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In this paper, I will try to provide the justifications according to the laws in force and the needs of democratic policies and institutions to allow the creation of PMCs according to international rules and standards by applying the constitutional laws and with particular emphasis on freedom and human rights in the civil-military aspect. So the challenge and the journey remain in the aspect of the formation of the professional framework within the organizational structure of the PMC from the functionality of the state military structures. During the work, I will be able to identify why there is a demand and implementation of PMC by many democratic states and how much these are covered by laws, regulations, and international conventions, considering that we are dealing with direct intervention in the civil-military aspect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military companies are private entities that offer a wide range of services in the field of security. The services included in the framework of the PMC are from logistics, intelligence, and combat operations, where there is very little information about the latter—general actions used by states. In the field of security, private military companies are called private insurance companies, mercenary companies up to the appointment as private military firms, where mainly within these companies the persons/individuals who are employed (contracted) are from the former Special Forces. Since the terrorist attack with major international consequences, the challenge and advancement of the use of private military contractors has become increasingly common. The paper will present the methodology of action and use of the PMC with increasing specific requirements for reducing the number of soldiers and regular army personnel and replacing them with private military contractors at a lower cost. So, within the framework of this paper, I will try to shed light on the rationale for the use of PMCs up to the involvement of the state in them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does growing reliance on private military and security companies (PMSCs) lead to the re-configuration of the state as a security and defence actor in Europe? Building on the multiple-networks-approach in organisation theory (Padgett and Powell), the current paper develops an analytical approach for studying the rise of new organizational forms in interstitial spaces via mechanisms including extension and differentiation; fusion and hybridity; transposition and refunctionality; and multivocality. The empirical analysis focuses on the rules and practices of Vesper Group - a PMSC working closely with the Swedish government. Several findings are reported. First, a new organizational form seems to be emerging as a result of the ongoing multiple network dynamics – national defence entrepreneurial firm. This is a type of a firm different from mainstream PMSCs in that it is owned by venture capital companies from their home state and also in that it is closely associated with its respective state in terms of its personnel policies, expertise and operational goals and scope. Second, the case of Sweden's Vesper Group and its cooperation with the Swedish government indicates that some EU member states may also be in the process of structural and institutional mutation as providers of defence and crisis management capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A series of military coups in West Africa, starting with Mali in 2020, have led to the rise of military regimes that have gained popular support. These regimes have withdrawn from ECOWAS and formed their own regional structure called the Alliance of Sahel States. They have made significant changes in security, domestic policy, and foreign policy, including ending military cooperation with France and strengthening ties with Russia. The coups have been justified by the need for change due to the previous governments' failure to improve security. The juntas in Mali and Niger have accused France of supporting jihadist groups and violating their sovereignty. The popular support for the juntas has put pressure on ECOWAS and allowed the regimes to maintain power. The relationship between Mali and France has been complex, with France initially supporting the transitional government but later becoming a target. The recent partnership between Mali and Russia has led to a more offensive military approach, but it has also been accompanied by allegations of human rights abuses and a narrowing of democratic freedoms. The economic situation in Mali has worsened, and diplomatic tensions with France and the departure of international forces have further complicated the country's challenges. [Extracted from the article]

This article delves into the use of herbicides in U.S.-backed counterinsurgency efforts in Latin America and beyond. It specifically examines instances of herbicide experimentation and fumigation in Georgia and Colombia, noting the lack of documentation surrounding these events. The article emphasizes the connection between herbicides, war, and the control of nature, highlighting the transnational history and violent politics associated with counterinsurgency. It explores the concept of ecocide and its link to counterinsurgency campaigns in Latin America, discussing how the fear of rural revolution led to large-scale "pacification" efforts that resulted in the destruction of environments seen as supporting political opposition. The use of herbicides played a significant role in these campaigns, eradicating both human and nonhuman populations. The article also addresses the connection between environmental violence and state-led "dirty wars," as well as the challenges of documenting and uncovering evidence of these crimes. [Extracted from the article]

