Search

This article provides an in-depth analysis of Hegel's philosophy of action, focusing on his concept of subjective will and moral motivation. The author explores Michael Quante's interpretation of Hegel's theory, which emphasizes understanding actions from the perspective of the agent. The article also discusses the role of practical feelings, drives, interest, and the pursuit of happiness in moral motivation and free will. It concludes by highlighting the importance of cultivating individuality and ethical conduct for achieving freedom and equality in society. [Extracted from the article]

Is it impossible to imaginatively simulate what it's like to be someone with a different gender experience – to understand them empathically? Or is it simply difficult, a challenge requiring effort and dedication? I first distinguish three different sorts of obstacle to empathic understanding that are sometimes discussed: Missing Ingredient problems, Awkward Combination Problems, and Inappropriate Background Problems. I then argue that, although all three should be taken seriously, there is no clear reason to think that any of them are both genuinely intractable and also significant impediments to the kind of empathic understanding we might want. To that extent, the challenge to interpersonal understanding here may be more a matter of skill and work than a hard boundary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its long period of dominance, the details of associationism as developed by the British Empiricists in the 18th and 19th centuries are often ignored or forgotten today. Perhaps as a result, modern understandings of Empiricist associationism are often oversimplified. In fact, there is no single core view that can be viewed as definitional, or even weaker, as characteristic, of the tradition. The actual views of associationists in this tradition are much more diverse than any such view would allow, even on fundamental aspects of the concept of association. This paper presents some of the most striking theoretical diversity and most significant discussions within the Empiricist associationist tradition. Recognizing this diversity, Empiricist associationism is best viewed as a project with shared questions and methods rather than a shared substantive theory of mind. This discussion can inform our understanding of the historical tradition, and also inform our current use of association and associationism. The concept of association is more flexible than it is often treated, and even its basic nature and function remain up for debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the special issue 'The point of view of shared agency', a collection of papers that develops, and critically assesses, a striking development in recent philosophy of mind, epistemology, and developmental psychology, that is, the fundamental reappraisal of the time-honoured distinction between a 'first-person' and a 'third-person perspective' on our mental lives. In recent years, the nature of the 'second-person standpoint' has become a major focus of work across a range of disciplines. More recently, the idea of 'first-person plural knowledge', has received some attention, for example in considering knowledge of what 'we are doing' when we are doing things together. This collection explores collective agency, self-knowledge, and knowledge of other minds, from this plural and relational point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between philosophy and science has always been complementary. Today, while science moves increasingly fast and philosophy shows some problems in catching up with it, it is not always possible to ignore such relationships, especially in some disciplines such as philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and neuroscience. However, the methodological procedures used to analyze these data are based on principles and assumptions that require a profound dialogue between philosophy and science. Following these ideas, this work aims to raise the problems that a classical connectionist theory can cause and problematize them in a cognitive framework, considering both philosophy and cognitive sciences but also the disciplines that are near to them, such as AI, computer sciences, and linguistics. For this reason, we embarked on an analysis of both the computational and theoretical problems that connectionism currently has. The second aim of this work is to advocate for collaboration between neuroscience and philosophy of mind because the promotion of deeper multidisciplinarity seems necessary in order to solve connectionism's problems. In fact, we believe that the problems that we detected can be solved by a thorough investigation at both a theoretical and an empirical level, and they do not represent an impasse but rather a starting point from which connectionism should learn and be updated while keeping its original and profoundly convincing core. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek, and John Hawthorne argue for the rational permissibility of 'credal imprecision' by appealing to certain propositions associated with non-measurable spatial regions: for example, the proposition that the pointer of a spinner will come to rest within a certain non-measurable set of points on its circumference. This paper rebuts their argument by showing that its premises lead to implausible consequences in cases where one is trying to learn, by making multiple observations, whether a certain outcome is associated with a non-measurable region or a measurable one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our decision-theoretic states are not luminous. We are imperfectly reliable at identifying our own credences, utilities and available acts, and thus can never be more than imperfectly reliable at identifying the prescriptions of decision theory. The lack of luminosity affords decision theory a remarkable opportunity — to issue guidance on the basis of epistemically inaccessible