theory of jus cogens and a definition of terrorism that takes its central feature as violence that targets citizens in an attempt to dissuade them from exercising their lawful rights. However, because international actors have not reached a consensus on a workable definition of either jus cogens or terrorism, it is unlikely courts will adopt this approach. This Note considers alternative approaches to enable suits to go forward against individual officials who allegedly sponsored terrorism, including an addition to the statutory tort scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court reopens the debate on the extent of the immunity enjoyed by states for violations of jus cogens. The decision, which questions the authority of the ICJ's 2012 judgment in Germany v Italy, could certainly have effects on the formation of customary international law. In addition, it revives the discussion on the relationship between national and international law and on the supremacy of the latter over the former, especially if read in light of the previous Medellín and Kadi I decisions. Judgment 238/2014 is an opportunity to reappraise the role played by international law in domestic courts, particularly in cases where international law conflicts with core domestic constitutional values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the International Law Commission's sixty-seventh session held in Geneva, Switzerland from May 4 to June 5, and from July 6 to August 7, 2015, under the chairmanship of Narinder Singh. It mentions that the Commission completed its work on the topic of the most favored- nation clause and decided to add a new topic of jus cogens to its agenda.

The article focuses on the concept of unilateral non-colonial (UNC) secession in several countries such as Croatia, Macedonian and Serbia with the importance of the method of state creation. It mentions that legality of the UNC for the statehood in the international law and the right to UNC secession with the declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It also mentions that the conformity with the customary law of self-determination and compliance with jus cogens.

The article discusses the U.S. Alien Tort Statute (ATS) in relation to a judicial practice which identifies the jus cogens international legal doctrine as the law of nations (international law) as of 2015. The jurisdictional scope of the ATS is addressed, along with the U.S. Congress and the nation's Supreme Court. An external restriction on the application of the ATS is examined, as well as the textualism legal interpretation theory and American constitutional law.

Human trafficking for purposes of sexual and other forms of slavery continues to pose a major threat to the human rights and human dignity of many persons. This is particularly the case for young women from Eastern European nations. Not to be confused with human smuggling and undocumented immigration, human trafficking usually aims at exploitation, often through slavery in the form of un-oder underpaid domestic work or forced prostitution. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as well as jus cogens outlaw slavery. In this article it is shown by the authors that human trafficking - although not explicitly dealt with in the ECHR - is also prohibited if it aims at creating or maintaining a situation of slavery. Indeed, it is then prohibited by jus cogens and states have a positive obligation to combat human trafficking effectively. Many states fail to do so, showing that this problem is one of law enforcement rather than of creating effective legal norms since those already exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International Human Rights Law is claimed to be jus cogen of International Law, a rule that preempts any other rule of International Law which is conflicting with it. To assess the jus cogen nature of International Human Rights Law the paper refers to the instances where International Human Rights Law is conflicting with other peremptory rules of International Law, State immunity, for example. The concept of jus cogen itself is so confusing that before the jus cogen nature of International Human Rights Law is assessed the paper throws light on the concept of jus cogen itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the aggregate effect of various human trafficking-related initiatives and laws which the author refers to as "exploitation creep," and it mentions several legal and moral issues related to forced labor and slavery, as well as the jus cogens international legal doctrine. According to the article, states have been asked to use military power, as well as public health and trade laws to combat human trafficking. American criminal justice and anti-trafficking laws are examined.

The article focuses on the concept of party autonomy in international contracts. Topics discussed include the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts, a soft-law tool adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law in November 2012, the Restatement of Conflict of Laws in the U.S, and the concept of lex fori or lex loci contractus rule. Other topics include the concept of jus cogens and the U.S domestic law principle of freedom of contract.

International law was traditionally a horizontal and state-centric system of rules. Although state-centrism is in decline, it is still reflected in some of the core concepts and procedures governing contemporary international law. This article identifies the community-oriented values in the international community that stretch beyond the interest of sovereign states. It further explores how these values can be protected by the international community when states abuse their sovereign powers. Attention is paid to the concepts of Chapter VII powers and limitations on the authority of the Security Council, as well as the concepts of obligations erga omnes and norms jus cogens. While the latter two concepts reflect fundamental values of the international community, they cannot be used as an enforcement mechanism to address the abuses of sovereign powers. The enforcement can come from Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Notably, the concept of the international peace and security nowadays covers even seemingly purely domestic gross and systematic violations of human rights. Despite this stretch of the Security Council's powers, the community-oriented rules also demand that its measures need to be interpreted with the framework of international human rights law in mind. The article concludes that the post-Second World War era has seen a turn away from state-centrism and toward a community-oriented international legal system. The international community has acknowledged the existence of a rights-based minimum threshold of a shared value system. However, the enforcement of this value system remains subject to state-centric procedures. There is no automatic and readily available remedy against abuses of sovereign powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the tensions between sovereignty and a right to self-determination in relation to a struggle for independence in Somaliland, focusing on the jus cogens international law doctrine, theories of recognition, and the influence of Great Powers on Somaliland. According to the article, Somaliland does not have access to foreign aid because it has not been recognized by the international community as a state. The United Nations and Somaliland's democratic government are examined.