Though the same descriptors have been applied to Wagner Group and US/Western Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), this article differentiates the two experiences to better appreciate Wagner Group's unique characteristics. To make this differentiation, the article examines the distinctions between defensive and offensive violence, the access to crewed weapons, and an integrated team approach. In this way, the article presents Wagner Group as offensively minded, kitted out with crewed weapons, and operating outside of an integrated team. The article closes with resulting questions to consider regarding Russia's stance toward weaponry and how Wagner Group's characteristics might have contributed to the June 2023 uprising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era of globalization, states employ private military and security companies (PMSCs) to carry out various military functions. This signals an international shift in military strategy away from traditional state actors and towards the use of nonstate actors motivated by profit. The result has been an unequal application of international humanitarian law (IHL) towards PMSC personnel in international armed conflict. This Comment offers three suggestions on how to standardize the treatment of PMSC personnel in international armed conflict and ensure accountability and compliance with IHLs: (1) treat PMSCs engaged in international armed conflict as personnel of the state employing them, (2) outlaw PMSCs operating in international armed conflict, or (3) require PMSCs to apply for international licenses. Each option is examined through the lens of Blackwater operations in Iraq and Wagner operations in Ukraine, two of the most notorious PMSCs widely criticized in the media for their blatant disregard for IHL. These suggestions aim to strike a balance between an evolving military landscape, the profit-driven motivations of nonstate actors, and IHL considerations. Ultimately, this will create a more equitable and legally sound framework for addressing the role of PMSCs in contemporary armed conflicts, ensuring that they are held accountable for their actions and that IHL is upheld. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of African soldiers in the apartheid security apparatus in South Africa during the Cold War and post-Cold War era. It acknowledges that these soldiers played a significant role in supporting the racial regime and combating communism, but their experiences and contributions are often overlooked. The article suggests that further research is needed to understand the experiences and trajectories of African forces during this time period. It also discusses the challenges of researching African soldiers due to limited access to archival records and proposes alternative methods such as veteran-authored memoirs and oral history interviews. The authors argue for a diverse research agenda to study the role and experiences of African soldiers in this context. [Extracted from the article]

Peacekeeping is a central element of Russian foreign policy. The country has been deploying peacekeeping troops under highly controversial circumstances for more than three decades. A major power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia obviously plays an important role in defining the standards by which peacekeeping is and may be done. When Russian troops invaded Ukraine in an unprovoked aggression on 24 February 2022, Russian politicians initially referred to them as 'peacekeeping troops'. This led UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to declare his concern about 'the perversion of the concept of peacekeeping'. This article offers a discussion of the Russian approach to peacekeeping as this has been and is being expressed in both recent conceptual thinking and implementation. Relying on a large pool of Russian policy documents and scholarly works, the article finds that Russia is likely to execute more operations with a lowered threshold for intervention and under conditions of greater flexibility. It is a more pragmatic approach. Operations will increasingly be designed comprehensively across the physical, cyber and cognitive domains and will include the use of private military companies. This will almost inevitably bring Russian interests to clash even more with the interests of western states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States pays half-a-trillion dollars to defense contractors every year. Although the U.S. military could not operate without profitable contractors, excessively profitable contracts reduce manufacturing output and can imperil soldier safety. Stretching back to the founding, there is a long history of the executive branch compelling ex post modifications of military contracts to a lower price than the parties agreed to at signing. Sometimes authorized by Congress (but not always), this executive practice of "downward revisions" has fallen into disuse. Nevertheless, at least one statute might authorize this practice today: Public Law 85-804. Commonly understood to provide higher payments to defense contractors, this Note argues that Public Law 85-804 should be interpreted in light of its text and history to authorize downward revisions to excessively profitable defense contracts. Such an interpretation could save soldiers' lives and lower defense costs during today's challenging fiscal and geopolitical times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the recent changes in the nature of wars, hybrid wars have become widespread, and private military companies have become an important tool in the war strategies of states, especially of those with global goals. While private military companies provide various advantages to countries of origin, they also pose some threats. Wagner has been the most important military company of the Russian Federation, which desires to gain influence in global politics and instrumentalizes private military companies in its foreign policy. However, the rebellion attempt of Wagner has made the risks posed by private military companies to countries of origin debatable again. Wagner started to make a name for itself by taking part in Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and has turned into a useful device for Russia, but its rebellion revealed that such structures can cause serious national security problems for the states to which they belong if they cannot be kept under control. Discussing the risks posed by private military companies to countries of origin through the example of Wagner; this study evaluates Wagner's role and influence in Russian politics and examines the threats it poses to Russia. This study, uses historical and descriptive methodology and is based on the hypothesis that "private military companies may pose a risk to the country of origin when they become excessively powerful and operate in nearby geographies". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alongside the private military company Wagner and his notorious Internet Research Agency (IRA), Yevgeny Prigozhin was associated with the Patriot Media Group (PMG) which amplified state narratives through its webpages and was registered by Roskomnadzor, the federal agency for supervision of Russian media. The Patriot Media Group was shut down after the mutiny, June 23, 2023, while most of its channels were removed or remain inactive currently. The essay provides a brief account of the Patriot Media Group’s structures, partnerships, and campaigns based on digital ethnographic observations of their web channels. The news coverage from predominantly Russian language news outlets sheds light on how the Group operated and what happened after Prigozhin’s mutiny. The essay concludes with some directions for future research on a complex and murky media production facility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military companies (PMC) can have considerable advantages for the customer on the one hand, but on the other hand can come with great dangers. Based on the theory of externalities, an attempt is made to illuminate this situation and to analyze the negative externalities associated with it. By using an instrumental case study method we can identify two potential negative technological externalities of hiring PMCs which should be internalized. These two are the violation of national law and international humanitarian law in the theater of operation, and the lack of control of the executive by the legislative branch in the exporting state. Based on this, we present and discuss options to eliminate these negative technological externalities. It can be shown that the preferable set of measures includes instruments to create transparency, and command-and-control regulations on the individual state's level. While the second effect can easily be solved with domestic instruments, a supranational organization is needed to solve the first effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era of globalization, states employ private military and security companies (PMSCs) to carry out various military functions. This signals an international shift in military strategy away from traditional state actors and towards the use of nonstate actors motivated by profit. The result has been an unequal application of international humanitarian law (IHL) towards PMSC personnel in international armed conflict. This Comment offers three suggestions on how to standardize the treatment of PMSC personnel in international armed conflict and ensure accountability and compliance with IHLs: (1) treat PMSCs engaged in international armed conflict as personnel of the state employing them, (2) outlaw PMSCs operating in international armed conflict, or (3) require PMSCs to apply for international licenses. Each option is examined through the lens of Blackwater operations in Iraq and Wagner operations in Ukraine, two of the most notorious PMSCs widely criticized in the media for their blatant disregard for IHL. These suggestions aim to strike a balance between an evolving military landscape, the profit-driven motivations of nonstate actors, and IHL considerations. Ultimately, this will create a more equitable and legally sound framework for addressing the role of PMSCs in contemporary armed conflicts, ensuring that they are held accountable for their actions and that IHL is upheld. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing literature is unclear about whether private military and security companies (PMSCs) are a cause of increased conflict severity, or rather are simply hired within more severe conflicts. We argue that PMSCs do increase conflict severity, yet this is the result of an escalation strategy by states to regain territory from rebels. If contracted, PMSCs either substitute for host nation forces, or free up such conventional forces to engage in offensive operations. In both cases the conflict severity increases substantially. This argument is tested with OLS regression using data from 30 weak states from 1990 to 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) as active participants within global security environments has increased in the last two decades exponentially. States have progressively incorporated PMSCs in their security functions, both domestically and internationally. Since the conflict in Iraq in the early 2000s, there have been numerous plausible reports of PMSCs violating international humanitarian law. Despite this, only a few have ever been prosecuted, suggesting a fundamental challenge to understandings regarding state control and monopoly over violence. Utilising a historical case study of an Australian PMSC in Operation Iraqi Freedom, this article argues that PMSCs undermine Australian sovereign legitimacy. It demonstrates how Australian oversight and accountability regarding its use of PMSCs is significantly fractured and current regulatory mechanisms concerning PMSCs are deficient. Thus, the Australian government's ability to provide control over the actions of PMSCs is diminished, affecting its sovereign legitimacy and ability to monopolise violence. The article overall conveys the dubious position states come into when the use‐of‐force is wielded by actors for distinct material incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insofar as, in the context of privatized war, the mercenary's job entails enforcing rights on behalf of a state, not independently, the state must grant, through contract, a moral permission to the mercenary to use force on its behalf in order for I that i use to be non-arbitrary. Soldiers - and, as we shall see, only soldiers - can be regarded as extended agents of the state, because one essential feature of the status of soldier, as defined by the constitutive rules of soldiery, is that they respond to the I chain of command i within the official structure of the military. In turn, the state should not consider itself wronged if the mercenary fails to comply, for this failure is only possible as a result of the state's previous wrongful failure to release the mercenary. If, by contrast, the state (wrongly) accepts the mercenary's promise, it would still be wrong for the state to demand that the mercenary comply with the offer's terms. Therefore, whenever a state attempts to enforce that duty on the mercenary - including, for example, by threatening them with economic sanctions if they do not perform - the state wrongs the mercenary. [Extracted from the article]