facts. We show how a decision theory can guarantee action in accordance with contingent truths about which an agent is arbitrarily uncertain. It may seem that such advantages would require dubiously adverting to externalist facts that go beyond the internalism of traditional decision theory, but this is not so. Using only the standard repertoire of decision-theoretic tools, we show how to modify existing decision theories to take advantage of this opportunity. These improved decision theories require agents to maximize conditional expected utility — expected utility conditional upon an agent's actual decision situation. We call such modified decision theories 'self-confident'. These self-confident decision theories have a distinct advantage over standard decision theories: their prescriptions are better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synthetic physicalism—understood as the view that while mental concepts are distinct from physical concepts, mental properties are nonetheless identical to physical properties—is the dominant type of reductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. With a focus on phenomenal concepts, this article examines two competing versions of synthetic physicalism: the demonstrative approach and the constitutive approach, both of which attempt to cash out the common idea that phenomenal concepts directly refer to phenomenal properties. I aim to argue that the synthetic physicalist is impaled on a dilemma in addressing what I call the problem of double aspect: the mental-physical conceptual distinction seems to imply property dualism at a new level. Either she adopts the demonstrative approach or she goes for the constitutive approach, but neither option is acceptable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the concept of intentionality in philosophy of mind and phenomenology. It explains that intentionality refers to the directedness of consciousness towards something. The article explores the perspectives of philosophers like Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl on intentionality and its relation to mental phenomena. It also discusses the role of tendency, affect, and drive in understanding the basic structures of intentionality. The text highlights the historical origins of the phenomenological tradition and includes contributions from various philosophers and psychologists. It argues that intentionality is not fixed but has an orientation that allows it to acquire determination, with affect and interest playing a crucial role in this process. The article also examines the relationship between intentionality and curiosity, as well as the connection between intentionality and drives. It emphasizes the importance of understanding intentionality as a dynamic orientation that encompasses cognitive, emotional, and volitional acts. [Extracted from the article]

It is usually, and without much disagreement, regarded that ‘knowing one’s own consciousness’ is strikingly and fundamentally different from ‘knowing other things’. The peculiar way in which conscious subjects introspectively know their own consciousness in their immediate awareness is of immense importance with regard to the understanding of consciousness insofar as it has a direct bearing upon consciousness’ fundamental existence. However, when it comes to the understanding of consciousness, the role of consciousness’ introspective knowledge is rather downplayed or not given much importance with regard to its ontology. With this in the background, the whole purpose of this paper is, first, to make the rather obvious point that the very existence of consciousness in its most fundamental form is constituted by this introspective knowledge of it or its epistemic dimension, whereby its ontology gets its epistemological or epistemic nature. Second, it aims to strengthen the explanatory gap argument by appealing to our enhanced understanding of consciousness in terms of its epistemic ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to dissociate Metaphysics and Theology. In Metaphysics, I propose a Neutral Monist foundation of the Being of Reality, which is, therefore, not material or ideal, but a cosmic field of possibilities that generates both domains. God is conceived as one possibility embedded in the Being of Reality that may or may not become actual, depending on conditions established by the evolution of the Cosmos. As far as we know, the conditions for the actualization of God are satisfied by human consciousness. The relation between the Being of Reality and its outcomes, as the realization of God in human society, is one of actualization of potentialities, as in Aristotelian philosophy. This approach leads to a Feuerbachian view of God as emergent in social conscious experience, achieving embodied expression in human social practices, from the legitimate symbolic message of prophets, in sacred texts, rituals, images, buildings, and social institutions implemented by religious organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the centuries, the concept of the self has remained a prominent subject of philosophical inquiry. However, recent years have witnessed a notable shift, with empirical investigations in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology directing their focus toward unraveling the mysteries of the self. These multidisciplinary endeavors have yielded profound insights into the nature of the self, particularly its intricate connection to the physical body. This article centers on a prevailing theory in contemporary discourse: the concept of the embodied self. Central to this theory is the proposition that the self is not an abstract entity but is fundamentally constituted by and inseparably linked with the corporeal form. The article provides an analytical examination of the theoretical scaffolding supporting this theory, drawing substantiation from recent empirical studies spanning diverse disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. Additionally, it