Upon conceiving constitutionalism on the scale of the nation-state as transparent and unproblematic, one may think global constitutionalism to be a mere utopia. On closer analysis, however, legitimation of nation-state constitutionalism turns out to be much more complex and contested than initially apparent, as becomes evident based on the contrast between liberal and illiberal constitutionalism. Upon the realization that nation-state liberal constitutionalism can only be legitimated counterfactually, the social contract metaphor emerges as a privileged heuristic tool in the quest for a proper balance between identity and difference. Four different theories offer plausible social contract justifications of nation-state liberal constitutionalism: a deontological theory, such as those of Rawls and Habermas, which privileges identity above difference; a critical theory that leads to relativism; a thick national identity based one that makes legitimacy purely contingent; and a dialectical one that portrays the social contract as permanently in the making without any definitive resolution. Endorsing this last theory, I argue that differences between national and transnational constitutionalism are of degree rather than of kind. Accordingly, it may be best to cast certain transnational regimes as constitutional rather than as administrative or international ones. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the role of corporations in preventing human trafficking for labor exploitation. Topics discussed include an analysis of the United Nations Protect-Respect-Remedy (PRR) Framework and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in relation to human trafficking, the three P paradigm in preventing human trafficking, namely, prosecution and prevention of human trafficking and the protection of victims, and the concept of the jus cogens prohibition of slavery.