Stakeholders use a number of different terms to refer to the contractors supporting expeditionary military operations. Often, these terms are inconsistently-applied, stigmatising, and unclear. This analysis uses the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) as a case study for exploring the efforts that the U.S. military has taken to improve contractor terminology. The study finds that DoD uses the terms contractor, contractor personnel, and contractor employee to refer to organisations, groups of employees, and individual employees providing outsourced expeditionary services. DoD also uses a number of more specific terms to refer to certain contractors and relationships. However, there are gaps and inconsistencies in DoD's terminological scheme, and challenges remain in differentiating contractors from other actors in war and in reconciling terminology across the U.S. Government and the international community. By contextualising DoD contractor terminology within the framework of the Confucian Rectification of Names, this study offers insights regarding contractors' normative roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military companies (PMC) offer combat and training services and can have considerable advantages for the client on the one hand, but on the other hand it is hard for the client to exercise effective external governance. Using tools of New Institutional Economics, we analyse the relationship between the PMC and the client and show that effects like adverse selection, moral hazard and supply induced demand are detrimental to the client. We derive approaches from the theory to solve the identified problems. With the help of a comparative case study (Wagner Group in Syria and Gurkha Security Guards in Sierra Leone), the insights gained are tested and put into perspective. It turns out that there must be an effective military or economic threat potential in particular in order to achieve good behaviour on the part of the PMC. In this way, we expand the insights of successful monitoring private providers of military force from the client's point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian private military company (PMC), the Wagner Group, went from being a public secret to openly fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia's war in Ukraine. By looking at Russian pro-government media discourses on PMCs, this paper argues that this development is largely made possible by a discursive shift, which happened before the war. Two basic discourses are found in the period leading up to the war – a discourse that denies the existence of Russian PMCs, and a discourse of normalization, which constructs PMCs as legitimate businesses and Russia as a great power. The two discourses previously kept the PMCs in a grey zone, allowing the Russian political elite deniability, while also taking credit for the foreign policy successes the PMCs achieved. However, this paper shows a discursive shift of recognizing PMCs as legitimate actors, which allowed for the Wagner Group to play a key role in Russia's war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two decades of war in Afghanistan left a mark on the American armed forces and redefined the American ways of war-making. One of this war's legacies is the reimagining of the role of private military and security contractors in contemporary warfare. Due to the massive involvement of the private sector in the American war machine, this industry transformed from a marginal participant into a central partner. The privatization of military and security functions became a norm, an integral part of security architecture and military operation. In this study, I provide a brief review of this development and its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War era, private military security firms are increasingly used in many areas of armed conflict. Especially in this period, using private military companies in low-intensity armed conflicts in many parts of the world was one of the modes developed to cope with the problems in these regions. Although the use of these companies is highly controversial in terms of legal and political aspects, their areas of service are increasing. It is observed that these structures, which also undertake armed conflict functions in some cases, are generally used effectively in the logistics area and various protection services. These companies gained appreciation quickly due to their professionalism, expertise, and sound organizational structure. Since the 1980s, they have been widely used by states and international organizations such as the United Nations other international humanitarian organizations, and multinational companies. It is estimated that these companies, which operate in very different formats and have been established for various purposes, will continue to take active roles in international security architecture. In addition, the financial volume of this sector has recently reached significant dimensions. In this case, examining and understanding these structures will be helpful. In this study, the historical development of private military and security companies operating in a wide range within the changing system of the security environment, in this context, their current structures and the reasons for their preference, the roles they undertake, and their place within the scope of existing international law are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fifty-two years ago, in 1971, President Nixon declared the "War on Drugs", identifying drug abuse as a public enemy in the