delves into the realm of phenomenology, briefly delving into Merleau-Ponty's philosophical contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of self-awareness and awareness of the surrounding world for Muslim scholars has been categorized into divisions such as experiential and acquired awareness. However, the ontology of awareness, meaning the discussion of whether awareness is immaterial or material, as well as the material or immaterial nature of the origin and end of awareness, has been a particularly challenging topic among Muslim theologians. Some Muslim scholars, denying the existence of a factor beyond the human body for his movement and life, considered both awareness and the process of awareness-formation in humans and the factor-shaping awareness in humans to be within the same body. They engaged in critiquing the perspectives and foundations of philosophers, especially Avicenna on this matter and, utilizing specific principles in their philosophical physicalist psychology, regarded awareness as a material entity. In this discussion, after examining the foundations of this group of Muslim theologians regarding the material nature of awareness and their criticisms of considering awareness as immaterial, we will focus on the philosophical and epistemological consequences arising from the materialistic view of awareness in their thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People often think that phenomenal consciousness is unique to humans and animals, but panpsychism extends it to other beings, considering consciousness as fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. This extension claim, which is shared by all panpsychists, carries ethical implications. Panpsychists vary in their views of the scope of extending consciousness. Micropsychism extends consciousness all the way down to fundamental particles at the micro-level, while macropsychism extends it to the cosmos and all physical objects in the universe. While micropsychism suggests that fundamental particles have moral status and significant moral standing, this truth does not necessarily translate into practical moral consequences, nor does it require us to change our behavior towards them. On the other hand, macropsychism implies that the universe holds moral status and significant moral standing. Advocates of this view argue that we should act in a way that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain for all beings in which we can discern the causes of pleasure and pain. Additionally, macropsychism requires recognizing the moral status and significant moral standing of all animate and inanimate entities. We should therefore behave in such a way that enhances the pleasure and alleviates the suffering of animals and plants, although we do not have any moral obligation regarding inanimate beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physicalists and dualists have failed to provide a convincing answer to the mind-body problem. This is because they, respectively, sacrifice mental causation and neglect the close relationship between the mind and the body. To tackle this, some contemporary philosophers, such as Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, have turned to the concept of strong emergentism. This perspective views the mind as an emergent physical substance with autonomous causal powers. If this standpoint is tenable, it holds promise for resolving the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, the idea of strong emergentism faces substantial challenges. This article aims to achieve two objectives. First, it addresses these challenges and asserts that, even in the face of the most serious concern, “the collapse problem”, a specific interpretation of strong emergentism remains unthreatened. Second, we contend that while O’Connor and Jacobs present a thought-provoking proposal, its clarity is hindered, and a thorough understanding is only possible when we perceive the emergent substance as more than merely physical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary theology is realizing the importance of integrating the knowledge of modern/contemporary physics into the metaphysical and ontological categories used to consider God and the God-world relationship. Time is a complex notion with different meanings, characterized by a plurality of uses. The concept of time opens up to broader conceptions than those of physics, mathematics, and philosophy and reveals that the human being, the earth, and the cosmos are not the center of space or time. The concepts of space, time, and matter, to which the concept of vacuum is connected, are of central importance in any modern physical theory, and particularly in the theories of unification. It is being discovered that spacetime is absent at the most fundamental level and only emerges at an appropriate limit. This emerging image of time leads to new conceptual challenges that must be faced in parallel with philosophy and theological research to achieve its correct understanding. It is a comparison of the viewpoints of the three investigative domains concerned with understanding the nature of consciousness, namely science, philosophy, and metaphysics. This thought process is connected to the intuitions of the contemplative and mystical traditions and seems to be in line with current scientific thought, which can be mathematically expressed. Recent scientific research struggles to grasp the subjective aspect of consciousness; subjective experience is in conflict with the figure of the observer classically understood in the scientific sense. The evolution of life and the relationship with the transcendent could have their information basis in a hyper-complex multi-dimensional space; recent efforts try to explain how mental states exist in the higher dimensions of this hyperspace; some recent models of unification integrate matter and consciousness through the use of this primordial multidimensional dynamic