This article considers the jurisdictional immunity of States in respect of proceedings before the forum State's court in which a foreign State claims immunity for actions of its armed forces. Injurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) the International Court of Justice held that Germany is entitled to immunity before Italian courts for acts of its armed forces committed during the Second World War, even though it considered the German acts as displaying a complete disregard for the "elementary considerations of humanity". The World Court decided that a breach of jus cogens rules does not amount to a denial of immunity. State immunity is procedural in nature and therefore it is not in conflict with peremptory rules of international law, since the two sets of rules operate at different levels. The thesis advanced in this article is that State immunity protects substantive principles of international law and therefore it cannot be regarded only as a procedural rule. The paper focuses also on other aspects of Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, including the tort exception to State immunity and a right to individual compensation under Article 3 of the Hague Regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporal punishment of children is pervasive throughout the Pacific Island nation of Tonga. In May 2014, a mother was imprisoned for causing the death of her 14-year-old daughter who was beaten with a stick, watering hose and hammer and left to die on her living room floor. Tonga remains in a group of 39 countries that retain corporal punishment of children as a legal sanction for a crime and has defied recent calls during the Universal Periodic Review to abolish these laws. Despite the Tongan Court of Appeal observing corporal punishment to be a violation of the Constitution of Tonga and the jus cogens right to freedom from torture, the court has yet to suspend the operation of these laws. This article argues that the court has failed to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed to children and uphold the Constitution as the supreme law of Tonga. Analysis of the Constitution and the presentation of literature detailing the pervasive and destructive nature of corporal punishment in Tonga highlights the material extent of this injustice. This supports a call for the complete legislative prohibition of corporal punishment in Tonga, including in the criminal justice system, schools and the home. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides the initial contours of an argument that uses International Law to challenge the validity of Israeli apartheid. It challenges the conventional discourse of legal debates on Israel's actions and borders and seeks to link the illegalities of these actions to the validity of an inbuilt Israeli apartheid. The argument also connects the deontological doctrine of peremptory norms of International Law ( jus cogens), the right of self-determination and the International Crime of Apartheid to the doctrine of state recognition. It applies these to the State of Israel and the vision of a single democratic state in historic Palestine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the rhetorical structure of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in the Germany v Italy case. The author maintains that in all likelihood the ICJ’s decision will exert great influence on future State practice. This is due to a number of different reasons, ranging from the particularly authoritative role that the ICJ enjoys in the epistemic community of international lawyers to the rhetorically persuasive use of the arguments by the Court in a judgment that is perfectly attuned to the Court’s main audience. Indeed, it is a well known principle in rhetoric that the adjustment of an argument to the audience is one of the most powerful tools to ensure adherence to whatever the speaker (or the Court in this case) may say. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Denounced by customary international law and recognized as a breach of jus cogens, maritime piracy also is defined and proscribed by a number of international treaties. Piratical attacks off the coast of Somalia, which peaked several years ago, have triggered considerable international attention. While incidents of Somali piracy are sharply decreasing, attacks persist elsewhere, for example off the Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa. The U.N. Security Council endorses a criminal justice model in response to acts of piracy. The Security Council thereby promotes a mechanism of judicialization and penalization. So, too, do the U.N. General Assembly, many states, international organizations (such as the International Maritime Organization), trade groups, and the shippers lobby. In the recent past, many detained pirates were perfunctorily captured and released. With the spread of the criminal justice model, however, pirates are increasingly facing prosecution in national courts, mainly in Kenya, Seychelles, and Maldives, but also in Germany, the U.S., India, France, Spain, Japan, and Somalia--among others. It has been estimated that approximately one-third of captured pirates are minors, that is, persons under the age of eighteen. This article explores issues of accountability, reintegration, deterrence and rehabilitation in the context of child pirates. It recommends modalities of restorative and reintegrative justice for child pirates that avoid the careless superficiality of immediate release and the retributive heavyhandedness of criminal trials. Regrettably, prevailing imagery that cloaks juveniles enmeshed in international crimes, for example child soldiers, does not favor this middle ground. Instead, this narrative imagery facilitates either perfunctory release (the faultless passive victim image) or criminal trials regardless of age (the demon and bandit image). Unlike the case with child soldiers, however, the position of U.N. entities when it comes to child pirates tends toward greater punitiveness--assuredly, a concerning development. In response, and after examining why juveniles may end up in pirate gangs, this article proposes a new path, namely one that leads toward restorative justice initiatives. As [his lawyer] is leaving, Abdiwali [a juvenile pirate criminally prosecuted in Germany] says to him: 'You are father and brother to me. Your rule of law is a miracle on earth. All the expense, and two lawyers fighting just for me, and I don't have to pay any money at all! I have rights--I didn't know that. I am grateful that I have the chance to learn this. It all seems like a fairy tale to me. ' And then he says to the interpreter: 'But one thing is still a mystery to me: What do they get out of it?" [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legal definition of piracy has fluctuated throughout the centuries to account for both the methods of the perpetrators and the power of the state. The heinous nature of the act usually meant pirates were subject to universal jurisdiction, but what constitutes the act itself has ranged from straightforward robbery at sea to, recently, violence at sea that includes engaging in acts of political protest. The modem trend of employing an expansive "violent attacks at sea" definition is appealing because of its ability to account for a wide variety of conduct in a wide variety of contexts. But the consequences of such an approach include a risk of returning to past experiences where political expediency was prioritized over due process. States should instead consider ways to implement a uniform and appropriate approach to this scourge, and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea provides one way to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I accept the authors’ premise in their article entitled ‘Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ that apartheid, as practised in the former South African regime, remains today a crime against the law of nations applicable to states practising a similar regime. The obligation of a state and its officials to refrain from practising any policy of apartheid is considered a jus cogens norm under international law. Whoever practises apartheid bears international criminal responsibility and may be put on trial for committing that crime, either in any state in the world based on universal jurisdiction or before the International Criminal Court. However, the very gravity of the crime requires that accusations of apartheid be made with the greatest caution. The accusation that Israel practises apartheid against the Palestinian population in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza is unfounded and based on gross errors. In this article I expand on two of these errors – the failure to differentiate between the norms governing occupied and sovereign territory, and the authors’ complete failure to address Israel’s policies in the context of an armed conflict characterized by the Palestinians’ use of terror. As I show, once the authors’ errors are exposed and considered, it is clear that Israel’s actions cannot be considered a basis for the crime of apartheid. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 25 July 2012, the Complaint Division of the Swiss Criminal Federal Court of First Instance decided that the proceedings led by the Office of the Attorney General could continue against a former Algerian minister accused of having perpetrated war crimes between 1992 and 1999. The Court first examined whether Swiss law allowed such proceedings and addressed comprehensively the issue of Swiss jurisdiction, and especially the standing of a domestic proceeding based on universality. It then discussed the question of immunities, in particular functional immunity, and its application when an international crime considered as part of jus cogens is at stake. The indirect dialogue between this decision and the International Court of Justice judgment on jurisdictional immunities of February 2012 is outlined in the article, which then elaborates on the two paradigms organizing the prosecution of international crimes, namely ‘representational capacity’ and ‘global governance’. It highlights some of the issues raised by the global governance paradigm to which the decision of the Swiss Criminal Federal Court adheres. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In February zoia, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic found that opposition groups fighting against the Assad regime are bound by human rights obligations constituting peremptoly norms of international law. This finding is innovative for two reasons. First, human rights obligations apply generally to the vertical relation between States and their subjects. Second, whereas is seems accepted that non-state armed groups can have human rights obligations when they control territoly, the Commission of Inquiry was unable to confirm that Syrian opposition forces exercised such control over territory. This article examines whether the finding that non-state armed groups are bound by peremptory human rights norms is supported by contemporary international law. Moreover, recent trends in the practice of the United Nations with regard to human rights obligations of non-state actors will be analysed. Even though this article argues that non-state armed groups can have human rights obligations in other situations of violence, it points out particular challenges to their practical application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the practice of recognizing the banking contract as a special fiduciary contract for the purpose of creation of fair and proper banking practices in Israel. It discusses the stages of development of the legal approach to the bank-customer relationship from a general contractual approach to a fiduciary approach developed by Israeli courts under the contract law. It analyzes the role of the doctrine of jus cogens in providing protection for the banking customer.

The article offers information on the history, purpose and significance of the proposal to recognize consumer contracts law as a special branch of contract law for the protection of consumers in the jurisprudence of Israel. Topics discussed include the differences between the rules of consumer contracts law and general contract law, different forms of contracts such as consumer contracts, labor contracts, and standard contracts, and significance of the jus cogens law in consumer protection.