United States. Since then, US drug policy has been militarized and, more recently, privatized. Every year, the US government increasingly contracts private military and security companies to provide intelligence, logistical support and training to armed forces in drug-producing or drug-transit States. In Latin America, this militarization and privatization has increased the intensity of violence and has complexified domestic situations, to the extent that the existing international legal regimes now seem inappropriate to respond to the challenges posed by the War on Drugs. On the one hand, human rights law does not adequately address situations where the State faces organized crime groups that are able to control territory. On the other hand, international humanitarian law (IHL) was not created to address law enforcement situations, which the War on Drugs and the fight against organized crime ostensibly are. This article examines the situation in Latin America, looking at examples of different types of situations through the lens of intensity and organization of the group involved and, in some cases, the group's control over territory. It discusses the application of IHL and human rights law (focusing on the inter-American system of human rights) in these situations and their complementarity, and debates how these bodies of law are adapting or may need to be adapted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship between Belarus and the European Union (EU) since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It highlights that while other post-Soviet states established partnerships and cooperation agreements with the EU, Belarus failed to do so due to the actions of President Lukashenka. As a result, relations between Belarus and the EU have been frozen since 1997, with the EU reducing cooperation and imposing restrictive measures. The article also mentions the recent political unrest in Belarus and the need for a democratic and pro-European Belarus to ensure regional security and good neighborliness. [Extracted from the article]

In 2016, the US-based private military contractor TigerSwan was denied a license to operate in North Dakota. Nonetheless, it coordinated a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign employing war-on-terror tactics, brutalizing Indigenous and allied water protectors associated with the Indigenous-led movement to stop the Dakota Access Pipeline (#NoDAPL) on Standing Rock Lakota territory. This article takes COIN as an analytic to show that US settler colonialism is a multilateral, internally conflicted, and anxious mode of power. The settler state both depends upon and disavows anti-Indigenous and anti-Black violence enacted by rogue civilian individuals and organizations, a phenomenon here termed 'more-than-state policing'. The repression of #NoDAPL was not solely a boomerang by-product of the global war on terror but rather exposes an established infrastructure of settler colonial COIN intrinsic to US normal politics, in which Indigenous resistance and sovereignty are constructed as metastasizing, viral threats to settler colonial legitimacy. As modern COIN warfare has evolved from four centuries of North American settler colonial invasion and governance, settler colonial studies are key to grasping 21st-century topics of war, imperialism, securitization, resource extraction, and climate justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exacerbation of terrorism in Sahelian West and Central Africa and the presence of foreign legions in aid of counterterrorism has generated research interest in private military companies (PMCs) as legions, including drone legions. This article discusses the French Legion in Mali, PMC Wagner in Central Africa Republic (CAR) and United States (US) drone legions in Sahelian West and Central Africa which is entirely francophone. French Legion disengagements from counterterrorism assignments in Mali and CAR due to increasing operational challenges compounded by policy disagreements with host governments or political disenchantment, also ushered in PMC Wagner, while US drone PMCs provided surveillance and intelligence. The choreography between France's hard-line policy not to negotiate with terrorists and Mali's decision to negotiate with terrorists, points to a gradual development across governmental, non-governmental and military circles home and abroad rather than an overnight policy switch against the French. The consensus going forward is a cautious dialogue with the terrorists. Meanwhile, Wagner incursions across Africa have re-ignited Cold War East–West competition for African alliances. With the proliferation of legion presence, African militaries have become actors in the foreign policy agendas of whichever legions they host, whether French, Russian or American. However, there are no guarantees yet that drone operators would protect drone hosts from terrorist backlash. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its hailing as the 'supreme international crime' during the Nuremberg Trials, aggression has largely been neglected relative to other core international crimes. However, the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War starting in early 2022 is being held as an opportunity to breathe new life into this de facto dormant norm. This article seeks to address novel concerns as to the scope of liability permitted by the crime of aggression, which arise from Russia's enthusiastic use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in this conflict. It first overviews the relevant terminology applicable to the use of private armed personnel. It then asserts the value of pursuing accountability for both aggression and PMSCs. The article continues by evaluating the requirements of aggression's 'leadership element', which seeks to restrict liability to high-level leaders. As an illustrative case study, it applies this to the Wagner Group's military operations in Ukraine. This article confirms that senior corporate officers of PMSCs may, in principle, satisfy the leadership requirement of aggression, opening up the door for their liability and urging closer scrutiny of such matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing usage