space. Ontological interpretations of quantum theory have been given, leading to patterns of bidirectional flow of consciousness between an explicate and an implicate order, supporting both local and non-local phenomena in the cosmos. The paper aims to offer an overview of the indicated issues with a trans-disciplinary method and through interesting hints for thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, property dualism is a respectable theory whereas substance dualism need not be taken seriously. This paper argues that property dualism, as it is usually understood, is incoherent. The commitments that are meant to lead to property dualism actually lead to substance dualism. The argument presented here adds weight to David Chalmers’ suggestion that the serious nonphysicalist options are in fact various kinds of panpsychism and substance dualism. Along the way, I offer an account of the substance/property distinction, argue against the existence of substrata as distinct from substances and properties, and describe a new position that I call ‘transcendent panpsychism’. I identify some reasons why philosophers of mind might have overlooked the incoherence of property dualism and finish with some thoughts on the significance of my conclusion for developmental psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Johann Gottlieb Fichte's thinking is part of the Sattelzeit, in which the foundation for the modern use of important concepts is laid. The stages of Fichte's philosophy and his various theories of religion and Christianity reflect attempts to determine the function of religion in a modern society. Important is the philosophical foundation of religion, which is transformed from a moral theology based on Kant to a unified theory of the philosophy of mind. Fichte thus offers an alternative to Hegel and Schelling. This alternative has only been taken up in Protestant theology at a small number of points, but all the more intensively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the philosophical questions surrounding the experience of recovering from psychosis and regaining a sense of self and agency. The author discusses the limitations of understanding the self and agency as inner experiences and argues that they are instead shaped by external factors and the endorsement of beliefs supported by external facts. The article proposes that recovery from psychosis involves committing to the transparency condition, which entails finding and endorsing facts in the external world. This perspective offers a non-psychological account of recovery and provides a comprehensive orientation for psychiatrists to facilitate recovery. The article also raises questions about the accuracy and potential oppressiveness of this process, as well as its applicability to healing in psychopathology more generally. [Extracted from the article]

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary mind and brain sciences provide theories and data that seem to confirm a hypothesis about human nature that we might formulate as follows. Human life is conditioned by a need that is no less important than elementary biological needs (such as survival and reproduction) or universal forms of social competition: the need to build and, indeed, defend a subjective identity whose solidity and clarity are the foundation of our intra- and inter-personal equilibrium and therefore of psychological well-being and mental health. In this article, distancing ourselves from a neo-Cartesian position still prevalent in the philosophy of mind and approaching instead the outcomes of contemporary cognitive sciences, we sketch the complex interweaving of the cognitive, emotional, and affective elements that are constitutive of subjective identity, with a focus on the role played in self-identity construction by Theory-of-Mind abilities. We will suggest that, at every stage of self-construction, individuals engage in processes of understanding others that have a largely innate basis. In this perspective, a mature self-awareness is somewhat secondary to the knowledge of others, an evolutionarily refined acquisition primarily serving as a defense mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "James and Whitehead on Life after Death" by David Ray Griffin explores the possibility and reality of life after death. Griffin argues against materialism, which rules out the existence of an afterlife, and presents his version of panexperientialism as a metaphysical framework that allows for the possibility of an afterlife. However, the book does not provide a clear explanation of what is supposed to survive the death of the biological organism. Griffin discusses cases of mediumship, near-death experiences, apparitions, and reincarnation as evidence for the reality of life after death, but these claims are not supported by scientific consensus. The book also loosely connects the ideas of Whitehead and James to the topic of life after death. Overall, the book raises philosophical questions about the nature of the self and prompts further exploration of related topics. [Extracted from the article]

Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his 'activity view' with the mental action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment. In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways. In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dualism of properties and qualia have been inherited problems of the Cartesian theory. Old problems with new vestments that have been overlapped in the speech of cognitive sciences, in special in the one of the philosophy of mind. For some contemporary thinkers the above mentioned 'problems' are within the frameworks of the Metaphysical questions. This article presents advances concerning an analytical research that tries to reveal the genesis of the problem caused by the inadequate use of language, in order to show that such questions in the long run are only pseudoproblems. Problems of linguistic and logical order disguised with metaphysical apparel. In the first part of the writing the speech that gives origin to the problem will be analyzed, later the Cartesian speech will be checked - being this the official doctrine that inherits the problem to the philosophy of the mind-they will present the reasons for which it affirms that these problems are not more than errors inherited by the use of language. Finally, they will present in a brief way how the eliminative and emergent positions of Dennett and Searle there are no really overcoming of the dualism as they sustain it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding and characterizing the relationship between mental phenomena and the brain is a huge challenge for modern neuroscience. No doubt, the conservative orthodox view of this relationship can be described as physicalist. Physicalism is the idea that, no matter how enigmatic mental phenomena may seem, they are nevertheless completely describable in physical and material terms. Still, despite centuries of effort, aspects of mind, such as the qualitative nature of subjective experience, have defied physical characterization. In the early 1920s, emergentism was advanced to explain the relationship between physical reality and higher-order phenomena, including life and mind. According to emergentism, such higher-order phenomena are derivative of and, at the same time, autonomous to underlying physical reality. This article describes the historical and philosophical development of emergentist theses, particularly as they have been treated in the neurosciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical pragmatism has often been branded as being primarily a new theory of truth. Using F.C.S. Schiller's response to an article written by F.H. Bradley, I show that, in fact, a certain theory of thought is the essential point of pragmatism according to Schiller as well as John Dewey and William James. I go on to argue that without taking this theory of thought into account we cannot properly understand the British reception of classical pragmatism in the early 1900s. I illustrate the significance of this contention by criticizing the responses to pragmatism given by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we consider the importance of trust, in the context of economic institutions, and specifically with respect to questions about market mechanisms and the role of social interactions. We review recent advances in institutional economics closely tied to developments in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, involving extended and enactive cognition. We argue that the analysis of different conceptions of institutional mind extension, in Denzau and North's shared mental models, Clark's extended mind, and a more enactive approach that emphasizes the importance of social interaction and personal relationships, can benefit from Kathrine Hawley's distinction between reliability and trust. Institutional arrangements based solely on the reliability of impersonal mechanisms can lead to a variety of social pathologies and, at the extreme, a form of cognitive atrophy, all of which can undermine the sustainability of institutions. Even if trust comes with risks and some degree of unpredictability, it turns out to be a necessary glue-like ingredient in the constitution of social institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an increasingly popular view in epistemology and philosophy of mind, beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors such as practical factors and salient error possibilities. A prominent version of this view, called credal sensitivism, holds that the context-sensitivity of belief is due to the context-sensitivity of degrees of belief or credence. Credal sensitivism comes in two variants: while credence-one sensitivism (COS) holds that maximal confidence (credence one) is necessary for belief, threshold credal sensitivism (TCS) holds that belief consists in having credence above some threshold, where this threshold doesn't require maximal confidence. In this paper, I argue that COS has difficulties in accounting for three important features about belief: (i) the compatibility between believing p and assigning non-zero credence to certain error possibilities that one takes to entail not-p, (ii) the fact that outright beliefs can occur in different strengths, and (iii) beliefs held by unconscious subjects. I also argue that TCS can easily avoid these problems. Finally, I consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS in terms of explaining beliefs about lotteries. I argue that lottery cases are rather more problematic for COS than TCS. In conclusion, TCS is the most plausible version of credal sensitivitism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I discuss the emerging field of conceptual engineering from the perspective of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I explore the role the latter disciplines can and do play by specifically focusing on how different notions of what a concept is affects the general conceptual engineering framework, both positively and negatively, before considering a particular account that eschews talk of concepts altogether. I call this project 'Cappelen's challenge' as it draws from suggestive remarks in his work (Cappelen, H. 2018. Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits of Revision. Oxford: Oxford University Press). I argue that by appreciating the range of options that each theory of concepts brings with it, the field as a whole can come to better grips with its foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of acquaintance is one of the pillars of Russell's philosophy and it remains at the center of work in the philosophy of mind and language. Russell's development of his theory of acquaintance was influenced by Brentano and Meinong. In this paper I will trace this Austrian Influence on the development of Russell's theory of acquaintance through two phases; one before and one after Russell introduced the multiple relation theory of judgement in 1907. I will use Brentano's view of the distinction between judgement and presentation to highlight problems with Russell's theories of acquaintance in both phases. In doing so I will give special attention to Russell's notion of experiencing together that plays a foundational role in the second phase. The paper concludes by recommending to Russell that he returns to Brentano's original ideas about judgement and presentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical beliefs or principles can help healthcare providers establish effective approaches to mental health analysis. This article aims to demonstrate how modern philosophical tenets could improve mental health analysis from diagnosis to treatment. It describes the role and importance of philosophical approaches, including the Gadamer philosophical hermeneutics, in providing alternative approaches to mental illness treatments as an interdisciplinary field combining practical views and methods of the philosophies of mind, neuroscience, psychology, and moral philosophy. This is achieved by exploring the evolution of mental illnesses, the philosophical views on the manifestation of psychiatric disorders, scientific and philosophical viewpoints, and insights on applying Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics to mental illnesses. Gadamer's viewpoints present essential philosophical foundations that could solve the crucial problems associated with the antecedent theories of mental illnesses. Overall, the philosophical viewpoint requires patient diagnosis and treatment approaches that holistically consider the use of language in all interpretive practices, cultural phenomena, patients' histories, and environmental factors that are critical sources of hermeneutic experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning" by Atmanspacher and Rickles delves into the connection between the mind and the material world, specifically focusing on Jung's concept of the Unus Mundus, archetypes, and synchronicity. The authors argue that this concept extends beyond the collaboration between Jung and Pauli and applies to other influential figures in quantum theory. Divided into three parts, the book covers the philosophical background, theories of meaning, and three approaches to quantum theory. While it requires a solid understanding of quantum theory, the book offers profound insights into the nature of the psyche and the implications of quantum theory. The text also explores the Pauli/Jung Conjecture, which examines the relationship between psychology and quantum physics. The authors propose a dual-aspect monism framework, where the psycho-physically neutral base separates into mental and physical states that are structurally correlated, with archetypal patterns forming the foundation of this correlation. The text further delves into the implications of this conjecture for analytical psychology, synchronicity, and the nature of meaning in the world. [Extracted from the article]

The paper aims to present the role of the philosophy of mind and consciousness for the philosophical practice (philosophical practice) and to explore the possibility of a transpersonal philosophical counseling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Music clearly has a mathematical structure. From the ancient Pythagoreans we know that harmony is the mathematical ratio between the notes (the frequencies as has been discovered by physics). This operation can be performed by the brain which has been seen as a kind of computer by the philosophy of mind of the last decades. And it is an unconscious operation. The conscious presentation of music contains the intervals as phenomenal components, yet not in a mathematical form, obviously, but in a sensorial form, alongside the notes themselves. The experience of music must contain the intervals as cognitions (in the sense that they have phenomenal form), otherwise no music would be possible at all. The phenomenological structure of harmony shows us the notes themselves in the foreground but the intervals in the background that we can still hear and experience it fused with the notes. The experience of the intervals are also not the emotions that music evokes in us - though they are definitely connected in some ways by the neural circuits of the brain and compose further phenomenological structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In philosophy of mind, the problem of consciousness refers to a difficult problem about the nature and properties of consciousness. This problem includes fundamental questions such as “what is consciousness” and “how can it be explained”. Consciousness refers to the subjective awareness that an individual experiences. However, how consciousness arises and how it relates to neurological processes is still not fully understood. The problem of consciousness is handled with two basic approaches: physicalist and dualist approaches. The physicalist approach tries to explain consciousness in terms of physical processes. Physicalists argue that brain activities, neural interactions, and neuronal networks are the main factors that create consciousness. According to this view, consciousness arises as a result of neurological activities. However, exactly how the physicalist approach works and how consciousness relates to neurological processes still remains unclear. Another approach, dualism, argues that consciousness is a non-physical entity and cannot be fully explained by brain activities. According to dualists, there is a relationship between consciousness and the brain, but consciousness is something that exists outside the physical world. According to this view, another explanation or existence beyond physical processes is necessary for the explanation of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A long‐standing aim of cinema – in particular of 'extreme', 'unwatchable' or 'feel‐ bad' cinema – has been to acquaint viewers with extreme suffering. In this article I first offer an explication of that aim in terms of recent work in philosophy of mind, then exploit the resulting framework to examine claims to the effect that a new technological development, Virtual Reality, provides cinema's best shot at achieving that aim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting‐for‐a‐reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author of this paper discusses the theme of the "simulated body", that is the sense of "being there" in a body that is not one's own, or that does not exist in the way one perceives it. He addresses this issue by comparing Immersive Virtual Reality technology, the phenomenological approach, and Gerald Edelman's theory of Neural Darwinism. Virtual Reality has been used to throw light on some phenomena that cannot be studied experimentally in real life, and the results of its simulations enrich the phenomenological discourse on the lived body. Virtual "Reality" seems to replicate—at least in part—the simulation mechanisms of our mind, thus favoring developments in the field of philosophy of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his unpublished 1979 Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, Saul Kripke offers a knowledge argument against materialism focusing on deaf people who lack knowledge of auditory experience. Kripke's argument is a precursor of Frank Jackson's better‐known knowledge argument against materialism (1982). The paper sets out Kripke's argument, brings out its interest and philosophical importance, and explores some similarities and differences between Kripke's knowledge argument and Jackson's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nibbānasukha-sutta contains Sāriputta's statement that the pleasure (sukha) of nibbāna lies in the fact that nothing is experienced (vedayita). This statement may be seen as complementary to the proclamation in the Kaḷāra-sutta that all that is experienced is unpleasant (dukkha). In this paper, I attempt to reconstruct the ideas serving as a philosophical backdrop to these radical and seemingly counterintuitive claims. I use a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, re-examining several key Nikāya passages, as well as drawing on modern cognitive science and philosophy of mind. I suggest that vedayita and the closely related concept of the five khandhas (and in particular viññāṇa) refer to various aspects of the type of consciousness whose content is phenomenal, introspectable, reportable and may be integrated into memory. I suggest that such consciousness is not a constant feature of our being engaged in the world and that its absence does not entail insentience or being incognizant. I hypothesize that a relatively low frequency of occurrences of such consciousness in the states known as absorption or flow contributes to their pleasurable nature and the altered sense of the passage of time and selfhood. I attempt to explain how the presence or absence of such consciousness is related to the states of dukkha or sukha, with particular focus on the role played by saṅkhāra. I also discuss the limits of introspection as a means of understanding what exactly makes experiences pleasurable or painful, and consider the possibility of non-introspectable forms of pleasure. In conclusion, I suggest that psychological transformation in early Buddhism is connected with a radical change of perspective, which involves no longer identifying with one's own consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article replies to criticism of my article, "Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?" by Sebastian Gäb, Eva Schmidt and Michael Scott. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here is a widespread but controversial idea: those animals who represent correctly are likely to be selected over those who misrepresent. While various versions of this claim have been traditionally endorsed by the vast majority of philosophers of mind, recently, it has been argued that this is just plainly wrong. My aim in this paper is to argue for an intermediate position: that the correctness of some but not all representations is indeed selectively advantageous. It is selectively advantageous to have correct representations that are directly involved in bringing about and guiding the organism's action. I start with the standard objection to the claim that it is selectively advantageous to represent correctly, the 'better safe than sorry' argument gand then generalize it with the help of Peter Godfrey Smith's distinction between Cartesian and Jamesian reliability and the trade‐off between them. This generalized argument rules out a positive answer to our question at least as far as the vast majority of our representational apparatus is concerned. But this argument fails to apply in the case of the correctness of a special kind of representation, one that is directly involved in bringing about, and in guiding, actions. We can still maintain that it is selectively advantageous to have a reliable mechanism for producing representations of this kind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grounding physicalism is the doctrine that mental properties are metaphysically grounded in underlying physical properties. The present paper develops a novel challenge to this view derived from two main claims: one of them concerning the natures of phenomenal properties, the other concerning the relation between grounding and essence. The central goal of the paper is to explain how grounding physicalists can meet this challenge by means of appealing to grounding laws, thereby making room for ‘Moorean’ connections between distinct types of property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that (former) patients are experts who could contribute to mental health care practices is gaining traction. Experts-by-Experience are increasingly employed