of mercenaries and proxies by Russia, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf states in ongoing Mediterranean conflicts such as the Libyan and Syrian civil wars highlight the changing state of warfare. It is no longer just about who has the most effective artillery, navy, or fighter jets. Instead, the future of warfare consists of battles fought by mercenaries and proxies, and is now a business too as evidenced by the usage of private military companies (PMCs). While it may initially seem appealing for the United States to use mercenaries and proxies in order to protect its regional interests and influence, there are considerable risks in employing both. Instead, other avenues such as establishing regional partners, implementing security partnerships, and collaborating with allies may be more pragmatic options. Concerns should be raised regarding the evolving forms, trends, and manifestations of mercenary and proxy-related activities around the Mediterranean. These developments, we believe, have contributed to the exacerbation of the aforementioned conflicts and resulted in the Mediterranean becoming the global epicentre of mercenary and proxy warfare. How these intervening countries decide to act moving forward will determine the outcome of the ongoing Mediterranean conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the activities and impact of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military and security company, in the Central African Republic and Mali, within the broader context of Russia's illiberal peacebuilding approach.The article utilizes conceptual frameworks to analyze Russia's unique conflict management strategy and its implications on state sovereignty, as well as exploring the Wagner Group's involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Central African Republic.

The collapse of Western-supported Afghan forces in mid-2021 emphasizes how difficult building whole armies can be. The Liberian experience 2004–2009 holds relevant lessons. After the civil war ended, the US State Department engaged two private military contractors to recreate a new Liberian army from the ashes. But scholarship so far on the Liberian army reconstruction process has been mixed, partially obscuring some of the core truths of the program. On reflection, the reasons for the very mixed results appear to be, first, that the idea of SSR itself is flawed, which is partially why "Security and Justice programming" is rising in prominence—local ownership in such armies is shared upwards through a multi-faceted patronage chain; second, that the Liberian state never had any meaningful history of military professionalism; and that creating an entire army was far more complicated than the usual tasks assigned to private contractors. The complete absence of any experienced leadership in the first months was devastating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Apartheid's Black Soldiers: Un-National Wars and Militaries in Southern Africa, by Lennart Bolliger Lennart Bolliger, I Apartheid's Black Soldiers: Un-National Wars and Militaries in Southern Africa i . Bolliger points out that most of these former soldiers had little formal education and nothing but military skills to sell. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on the perception of Russia's 'return' to Africa through an analysis of field research data from three African states: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, gathered in late 2021. In this article, the authors argue that the Russian 'return' to Africa, which is primarily seen in the provision of security services through the presence of Russian private military companies (PMCs), is perceived positively in West Africa. An important role is played in these perceptions by the Soviet legacy on the continent, which is remembered positively among Africans. Perceptions among the youths surveyed appear significantly influenced by the crisis in relations between West African countries and France, as well as the experience of Russian involvement in the field of securitisation since 2014. The net effect is that Russian engagement in West Africa, and specifically by PMCs, is welcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past, the demand for better security forced states to adopt various private security arrangements, most of which were ad hoc, secret, and temporary. Today, private military and security companies (PMSCs) dominate the security industry, and their international operations reflect growth rather than contraction. This research article does not provide an exhaustive analysis of PMSCs' involvement in counterterrorism but focuses on core aspects of this seminal issue. The article assesses the involvement of private military and security companies in counterterrorism to identify trends, implications for international security, and trajectory. It concludes that further research is needed to compare the role and activities of PMSCs in security and counterterrorism and to compare national legal and regulatory frameworks to find overlaps and parallels for an internationalized regulatory framework and oversight of the private security industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marcus Schulzke's I Twenty-first century military innovation i builds on this literature. The classical military innovation literature analyses how military organizations seek to preserve the utility of their force through doctrinal change. In doing so, Schulzke offers an innovative perspective on military innovation, not focusing on the mechanisms behind its emergence but instead on its wider political and normative implications. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses a book by Alex J. Bellamy that examines the wars of Vladimir Putin's Russia, including conflicts in Georgia, Crimea, the South Caucasus, and Syria. The book explores the toll of these wars, such as the high number of civilian casualties. It also delves into the idea that Putin embodies a mix of nationalism, pride, and imperialism, and how war has shaped his leadership and the social contract in Russia. The article suggests that the book raises questions about whether Putin is a warmongering president or if Russian presidents in general engage in warmongering. [Extracted from the article]