by institutions to contribute to various levels of care, organization and policy-making. However, the success of this movement is hindered by conceptual and epistemological ambiguities. Our goal in this paper is to turn to the rich philosophical literature to start addressing such ambiguities. We first summarize the advantages of and challenges for Experience-based Expertise movement in mental health care. Next, we explicate the theoretical assumptions of this movement by outlining its salient tenets, with a focus on the Dutch mental care system. We point out three challenges of the movement that could be addressed using the insights by recent work in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, i.e., (i) conceptual problems, (ii) worries about the subjectivity of the contributions of Experts-by-Experience, and (iii) addressing of the conflicts between the Experts-by-Experience and other experts. We conclude by proposing an enactive affordance-based framework as a candidate for clarifying the goals of the Experience-based Expertise movement in a way that avoids the current conceptual and epistemological problems and opens up venues for its growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite experience‐based expertise being increasingly common in health care, what experiential knowledge consists of remains a topic for debate. Here I propose a philosophical approach to clarify experiential knowledge, drawing on an analogous debate in philosophy of mind, which similarly targets the intuition that experience may generate unique knowledge. I outline the philosophical debate and explicate some relevant ideas for health care, so as to (a) evaluate whether and to what extent this analogous debate is helpful, and (b) supplement existing ideas on experiential knowledge with a philosophical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Introduction to Morris N. Eagle’s book Subjective Experience: Its Fate in Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and Philosophy of Mind (London: Routledge, 2024, in press) is pre-published. Subjective experience is of fundamental importance for the human being, and it is at the core of the feeling of being alive. However, it has traditionally been neglected by the disciplines that deal with the study of the mind (such as psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience and philosophy of mind). It has been variously viewed as an epiphenomenon, has been seen primarily as manifest content that hides and disguises unconscious latent meanings, and has been reduced to neural processes. Morris N. Eagle’s book Subjective Experience includes the following eight chapters: 1, Consciousness and subjective experience in psychology; 2, Consciousness and subjective experience in psychoanalysis; 3, Consciousness and subjective experience in philosophy of mind; 4, Are consciousness and subjective experience uninvestigable?; 5, Intersubjective experience; 6, Feelings and affects; 7, Consciousness and subjective experience as a continuum; 8, Some summing up and concluding comments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is timely, then, that a book appears with the specific aim of integrating discussions of hinge epistemology with fields that are not always considered within Wittgenstein scholarship, such as political philosophy, philosophy of mind and social philosophy. She also takes issue with Pritchard's hinge epistemology, specifically with his merging of hinge epistemology with epistemological disjunctivism. Hinge epistemology, a field of epistemology inspired by Witttgenstein's reflections in I On Certainty i , has rapidly been gaining recognition for those interested in Wittgenstein. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the role of philosophy in psychopathology and argues for its continued relevance in the field. The author explores Karl Jaspers' perspective on the role of philosophy in psychopathology and emphasizes the importance of understanding in the study of mental states. The article also highlights the relationship between philosophy and science, as well as the role of philosophy in clinical settings. Overall, the author suggests that philosophy can bring clarity to complex issues and expand our understanding of psychopathology. [Extracted from the article]

The article explores the connections between pantheism, panpsychism, and secularism in the Renaissance period. It challenges the traditional Enlightenment narrative that assumes the eradication of pantheism and panpsychism with the rise of secularism. The article argues that the Renaissance was a complex and diverse era, with the existence of Christian Humanism and the influence of Hermeticism. It also discusses the renewed interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. The article suggests that secularism in the Renaissance was not solely the result of deliberate decisions by intellectuals, but rather a product of various factors and conflicting interests. It explores the relationship between philosophy, theology, and science during this period and the tensions that arose. The article concludes by highlighting the ongoing tension between the secular and the sacred, the rational and the revealed, in modern culture. [Extracted from the article]

The Letter on the Soul is interesting and significant; it attempts to tackle fundamental problems that fall on the borderlines of psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and logic. The consensus among Avicenna scholars is that The Letter is Avicenna's. In this paper, I will argue against this consensus. I will examine the philosophical and logical content of The Letter, as well as Avicenna's view on the impossible forms in his authentic works, and construct a content-based argument against the authenticity of The Letter. This study, I hope, sheds some light on Avicenna's view on the impossibilia , what they are, and how they can be apprehended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]