International organisations (IOs) have increasingly resorted to private military and security companies (PMSCs) as providers of armed protection, training, intelligence, and logistics. In this article, we argue that IOs, seeking to reconcile conflicting international norms and member states' growing unwillingness to provide the manpower required for effective crisis management, have decoupled their official policy on and actual use of PMSCs, thereby engaging in organised hypocrisy. Due to its stricter interpretation of norms like the state monopoly of violence, the United Nations (UN) has showcased a more glaring gap between talk and action than the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which display a more pragmatic, but not entirely consistent, approach to the use of PMSCs. By examining the decoupling between UN, EU, and NATO official contractor support doctrines and operational records, this article advances the debate on both security privatisation and organised hypocrisy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990–2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting with the Egyptians in the Ancient Age, almost every empire has tried to make foreign military elements fight on its own behalf. These companies, which appear to be commercial enterprises in theory, but are frequently used in intelligence and secret military operations, have become more known and recognized, especially after the invasion of Iraq by the USA in 2003. Private military company personnel composed of military professionals retired or dismissed from the armed forces. Russia has also tried to use private military companies in order to realize her national security and interests. However, some restrictions originating from the constitution and criminal code of the Russian Federation made that solution difficult. The Russian Constitution and the Russian Penal Code does not allow the establishment of mercenary and private military companies and describe such organizations and activities as illegal. Additionally, the Russian military companies, were late for the international security market because of economic problems and the opposition from the armed forces. In this study, the first period of the establishment of the private military company system, the period between 1999 and 2013, is explained in the chronological method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for the utility of remote warfare as a means of analysing the geopolitics of American primacy. Through the use of new technologies and surrogate forces to address security challenges with a minimal military footprint, remote warfare (re)imposes political distance between the United States and the sites of its military interventions. Its constitutive modalities of intervention range from drones and Special Operations Forces to Private Military Security Companies, security cooperation programmes and emerging technologies associated with Artificial Intelligence. As public support for large-scale overseas interventions has dwindled and strategic competition with China has intensified, remote warfare represents a means of 'retooling' US primacy, which is both a structural condition and a strategic orientation. As a strategic approach to the use of force, remote warfare enables the American state to project military power in a more flexible and sustainable manner. This has supported the maintenance of US primacy as Washington's strategic focus has shifted from counterterrorism towards a renewed emphasis on great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the set of tools that China is using to expand its influence in Kyrgyzstan's security sphere and the relationship of these actions to Russia's traditional role in the region. Through in-depth interviews with experts in the military field, the authors conclude that Beijing is gradually 'maximising power' in relation to Russia, which still occupies a leading position in Central Asia (including education and the supply of weapons), in a manner that is non-aggressive and covert. These actions are reflected in the non-institutionalised nature of China's interactions with countries in the region, which are more beneficial, in contrast, to institutionalised mechanisms. Beijing is betting on its 'safe city' system in Central Asia, which will allow the country to solve its own internal problems (Uyghur separatism, terrorism) while also strengthening Chinese influence in the security sphere by permitting it access to the data of Kyrgyz citizens and by making Kyrgyzstan more financially dependent on China; its educational programs for security service employees in Central Asia, which will, in turn, prepare the ground for the legalisation of the activities of Chinese PMCs (military contractors or 'private military companies'). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of contracts outsourcing military functions to private companies raises serious oversight concerns vis-à-vis regulation and accountability. As the industry is emerging, regulation of these outsourced function is considered weak. While critics predict an unchecked industry, supporters have defended the lack of an adequate accountability mechanism by touting self-regulation as a potential solution. Following this discussion, we examine whether the frequency of contractor violations and legal repercussions within the overall contracting industry differed between those in the burgeoning security-contracting community and those in the traditional contracting community. We utilize a preexisting dataset of American contractors' misconduct to compare military contacting to non-military contracting and military contractors to non-military contractors. Our results indicate that contracting military functions is associated with higher levels of violations and lower levels of legal repercussions, while military contractor companies themselves are not associated with higher levels of violations or legal repercussion. These findings support calls for improved oversight of conflict area's contracting in order to prevent contractors' misconduct with impunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]